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Figure 1: Figure-ground reversal: the face-vase illusion (original design by Edgar Rubin).  
Ian E. Gordon, Theories of Visual Perception (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1989) 53. 
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 PART 1: THE ECOLOGY OF THE IMAGE 
 
 
…no denser or more tacit form of communication, no 
shaping or organising force more comprehensive or 
more insidiously embedded in our lifeworld than 
images. They make up the true lingua franca of 
commerce, politics, and psyche; they are the 
‘cloaking devices’ par excellence of the human social 
world. (Sanford Kwinter)1  
 
One must see, at first sight, what does not let itself be 
seen.  And this is invisibility itself.  For what first 
sight misses is the invisible.  The flaw, the error of 
first sight is to see, and to not notice the invisible. 
(Jacques Derrida)2
 
…nothing seems more important than to debate the 
ecological role and character of images. (Andrew 
Ross)3
 
 Don’t worry sweetheart — it’s just a movie. (Anon) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
SNAP SHOT: AN ACCIDENT IN SLOW MOTION4
I am sitting in a Holden car designed in 1966, travelling down a highway 
on an extremely hot day at fifty miles per hour. The luxurious design of the 
interior (beautifully preserved by the car’s owner) speaks of a familiar car 
culture even though the detailing has changed. Something is, nonetheless, 
                                                 
1 Sanford Kwinter in his introduction to Bruce Mau, Life Style (London: Phaidon, 2000) 36. 
2 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994) 149-50. 
3 Andrew Ross, “The Ecology of Images”, The South Atlantic Quarterly 91:1 (Duke University 
Press, 1992): 219. 
4 Hajer after Roqueplo describes ecological damage as ‘an accident in slow motion’, a gradual 
process of incremental change rather than a clearly identifiable event. I am here borrowing this idea 
to make a point about the ecology of design, which is, as shall be seen, not other to biophysical 
ecology. Maarten Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernisation and 
the Policy Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 21. 
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out of place, and it has to do with what I can sense but can’t see: the air. 
The windows are open and air is circling around the car in a gentle and 
starkly unfamiliar way. Then I realise what is affording me this experience: 
the quarter-vent or ‘butterfly’ windows. These small, metal rimmed, 
triangular windows form part of a dual window design that has almost 
completely disappeared from cars, due partly to developments in 
manufacturing and to rising car theft. Yet the opened windows 
simultaneously circumvent the need for air-conditioning by gently 
directing the flow of air into and out of the car and allow me to keep in 
touch the environment I am speeding through, an experience that has also 
almost completely disappeared from driving today. The butterfly windows 
reveal the design of the modern car — with its ozone depleting air-
conditioning, toxic upholstery, air-fresheners, growing range of safety, 
security, entertainment and orientation features, and of course tinted, all-in-
one windows (which, opened at speed, produce a fierce, deafening wall of 
air) — as a form of designed environmental ignorance. 
 
The role of the image in shaping a product like the car is paramount. The car is a 
designed assemblage that forces together materials, industry, human being, culture 
and environment. Yet through the collusion of image and design, the car is 
extricated from these conditioning relations and has come to embody instead the 
Western dream of emancipatory thought. It is as though with an engineered-for-
satisfaction whoomph of the car door, Descartes’ mind body split is made material. 
And in spite of the insistence of the material world in its visceral collisions with 
this dream, the car is increasingly designed to behave as though it were operating 
in an artificially resilient, consequence-free televisual domain, disarticulated from 
material constraints — endlessly tracing open trajectories over the world as res 
extensa.  
 4
The car is an extremely significant object in the technologically ‘liberated’ 
democracy of our culture.5  It sits in an anxious place between ideas and their 
material effects: it is an object of desire and fear, trust and betrayal, success and 
failure. When people feel good, they buy cars and the economists project a secure 
world. Likewise historically, nations have employed a car industry to proclaim 
themselves to the world as modernised.  
The confrontation between the industries producing and promoting cars 
and those whose job it is to manage the material impacts left in its wake, can be 
reconceived as a debate about this erroneous idealism of the car. The influence of 
promotional images on real driving habits, particularly speeding, has been a 
particularly ‘hot’ topic. While for many it feels as though there just is an obvious 
connection between the promotional image and the actual conduct of car users, 
this connection cannot be made with the available mechanisms of proof, much to 
the delight no doubt, of every Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries. If there 
is a connection, it is clearly a transfigurative event, but it is one that cannot be 
presented.  
The terms of the debate change, however, if a consideration of the agency 
of design takes precedence over the individual culpability of car users.6 The car is 
a designed thing that, as it “worlds” — and here we use the Heideggerean 
understanding of a world as a coherent and distinct context opened by the designed 
machine — is both sign and world.7 In the world of the car, a space radically 
disarticulated from the outside environment is delivered, and desire is shaped.  
                                                 
5 For Albert Borgmann, technology’s cultural power resides in its actualisation of ‘liberal 
democracy’. Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 92. We take up Borgmann’s work in Part 4. 
6 Ulrich Beck points out that the horror of mass deaths on the road has been normalised socially 
because it is ostensibly a matter of people’s free choice to drive or not, and traffic accidents are 
therefore perceived as events of individual culpability. Ulrich Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age 
of Risk, trans. Amos Weisz (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 165. 
7 Martin Heidegger turns ‘world’ into a verb: the “world worlds”. This names the ongoingness of 
world making in relation to being. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Poetry, 
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1975) 44. Hubert Dreyfus 
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The car has become the ultimate icon of the linear force of consumerism as 
well as of its systemic blindness. In its endless negotiation of parameters of safety, 
speed, security, comfort and style, the car continues to arrive as the latest 
perfection of a utopian, streamlined future. This scenario is ever ironic: in the 
recent promotion of a vehicle that is environmentally benign, for example, 
industry in fact is merely creating and meeting the demands of a niche market for a 
machine that in the context of the world it has helped create, will never be benign.  
It is not surprising that the centrepiece of the permanent design exhibition 
at the Powerhouse Museum in Sydney entitled Ecologic: Creating a Sustainable 
Future is a ‘parallel-hybrid’ vehicle called the ECOmmodore — the result of a 
collaborative effort between Holden and CSIRO that boasts a conventional and 
electric engine.8 The car is attended by a video that demonstrates, in luxurious 
images, the ‘beautiful’ transparency of technology’s sustainability crusade. Not 
only does the car look like a conventional Commodore, one might also say the will 
of the car remains intact.9 The technology makes sure that performance is not 
sacrificed and you can continue to drive as usual. Your driving dictates the 
imperceptible switch between, or utilises the combined power of, the conventional 
engine and electric motor. Where once the exhaust belched modernity — 
                                                                                                                                      
and Charles Spinosa aptly explain the process of world making: “According to Heidegger our 
nature is to be world disclosers. That is, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices we 
human beings open coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, act, and think. Each 
such world makes possible a distinct and pervasive way in which things, people, and selves can 
appear and in which certain ways of acting make sense.” In Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Highway 
Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology”, After 
Postmodernism conference, 1997. Last Accessed August 30, 2004.  
<http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_highway.html>.  
8 The ‘parallel-hybrid’ is an electrically assisted mechanical power train that has an electric motor 
generator and an internal combustion power source. It is conceived as an interim design on the way 
toward a mechanically assisted electric power-train called a series hybrid, which in turn will be 
followed by a fully electric power train: the fuel cell. There are other parallel hybrid cars available; 
Toyota’s Prius (Latin for ‘to go before’) and Honda’s ‘Insight’ have both been heavily marketed.  
9 “Technology is without a directing human subject. It now exists and functions independently of 
any subject’s overall direction. This is to say that technology has taken on a ‘life’ of its own. It has 
become something to react to, rather than direct…technologies have been designed with an 
embodied ‘will’ of their own that designs the users’ and the technicians’ relation to them.” Tony 
Fry, A New Design Philosophy: an introduction to defuturing (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999) 33. 
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modernity’s dark side — it will now produce, it seems, modernity’s fume-free 
salvation.10
‘We’ live in a world where it appears that everything hinges on productive 
capacity.11 This cannot be shut down, even where material abundance of goods far 
exceeds our ability to consume them. Value can only be maintained through 
systematic forms of semiotic reconfiguration, a task that is largely carried out by 
the “manifest discourse” of the televisual image.12 The role of the image in 
consumer culture is not merely to represent things or even simulate them. It is to 
sustain growth without consequence.13 The image clears the way for productivism; 
it makes things appear and disappear and it makes us remember and forget. It does 
this, with much success and vigour, by semiotically reconfiguring what is 
significant in our experience of and with designed things. Yet the ecological 
irritation produced by the semiotic manipulation of material things and 
environments shows up the short-sightedness of such productivism. There is, for 
example, the after-image of the material refuse of dead and abandoned 
technologies; the growing, unpredictable ‘hertzian’ environment of 
electromagnetic radiation; toxins that refuse to acknowledge either object, body, 
legislative or national boundaries.14 A careful elaboration of this situation will 
                                                 
10 This idea is not yet a reality. While standing alone the fuel cell could be said to produce zero 
emissions, the technology depends upon obtaining pure hydrogen from processes that are still 
predominantly petroleum based.  
11 The ‘we’ of this thesis in the most general sense is the ‘we’ who live within the cultural orbit of 
the televisual. Both the reader and myself are implicated by the pronoun, which also marks the 
journey of participation that reading and writing entails. More specifically, the reader will find that 
the ‘we’ changes slightly according to the disciplinary focus of each of its four parts.  
12This useful characterisation of the image comes from Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: 
Myths and Structures (London: Sage/TCS, 1998) 124. 
13 Baudrillard refers to the productivist tendency in consumer society toward the “homeopathic 
treatment of growth with growth.” This observation dates to 1970, yet it is all the more important 
now in a world in which we increasingly “live off signs and under the protection of signs”. 
Baudrillard, The Consumer Society 33-9. 
14 Dutch research shows that polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs) and polybrominated diphenyl 
ethers (PBDs), toxic chemicals used as flame-retardants in millions of computers and televisions, 
can damage an organism’s nervous and reproductive systems. A New Scientist article reported that 
these chemicals were excluded from a UN ban on certain chemical pollutants because there was no 
evidence that they spread beyond national boundaries. However they have since been found in the 
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reveal the ecological carelessness of designed things and the need for product 
makers and users to develop a literacy that can create and project links between 
images, objects and broader social, cultural and physical conditions.  
The question concerning the image in this thesis is not one of its fidelity 
but of its materiality. What can be learnt about the cultural disposition and material 
propensity of designed things if we consider the image to be integral to their 
designing, vitally and relationally involved in what and how they are? In what 
follows, we reveal the ecological nature and agency of the image and draw out the 
implications for cultural intervention and change from the worldly initiative we 
discover.      
   
*** 
 
Drawing evidence from the everyday environments and objects of design, this 
thesis argues that images are powerful conceptual forms that actualise new 
relations between ideas, human actions and material conditions. Images assemble 
disparate, decontextualised elements, which are deprived of spatio-temporal and 
sensory complexity. Nonetheless, images go on to have a life of their own as they 
interact with minds, bodies and environments.  
As televisual technologies have developed and expanded, images have 
grown in ecological significance. The ecology of the image is fast becoming our 
first ecology — emerging from the horizon of our seeing and knowing — an 
organising framework for all other ecologies. Whilst the implications of this 
ecology cannot be fully or finally apprehended, the unsustainability of so many of 
                                                                                                                                      
tissue of sperm whales in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Debora MacKenzie, “Still at Large: 
PCB’s dangerous cousins have slipped through the UN’s net”, New Scientist 159.2141(1998): 6. A 
bibliography of up-to-date research on the issue of the lifecycles of persistent organic pollutants is 
presented in A. J. S Rayl “Pollutants without Borders”, The Scientist 2 Sept. 2002 <www.the-
scientist.com>. 
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our designed environments bear witness to a highly problematic evolution that 
deserves urgent and significant attention from a design perspective.15
This thesis presumes that many of our practices of world-building are 
unsustainable. Unsustainability is characterised here not in the negative, as the 
binary opposite to sustainability, but as the means of achieving sustainability — it 
is the observable problem that can be grasped on the way to better understanding 
what we need to sustain ourselves and that upon which we depend. The disjuncture 
between ecological impacts that show up in our environments and the unrevised 
perpetuation of the conditions that cause them, indicates that our ability to make 
connections between actions and material conditions is wanting. We argue that the 
world of designed, fully–integrated and manipulable products that we do see — 
products like the car — also manifest a profound inability to perceive causal 
relations. This lack of relational ability is implicitly shared between people and 
can thus be considered a ‘cultural’ norm.16  
Sustainability, on the other hand, is a “greenfield site”, a landscape to be 
invented.17  Since 1987 and the publication of the Brundtland Report, this site has 
been quickly filled in and there is now considerable satisfaction around the 
                                                 
15 My project arrived out of working at the EcoDesign Foundation, which Tony Fry and Anne-
Marie Willis founded in 1991 and served as Directors until 2001, and where I worked from 1996 to 
2002. During this time, the theories of the ecology of the image, the televisual and ontological 
design, were shared, lived and worked with. Fry has written extensively on the televisual and the 
theory of the ecology of the image, and sign-posts the need for this ongoing, collaborative attention 
when he writes: “the material consequences of the image ecologies that sustain and drive the 
productivism of the televisual have hardly begun to be recognised.” Fry, A New Design Philosophy 
272.  
16 We take ‘culture’ to refer to what is manifestly and potentially shared between people, including 
ideas, values, things and experiences. In his thoughtful book on consumption and material culture, 
Daniel Miller highlights the significance of sharing and the shared in ‘culture’. He writes “culture 
is always a process and is never reducible to either its object or subject form. For this reason, 
evaluation should always be of a dynamic relationship, never of mere things.” Daniel Miller, 
Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 11. As 
the thesis unfolds it will become clear that designed products are never considered to be  ‘mere 
things’. We take up the question of the referent ‘culture’ further in Part 3. 
17 “The ecological imagery, its schemata, its scripts are developed on a greenfield site, so to speak, 
they form a terrain that is not yet occupied.” Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media, 
trans. Kathleen Cross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000) 111–13. 
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meaning and presence of ecological sustainability, particularly in economic 
terms.18 Post-Brundtland, the nomination of sustainability often functions as a way 
to assure the business-as-usual growth of the product world. Hitched to the 
monolithic and abstract notion of global economic development, sustainability is 
the symbolic bridge coupling materially intensive Western standards of living and 
their technological means, to human need. Our position is that this situation is 
intrinsically unsustainable, and is evidence of what Ezio Manzini calls “product-
based well-being” — a perception of quality of life that is linked to the acquisition 
of material products.19 The nomination of unsustainability as a way toward 
sustainability is meant to draw attention to design’s role in this situation and to 
expose the challenge of designing otherwise. In order to develop the ability to 
sustain, there is a need to critically reflect upon the worlds that design has given us 
and the shape of the futures that design brings into being — to ask: what does 
design design?  
The theoretical framework and methodology employed by this thesis is 
provided by the established though recently named theory of ontological design.20 
                                                 
18 In 1987, the appointed Chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, commissioned what is now commonly referred to as ‘the Brundtland 
Report’: Our Common Future. This report brought sustainability into line as a qualifier of global 
industrial development and has had a powerful role in shaping the meaning and application of the 
term since then. The most widely quoted phrase from the report is “Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 43. Many have pointed 
out that this definition fails to distinguish between ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ and therefore avoids the 
problem of their inextricable entanglement in consumer culture. 
19 Ezio Manzini, “Scenarios of Sustainable Wellbeing”, Design Philosophy Papers Collection One, 
ed. Anne-Marie Willis (Ravensbourne: Team DES, 2004). 
20 Ontological design is a practical theory based on the thought of Martin Heidegger and Hans-
Georg Gadamer. It is elaborated in Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores, Understanding 
Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design (New Jersey: Ablex, 1987); Tony Fry, 
Remakings: Ecology Design Philosophy (Sydney: Envirobook, 1994); Tony Fry, A New Design 
Philosophy: an introduction to defuturing and Anne-Marie Willis, “Redirective Practice: 
Ontological Designing” a paper presented at the Design Cultures conference, Sheffield-Hallam 
University in 1999. In addition, the EcoDesign Foundation has put ontological design into 
everyday practice in its design research, education and consultancy activities. The ontological 
design context for the ecology of the image will be elaborated below in Chapter 1. 
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Ontological design takes after Martin Heidegger’s inversion of Descartes’ cogito 
“…the first statement is ‘sum’, in the sense of I-am-in-the-world. As such a being, 
‘I am’ in the possibility of being toward various modes of behaviour (cogitationes) 
as ways of being together with inner worldly beings.”21 For Heidegger, human 
beings are always already in the midst of and in relationship to things. Ontological 
design is a practical theory that with hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to 
understand the production of materiality (images, objects, infrastructures) in 
relation to the ontological continuity of mind, body and environment. It calls to 
presence the always already dynamic nature of the process of human making, in 
which the things we make are always more than themselves, have implications 
beyond themselves and are disposed to behave in particular ways toward and away 
from humans, as they make their way in the world. In this frame of interpretation 
designed things perpetually travel between cultural histories and futures. They are 
always relational and the environment is alive with design intention — human and 
non-human. Yet we do not encounter this dynamism, the things of the world 
appear to us to stay in place. 
Our key example of an ecology of the image is the ‘televisual.’ 22 The 
televisual helps us to explore both the apparently impassive and inert nature of 
things that our seeing sees and the ecological relationality that undoes it. Many 
have thought about the socio-cultural impacts of television and the media more 
generally. In this thesis the televisual is explored from the perspective of 
ontological design as a particular kind of operation that has profound ontological 
and ecological implications. The televisual, constituted and generated by all forms 
of mass media, is the designed thing plus its designing milieu. It is both the object 
that provides the primary locus of our everyday engagement with images, and “a 
                                                 
21 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996) 195. 
22 The idea of the televisual is first elaborated in Tony Fry, ed., RUA TV? Heidegger and the 
Televisual (Sydney: Power Publications, 1993). 
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medium that has escaped from itself”.23 This medium is not a mere means of 
transmission, but the imposition of “new modes of relating and perceiving.”24 The 
televisual image throws forward into the world not simply cultural models, but in 
Marshall McLuhan’s evocative words, actual “tactile promptings” for configuring 
mind, body and environment. 25 The televisual has fundamentally reshaped the art 
of society and has become a significant instructive feature of our environments. 
With the theory of ontological design, television will be developed as materially 
and symbolically radiant, a thing that informs our memories, our bodies, our 
perceptions, and our actions, in a way that extends and contextualises the critique 
of the television as a medium of socio-cultural reflection. The televisual asserts the 
persistent authority of representation by bringing the world to presence as an 
object of recognition, and in so doing shapes who we are and the worlds that we 
build.26  
In 1938 Heidegger wrote the essay “The Age of the World Picture” which 
considers the status of our modern world in the age of calculative reason where 
everything can be seen or is on the verge of being seen. He indicated the 
ontological sway of the image when he wrote that “the fundamental event of the 
modern age is the conquest of the world as picture…the structured image [Gebild] 
that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before.”27 The 
world picture does not merely imply a picture of the referent ‘world’, but refers 
instead to the manner in which the world is fundamentally and thus normatively 
                                                 
23 Fry, RUA TV? 24. 
24 Baudrillard, The Consumer Society 123. 
25 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: the extensions of man (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1967) 316. 
26 This assertion rests upon a diverse body of work expanding upon Martin Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics of technology, most explicitly in Fry RUATV? and Winograd and Flores 
Understanding Computers and Cognition. Don Ihde explores the technological mediation of 
perception in Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).  
27Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” The Question Concerning Technology and 
other essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977) 134. Lovitt explains that 
this essay was originally presented as a lecture in 1938. 
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conceived and interpreted. Thus the image in Heidegger belongs to the thought of 
representation and becomes its “most visible outgrowth.”28  
While Heidegger did not explicitly comment on television until 1950, the 
world picture prefigured his theoretical concern with the medium in which 
metaphysics and technoculture converge.29 In “The Age of the World Picture” 
representation is both a system within which being is implicated, and the bodying-
forth of the system.30 This understanding of representation as a fundamental, 
ongoing, structuring event of the modern age, is a powerful interpretation and a 
fruitful proposition for considering the image in an operational frame. Heidegger 
reveals that images are not just representations but are ontological interventions 
into the modern world. In spite of all the contemporary discourse on the media, 
these insights still have much to teach us about the designing power of the image 
and the telegenic attitude of our practices of world-building.31  
A wealth of philosophical thought tells us that representation is a problem 
and “dominant generality” in modern times.32 As a philosophical conflation of 
knowledge, truth and visual acuity, representation has, according to Heidegger, 
become normative and self-evident, instrumentally learnt and unproblematically 
                                                 
28 Heidegger here refers to autonomous machine technology as ‘the most visible outgrowth’ of the 
essence of modern technology. In this thesis, we connect the image to the designing of the 
autonomous machine. Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 116. 
29 Fry RUATV? 12. Heidegger discusses the ontological significance of television in “The Thing” 
remarking that “(t)he peak of (the) abolition of every possible remoteness is reached by television, 
which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication.” Martin 
Heidegger, “The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 165. The relation between Heidegger, design 
and the televisual is explored in Part 2. 
30 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 141. 
31 Michel Foucault describes the Enlightenment as a condition or attitude, rather than just an epoch 
or historically contained era. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The 
Foucault Reader (London: Penguin Books, 1984). 
32 Jacques Derrida, “Sending: On Representation,” Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: from 
Nietzsche to Nancy, eds. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1990) 118. Samuel Weber indicates that Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Roland 
Barthes, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Francois Lyotard form a group of key thinkers who 
have explored the problematic of representation in Western thought. Whilst I refer to the work of 
some of these thinkers, I focus primarily on Martin Heidegger’s thought on representation, which 
 13
applied. Yet at the same time, this embeddedness makes representation impossible 
to track down. Jacques Derrida says: “(T)he authority of representation constrains 
us, imposing itself on our thought through a whole dense, enigmatic, and heavily 
stratified history. It programs us and precedes us and warns us too severely for us 
to make a mere object of it, a representation, an object of representation 
confronting us, before us like a theme.”33  
After Heidegger, representation is epochal but also operational: a 
calculative impulse. Representation names the move of bringing something to 
stand as object in relation to oneself and also the object that is thus set in place.34 
Representation’s internal logic is projected before it, structuring and preparing the 
ground of interpretation. It opens a self-certain space in which objects can move, 
resonate and be verified. Yet the logic of representation generates distinctive 
issues in every placing of objects, issues moreover that it has increasingly failed to 
explain or accommodate. While the televisual world picture continually affirms 
representation’s ‘restricted’ and self-evident economy of form in the space of the 
everyday, the relational indifference that it normalises has its own unrepresentable 
influence on being in the world.35  
The failure of representation to respond to the differences that it generates 
is not a matter of insufficiency. The televisually assembled world does not simply 
leave some thing out of the picture, nor does it cast an illusory veil over the world, 
                                                                                                                                      
has in various ways influenced the thinkers referred to above. Samuel Weber, Mass Mediauras: 
form, technics, media, ed. Alan Cholodenko (Sydney: Power Publications, 1996) 55. 
33 Derrida, “Sending: On Representation” 114. 
34 “To represent” says Heidegger, is “to set out before oneself and to set forth in relation to 
oneself.” Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 132.  
35 Georges Bataille posited a distinction between the ‘restricted economy’ of limited monetary 
exchange based on scarcity economics and the ‘general economy’ of the totality of exchange 
generated by the excessive, energetic ‘gift’: the sun. The restricted economy is conceived as a 
reduction, representation and organisation of the second, which composes its vital setting. Georges 
Bataille, The Accursed Share: an Essay on the General Economy, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Zone Books, 1988). Following on from Bataille, Fry posits a broader economy — the aeonic — as 
it opens onto a non-anthropocentric ecological system of exchange, neither containable nor 
knowable. The ‘aeonic economy’ simulates the unnameable totality, the relational ‘sum’ of this 
reality of human and non-human exchanges. Fry, Remakings 161. 
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though critique often falls into the trap of attenuating both the image and its 
effects, as we shall see. Similarly, the image does not simply brand the world, like 
the impression left by a stamp. These conceptions of the influence of the image 
return us to the problem of representation’s calculative impulse. What can be 
shown to be the work of the image and how can its effects be calculated? In 
essence, we argue that the televisual is one of the key means by which being is 
directed, that is, forced into being. 
The image is both consensual and potent. It intervenes in the world, 
transgressing its constraining media, animating ecologies beyond itself. The 
screened objects that immobilise and orient people in private and public, 
regenerate these ecological relations. More than what André Bazin called “the 
instrumentality of a non-living agent,”36 the televisual image is a human-designed, 
non-human thing acting both in and on the world and producing material impacts 
both within and beyond human experience. This is not to say that these impacts are 
no longer of the result of human design. Man as animal rationale has created a 
world in which no thing remains untouched by anthropocentric intention.37 In the 
words of Augustin Berque “the space of human territory has a physical and 
measurable dimension, but it always deploys itself beyond that dimension.”38 
Following Heidegger’s proposal, the worlding of the world picture gathers and 
mobilises ways of being and structurally inscribes material forms. It is this agency 
of the image, as both a form and force of designing, that the ecology of the image 
names and seeks to bring to presence.  
As this force, the image makes new relations but is structurally incapable 
of recognising them. This operation is particularly significant in the context of 
unsustainability of productivism. In this thesis, productivism refers to the 
                                                 
36 Bazin quoted in Philip Hayward and Tana Wollen, eds., Future Visions: New Technologies of the 
Screen (London: British Film Institute, 1993) 1. 
37 As Fry puts it, “‘man’ has created an instrumental world that structurally inscribes the 
anthropocentric in material forms” Fry, A New Design Philosophy 228. 
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‘autopoiesis’ of product-generating structures, including the industrial and 
televisual.39 It is, we argue, sustained as much by the representational/televisual 
logic that is shared, exchanged and lived, as it is by the ostensible political and 
economic configurations of the global product market. 
Inducted into the logic of representation, we do not bear witness to the 
ecology of the image. What we commonly recognise as environmental problems 
for example — problems ostensibly experienced by the natural world — are 
themselves designed appearances of a particular form, location and time. 
Environmental crises — which as Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann observe, are 
crises on this side of industrial society — are not of the environment per se. The 
overarching ecological crisis — the “crisis of crisis” — is the foreclosure of our 
ability to perceive relations, which is sustained by the productivism of the 
televisual.40  
My contention is that the image needs to be considered in terms of this 
self-concealing productivist ability to not only make things appear or produce 
meaning, to return or “restore for the second time to presence”,41 but to bring 
relations into being for the first time. The image that asserts the possibility of 
bringing whole things frontally and indifferently before one “as a manifestness of 
                                                                                                                                      
38 Augustin Berque “Ecumenal Ethics” lecture given at the Faculty of Architecture, University of 
Melbourne, 15th July 1997. 
39 Here we follow Niklas Luhmann’s understanding of autopoeisis derived from ‘theoretical 
biologists’ Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (see Autopoiesis and Cognition: the 
realization of the living [Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1980]). Luhmann’s translator 
John Bednarz Jnr, tells us that autopoiesis “capture(s) the unique capacity of living systems to 
maintain their autonomy and unity through their very own operations.” Maturana and Varela 
worked out a model for a dynamic autopoietic system “that was both closed (organizationally) and 
(structurally) open at the same time.” For Luhmann, the concept of autopoiesis can be mobilised to 
analyse the social system when the elements of the system are understood as communicative events 
rather than individuals. Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication, trans. John Bednarz Jnr 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) xi.  
40 The crisis of crisis indicates a crisis not of the environment, but of the perception of environment 
and its limits. See Fry, A New Design Philosophy 130; 244.  
41 Derrida, “Sending: On Representation” 117. 
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beings as such as a whole”,42 is a product of the mode of thinking that denies the 
need to even interrogate the designing power of images because they are just 
fleshless copies. The image can show what it likes because it is essentially no 
thing; at the same time it secures and sustains the production of objects. By 
reading the televisual as an environment and an ontological domain, the 
relationality that the televisual image renders inconsequential, becomes legible and 
significant. This thesis proposes that the material entities of the product world and 
their contexts of use, make this designing of the image sensible.  
This is not to say that we can account for all of the openings and effects 
generated by images, nor that all of these effects are ecologically harmful. Content 
analyses have, for example, provided a rich critical sounding board for the cultural 
influence of the growing image environment. We do argue, however, that the 
practical consequences of the image override content as content. Content of the 
image becomes content of the world. It is generative material turned out toward 
the world. Screened images are already beyond the screen, prefigured in mind, 
memory or thing. This is not to say that content analysis has no place. Rather that 
the image, as content of the world, “opens a dimension that can never again be 
closed.”43  
The ecology of the image is thus identified as a far-reaching problem that 
touches on an extensive history of philosophical ideas on being, perception, 
making, and the reifying powers of the Western metaphysical tradition. The 
critical practice of deconstruction that Jacques Derrida has applied to Western 
metaphysics informs ontological design, particularly as Heidegger prefigured it.44 
                                                 
42 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995) 304. 
43 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1995) 151. 
44 The insights of deconstruction inform the research approach of ontological design. Here we 
might signpost Fry’s explanation of defuturing as ‘a learnt act of critical deconstructive reading’: 
“the deconstructive move is accompanied by a reconstructive one, with the re-assembled forming a 
new pattern.”… “(E)mbracing defuturing means confronting and removing the authority of the 
foundations of thought, upon which the narratives of the like of ‘world’, ‘future’, ‘production’ and 
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While intuitive and sometimes explicit use is made of his work,45 I do not retrace 
or review the ground established in a significant body of philosophical literature 
inquiring into the metaphysics of presence and the ocularcentrism of Western 
thought.46 The present project is an inquiry into the operation and material 
consequences of the ecology of the image and, as such, focuses on design’s work: 
the design(ing) of ‘the things themselves’.47 Following the approach of Terry 
Winograd and Fernando Flores, I listen to this literature for the relevance it has to 
my own considerations of the hegemony of the image in the phenomenal world.48  
In the fields of media and cultural studies there is an extensive body of 
work that is similarly important in exploring cultural life of images, particularly as 
it foregrounds the proposal that we increasingly live in meaningful immaterial 
spaces. The seminal work of Marshall McLuhan, which made an object of the 
media’s transformative and prefigurative agency, needs acknowledgement. 
McLuhan speaks of the media in a highly designerly way, as a natural resource for 
extending human experience.49 McLuhan’s somewhat apolitical critique is 
developed by continental philosophy, particularly in the work of Jean Baudrillard, 
which is addressed in Part 3. In more recent media theory, sophisticated debates 
                                                                                                                                      
‘progress’ stand — this in order to make things otherwise.” (My emphasis). A New Design 
Philosophy 2-3; 11.   
45 Derrida’s post-Heideggerean putting of things and signs under erasure, his critique of the 
restricted writing of structuralism in the theory of ‘general writing’ and the hinge-like, ambiguous 
play of différance (defers-differs [diffère]) all inform the way I explore the image in this thesis. I 
have drawn particularly on the first part of Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) in relation to sign theory, and 
Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) in terms of 
the undecideability of forms. One can also hear Derrida’s play of differences in a recurring motif in 
this thesis — Gregory Bateson’s understanding of the idea as a difference that makes a difference 
(discussed in Chapter 2 of this Part).  
46 A key survey of recent ideas in relation to the proposal that the modern world is characterised by 
an ocularcentric tendency is David Michael Levin, ed., Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).  
47I refer here to Edmund Husserl’s famous phenomenological dictum from Logical Investigations 
(1900-1901): “now let us turn to the things themselves.”  
48 This practical disposition in relation to ideas is explained in Winograd and Flores, 
Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design 9. 
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regarding the vitality and cultural power of the sign have gone well beyond the 
‘numbing’ effects of the media.50 However, in such texts interpretations about 
media images are predominantly circumscribed by their identity as (electronic and 
print) media, which also places constraints on the possibility of the phenomenal 
analysis I pursue here. It is interesting that when the image does escape into the 
world it is often described in terms of a literal projection, the metaphysical image 
made physical, as in a hyperreal environment, which also abides by the constraints 
of identity.51
Theorisations of the image are often unreadable cross-culturally, which 
keeps the diagnoses of the cultural power of the image a secret from the scientific 
disciplines in which image-based practices are becoming increasingly 
significant.52  Such theorisations are important beyond their identified disciplinary 
contexts and need to find ways to transcend these contexts since the image has 
itself transcended them. The analytical skills developed in the disciplines of 
cultural theory, for example, which reserves the right and the authority to speak of 
and on behalf of the image, do not tend to make a difference in the real world 
discourses of science and ecology (which completely efface the significance of 
their own image-making practices as we shall see). So in spite of the weight of 
                                                                                                                                      
49“Any extension, whether of skin, hand, or foot, affects the whole psychic and social complex.” McLuhan, 
Understanding Media: the extensions of man 4.  
50 Mckenzie Wark’s proposal after Paul Virilio that the media are not representational but are rather 
vector-like trajectories, suggests that the media have a significant constitutive agency in relation to 
economic and political reality. However I think a more relational comprehension of this 
displacement is enabled by a design approach, as it breaks free of a critical circling of the media 
‘object’. See Mckenzie Wark, Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
51 Identifying these literal projections has become a popular task in cultural theory. The Disney 
planned community of Celebration in Florida, for example, is displayed as evidence of the growing 
‘regime of the image’ by both Zone Books designer Bruce Mau and journalist author Naomi Klein. 
We discuss this understanding of how the image gets into the world further in Part 3 in relation to 
strategies of visual politics. 
52 The cultural productions of instrumental disciplines has been identified in much cross-
disciplinary work, a striking example of which is Catherine Vasseleau’s essay on the designing 
power of medical imaging technologies, “Life Itself” in Cartographies: poststructuralism and the 
mapping of bodies and spaces, eds. Rosalyn Diprose and Robyn Ferrell (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 
1991).  
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discourse on the image, there is a sense in which the relentless business of the 
image that Sanford Kwinter refers to in our opening quotation, continues 
unchecked by critical interpretation.  
In industrial design discourse — the science-based discourse of products 
— a critical theory of the image struggles to emerge in the environment of 
computer-aided design, theatrically perfect industrial graphics, software driven 
prototypes, expanded polystyrene models and client-driven design management. 
The presence and transformational power of the image is vital in the practice of 
industrial design, but the image is seen as merely instrumental to the design 
process.  
Thus whether the image is the object or the way toward the object, the 
image considered in terms of its own designing agency and generative, world-
building power— particularly as it informs late modern styles of life— escapes 
adequate disciplinary engagement.  
There is, however, a general cultural idea of the image and its worldly 
effects, which is in concert with the self-concealing characteristic of images. This 
idea is one of de-realisation: “images”, Susan Sontag tells us, “consume reality”.53 
Images work to conceal the world’s true depths. This idea is predicated on the 
Platonic notion of the depreciated reality of the copy, which in modern times has 
become technologically enhanced. In this thesis we identify a cross-disciplinary 
tendency to unproblematically perpetuate this idea, which suggests that image and 
world are of irreducibly different ‘stuff’. However, in closing off the reality of 
images, an adequate critical response to the ecology of images is also denied. The 
polarised responses to advancements in technologies of tele-presence provide an 
example. On the one hand, there is an extreme enthusiasm about the idea of 
leaving the material world and its constraints, including our lived bodies, behind. 
On the other, is the fear that when we finally can tele-immerse, we will live in our 
                                                 
53 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977) 179. 
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heads, forget about the real world, stop interacting with other embodied beings and 
the like.54  What is contentious in this example are not these ontological effects. 
Rather, it is the manner in which they are thought, the revision of the world in 
terms of the idea of the image. As the image gains control, the cost, it seems, will 
be the wholesomeness of the world and of life within it.55  
My argument seeks to account for these effects in an alternative way. The 
image does not deplete the world’s substance. Rather, it secures a mode of valuing. 
It is a mode of valuing that Heidegger points to when he writes that in the pursuit 
of truth, “the openness of beings gets flattened out into the apparent nothingness of 
what is no longer even a matter of indifference, but rather is simply forgotten.”56  
The persistent ascription of an illusory nature to the image and thus of a 
cleavage between image and world contributes to the foreclosure of a relational 
approach. From this perspective, the agency of the televisual does not dissipate in 
the “sedative consumption” of images.57 Rather, such narcissistic effects suggest 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of telepresence and its cultural implications, see Hubert L. Dreyfus, On the 
Internet (London, Routledge, 2001). 
55 Daniel Boorstin’s position, for example, is that the image refuses the world. There is something 
inherently contrived and ‘pseudo’ about the image that the ‘spontaneity’ of reality must be 
extricated from. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo Events in America (New York: Atheneum, 1975). 
See also Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (London: Abacus, 1980). Others who hold a 
similar position are discussed throughout this thesis. The work of Albert Borgmann, who draws on 
Boorstin and for whom the image represents the ultimate attenuation of the world, is discussed in 
Part 4. The critical perpetuation of a ‘sign-world’ rift is not the preserve of theory. It is also 
perpetuated by the techno-cultural discourse of images themselves.  In the Steven Spielberg 
directed film Minority Report, (Twentieth Century Fox and Dreamworks, 2002) there is a 
memorable icon that simulates this mythic nature of images. A man in profile confronts a 
holographic image of a woman, also in profile. The image is of a presence constrained by filaments 
of light pulling ‘it’ back into the flat projection and equally by its belonging to a recorded past. 
56 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,”trans. John Sallis, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 147. 
57 The idea of ‘sedative consumption’ comes from Felix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, trans. Ian 
Pindar and Paul Sutton (London and New Jersey: The Athlone Press, 2000) 41-2. The Greek tale of 
Narcissus, who wastes away before his beloved reflection, has often been called upon in relation to 
the ‘consumption’ of images. See Boorstin The Image: A guide to pseudo-events in America 157. 
David Michael Levin reads narcissistic character disorders as a consequence of the ‘metaphysical 
ego’ and its ‘ontology of the image’ in Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern 
Situation. (London: Routledge, 1988). We discuss Levin’s work in Part 2. 
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the generative power of the image and demand a broader understanding of its 
designing, such as implied by Baudrillard’s work on the ‘sign economy’.  
This tendency to understand the image as both unreal and de-realising 
points to a certain problem of idealism hinted at earlier: the image can make 
relations only by being blind to its relation to those relations; the image can only 
make the world apparent by excluding its productive role in bringing the world to 
presence. The image is constituted on the basis of this paradoxical logic, which is 
well-trodden theoretical ground and goes back to classical antiquity. It hinges on 
the problem of contingency, the impossibility of gaining an objective or outside 
perspective.58 The dilemma of logic entailed by representation is destabilised, 
however, if it is considered from the perspective of the differences that 
representation makes.59 
Representation is an idea and the idea is, in Gregory Bateson’s words, “a 
difference which makes a difference”.60 Representation has caused changes in the 
world but is unable to recognise or learn from these changes because they cannot 
be represented. This situation will be explored with the help of the systems-based 
approach of thinkers like Bateson and Niklas Luhmann, for whom “some form of 
                                                 
58 Modes of thought experience crisis only when their assumed ground becomes contested. Cary 
Wolfe indicates another “crisis of crisis” in this regard, the crisis of the crisis of postmodern theory. 
He argues that contemporary intellectuals now confront a crisis of the pragmatism of their 
deconstructions. What has critically arisen, he suggests, is the need for postmodern theory to 
confront its own orthodoxy with the problem of the ‘outside’ of theory. Cary Wolfe, “Critical 
Environments: Postmodern theory and the Pragmatics of the ‘Outside’” Theory Out of Bounds 13, 
eds. Sandra Buckley, Michael Hardt and Brian Massumi  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998). 
59 In reference to the ‘hermeneutic circle’, which will be discussed further in Chapter 1, Heidegger 
says “…It would be more ideal, of course … if the circle could be avoided and if there were the 
hope for once of creating a historiography which is as independent of the standpoint of the observer 
as the knowledge of nature is supposed to be. 
But to see a vitiosum in this circle and to look for ways to avoid it, even to ‘feel’ that is an 
inevitable imperfection, is to misunderstand understanding from the ground up.” Heidegger Being 
and Time 143. 
60 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2000) 271. Bateson also describes ‘information’ as a temporality of differences: “The 
technical term ‘information’ may be succinctly defined as any difference which makes a difference 
in some later event” 381. 
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difference …‘unfolds’ the unity of self-reference”, gives it ‘life’.61 The systems 
approach does not do away with the binary structure because it can be shown to 
occur within the paradigm of representational thinking. Rather, it allows an 
understanding of both the error and the actuality of representation. The de-centred, 
systemic approach of ontological design reveals the binary structure as designed 
into the world.  
The shape of this thesis reflects the complexity of bringing together 
‘ecology’ and ‘image’. There is much setting up to be done and as we draw to our 
final proposal there is an undeniably dramatic tapering from the epic problem. 
This is an inescapable consequence of the nature of the problem we are trying to 
expose and address. We also refer to and make use of a very broad range of ideas, 
and this requires a certain heavy handedness in mobilising disciplines of thought. 
Specifically, I characterise ‘cultural theory’ as a more reflective, humanities-based 
discipline of thinking, and ‘design theory’ as a more instrumental, scientifically-
inclined discipline of thought. This is not, of course, to suggest all thought under 
the banner of ‘culture’ is reflective and all thought under the banner of ‘design’ is 
not, nor that these modes of thought necessarily arise from distinct traditions.62
This thesis lies between these disciplinary tendencies and attempts to bring 
them into a dialogue. It draws on the insights of ontological design as developed in 
different ways by Fry and Winograd and Flores, which in turn rest on the work of 
Heidegger. It also draws on moments in the work of key theorists whose 
perspectives emerge from very different worlds but whose thought contributes in 
important ways to a design approach to the image: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose 
notion of the ‘flesh of the world’ makes the perceptual leap that the ecology of the 
image presupposes; Luhmann and particularly Bateson, whose “ecology of mind” 
                                                 
61 John Bednarz Jr in his introduction to Luhmann, Ecological Communication xiv.  
62 Cultural theory arises in part from the science-based discipline of anthropology as well as from 
literary theory and the arts. 
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made possible the emergence of ‘ecosystemic’ thought63; Baudrillard, whose early 
work on the nature and intent of the sign is particularly open to design 
appropriation; and Manzini, a design thinker with one of the highest profiles in 
design-led strategies to change Western consumption patterns, whose work opens 
cultural questions at the heart of industrial design. I also draw on the work of 
Elaine Scarry, whose approach to the reciprocity of made things offers an 
evocative and useful intuition of what design actually is; and the sociologist Ulrich 
Beck who reveals that ecological problems are difficult to sense because they do 
not occur as single, observable events — which is how we tend to rationalise them 
— but relationally. The insights of certain other thinkers are crucial in particular 
sections of this thesis. David Michael Levin helps us to understand Heidegger’s 
thought on technology and vision in relation to what he calls the ‘frontal ontology’ 
of our age; and Samuel Weber creates an enabling trans-linguistic bridge between 
Heidegger and deconstruction, illuminating Heidegger’s somewhat “bizarre 
conversation with ordinary language”.64 Albert Borgmann’s approach to the nature 
of designed things after Heidegger’s total understanding of the technological 
paradigm informs the last part of this study. 
The three chapters of this first Part serve to explain the idea of the ecology 
of the image by carefully laying out its working concepts and theoretical bases. In 
Chapter 1, the theory of ontological design is explained. Chapter 2 elaborates the 
counter-intuitive notion of the relationality ontological design depends on by 
drawing on: Heidegger’s relational understanding of language; Merleau-Ponty’s 
metaphors of the visible and the invisible; and Gregory Bateson’s idea of 
                                                 
63According to David W. Kidner, Bateson made the necessary cross-disciplinary leap between 
biology and ecology that enabled ‘ecosystemic’ thought. Kidner argues that while both the social 
and natural sciences have learnt from Bateson’s work, it has yet to arrive in the domain of 
psychology. By normalizing the behavioural, life style and personality configurations associated 
with environmental destruction, psychology has not been able to find a voice to contribute to the 
ecological debate. Kidner, “Why Psychology is Mute about the Environmental Crisis” 
Environmental Ethics 16 (1994) 359. 
64 Weber, “Upsetting the Setup” Mass Mediauras 56. 
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‘ecological communication’ (to borrow a title from Luhmann). In Chapter 3, we 
bring the idea of relationality to the context of the industrial product and explore 
the limits and opportunities of Manzini’s understanding of an ecology of the 
artificial. In this chapter we introduce the idea of the ‘pro-duct’ — pro (forward) 
duct (link).65 The pro-duct allows us to specify our critique of monolithic 
productivism, and avoid soaring over and thus dissipating the specificity of 
designed things, which Bateson describes as the “thousands of cultural details.”66 
The pro-duct is both the object of and manifests a different activity and 
understanding of designing, premised on relationality rather than the logic of 
representation.  
In Part 2 we return to the televisual in light of these enframing concepts to 
consider its ontological designing and its objections to the development of a more 
relational literacy. We gather evidence for the proposal that television makes 
manifest a vision of representation — a way of seeing ‘correctly’ that naturalises 
the concealment of relationality. We then consider a case study of this televisual 
proposal: the role of the image in the discourse and practice of environmentalism. 
Part 3 explores how the development of a more relational intuition in light 
of the televisual might be achieved. We argue that the current circumstances of 
unsustainability, which we have linked to the world-making of the vision of 
representation, warrant the development of a ‘de-sign’ practice, in which the 
mechanism of the sign and the acquired interpretative skill of reading signs can be 
introduced and mobilised in a design context. Specifically in this Part, we seek to 
                                                 
65 The notion of the ‘pro-duct’ was first developed by Tony Fry at the EcoDesign Foundation in 
1992. It was then elaborated in relation to the practice of planning in a paper written by Fry for the 
international Portraits of Planning Conference held in Adelaide in 1995 and in another 
unpublished paper from 1995 “Ecodesigning the mainstream: the question of planning and the 
making of another way.” Since then, it has become part of the Foundation’s general lexicon of 
terms. 
66Bateson suggests that ecological problems emerge when our familiar, Western epistemological 
values “become reinforced by thousands of cultural details.” Steps to an Ecology of Mind 493. 
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retrieve, from semiotics, the sign as a significant tool for revealing the “naturalised 
artificial” conditions of our lifeworlds.67
The final Part of this thesis focuses on bringing a cultural approach to what 
is possibly the least reflective of design disciplines, that of product design. In this, 
we bring into dialogue the conventionally opposing movements of analytical de-
scription and design in-scription.68 We de-sign the telegenic product, which is 
hard-programmed to be environmentally ignorant and which is revealed, via 
analysis, in relation to its foreclosed histories and cultural effects. We address the 
suppression of a cultural understanding of unsustainability in technical design and 
finally, drawing on key moments in the unfolding of the thesis as theoretical 
resource, offer a strategy whereby the designing power of the image is revealed in 
the conduct of design practice and redirects that practice.  
                                                 
67 Made or artificial culture becomes the withdrawn condition of our modern dwelling, and is thus 
‘naturalised’. The implication of this is that nature is not knowable outside the artificial and thus 
that the artificial is “the only available domain of ecological concern and action.” Fry, Remakings 
79. 
68 I draw this distinction from Akrich and Latour’s semiotic lexicon. The entry under “Script, 
description, inscription, or transcription” reads in part “the de-scription, usually by the analyst, is 
the opposite movement of the in-scription by the engineer, inventor, manufacturer, or designer (or 
scribe, or scripter to use Barthes’s neologism)…” Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour, “A 
Summary of Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies” in 
Bijker, Wiebe E. and John Law eds. Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992) 259. 
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CHAPTER 1. ONTOLOGICAL DESIGN 
 
Ezio Manzini has suggested we live in a world of unrestrained making and not 
enough designing. This is related to a problem of design ethics: “the debate on 
ethics, which is defined in relation to large choices, is hard to articulate in relation 
to the smaller and more minute choices made in the manufacture of daily 
objects.”1 Many design theorists have taken issue with how design plays out in the 
critically immune realm of industrial production and consumption. In this world, 
design is a largely instrumental activity. The forms of products replicate and 
proliferate in the context of a narrowly economic paradigm, without reflection on 
questions of quality. 
Certainly the idea of design has significantly changed over the course of 
the 20th century. In much contemporary design discourse, this change is generally 
considered to be an erosion of quality that parallels the rise of the cultural presence 
of the image.2 Jan van Toorn suggests that design is in danger of becoming simply 
a visual rhetoric of ready-to-use pieces, wherein a distinction between design and 
technology hardly exists. Design education is criticised as being bereft of a culture 
of research and of being primarily concerned with the transmission of 
instrumentally practical skills in “generating the culture industry in its worst 
form”, that is, precisely the bringing to reality of the vacuous, superficial 
                                                 
1 Ezio Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday,” Discovering Design: Explorations in Design 
Studies, eds. Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
220. 
2 Peter-Paul Verbeek and Petran Kockelkoren lament the ‘Platonism’ of design, arguing that things 
need to be considered as things, not as signs. “The Things that Matter,” Design Issues 14.3 (1998): 
28-42.  
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commodity dream-world that is critiqued in many discourses and commonly 
implicated in the problem of over-consumption.3 Design is something you spread 
over the surface of things at a point in the process where form and its 
contingencies have already been determined. The client is there to service, not to 
question. The design(ing) that is the target of these critiques is directed by the 
moment of aesthetic realisation; there is little thought or care given to the being of 
what is made and thus forms are generated without thought to their material 
consequences.  
However Manzini’s sense that there is not enough designing going on, also 
implies that design is much more than the reification and multiplication of banal 
objects. Design is a strategic activity that isn’t necessarily even about bringing 
new things into being. It can also be an unmaking, a replacement of things with 
services or co-operative use, or a utilisation of what already exists. Design can 
eliminate things in life-enhancing as well as in destructive ways.4 Such an 
approach depend upon an attention to the cultures that designed things create or 
sustain, the needs they have generated and the kinds of things that people do with 
them. Design in these terms is a project, a form of planning and a way of 
understanding and encapsulating all of those activities involved in bringing forth 
practically relational things.5  
                                                 
3 These comments about the contemporary status of design are drawn from the discussion during 
the international design conference “Design Beyond Design”, documented in Jan van Toorn, ed., 
Design Beyond Design (Amsterdam: Jan van Eyck Akademie editions, 1998) 94; 153.  
4 ‘Dematerialisation’— the replacement of things with services, co-operative use, or electronic 
media — is a strategy that attempts to reduce material consumption by focussing on delivering the 
result of a product rather than the physical object. This strategy is elaborated by Ezio Manzini in 
“Toward a new product-service mix” a paper given at the Eternally Yours Congress 1997. The 
subject is treated much more critically in his more recent work, which reflects on the ‘rebound 
effect’ in which materials efficiency in design has actually enhanced the overall ‘throughput’ of 
materials. See Manzini, “Scenarios of Sustainable Wellbeing”. 
5 There is a history of considering design as a planning activity, rather than as simply an activity of 
shaping and synthesising things. Victor Margolin cites a comment made by Laszlo Moholy-Nagy 
in 1946: “design ‘is an attitude which everyone should have; namely the attitude of the planner —
whether it is a matter of family relationships or labour relationships or the producing of an object of 
utilitarian character or of free art work, or whatever it may be. This is planning, organising, 
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There is, as is also suggested by Manzini’s comments, a need to reclaim 
the significance of design in the face of the problems of material culture. Not 
simply to claw back a thoughtful design culture that has been overtaken by the 
disciplines of calculative reason, or even to design better things (which is, after all, 
often the intent if not the achievement of professional designers). The thing about 
the significance of design that current conditions demand a recognition of, is its 
cultural agency: design designs, along with things, desires, perceptions, 
techniques, practices, habits and styles of life all of which have ongoing ecological 
implications. Design designs, whether designers are conscious or not of what they 
are sending out into the world. In the current situation wherein an ideological 
divergence between industrial productivism and environmental conservationism is 
increasingly tolerated, and where unsustainability has become a structural feature 
of the environment, this aspect of design is critically important. It both sustains the 
status quo and can potentially become a more explicit context for design practice, 
oriented toward cultural change. Yet it is largely overlooked. 
Many acknowledge that the West’s culture of quantity is disarticulated 
from ecological consequence — usually indicated by the myopic devouring of its 
own vital resources — and that this is a problem (though of varying degrees of 
significance) for securing the sustainability of the ongoing conditions for life. But 
while this is generally accepted, our worlds are becoming more and more 
powerfully conditioned by the transcendental promise of technology and the 
limitless possibilities for life styles it makes available. New, technologically-
derived spaces that invite myriad engagements continually open up in the world 
without, however, promoting any relational sense of the ways in which these 
‘virtual’ environments impact upon, and are generative of, material environments. 
The destructive propensity of the technological paradigm in its current unfolding 
                                                                                                                                      
designing.” Victor Margolin, The Politics of the Artificial (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2002) 79. 
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has been well theorised in this regard, but the design, production, use and disposal 
of products that make material this propensity, continues regardless.6  
It is important to acknowledge the significant contribution that individual 
products of design make to this paradigm. The proliferation of cheap, 
domestically-oriented image-making technologies for example, assert, by their 
very nature, that to print out a draft copy of this thesis is nothing. The value of 
such products depends upon their rate of production of ‘pages per minute’, rather 
than issues such as durability, resource efficiency, ability to accommodate 
recycled paper stock or even print quality.7 Yet the theory that enables us to see 
this as a cultural problem and the design theory that lodges the problem in the 
thing (as a composite of material, aesthetic form, energy and performance) rarely 
meet. The relationship between capitalism’s logic of value-creation without end 
and the increasingly productive technologies of production, clearly bears a good 
deal of the responsibility for the ecological crises of our moment. Yet evidence of 
the unsustainability of designed things is increasingly taken as proof of the nascent 
state of technology, which translates the ecological (back) into an economic 
problem.8  
Getting on with the business of designing for sustainability in this regard 
often conforms to the productivist intent of material culture: the industrial world 
                                                 
6 Bateson draws attention to an affinity between the productivist mind set and technology, 
specifically the technological augmentation of ‘purposive thinking’. The purposiveness of 
consciousness is implemented, he says “by more and more effective machinery, transportation 
systems, airplanes, weaponry, medicine, pesticides, and so forth.” Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind 434. 
7 A Canon advertisement for a cheap range of colour printers promises for example, that you can 
“fly through documents at up to 20 pages per minute”. In addition, the ranges of home based colour 
printers have been heavily marketed to children, suggesting they make full colour drawings on the 
computer and print out the results rather than hand-draw. It is the massive throughput of 
consumables that subsidises the minimal cost of such machines. It is interesting to contrast this to 
times when paper was not so seemingly plentiful and cheap, when children learned to draw and 
write in frugal styles on slate boards and had to earn the right to use the precious resource of paper.  
8 Aidan Davidson remarks, “Late modern evidence of unsustainability is being taken as proof of the 
fact that technological progress has not yet gone far enough and that ecological efficiency is first 
and foremost economic efficiency.” Aidan Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of 
Sustainability (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001) 5. 
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offers ever more promising practical antidotes and ‘cookbook’ solutions to 
individuated environmental problems — mainly constituted in forms of agreement 
with the rational need of the market economy — by inventing ways to conceal 
rather than promote any changes within the status quo of familiar forms. Thus we 
have an entire new range of more energy-efficient, biodegradable or recyclable 
versions of familiar products that nonetheless persist in communicating 
disjunctive, if not erroneous cultures of use. We have for example single-use 
cameras that are recyclable, disposable plastic bags that are biodegradeable, and of 
course, parallel-hybrid cars that are path-finding for the culture of driving. In spite 
of their ‘environmentally-friendly’ and in some cases award-winning designs, 
these products both disown the possibility of cultural change and evacuate the 
agency of the designed thing itself in effecting change.9
Confronted with the problem of shifting norms vis-à-vis environmental 
accountability, the design industry has responded by installing uniform checklist-
based and comparative methods of environmental management. Such methods are 
structurally incapable of recognising the possibility of a design ethic centred on the 
‘small and minute’ choices of design practice, as suggested by Manzini’s 
comments. Yet it is this incremental level of design that bears the burden of 
cultural change.  
This situation evidences a serious disjuncture between worlds that are 
brought into being by design and the ecological consequences of these worlds. The 
complex and extensive nature of this disjuncture extends from image perception 
and interpretation into the very design of things and is sustained by the 
relationships that things invite by design. In these conditions, the cultural agency 
of design mostly escapes the senses.  
                                                 
9 As we shall see, environmental methodologies that work on the embodied ‘impacts’ of things 
rather than raising the question of the need for things in general, sacrifice peripheral vision and fail 
to recognise the agency of the product. 
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The image-led erosion of design that so worries some design theorists is 
not a matter of concern outside design theory, education and practice. Generally, 
design in everyday life is a known domain; the design(ed) object is a completed 
work of design that can be brought before one. The object is a resolution of the 
effort and skill of the designer, the quality of the materials and the precision of 
manufacture. Design is also understood as a professional activity of aesthetic 
planning, which is brought to completion in the delivery of the designed thing. 
Often a designed thing is perceived as merely a materially elaborated look — a 
‘designer’ object, which is viewed by some critical design discourse as the most 
abhorrent branding of design.10  
According to Manzini, the idea that the artificial product is a unitary 
project has given rise to “a delirium for power by the designer-demiurge, who 
designs and produces a total environment, from a spoon to a whole city.”11 This 
kind of determinism is evident in several ‘world scale’ projects in the 20th 
century.12 The issue of the location of agency in the commonplace understanding 
of design is inseparable from the linear model of causality that is the mainstay of 
rationalist thought and the discourses it supports. In a design context it would go 
something like this: a (more or less creative) designing subject designs an object 
that through the design process becomes imbued with their intention, which fits 
                                                 
10 A critique of the social irresponsibility of ‘designer’ products is made for example in Nigel 
Whiteley, Design for Society (London: Reaktion Books, 1994). 
11 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 229.  
12 Le Corbusier’s famous “all-in-one” the Unite d’habitation, which was conceived as part of a 
broader urban design and social planning project, is an example of modernist environmental 
determinism where the agency of the designer conducts and brings to order an entire environment 
of things. The failure of an urban design ‘mission’ like the South American city of Brasilia 
designed by Oscar Niemeyer (who had worked under ‘Corbu’ and designed the Brazilian Pavilion 
for the New York World’s Fair in 1938, the same year as Heidegger’s “The Age of the World 
Picture” was written), offers a spectacular example of environmental determinism’s lack of 
engagement with the directional agency of things. Tellingly, the motto of Juscelino Kubitschek de 
Oliveira, who was president in 1956 when work on Brasilia commenced, was “50 years in 5”. Fry’s 
A New Design Philosophy explores the history of the nature of such designing, for example the 
New York World’s Fair’s production of desire for a new world. James Holston explores Brasilia as 
a pre-eminent construct of modernity in The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of 
Brasilia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
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the needs of perceived users to varying degrees of success.13 The designed artefact 
merely serves an instrumental function. Designing in this scenario is always 
reducible to the conscious intention of the designer, no matter what design ethic is 
employed.  
The linking of design agency to the designer source is clear in the Platonic 
timbre of Bauhaus discourse, where designing became a search for 
representational ideals in the production of “clear and logical forms, based on 
rational principles”.14 This search for ideal type has been theorised as modifying 
the nature of the encounter with the materiality of things; the meaning of materials 
simply becomes the most authentic or improved delivery of form.15 Fry sees the 
Bauhaus project in terms of a totalist ambition of striving to launch “an object 
regime of uniform mass symbolic agency”.16 This is a key point of departure of the 
sign economy as theorised by Baudrillard, who says that “(t)he ‘object’ only began 
truly to exist at the time of its formal liberation as a sign function” and that before 
the Bauhaus there were no ‘objects’.17 Baudrillard insists that Bauhaus design did 
not do away with styling, but merely submerged and elaborated it under the sign of 
‘functionalism’.18 Fry makes the point that the theorisation of this form of design 
agency, particularly as it reveals the emergence of the sign as a commodity form, 
is dramatically underplayed in design thinking.19
In a decidedly different context to the advent of thing as sign, Victor 
Papanek calls for a morally responsible designing that focuses on the material 
                                                 
13 Bateson comments on the rationalist approach to things: “The average Occidental…believes that 
there is a delimited agent, the ‘self’, which performed a delimited “purposive” action upon a 
delimited object.” Steps to an Ecology of Mind 318. 
14 Marcel Breuer quoted in Whiteley, Design for Society 9.  
15 This argument is put forward in Verbeek and Kockelkoren, “The Things that Matter”.  
16 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 154. 
17 Jean Baudrillard, “Design and Environment or How Political Economy Escalates into 
Cyberblitz”, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis: 
Telos Press, 1981) 185. One can hear in Manzini’s work recognition of Baudrillard’s critical 
transformation of things into the ‘object’ as sign-function. We return to this point in Part 3. 
18 Baudrillard, “Design and Environment”197. 
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welfare of society. He wants to democratise design, to say that design is a basic 
human activity rather than the preserve of specialists. Widely considered to be a 
founding figure of ‘ecologically conscious design’ or ‘ecodesign’, Papanek’s 
nemesis is consumerist design, the practice of which he describes as akin to what 
would happen “if all medical doctors were to forsake general practice and surgery 
and concentrate exclusively on dermatology, plastic surgery and cosmetics.”20  
Papanek promoted a vision of an ideally transformed society that operates 
on a socially and ecologically equitable basis. His key point was that design 
needed to develop a conscience. Writing on the issue of the incommensurability of 
urban design and the development of a sense of community, Papanek argues that 
the modern city has lost its centre and that the project of urban design should 
therefore be one of recovery.21 A common humanist theme is echoed in this 
argument; the way to a better life in the modern world is to find the ‘unified moral 
core’ that we have lost. 22 In this approach there is a sense that human intention is 
everything — design is the conscious effort to impose meaningful order and 
material things again become the mere means of the delivery of the vision of the 
designer. Papanek is one of a very few designers who have addressed the ethics of 
consumer products. His work has played an extremely important role in raising the 
issue of design’s social responsibility and transformative power. However, in 
articulating the broad needs that design should service, Papanek misses the de-
                                                                                                                                      
19 Fry refers to the above Baudrillard essay on the Bauhaus. Fry A New Design Philosophy 154-
160.  
20 Victor Papanek, Design for the Real World: Human Ecology and Social Change (London: 
Thames & Hudson, 1984) 247.  
21 Victor Papanek, The Green Imperative: ecology and ethics in design and architecture (London: 
Thames & Hudson, 1995) 195. 
22 Such a project is exemplified in some aspects of social psychology that read contemporary 
technological life as having a ‘fragmenting’ and ‘schizophrenic’ effect on the self. See for example 
Kenneth J. Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life (New York: 
Basic Books, 1991). However as McLuhan notes “…the aspiration of our time for wholeness, 
empathy and depth of awareness is a natural adjunct of electric technology.” Understanding Media 
5. 
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centred agency of design, which subjects the vision of the designer, regardless of 
its ethical integrity, to inevitable fracture. 
Phenomenologically, the situatedness, order and power of design agency 
requires a somewhat different explanation than simply being put down to the 
world-view of the designing subject, particularly regarding the question of what 
designed things themselves do in the context of human practice. Ontological 
design offers such an explanation as well as a new direction for design thinking. 
Fry maps three interrelated aspects of design that together introduce the 
ontological approach: 
1. The design object — any product of design; 
2. The design agency — the designer designing, or the design tool (software, 
pattern, a drawing, instruction, specifications); design education and the designed 
thing as it acts on (the) world; 
3. Design in process — the system, organisation, conduct and activity of designing 
“which is the on-going designing that is the agency of the designed object as it 
functions or dysfunctions.”23
The idea here is that design is always more than the conscious or 
unconscious agency of the designer.24 It is a projection of tacit understandings as 
well as conscious interpretation, and further possesses a thingly force — its ‘own-
weight’ in Don Ihde’s terms.25 Design in this context of relations is not plural or 
ambiguous, but is a de-centred practice in which things as well as people design — 
                                                 
23 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 6 
24 As will be presented in the following explanation, ontological design’s recognition of the 
existing design environment, the pre-figurative nature of understanding and the inevitable partiality 
of interpretation, remove it from the modernist environmental determinism of designers like Le 
Corbusier.  
25 In his Technology and the Lifeworld, Ihde offers a phenomenological account of design agency 
that bears some relation to the ontological theory of design. He describes all technology as 
‘technology-to’, dependent on its context for a (relative) identity. However technologies for Ihde 
also have their ‘own weight’, they are not neutral, merely beholden to the designer’s intention, but 
co-shape the uses made of them. This aspect of Ihde’s work and what it has to say about the 
experience of the materiality of things is discussed in Verbeek and Kockelkoren, “The Things that 
Matter” 36. 
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design designs. 26 This implies that there is a circularity to design, that the 
designed thing acts back on the human agent, modifying desires, habits, 
expectations, actions and the conditions of interpretation. Elaine Scarry offers an 
eloquent analogy for this ontological relationality when she says that the made 
object is never just ‘for-itself’ but is “a fulcrum or lever across which the force of 
creation moves back onto the human site and remakes the makers.”27 This ability 
of designed things to alter the condition and behaviour of other things constitutes 
the ethical focus of ontological design. It is not that the thing simply possesses 
human-like intent (while it may sometimes be useful to ask of a designed thing 
what it ‘knows’ about its users)28 but that it materialises understanding of its pre-
sent world and is thus disposed to(ward the) world in particular ways. Scarry 
suggests that in order to understand what kind of a world-making activity design 
is, we need to examine the structure of the actions that things design. There is, 
however, a strong resistance to thinking about design in this way, as the products 
of design are generally understood as the end point of the design process rather 
than its beginning, particularly in the aesthetic design culture lamented by the 
design theorists referred to earlier. Designed objects are fixed and fetishised points 
                                                 
26 John A. Walker says that “design causes ‘ambiguities’ because it has more than one common 
meaning: it can refer to a process (the act or practice of designing); or to the result of that process 
(a design, sketch, plan or model); or to the products manufactured with the aid of a design 
(designed goods); or to the look or overall pattern of a product (‘I like the design of that dress’)”. 
Yet this still stops short of the observation that design designs. Design History and the History of 
Design (London: Pluto, 1989) 23. 
27Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) 307. 
28 In The Body in Pain Elaine Scarry speaks of the ‘sentience’ of things involved in reciprocal 
relationships of care with their human users. The anthropological projection is also a strategy used 
by Kockelkoren in his project to ‘de-Platonise’ things, for example in “Towards a Technological 
Intimacy with Things”, Research in Philosophy and Technology 17 (1998): 45-57. In this essay he 
takes issue with Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom, he says, there is nothing worse than to be a thing. 
“Human beings now…rip open the Earth, blow up mountain ranges, and pollute the oceans and the 
air…Things will not stand for this indefinitely, and according to their own natures, are rebelling 
noiselessly. Once they kindly invited human beings to allow themselves to coincide with 
themselves; from now on they will force humans to do so through harassment.” (47). 
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around which design activity revolves — for example, in design magazines, 
competitions and awards — and in which it dissipates.  
With Scarry’s image of the artifact as ‘lever’, the reciprocation of the 
designed exceeds the initial projection of designing. This is particularly the case in 
mass production, whereby any design idea can have substantial material, cultural 
and economic consequences. Ontological design puts forward the proposal that 
designed things change culture in incremental, though powerful ways. It is through 
designed things that reality is revealed — and we are open to seeing aspects of the 
world that we have never seen before. And as design opens reality, it also changes 
reality. Thus all design is ontologically directional, whether we ‘know’ about it or 
not. The difference is that as a practice “ontologically biased design comprehends 
direction.”29 Design in these terms demands awareness of the presence of 
informing relations, giving the catch-phrase ‘designing with environment in mind’ 
a new significance. 
Ontological design is a relational theory that recognises and acts upon our 
designing in and by environments of concern. It seeks to overdetermine 
rationalism’s cause-effect dynamic of passive contemplation preceding intentional 
action. Rather, ontological design reads the ‘act’ of thought as itself a form of 
designing. For Winograd and Flores, whose design thinking shares some of the 
same philosophical bases as Fry’s,  
(t)he most important designing is ontological. It constitutes an intervention 
in the background of our heritage, growing out of our already-existent ways 
of being in the world, and deeply affecting the kinds of beings that we are. 
In creating new artefacts, equipment, buildings, and organisational 
structures, it attempts to specify in advance how and where breakdowns 
                                                 
29 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 74. 
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will show up in our everyday practices and in the tools we use, opening up 
new spaces in which we can work and play.30
While “(w)e cannot directly impose a new structure on any individual …whenever 
we design changes to the space of interactions, we trigger changes in individual 
structure — changes to the horizon that is the precondition for understanding.”31 In 
this way “(t)he world determines what we can do and what we do determines our 
world.” 32
This ontological perspective was disclosed to Winograd and Flores through 
their apparently chiasmic activities of reading the hermeneutic phenomenology of 
Heidegger and Gadamer and designing computer technology. For Winograd and 
Flores computers — which, in spite of their ‘inhumanity’ have earned a notable 
status for forcefully throwing light onto the nature of human being — have a 
particularly powerful impact as they are machines for acting in language. 
(O)ur understanding of the computer centers on the role it will play in 
mediating and facilitating linguistic action as the essential human activity. 
In asking what computers can do, we are drawn into asking what people do 
with them, and in the end into addressing the fundamental question of what 
it means to be human.”33  
The ‘domains of action’ of a designed device like a computer, are based on an 
interpretation of ‘data’, ‘goals’, operators, and so forth. They say that in working 
with computers we assume their built-in interpretations and develop patterns of 
language and action that reflect them, which carry over into our understanding of 
ourselves and the way we conduct our lives.34  
                                                 
30 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 163. 
31 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 178. 
32 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 177. 
33 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computer and Cognition 7. 
34 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computer and Cognition 178. Donald Norman indicates 
the ‘misfit’ between the precise, binary logic of information systems and the flexible, ambiguous 
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According to Winograd and Flores’ careful exploration of how we work 
with computers, the computer reveals its dependence on Cartesian rationalism and 
its background understanding of cognition based on the systematic manipulation of 
representations, which has engendered a blindness to what computers do, and 
particularly to their ontological significance. They explore the ontological fit that 
occurs between computers and their human counterparts in spite of the erroneous 
thinking upon which computers are based. Computers mobilise a misinterpretation 
of human cognition and language.  
Winograd and Flores were interested in what happens ontologically when 
we create and work on new devices (and they work on us, and we work on them), 
and how possibilities for innovation arise. The general pattern of design innovation 
currently projects, in more and more sophisticated and ‘smart’ forms, the 
background assumptions and tacit understandings of rationalism. Given the 
familiar scenario of shops full of types and versions, this could be characterised as 
an ‘object-oriented’ designing that appears to be expanding despite a growing 
environmental sophistication in the sector. ‘Object-oriented’ designing is 
fundamentally disinclined to a relational view of its world. In this respect, part of 
the ontological design project can be understood as an intervention into the 
automaticity of design innovation, opening possibilities for new cultural outcomes: 
“(t)he creation of a new device or systematic domain can have far-reaching 
significance — it can create new ways of being that previously did not exist and a 
framework for actions that would not have previously made sense.” 35
In “Redirective Practice: Ontological Designing” Anne-Marie Willis says 
that ontological design is a practical theory involving a hermeneutics of the nature 
                                                                                                                                      
and intention-oriented understanding of humans. Donald Norman, The Invisible Computer 
(Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). 
35 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computer and Cognition 177.  
 39
and agency of design, as well as an argument for new ways of going about design 
activity, “especially in the contemporary context of ecological unsustainability.”36  
Ontological design is therefore a mode of concurrent research and making 
that might be characterised as moving in two related directions. First, it is de-
scriptive in that it works back from the cultural ‘feel’ of designed things; in the 
case of Winograd and Flores’ work this involves the conversations people engage 
in when they cope with and anticipate instrumental (computer) ‘breakdowns’. This 
reading/researching activity is a way of understanding how designs work and how 
designing happens — not a forensic analysis of things, but a way of seeking to 
understand the implications of the practical and material relationships organised by 
design. It is crucial in the contemporary context because the only way to design 
things more appropriately is to learn to read the cultural context of design; what 
design has enabled people to do, to share and to become. The second direction is 
concerned with how this reading contributes to a design process “in which new 
possibilities for interpretation and action emerge.”37 The two emphases of 
interpretation and action are neither linear nor self-enclosed, but are always 
already wrapped up in each other and in the practical situation: interpretation is 
itself a form of ‘world-making’. 
The theory of ontological design rests on insights drawn from the 
hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Both 
philosophers assume the fundamental relatedness of people to their world and in 
this reject the priority of human agency implied in the rationalist tradition. 
Heidegger’s work can be read as a systematic and careful dismantling of a history 
of thinking about being and world premised upon representation. In everyday life, 
it is how things are perceived and experienced (phenomenology) that enables an 
understanding of the conditions of and for being (ontology). Heidegger rejected 
                                                 
36 Willis elaborates the Heideggerean underpinnings of ontological design in “Redirective Practice: 
Ontological Designing”, a paper given at the Design Cultures conference, Sheffield-Hallam 
University, 1999. 
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the ‘parallel universes’ of Descartes mind-body dualism, where the objective 
world of physical reality is separate from the internal subjective world of the 
thinking individual, arguing that this separation denies the more fundamental unity 
of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s claim was that because we are always already 
‘thrown’ in a world-involved condition, human access to ‘what is’ is always 
interpretative.  
Following Heidegger, Gadamer elaborated a theory about the inevitable 
partiality and prejudice of human understanding in his concept of the hermeneutic 
circle. In this circle, the meaning of any thing is contextual, depending on the 
moment of interpretation and the horizon of understanding brought to it by the 
interpreter. We have a ‘pre-understanding’ or prejudice from which interpretations 
develop:  
It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our 
being...the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal 
sense of the word, constitute the initial directness of our whole ability to 
experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are 
simply conditions whereby we experience something — whereby what we 
encounter says something to us.38  
This understanding of the circular relation of pre-understanding and interpretation 
is crucial to ontological design. Our understanding – the horizon of our knowing – 
delineates appearances. What is there before us is a product of our interpretation.  
Edgar Rubin’s well-known ambigram, the figure-ground image of two 
facial profiles that together form the figure of a vase, offers a way to describe 
this.39 The image is drawn from the Gestalt suite of images developed to visually 
                                                                                                                                      
37 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 179.  
38 Gadamer quoted in Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 32. 
39 M.C. Escher’s drawings offer an interesting development of this ambivalence, representing the 
mutual enfolding of sign and world. An example is “The Picture Gallery” of 1956, which Maturana 
and Varela utilise as a formal explanation of cognitive circularity: “The picture (the boy) looks at is 
gradually and imperceptibly transformed into…the city where the boy and the gallery are! We are 
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argue the phenomenal coherence of the world of everyday experience. Rather than 
placing an emphasis on Gestalt theory’s eidetic or theoretical determinism, I want 
to draw attention to the depiction of relationship and interpretation in this image. 
The two figures, faces and vase, cannot be seen together as they share the same 
delineation; in order to see either one, the other must recede into the background. 
This figure-ground reversal is not, however, an agonistic confrontation of two 
discrete forms battling for attention. There is a mutual dependency that the 
disposition of the forms — one binary and one centric — bring to light. We 
understand that the two ‘potential’ figures exist together, and that as we perceive 
one figure, the other is always present. The image brings to light the irresistible 
urge to organise vision into figure and ground.40 In this respect it is a mechanism 
for suggesting to us the hermeneutic nature of perception.41  
The phenomenological notion of prejudice in the hermeneutic circle 
provides a way of understanding design as occurring within a horizon of intuitive 
understandings. The forming of materials embodies an understanding of what it 
means to design. The things made gather understandings and send them forth, 
creating worlds. ‘World’ in this sense does not appear before human beings as a 
complete picture, but is disclosed by human beings in domains of activity with 
worldly things. The structure of world is constituted in what Heidegger calls “a 
relational totality of significance”, each thing appears in the space and time of its 
                                                                                                                                      
unable to locate the starting point: Outside? Inside? The city? The boy’s mind? Recognising this 
cognitive circularity, however, does not constitute a problem for understanding the phenomenon of 
cognition. On the contrary, it constitutes the starting point…” Maturana, Humberto R. and 
Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, trans. 
Robert Paolucci (Boston and London: Shambhala, 1992) 243.  
40 Ian E. Gordon, Theories of Visual Perception (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1989) 52.  
41 Though Gordon suggests that the dominant psychological interpretation is that the figure-ground 
separation in vision is biophysically derived: we are built to see this way (52). Whilst Gestaltists 
argued for the fixed nature of perception, their theories stressed the significance of everyday 
phenomenal experience for understanding perceptual processes. So while the concepts of Prägnanz 
(the tendency toward perceiving coherence), perceptual constancy (a kind of ‘corrective’ quality to 
perception) and Gestaltqualität (the special excessive quality of form: the whole as more than the 
sum of its parts) can be seen as thoroughly ocularcentric, they can also be read in terms of the 
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being engaged by human beings, oriented with others, from and toward others. In 
this way, the world worlds.42 As Heidegger argues in his essay “Building Dwelling 
Thinking”, learning to dwell appropriately in our worlds requires an understanding 
of this relationship between thought and making. He says we make our locations 
but we are also made by them, for the boundary or horizon is not where something 
stops, but rather where something begins its presencing.43  
 
The reading/researching activity of ontological design depends on an 
attention that we do not usually give the products that make way for our everyday 
activities. When a needed thing is broken or unavailable, the flows of design-
enabled activities are obstructed and the worldly character of the designed thing 
shows up for theoretical reflection. This world disclosive character of the 
‘breakdown’, elaborated in Being and Time in relation to the ontology of 
equipment, is a key Heideggerean term drawn upon by Winograd and Flores. For 
them, the breakdown constitutes a situation of non-obviousness that affords 
opportunities for new distinctions in language to emerge.44 Such distinctions 
enable the determination of potential breakdowns and help us to anticipate and 
cope with them. This then provides the fulcrum of opportunity for design 
innovation in broadening the parameters of coping. For example, the way design 
manages the experience of breakdown determines whether the broken down thing 
gets designated as waste, whether there is a service context that can be called 
upon, whether the user can intervene and return the product to workable readiness 
or whether it can be transformed into some other useful form.  
                                                                                                                                      
determinant role ascribed to relationship; the mutual dependency of figure and ground. These 
concepts are described in Gordon, Theories of Visual Perception 56.  
42 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 44. 
43 “A boundary is not that at which some thing stops but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is 
that from which something begins its presencing. That is why the concept is that of horismos, that 
is, the horizon, the boundary.” Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking” Poetry, Language, 
Thought 154. 
44 Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 69. 
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Most contemporary products diligently attempt to erase the experience of 
non-obviousness and the opportunities it may afford. We are generally thrown into 
a transparent trajectory of “suavely efficient” useability whose determining 
conditions remain concealed.45 The ‘disposition’ of designed things oriented 
toward perfect transparency is continually enhanced by the technological paradigm 
that, as Heidegger shows, we are both in and of. Mostly, technological problem 
solving involves the subtraction of the interpretative agency of the user as much as 
possible from a machine’s operational system (often in tandem to the product’s 
semiotic declaration of performance). It is useless and sometimes dangerous, for 
example, to ‘tinker’ with many modern products.46 In addition to a reduction in 
mechanical competency, the user is also disarticulated from environmental effects. 
This situation has an impact on our ability to cope with breakdowns, which shapes 
consumer expectations of products, which becomes the impetus for further 
designing out user understanding and agency, which further expedites a 
technologically empowered trajectory of object-oriented innovation …and the 
background cycling of relational erasure continues.  
To take an example, consider the impacts of fossil fuel production due to 
escalating demand for power in urban environments. What will happen when the 
interior lighting is simply a given? Infrared and ultra-sonic light sensors detect 
when people enter and leave rooms, turning lights on and off. In the building 
                                                 
45 Dreyfus quotes John Dewey on his version of ‘breakdown’; “the more suavely efficient a habit 
the more unconsciously it operates. Only a hitch in its workings occasions emotion and provokes 
thought.” Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
Division 1 (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1991) 70. 
46 Largely this is an attempt by manufacturers to design out risk and culpability for accidents. At 
the same time, numerous products released prematurely fail due to issues of safety or functionality 
and still others whose risks are less attributable, continue to be marketed and sold. Beck notes that 
industrial innovation itself emerges as a kind of large scale ‘tinker-science’: “Nuclear reactors must 
be built, artificial biotechnical creatures must be released into the environment, and chemical 
products must be put into circulation for their properties, safety and long-term effects to be studied. 
Moral, political and logical problems lurk in this reversal of experiment and application, in this 
fusion of research and technology into a new type of manufacturing tinker science, in a society that 
is itself becoming experimental.” Ulrich Beck, Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of 
the Risk Society, trans. Mark A. Ritter (New York: Humanity Books, 1995) 104.  
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industry these sensors are considered to be discrete ‘energy saving’ products able 
to solve the problem of people forgetting to turn lights off. However, occupants' 
habits of forgetfulness are reinforced by the new ‘smart’ system in its attempt to 
take care of the problem. It is a designing out of a particular culture of engagement 
and communication, a responsibility constituted in the pause at the doorway and 
the snap of the switch that declares, “I am now leaving” or “…entering this room.” 
The manual organisation of lighting can be regarded as coming with a whole 
culture and behavioural ethic that remains in touch with a sense for scarcity, ideas 
about privacy, absence and needfulness.  
Further, such a system is rarely discrete; it usually comes with an extended 
suite of products on ‘24/7’ standby — office equipment, security systems, ‘set and 
forget’ climate control — all of which tend to go with the culture of ‘smart’ 
buildings. The ‘always on’ disposition of these technologies brings with it a raft of 
new behaviours that fundamentally alter the ethics of incremental environmental 
decisions, like the decisive act of a single human finger called upon by the 
conventional light switch. The specific environment found in this building is 
subordinated by such designing to an environmental uniformity, which depends on 
the transparency, neutrality and continuity of ‘space’ that makes way for an 
equally uniform subjective desire and intent.  
The retraction of lighting as a sphere of concern means that occupants 
become ever more used to not having to think about such basic environmental 
conditions, and are less aware over time of the direct relation between the conduct 
of their activities and their environments. While we live in multiple ‘private’ and 
‘public’ worlds, we continuously articulate these worlds, imposing our behavioural 
modalities on a range of environments. To recall Winograd and Flores, the 
enfolding of interpretation, pre-understanding and worlding means that our 
interaction with designed things carries over into our understanding of ourselves 
and the way we conduct our lives. Design is therefore ontological both in terms of 
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its explicit shaping of the ways in which we live but also in its background 
understanding and projection of how things should be.  
Tony Fry’s A New Design Philosophy: an introduction to defuturing is an 
account of the historical impact of the absence of an understanding that all 
design(ing) carries this ontological significance. Fry shows that designed things 
can be understood temporally as creating futures (making or giving time) or taking 
futures away — forfeiting futures. He argues that design in the 20th century 
mostly shortened the lifespan of the future, a tendency he calls ‘defuturing’. The 
autonomic designing of the modern technological paradigm has escalated this 
defuturing tendency as ‘man’ has developed technological systems with greater 
and greater capacity to ignore and conceal the fallout of productivism. The 
background worlding of designed things is ontological designing at its most 
general — “the undirected world-making of the directional agency of the created 
world, including its designed forms and processes.”47 As a naming of worlding, 
ontological designing serves to bring to the fore the fallout of design’s 
misjudgments.  
The tone of Fry’s discourse on unsustainability is decidedly negative when 
compared with the prevailing voice of environmental discourse, which, in insisting 
on the political efficacy of the oppositional stance, remains trapped in a 
representational paradigm. The environmental ‘good news stories’ that achieve an 
excessive resonance are of a David wins against Goliath type, mild mitigatory 
measures, or aesthetically ‘quaint’ items involving a particular object, event or 
location. The articulation of unsustainability is an extremely nascent and 
unpopular activity, particularly when it impinges on the lifestyles we engage in 
and aspire to, which quickly achieve undisputed naturalness by design. Yet 
pointing out and demonstrating negative examples, including deeply ingrained 
structural problems, help to clarify what design needs to respond to. To disclose 
                                                 
47 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 40. 
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problematic pre-understandings in designed things is not destructive but is 
explicitly oriented toward learning to intervene in the context of unsustainability. 
To gather insight into the power of the designed artefact is to initiate a different 
culture of design.  
With Fry and the ontological design community, we contend that 
unsustainability offers a world disclosive context. Relational investigation, which 
is capable of transforming familiar empirical interpretations, reveals that many of 
our intuitive ways of being with things are ecologically destructive. While the 
image becomes both more important in popular design culture, and more of a 
problem for critical design culture, the ontological perspective reveals that 
design’s designing is mostly ‘invisible’.48 We incorporate products as extensions 
of our own bodies enthusiastically, and largely without pain. As Scarry elaborates: 
“(t)he natural hand (burnable, breakable, small and silent) now becomes (with the 
asbestos glove, the baseball mitt, the scythe or the pencil) the artefact-hand 
(unburnable, unbreakable, large and endlessly vocal).”49 However, this painless 
incorporation does not ensure that design is ethical, that it will take care of us in its 
invisibility. ‘Care’ in this respect is not a spontaneous emotion, but is a disposition 
and a way of being that becomes structural by design.50 It is ‘built-in’ rather than 
                                                 
48 Sherry Turkle observes the functional transparency of technological interfaces in The Second 
Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). For Donald 
Norman, good design disappears by way of the smooth transparency of well-placed ‘affordances’. 
His argument is developed in books such as The Design of Everyday Things, (New York: 
Doubleday/Currency, 1990) and The Invisible Computer 1998. His latest book departs somewhat 
from this argument. Emotional Design (New York: Basic Books, 2004) is a strong advocation of 
‘object-oriented’ design. In this book Norman argues that things that have aesthetic appeal work 
better. I think the value in his argument concerns the care and attention of users as much as 
aesthetics – we tend to ‘see’ things that call upon the practice of what Albert Borgmann calls focal 
attention. 
49 Scarry, The Body in Pain 254. 
50 Heidegger says that ‘care’ is essentially the condition of being-in-the-world. Heidegger, Being 
and Time 180. We anticipate our environmental conditions, and proceed as ‘carefully’ as we are 
able to on the basis of our understandings because our own sustainability is an issue for us. The 
design implications of Heidegger’s ‘care-structure’ are explored in Fry, Remakings 103-112. 
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attitudinal or emotional. Every day, the newspapers reveal a misfit between this 
invisibility of design and expectations of care.51  
As Rachel Carson (Silent Spring, 1962) and many others since have shown, 
the unintended consequences of industrial culture mostly disperse slowly and 
uneventfully, returning in ways that demand new recognition of the directional 
agency of designed things.52  
As we have suggested, we imbue what we design with a disposition 
informed by our cultural mix of background understanding and interpretation. But 
we have also said that the designed thing also has its own intentionality born of 
this disposition, into which its users are inducted. The disposition of so many 
modern products is to lend transparency to our environments, effectively 
disengaging us from the consequences of our actions.  
The notion of design’s intentionality is very close to François Jullien’s 
exploration of the relationship between the ‘disposition’ and ‘propensity’ of 
things. Jullien considers how an understanding of this relationship is made 
possible in and by the polysemic Chinese concept of shi. He says that shi, 
particularly in its ancient usage, has an illuminating logic able to disclose “the kind 
of potential that originates not in human initiative but instead results from the very 
                                                 
51 During Easter 2002 for example, the market-driven subtraction of preservatives from some 
processed foods resulted in extensive food poisoning. This consequence was then used to provide 
an argument for the technology of food preservation. However what this situation evidenced in part 
was a lack of understanding about relational conditions, specifically that the retraction of food 
preservation was a ‘symbolic’ rather than a structural treatment of the problem. Food preservation 
has engendered particular expectations, habits and cultures of use. If the necessary changes in 
cultures and habits of use that preservative-free products would incur was both considered and 
presented, such consequences might have been foreseen as inevitable. 
52 The work of both Ulrich Beck and Maarten Hajer are important in this regard and both are 
discussed in Part 2. Another text that warrants mention here is Deborah Cadbury’s The 
Feminisation of Nature: Our Future at Risk (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997). In a journalistic 
turn upon the tradition of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Cadbury uncovers the impacts and 
explores the environmental and human health implications of the oestrogen mimicking synthetic 
chemicals found in many of our contemporary environments.  
 48
disposition of things.”53 He offers a simple image to capture the various aspects of 
this term:  
(I)f one uses logs and stones on level ground, they remain stable and 
therefore immobile, whereas on sloping ground they begin to move. If they 
are square, they stop; but if they are round, they roll down. Disposition 
includes the particular shape of the object (round or square) as well as the 
situation at hand (on level or sloping ground). Maximum potential is 
conveyed by the differing nature of the gradient.”54  
This understanding of disposition extends to an aesthetic theory; the force of visual 
and literary form is also conceived in terms of shi. Jullien emphasises the 
difference between the theory of propensity and the Western conception of ‘style’ 
that proceeds from the Aristotelian philosophy of form. The production of 
calligraphy and painting is a process of actualizing a configuration of the 
dynamism inherent in reality, rather than the mimetic reproduction of an ideal 
nature.55 The relationship between the figure produced and the movement that 
produces it is the aesthetic animation of shi as the efficacious force that runs 
through the form. In the tradition of landscape painting, for example, what is 
depicted are ‘attractions, tensions and interchange’ rather than things per se; the 
shi of rocks is conveyed by emphasising their tendency to pile up and press 
together at the foot of a mountain or of the bolt projected by a cross-bow to fly 
straight. Shi creates “its effect of tension at the exact boundary between the visible 
and the invisible, where the explicit nature of the configuration becomes more 
richly charged with implicit meaning, emptiness becomes allusive, and the finite 
and the infinite illuminate and reinforce one another.”56  
                                                 
53 Francois Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, trans. Janet 
Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1999) 13. 
54 Jullien, The Propensity of Things 29. 
55 Jullien, The Propensity of Things 75. 
56 Jullien, The Propensity of Things 84. 
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While in the West the condition, configuration and structure of things is 
opposed to dynamic force and movement, shi affords an understanding of the 
dynamic in terms of the static, propensity in terms of disposition. Such an idea 
points to what Jullien calls “a troublesome gap in Western strategic thought: the 
plan drawn up in advance, which is of an ideal nature, and its practical 
implementation, which renders it subject to chance.”57 The figure or thing is not 
‘representational’ but directive of an ongoing process that runs through it. The 
writer’s main task then, is to determine rather than render that propensity.58 This 
can also be taken as the task of the designer, to determine “… the directional 
consequence of the ‘thing-ing’ (on-going effects and environmental impacts) of 
some thing designed.”59  
The predominant disposition of Western design coincides with the Jullien’s 
gap between the ideal advance plan and how it plays out. Design practice operates 
according to its self-image as product and/or information delivery.60 There is little 
cultural recognition of design’s ‘own-weight’, whether in relation to the set-jaw 
instrumentalism of many short-life technological products or to the conservative 
values imbued in many products that invite more enduring relations with human 
beings.  
In ‘thinging’, things support, communicate and disseminate the worldviews 
that delivered them. Thus there is much to be learnt about where things are headed 
from unpacking what, or rather how they are. Winograd and Flores unpack the 
rationalism of the computer in order to design environments better able to 
anticipate and cope with breakdowns.61 While learning from their project, Fry’s 
                                                 
57 Jullien, The Propensity of Things 38. ‘Chance’ is an effect of a lack of understanding of the 
propensity of things that emerges from disposition. 
58Jullien, The Propensity of Things 89. 
59 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 40. 
60 This observation is based on comments made by van Toorn, Design Beyond Design 11. 
61 “… we are now witnessing a major breakdown in the design of computer technology — a 
breakdown that reveals the rationalistically oriented background of discourse in which our current 
understanding is embedded.” Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition 79.  
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design schema sets out a context for ontological design that is considerably 
broader than Winograd and Flores allow, one that concerns the powerful design-
led unsustainability of our contemporary world. The broader design milieu 
concerns design as an ecological as well as an ontological practice: a shaper of 
environments as well as beings. While this is already implicit in the nature of 
ontological design thus articulated, it points to the problematic relationship that 
exists between understandings of the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’, and to the 
preservation of their difference. ‘Artificial’ things design ‘natural’ ecologies and 
visa versa; they gather and set in motion relationships that are registered in terms 
of unintended environmental feedback, which then informs interpretations of the 
context for future design. Yet ecological effects tend, in Beck’s terms, to 
disenfranchise our senses, because they betray empirical commonsense.62 This 
disenfranchisement is largely unnoticed because modernity’s structures of 
explanation account for it.63 However, our ability to respond to the question of 
                                                 
62 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 12 – 13. 
63 George Myerson points this out in his elaboration of Beck’s argument in Ecology and the End of 
Postmodernity (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2001). In this book, Myerson argues that postmodernity 
misread the resilience and flexibility of modernity, which has now entered a more dramatic and 
radical phase with ‘ecology’. In his argument, Myerson opens a space in which to consider the 
implications of modernisms delegitimation of ‘common sense’. However his theory of 
‘ecopathology’ — a radical modernity that portrays big ecological threats lurking in the minutiae of 
everyday life (a blocked drain pipe becomes evidence of global warming) — Myerson forecloses 
on the potential of commonsense, or what he calls the ‘sensible view’ to learn a more relational 
perspective. Ultimately, Myerson fails to suggest what we might be able to do in or with this 
situation and the reader is left as disempowered as the farmers who do not know what to do with 
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what design designs is also disenfranchised. This problem demands a re-cognition 
of the relationality of appearances, to which we now turn. 
                                                                                                                                      
their blocked drains. I think that Bateson’s systemic analysis of ‘ecological pathology’, discussed 
below, offers a more practical critique of the colonisation of the world by ideas. 
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CHAPTER 2. (IN)VISIBLE RELATIONALITY  
 
The idea is … not a de facto invisible, like an object 
hidden behind another, and not an absolute invisible, 
that would have nothing to do with the visible. 
Rather it is the invisible of this world, that which 
inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible. 
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)1
 
As suggested in the introduction, things in our commonsense experience of the 
world appear to be finite, discrete, whole and inert. Yet an ecological perspective 
sees things differently. Things are dynamic and interrelated, brought into being by 
background understandings and giving rise to ways of being in the world. This 
chapter seeks to negotiate the leap of faith the ecology of the image requires of our 
commonsense, by exploring the counter-intuitive notion of relationality. It will 
examine ideas that support the development of relationality and its practical 
application to the reading/researching activity of ontological design.  
Relationality provides the means to think how the biophysical, artefactual 
and metaphysical things of the world are dynamically articulated. In its 
mobilisation of the priority of relationship over form, relationality specifically 
considers how things gather, interrupt and disseminate a flow of material and 
immaterial relations. Fry indicates that relationality is a way of thinking, based on 
correlative processes and structures, that draws on ancient Chinese thought; a way 
of thinking that is fundamentally different and unnatural for contemporary, 
                                                 
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1995) 151. 
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technologically accelerated Westerners.2 The ambivalent structure of shi provides 
us with a glimpse of this difference; shi avails us of an understanding of the 
dynamic in terms of the static, and is, as Jullien suggests, something we can learn 
from.3 No thing for us appears to be dynamic, ambivalent or mediated by ideas. 
So how can our induction into a mode of theoretical disclosure, that believes it 
sees things as they are, be reworked? Relationality is posited by ontological design 
as a way.  
The idea of relationality in a general sense counters the knowability of the 
world as Descartes’ calculable res extensa. The overdetermining complexity of all 
that is and the dynamism of causal processes cannot be apprehended as a whole. 
While we can never know the world in its entirety or alterity, we can know that the 
things of the world exceed our ability to know them and further, that we also have 
a responsibility toward them as we are inter-implicated in their worlding. The 
practice of relationality attempts to see things as “situated instances of worlding.”4 
Things bear the material and symbolic marks of design activity and intention, 
which indicate the culture of their making and use. A relational practice learns to 
respond to these signs. It also entails an understanding of the particular and 
habitual nature of our vision, wherein relations must be created as much as 
discovered.5  
                                                 
2 Fry further notes that some significant Western scholars have recognised the importance of 
relationality, namely Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as well as the collaborative pair David Hall and 
Roger Ames. A New Design Philosophy 13-14. 
3 Jullien says in his introduction: “The logic of shi could even pass beyond peculiar cultural 
perspectives and thereby illuminate something that is usually difficult to capture in discourse: 
namely, the kind of potential that originates not in human initiative but instead results from the 
very disposition of things. Instead of always imposing our longing for meaning on reality, let us 
open ourselves to this immanent force and learn to seize it.” The Propensity of Things 13. 
4 Willis, “Redirective Practice: Ontological Designing” 18.  
5 The consequence of learning to see how we see is itself a powerful designing of difference that is 
transformative of self and world. Niklas Luhmann’s understanding of the practice of self and 
‘second-order’ observation is important in this regard. He says “a system can only see what it can 
see…(n)evertheless, a system that observes other systems …can also observe the restrictions 
forced on the observed system by its own mode of operation.” Ecological Communication 23. 
Luhmann’s thought is explored in relation to the televisual in Part 2.  
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The attempt to understand things as dynamic and non-linear draws 
relationality close to the thought of ecology, but relationality differs from ecology 
in several respects. Particularly, it is the latter's deep attachment to the unmediated 
character of the world, as well as its authority to access and describe this world, 
that relationality challenges.  
The idea of ecology as it emerged from German romanticism was a way to 
understand the whole of nature by way of its smaller, knowable parts or 
‘households’, from which knowledge about the world could be extrapolated.6 
Historians of ecology show how the meaning of the term has changed over time 
and in relation to the cultural climate. The modern sense of ecology suffers from 
an identity crisis: it is both the sign and the science of nature.7  
Underlying the notion of ecology is a basic faith in objective truth.8 It 
supports both the harmonic vision of the abstinent approach to nature as well as 
the ‘right use’ approach of energy economists. Ecology effortlessly absorbs 
excessive complexity in its belief that the truth of nature can be apprehended. 
Further, it has little sense of the role of its tools (languages, technologies, methods) 
in producing this truth, or of the ecological implications of our increasingly 
electronically-mediated culture, which has fundamentally altered the experience of 
                                                 
6 Ernst Haeckel coined the name ‘ecology’ in 1866 for his study of the patterns of relationship 
between organisms and their environments. In her history, Anna Bramwell says ecology was used 
originally as co-terminous with ethology, the study of animal behaviour in its environment, and 
with oekonomie, the concept of ‘economical’ household management. “This implies that the use 
and conservation of resources is a moral activity as well as an economic one; and a morality closely 
bound up with the survival of the group.” Anna Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century: a History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) 15. 
7 In his definition of ecology Donald Worster says, “The major theme throughout the history of this 
science and the ideas that underlie it has been the interdependence of living things. An awareness, 
more philosophical than purely scientific, of this quality is what has generally been meant by the 
‘ecological point of view’. Thus, the question of whether ecology is primarily a science or a 
philosophy of interrelatedness has been a persistent identity problem.” Donald Worster, Nature’s 
Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 471.  
8 “The ecologist believes that nature embodies eternal reality, and also that the scientific method 
provides a means of uncovering the truth. There is a scepticism about ‘traditional’ science but no 
rejection of objectivity.” Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century 18. 
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proximity, as Heidegger shows.9 The biotechnological redesign of ‘nature’, which 
clears the way for productivism in so many fields in spite of ethical debates, has 
also eroded the workability of the concept of an exogenous sphere. Ecology is 
always already caught up in the problem of making distinctions in language and 
then attempting to cover its tracks by discovering those distinctions in the world.10  
This problem returns us to the nature of that world that we are part of. It is 
a world of our making that also makes us. It is a natural world in the sense that it is 
given, as well as an artificial world in that it is human-made. However the world 
we are born into is also a hermeneutic world wherein the natural and artificial are 
inextricably intertwined.11 In light of the hermeneutic circle, one must 
acknowledge that ecology cannot but be a simulation of the background process, 
as it happens out there, indifferently, in the ‘wild’ world. In this world, ecology is 
“exchange without understanding” — a meaningless complexity of allopoietic 
relationships which nonetheless impinge meaningfully on and within our culture.12 
Everything hinges on being brought to presence — observed, interpreted, imaged. 
As Maarten Hajer says, it is our discursive practices that give us our idea of 
nature.13The worldly proof of ecology therefore unavoidably appears as a set of 
relations that must be drawn together by an expert in a particular field, designed 
into a sign, like ‘the greenhouse effect’ to which other events, such as local 
extreme weather can be made to belong. Yet in order to possess particularly 
scientific authority, the productive quality of this process of invention must be 
                                                 
9 Luhmann’s account of the difference a systems-theoretical approach lends to the detached, 
scientific view of ecology is discussed further in Part 2. 
10 The etymology of ecology is also suggestive in this regard: oikos meaning home, house, dwelling 
and logos, which Heidegger explicates as ‘discourse’ or what we understand by language, 
“everything that is spoken or sayable”. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 305. 
11 Fry, Remakings 79. 
12 Fry characterises ecology as “exchange without understanding”, which opens it up as any 
manner of exchange ‘between’ technological, cultural, biophysical systems. Fry, A New Design 
Philosophy 33. 
13 Maarten Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernisation and the 
Policy Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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suppressed, sign and world must be clearly delineated.14 It is the success of this 
designing in language that determines the presence of ecology. It was, for 
example, Carson’s powerful image of a ‘silent spring’ that made real the dangers 
of DDT in the 60s.15  
One of the most useful thinkers of the sign as a designing power is Jean 
Baudrillard. He shows us that in the modern world, representation is not the mere 
re-presentation of reality, but the bringing to reality of reality: simulation.16 In his 
book on Baudrillard, Rex Butler notes the common error of interpreting simulation 
as the take-over of the world by the sign. Like ecological exchange, “we never see 
symbolic exchange as such, but only that sign value which stands in for it.”17 Our 
simulations do not give us what is outside the system, but define the interior limit 
of our systems. However, we live in light of signs of the ‘outside’. As Alec 
McHoul points out, there are whole communities of sign users who operate ‘as-if’ 
“there were existents outside the signs they use, and in order to make those signs 
work.”18 Ecology as a discipline does not acknowledge this presence of the sign; it 
has not learnt to see its own nor nature’s designedness.19
Empirical commonsense tells us that human beings and our artificial things 
effect ecologies but do not produce them. The idea that ecologies can be produced 
by inventions of thought — including ideas about reality, the natural and the 
artificial — offers a significant challenge to the biophysical bias of the concept. As 
                                                 
14 See for example Vasseleau’s essay “Life Itself”, which explores the designing power of medical 
imaging technologies.  
15 Hajer and Fischer argue that when Carson’s 1962 scientific expose of the relational effects of 
DDT was released, this image is what really captured the public imagination. Maarten A. Hajer and 
Frank Fischer, eds. Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 6. 
16 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (New York and 
Brooklyn: Semiotext(e), 1983). 
17 Rex Butler, Jean Baudrillard: the defence of the real (London: Sage, 1999) 88. 
18 Alec McHoul, Semiotic Investigations: Towards an Effective Semiotics (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996) 53. 
19 Anna Bramwell’s definition is revealing in this regard: “…(ecology) is a total world-view which 
does not allow for piece-meal reform, … it believes truth to be attainable, and its attainability to be 
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Bill McKibben argues in The End of Nature, we live in a post-natural world.20 We 
live with ecologies that incorporate the naturalised artificial of the made and 
interpreted world in articulating relationships between biophysical, psycho-social, 
cultural and symbolic processes. Relationality offers a way to rework how we see 
things by wrapping the artificial and hermeneutic worlds into the “flesh” of the 
biophysical world. It evokes the visible as fundamentally conditioned by the 
interpretations of human language and perception.  
 
THE RELATIONALITY OF LANGUAGE  
Every human act takes place in language. Every act 
in language brings forth a world created with others 
in the act of coexistence which gives rise to what is 
human. Thus every human act has an ethical meaning 
because it is an act of constitution of the human 
world. (Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela)21
 
In the frame of what Winograd and Flores call ‘the rationalistic tradition’ 
which informs the commonsense of Western culture, scientific language 
consistently discovers more and more of the objective world through acts of 
naming.22 In science, the sense that there is much that we do not yet know is not in 
any way self-reflective, but rather projects the task of the future accumulation of 
the world through the process of naming things. It is just a matter of time, funds 
and technology. Scientific discovery — what Heidegger called the relentless 
“business of knowing (that) bears itself without limit” — refuses the 
                                                                                                                                      
desireable; it fears the dissipation of energy and resources, and is not anthropocentric.” Bramwell, 
Ecology in the 20th Century 42. 
20 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (London: Viking, 1990) 55. 
21 Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge 247. 
22 The profound realism of scientific languages is shown up in much contemporary philosophy — 
particularly after Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation of the flexibility and variety of 
‘language games’ — by the nominalist understanding that there is no universal reality or 
metaphysical truth that exists independently of particular cases. Wittgenstein showed that “the 
limits of one’s language are also the limits of one’s world.” J.G Merquior, From Prague to Paris: a 
critique of structuralist and poststructuralist thought (London: Verso, 1986) 229.  
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unknowability of the unknown.23 The methodologies of scientific naming and 
bringing to presence constitute a particular disposition toward things that resonates 
in the things themselves.  
Heidegger tells us that we are inducted into a way of seeing via our 
language. He says “…language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by 
dwelling.” 24 The logos of Western thought invites the isolating nomination of 
classes, concepts, categories and equivalences. We do not have a language up to 
the task of describing and bringing into view ecological relationality. Yet it is also 
language as we know and use it that ushers in the possibility of a more relational 
perspective. Relationality can be understood as a habit of thinking that in 
Heidegger’s words steps back “from the thinking that represents — that is, 
explains — to the thinking that responds and recalls.”25  
Language is both our means of making sense and making the world 
sensible. It brings things to being, literally it says being. Heidegger writes, 
“naming does not hand out titles, it does not apply terms, but it calls into the 
word…In the naming the things are called into their thinging. Thinging, they 
unfold world.”26 Naming bids thing and world to come, but they do not subsist 
alongside one another, they penetrate each other. From this perspective language is 
already relational — there is a continuity between thought, interpretation and 
‘what is’ that transcends the apparently different stuff of interpretation and world. 
Relationality hears interdependence in naming.27  
                                                 
23 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth” 147. 
24 “But man is not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities. 
Rather, language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the 
truth of Being, guarding it.” Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi and 
J. Glenn Gray, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993) 237. 
25 Heidegger, “The Thing” 181. 
26 Heidegger, “Language”, Poetry, Language, Thought 198-199. 
27 Arne Naess explains relationality in terms of an interdependence or mutual affectivity, saying 
that organisms are knots in a field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A 
and B is such that the relation belongs to the definition of both A and B. Without the relation, A 
and B are no longer the same things. Naess, Ecology Community and Lifestyle, trans and ed. by 
David Rothberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989) 28. 
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Language is not simply equipment or a mechanism of communication, but 
rather a medium in which things occur. It is environ-mental: of the world as much 
as it is of thought. Heidegger writes, “the two traverse a middle. In it, they are at 
one”.28 Yet there is also separation and difference. For example the copula ‘is’ that 
links the subject with the predicate of a sentence, can be understood as a 
‘threshold’ that undoes discrete concepts (which can never arrive as self 
explanatory) as much as a means of establishing equivalence: “The threshold is the 
ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It sustains the middle in which 
the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other. The threshold bears the 
between.”29   
Language carries out the intimacy and unity of world and thing.30 The 
word, says Heidegger, is not a distinction established between objects only by our 
‘relative’ representations, nor does it prepare for this. “The difference for world 
and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosingly 
appropriates world into the granting of things.”31
To grasp being-in-relationship, Heidegger shows that one must listen to 
what language offers at its limit, rather than search for the explicit presence of 
‘essences’ in it. We do not ‘hear’, for example, individual words, but the intention 
of what is said.  
This is akin to the hermeneutic phenomenological approach to ‘what is’. 
Our discovery of the world is always in the midst of the world and of our situation 
in it. Human being is ‘world-forming’ and “intrinsically a peculiar transposedness 
into the encompassing contextual ring of living beings.”32 We are always already 
thrown in a condition of relationality. We are in relation to inanimate and animate 
things; people, events, environments.  
                                                 
28 Heidegger, “Language” 202. 
29 Heidegger, “Language”204. 
30 Heidegger, “Language” 202. 
31 Heidegger, “Language” 202-203.  
32 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 278. 
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Many of us will witness the coming into language of our children and, 
through them, glimpse the force of interpretation overcoming the material 
constraints we take for granted. For Merleau-Ponty, the child’s learning of 
language is not the acquisition of a coherent system, but a kind of habituation, a 
learning of a structure of conduct.33 The child responds to our intentional naming 
of the world. Her vision travels along our endless pointing out, forming a collage 
that gathers discrete signs (“that is the moon”) into odd amalgams of thing and 
intent (“the moon is following us home!”). The unfolding of the child’s world is so 
forcefully a matter of interpretation that teaching language often feels more like an 
undoing, or prying apart and reorganisation, than a process of accumulation. The 
world is intentionally attached to the child; she is spread out or scattered amongst 
environments and recognises herself in everything.34For Merleau-Ponty, children 
have a “plasticity of vision”.35 The word is never a mere sign, sticking to its terrain 
of mind or page; the word inhabits things and is an expression too of the 
thingliness of the body, a gesture of its engagement and shared nature.  
The significance of interpretation in the phenomenological approach ushers 
in the possibility of a changed view of the intrinsic relationships between things, a 
change in the horizon of our pre-understandings. This is not conceived as a linear 
passage from a state of seeing objects to another of ‘seeing’ relations. Rather, it is 
a concern of design: the production of signs of difference that transforms language 
and being. Language is an artificial element; it is something made and continually 
remade, and enfolds the remaking of perception. A change in our perception of 
relations is critically important for the sustainability of our world-making. 
                                                 
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, trans. William Cobb, The Primacy 
of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000) 99. These 
insights also depend on Wittgenstein who in his Philosophical Investigations teaches us that 
learning language is also an initiation into a way of life.  
34 “The child's person, says Wallon, is in a way scattered through all the images his action gives 
rise to, and it is because of this that he is apt to recognise himself in everything.” Merleau-Ponty, 
“The Child’s Relations with Others” 150. 
35 Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”150. 
 61
 MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE GROUNDED METAPHYSICS OF (IN)VISIBILITY 
There is a sort of madness in vision such that with it I 
go unto the world itself, and yet at the same time the 
parts of that world evidently do not coexist without 
me (the table in itself has nothing to do with the bed 
a yard away); the world is the vision of the world and 
could not be anything else. (Maurice Merleau-
Ponty)36
 
While relationality challenges the commonsense naming of things, it does not 
attempt to bypass the visible. It seeks, in positive terms, to consider the invisible as 
an invisible of the world. Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations of the phenomenal world 
as visible and invisible — an idea that we henceforth refer to as the (in)visible — 
helps us to make the idea of relationality sensible. The manifest whole of the 
world picture — which presents “in the form of a whole” — is contested by this 
idea of a relational whole.37
Merleau-Ponty argues that the visible, like language, is a system of 
differences, but these differences knit the world together rather than evacuate or 
cleave apart the perceiving body and its phenomenal situation. The visible is not 
just frontal, but all around us and in us — we do not see our interior organs but our 
visible body makes them sensible nonetheless. The invisible is not, contra Sartre, a 
void of negativity, the threatening unknown or imminent knowledge, but the lining 
of the visible, its interior limit. The visible mediates the invisible in being.38 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought enables us to speak about an inside and an outside, actual 
                                                 
36 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 75. 
37 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 285. 
38 This recalls the closing paragraphs of Heidegger’s “The Age of the World Picture”: “Everyday 
opinion sees in the shadow only the lack of light, if not light’s complete denial. In truth, however, 
the shadow is a manifest, though impenetrable, testimony to the concealed emitting of light. In 
keeping with this concept of shadow, we experience the incalculable as that which, withdrawn from 
representation, is nevertheless manifest in whatever is, pointing to Being, which remains 
concealed.” (154). 
 62
delineations that are nonetheless inter-implicated: joined by the threshold of the 
between.  
For Merleau-Ponty, our bodies are both sentient and sensible, both distinct 
from things and indelibly part of them, intertwined in the world. In The Visible and 
the Invisible a primordial sharing, empathy and mutuality of being is made present 
in an evocation of the common experience of touch. Merleau-Ponty says we 
achieve: 
…a veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand touches my left 
hand while it is palpating the things, where the ‘touching subject’ passes 
over to the rank of the touched, descends into the things, such that the 
touch is formed in the midst of the world and as it were in the things.39  
Merleau-Ponty’s grand metaphor, the “flesh of the world”, grounds 
phenomenological investigation in our experience as embodied beings. “(E)very 
relation between me and Being, even vision, even speech, is a carnal relation — 
with the flesh of the world.”40 This metaphor is both specific and general, self-
evident and flexible enough to take shape by way of description: it “is not matter, 
is not mind, is not substance…” but “an element of being, like water, earth, air, 
fire.” Flesh is a “general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual 
and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever 
there is a fragment of being.”41 It is the mediational character of flesh that 
Merleau-Ponty emphasises. The flesh points in two directions at once, it has a 
porous quality, it breathes or seeps as well as containing or separating.42  
The flesh of the world ‘remembers’ the ground that philosophy has 
forgotten or cast into doubt in favour of its own “floating realities”.43 It recognises 
                                                 
39 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 134. 
40 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 83. 
41 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 139. 
42 Jerry H. Gill, Merleau-Ponty and Metaphor (New Jersey and London: Humanities Press 
International, 1991) 60.  
43 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 106. 
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that our bodies and their capacities fundamentally limit us. Like Heidegger’s 
relational approach to existing language, things are always already what they are, 
but the ambition is to see things in a new way. The relationality of the flesh 
becomes the primal aspect of being-in-the-world, a “fundamental homogeneity”44 
and the “formative medium of object and subject”.45 The flesh brings to light the 
tacit promise of worldliness “that the things pass into us as well as we into the 
things.”46  
This quality of the flesh is an evocative and enabling premise for taking 
Heidegger’s thought of being-in-the-world in new directions. For David Michael 
Levin, who consistently remarks on the absence of the body in Heidegger’s 
thought, the flesh deconstructs “in one devastating sweep, not only the dualism of 
subject and object, but also the egology and objectivity of the body — and indeed, 
the entire complex of metaphysical representations within which the human body 
has been held captive.”47 For Levin, the flesh evokes the importance of getting 
back in touch with an authentic, pre-cultural body of nature. However it is also a 
meditation on the nature of philosophical reflection, a grounding of the 
metaphysical character of scholarly thought. “Thought is a relationship with 
oneself and with the world as well as a relationship with the other; hence it is 
established in three dimensions at the same time.”48 It is not natural to understand 
thought as relational. Attempting to imagine relationality, to ‘try on’ the idea of 
discrete things as flesh-of-the-world, impinges usefully on our enculturation as 
Western subjects.  
                                                 
44 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 114. 
45 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 147. 
46 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 123. 
47 David Michael Levin, The Body’s Recollection of Being: Phenomenological Psychology and the 
Deconstruction of Nihilism (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 65. For Levin, 
there is a pre-cultural body. Levin argues that it is only by getting back in touch with this 
primordial, ontologically attuned ‘visionary being’ that humanity can escape the nihilistic destiny 
of the modern world. This argument is made in The Opening of Vision and will be discussed in Part 
2. 
48 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 145. 
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 Merleau-Ponty’s grounded metaphysics allows for the intuitive experience 
of direct perception but at the same time denies the ambient indifference of the 
world implied, for example, by James Gibson’s influential theory of ecological 
optics, in which the natural world gives up culture-free, invariant information to 
the perceiver.49 From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, this scientific approach to 
perception serves to differentiate further man and world and to disregard the 
changes that the perceiving body also produces in the visible.50  
Science consistently undermines the reciprocity of the sentient and the 
sensible. For example, the face-off between biological beings and technology 
authenticates the dualism of subject and object. MIT’s Laboratory for Human 
Machine Haptics have experimented with isolating monkey brain signals that 
precede various actions and then feeding those signals into a computer connected 
to a robotic arm. Theoretically, the robot will be able to send tactile sensations 
back to the source, providing the feedback required for the body to incorporate the 
prosthetic device. “What would happen”, asks James Geary with a tone of 
dystopian mock-horror, “if the process was reversed? The signals that are routed 
from the monkey’s brain to the computer to control the robotic arm could be sent 
back to the monkey — to control its behaviour?”51 Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger 
show us that these premises are all wrong; feedback is always in the intention of 
                                                 
49 Gibson’s influential theory of perception contends that we have direct and unmediated access to 
the world, which is independently meaningful. Physical worldly surfaces receive light and thus 
form in spite of our interest. The environments around us contain natural invariant information, 
which we perceive and act upon in order to survive, without recourse to interpretation. This he 
explained by the concept of ‘affordances’, what things “furnish, for good or ill, that is, what they 
afford the observer”. Gibson quoted in Ian E.Gordon Theories of Visual Perception (Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1989) 159. Variation occurs because invariance is met by the different 
perceptual capabilities of beings, not by their cultural or interpretational differences. Gibson’s 
affordance theory was brought to design discourse by Donald Norman in his interpretation of the 
design/user interface in The Design of Everyday Things. 
50 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 134. 
51 James Geary, excerpt from his book The Body Electric in Time magazine’s special interactive 
technology issue 4 June, 2001: 49. 
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the thing.52 However aside from indicating the unfortunately hermetic nature of 
philosophy, such projects show the extent to which rationalist interpretations of 
subject and object are put to work in the world. The material extensions of 
technological design stand over the primordial reciprocity of things. They make up 
the world that relationality must learn to negotiate.  
Technological incorporation in such examples takes place at the level of 
material changes, inserting things into the body and running circuits out of the 
body, rather than in the more abstract terms of intention and empathy. Yet even 
without these physical appendages, the body is already turned inside out, reshaped 
by image ecologies that have transformed the experience of embodiment in ways 
that challenge the openness of perception implied by Merleau-Ponty’s flesh of the 
world.  
The transformation of embodiment during pregnancy is an example. 
Contemporary pregnancy invites an ever-increasing array of image technologies 
able to measure, calculate, verify and describe the foetus in transparent detail, 
including a new three-dimensional, full-colour ultrasound screening. These images 
mark the experience of being pregnant and one is confronted by the learnt ease of 
the incorporation of such models, not least the ability of the image to assuage 
anxiety by describing the unseen in a radical symbolic suturing and restoration of 
‘natural’ embodiment.53 The image is attached to the body and becomes part of its 
burden. The impact of an image does not dwell in the image, but in the force of the 
relations it makes in the world. 
The designed world that takes shape through such examples differs 
substantially to that which Merleau-Ponty inhabits in The Visible and the Invisible, 
which is infused by the primacy of naturalness, the organic quality of pregnancy, 
                                                 
52  For Heidegger, the objectifying tendency of science evident in such experiments annihilates the 
thingness of things. “The Thing” 170.  
53 This tendency is augmented by the growing popularity of ‘whole body scanning’, which is being 
used to pre-empt disease by visual means. One can imagine that when this procedure is normalised 
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and the ingenuousness of empathy. Levin says Merleau-Ponty does not recognise 
that the light “in conformity with which our vision takes place” is not a pure or 
natural light, but rather “a condition of visibility determined… by the world our 
vision has built for us.”54 The ease of listening back into the body and forward into 
the world, to what Merleau-Ponty calls the “wild being”, is scrambled by the force 
of designed languages that now inhabit the world and us.  
THE ‘FLESH’ OF COMMUNICATION 
There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an 
ecology of weeds. (Gregory Bateson)55  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the medium of the flesh entails communication based on a 
primordial empathy and openness.56 The generous relationality of the flesh of the 
world prepares the way for considering how design has obscured it. For this, 
Bateson’s ecology of ideas is extremely useful. Bateson’s thought elaborates the 
worlding of rationalist interpretations and acknowledges the power of design.  
Bateson rejects the mindlessness of nature that is the interpretation of both 
modern physics and the tradition of metaphysics. For Bateson, ‘mind’ is immanent 
in pathways and messages outside the body.57 His thesis of the “ecology of the 
mind” connects the ecological and the biological via communication. 
Communication for Bateson concerns the practical consequences of ideas. It is a 
conceived as a kind of path-finding by way of which restraints of redundancy and 
feedback steer choice. 58 In the cybernetic epistemology Bateson proposes, what 
                                                                                                                                      
and our bodies rendered completely transparent, we will look back in horror to a time when we 
lived with the intolerable risk of our embodied ‘darkness’. 
54 Levin, The Opening of Vision 86.  
55 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 492. 
56 “What is essential … is to see that a perspective on the other is opened to me from the moment I 
define him and myself as ‘conducts’ at work in the world, as ways of ‘grasping’ the natural and 
cultural world surrounding us.” Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception 117. 
57 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 339. 
58 This is a kind of path-finding. Communication for Bateson is the creation of restraints related to 
‘feedback’ and restraints related to ‘redundancy’ and predictable patterns, which steer choice. 
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 409-412. 
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‘thinks’ and thus communicates is the ‘man’ plus the product (thing or idea) plus 
the environment. As things come to embody and reproduce ideas, they 
communicate. Communication in these terms is a form of coordination or 
“structural coupling”, to borrow a term from Maturana and Varela, rather than a 
conscious operation generated at a certain point.59  
Ideas for Bateson are differences that make a difference. As human-
generated information, ideas enter the world ecologically and cause things to 
happen. They become embodied, “hard-programmed” in environmental, material 
things, which confirm and perpetuate the habits of thought that produced them.60 
Bateson says “the universe is informed by the message; and the ‘form’ of which 
we are speaking is not in the message nor is it in the referent. It is a 
correspondence between message and referent.”61  
The most problematic idea that has entered the world in this way is, for 
Bateson, the rationalist idea of transcendent mind. Where for Merleau-Ponty 
transcendental philosophy is a form of perceptual composure, in Bateson it has 
designs on the world. The rationalist idea itself constitutes a system, but one that 
lacks information about the communicational nature of systems and the 
immanence of mind. By forcing the linear structure of what Bateson calls 
“purposive consciousness” on the outer world, we become, he argues, blind to the 
cybernetic relationality of self and external world. Rational things — 
infrastructures, institutions, industrial processes, products — find their own 
momentum, but miss their own systemic effects, like poisons toxically flowing 
through the food-chain willed on, in increasingly powerful ways, by an immune 
industrial infrastructure.  
                                                 
59 Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge 196. 
60 For Bateson habit is ‘hard-programmed’ in things. “The economy (of habit) consists in precisely 
not re-examining or rediscovering the premises of habit every time the habit is used.”…“a habit of 
not examining (these premises) is developed.” Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 274. As a 
consequence, “(t)rusted ideas…become available for immediate use without thoughtful 
inspection.” (509).  
61 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 414. 
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For Bateson it is the increasing incongruence of these systems and their 
“speaking at cross-purposes” that has led to “ecological pathology”.62 The flow of 
toxins is a form of communication: the ecological movement of toxins 
communicates pathology. More and more, the erroneous premises of our 
acculturation, our familiar, Western epistemological values work and propagate 
themselves, and in this way “basic errors of our thought become reinforced by 
thousands of cultural details.”63  
This notion of ecological communication removes ecology from the outer 
world and makes it an effect of design. This is highly suggestive of design’s need 
to take responsibility for the systemic effects it puts in play. The problem for 
Bateson is essentially one of the bias or attitude of the system, substantially 
augmented by the ‘set’ of technological systems that conform to the bias.64 It is not 
enough, however, to simply know this. We are, he says, governed by 
epistemologies that we know to be wrong.65 We live them. We have learnt to 
habitually ignore the relationality of the systems we depend upon. We need to 
learn to learn in Bateson’s terminology, learn to receive new signals in an 
adaptive way attuned to change rather than to the perpetuation of the status quo.66 
This is not learning as the revision of choices within an unchanged set of 
alternatives — as with the transfer of instrumental knowledges in representational 
sets. Rather, it is learning to change the attitude of the system, to revise the set 
from which the choice is to be made. 67
What must be learnt, according to Bateson, are things as relationships. 
Things — the scientist’s microscope, the root structure of a tree — are not usefully 
conceived as positive objects but rather as “pathways of communication”, real 
                                                 
62 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 440. 
63 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 4 93.  
64 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 440. 
65 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 493. 
66 “Learning denotes change and change denotes process which is itself subject to change.” 
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 283. 
67 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 287. 
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only insofar as they are communicationally effective. This perspective reveals the 
systemic dependency of designed things that are, nonetheless, designed and 
produced as objects. The de-centred agency proposed by ontological design bears 
a significant relation to the ecology of mind, made explicit in the following 
description of immanent mind and its difference from the Western position on 
mind and its intent: 
Consider a man felling a tree with an axe. Each stroke of the axe is 
modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree left 
by the previous stroke. This self-corrective (ie mental) process is brought 
about by a total system, tree-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree; and it is 
this total system that has the characteristics of immanent mind… But this is 
not how the average Occidental sees the event sequence of tree felling. He 
says, ‘I cut down the tree’ and he even believes that there is a delimited 
agent, the ‘self’, which performed a delimited ‘purposive’ action upon a 
delimited object… popular parlance includes mind in its utterance by 
invoking the personal pronoun, and then achieves a mixture of mentalism 
and physicalism by restricting mind within the man and reifying the tree. 
Finally the mind itself becomes reified by the notion that, since the ‘self’ 
acted upon the axe, which acted upon the tree, the ‘self’ must also be a 
‘thing’.68  
The open circuitry of Bateson’s cybernetic model of immanent mind denaturalises 
the subjective deposit of rational decision-making. He acknowledges, however, the 
ubiquity of ‘average Occidental’ thinking, his own included. Nonetheless, this 
model foregrounds the transformative power of ideas as they conduct relationality, 
moulding both perception and form.  
This supports the thesis that things have design agency: they communicate 
ontological modes by their designing. The thousands of cultural details that 
                                                 
68 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 317-318.  
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compose our naturalised artificial world need to be read, in this regard, non-
thematically: as the relational products of a mind-set that is regenerated 
incrementally, in specific configurations.69 From this perspective, designing takes 
on a new significance because it also incurs a responsibility to understand the 
transformative promise of design. This problematises the expedient of imagining 
and designing objects and opens the idea of design in practice to new avenues in 
the contemporary context of unsustainability. 
An idea is a difference that generates differences. Let us consider an 
example. The idea of ‘dematerialisation’ can be understood as a product of the 
way means and ends are disassociated in actual technological operation, but also 
functions as a significant driver of the design of new technological devices and 
fashions desire by way of promotional images. In recent times it has also become 
an important idea for a materially prudent design practice that understands it is 
often the service or result delivered by a product rather than the material entity that 
consumers require.70 Yet dematerialisation can also be seen as further 
disassociating human actions from their environmental conditions and 
consequences. It is easy to overlook the fact that a stand-alone, lightweight, 
wireless laptop relies on a heavy infrastructure of global materials, manufacture, 
distribution, image design and communication, base station transmitters and 
industrial waste collection. The product user learns to expect the promised 
capability of dematerialisation in a world that is anything but immaterial.71
                                                 
69 Clive Dilnot evokes design as a ‘configurative activity’ between objects of knowledge and literal 
objects: “suppose that (a) posited lack of relation between configured things and configurations of 
knowledge is not the case — suppose indeed that the relation between objects of knowledge and 
literal objects is internal and dynamic, a correlation (of sorts) not a lack of relation… there is no 
object of knowledge (certainly in the modern period) that is not grounded on a model of objecthood 
just as there is no production of literal objects which is not at the same time the production of 
knowledge.” Clive Dilnot, “To Change the Object Itself”, Form/Work 1. 2 (1998): 10. 
70 For an up-to-date critical review of developments in dematerialisation see the D/Mat design 
project at the EcoDesign Foundation website: www.edf.edu.au. Last Accessed December 15, 2004.
71 There is a tendency to downplay the fact that the new ‘post modern’, digital era is still largely 
reliant on mechanical and modern devices, processes and infrastructures. W. J. T Mitchell for 
example, states “Biocybernetic reproduction has replaced Walter Benjamin’s mechanical 
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For Manzini, who uses Bateson’s critique to consider how design might 
lose its ecological blindness, we currently lack a design culture that is up to the 
task of negotiating the progressive ‘artificiality’ of our environments. We live in a 
technologically accelerated culture where both form and performance are liberated 
and technique and experience have parted company. With advances in engineering 
and materials science, “matter — which is always considered the solid, stable, 
inert counterpart of ideas — seems to have become pliable and capable of being 
moulded into any possible form.”72 Due to the fluid, alchemical qualities of a 
material like plastic, which represents the idealisation of matter, whatever can be 
thought, can also be made.73  
  
                                                                                                                                      
reproduction as the fundamental technical determinant of our age. If mechanical reproducibility 
(photography, cinema, the automobile) dominated the era of modernism, biocybernetic 
reproduction (video, digital imaging, the Web) dominates the age known as ‘postmodern’.” W.J.T 
Mitchell, “Biocybernetic Reproduction”. Lecture given at the Museum of Contemporary Art, 
August 15, 2001. 
72Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 221. 
73 See Ezio Manzini, The Material of Invention (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). 
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CHAPTER 3. THE ECOLOGY OF THE ARTIFICIAL  
 
The work of Manzini is perhaps as close as the practice of industrial design 
comes to the critically reflective nature of cultural theory. Yet unlike much 
cultural theory, as we shall see, Manzini provides a design direction for these 
reflections. His analysis of the culture of materials, and in particular the design 
scenarios he puts forward, present a range of opportunities for exploring the 
potential of design to reorient the social imagination.1  
However even while his arguments illuminate the leading role of ideas 
in shaping the matter of the world, his understanding of the artificial still hangs 
on an idealist opposition informed by a conception of physical (and perhaps 
moral) limit.2 For Manzini, the uncontrolled admittance of ideas into the 
material world has resulted in a retraction of real conditions and led to the loss 
of cultural significance. Just as in the physical environment the production of 
materiality has overstepped the environment’s ability to absorb excess, 
Manzini says that we are now discovering that the ‘semiosphere’ — the 
environment of ideas, information, signs — is also limited and the production 
of meanings oversteps the ability of materiality to absorb them, resulting in the 
production of ‘semiotic refuse’.3
The opposition of matter and idea persists in design theory. Victor 
Margolin, for example, holds that it is important to consider the natural and the 
artificial as distinct and non-interchangeable realms in order to limit the 
                                                 
1 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 237-38.  
2 In his critique of Susan Sontag, who argues that the photographic image contests the limits of 
meaning in On Photography, Andrew Ross writes that she must have in mind “ some Judeo-
Christian meaning of ‘pollution’, as applied to the moral equilibrium of the mind-body, and 
marked by the perversion of that balance.” Andrew Ross, “The Ecology of Images”, The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 91:1 (Duke University Press, 1992): 221. 
3 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 223. 
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ecological incursions of design as “the conception and planning of the 
artificial”.4 For many design theorists, the devaluation of design is considered 
to be inversely proportional to the rise of the image in design culture and an 
attendant failure to understand products as material entities. Designers are 
accused of falling into the superficial realm of “building, aiding and abetting 
the global image economy”.5 Design theorists Peter-Paul Verbeek and Petran 
Kokelkoren for example, say design has simply forgotten that “matter matters”: 
“When we strip all non-material aspects of products, something remains that is 
more than language, more than symbol, meaning, function, or icon. What 
remains is the thing as thing.” 6  
Manzini suggests that the way back to this matter of the thing is 
through the recovery of an ethic of limit in the physical and semiotic 
environments. We need, he says, new models to comprehend reality, models 
that allow for the irreducible complexity of ecological systems to show 
through. Drawing on Bateson, he proposes “to apply to the artificial 
environment the interpretative models that ecology has developed for the 
natural environment”.7 He envisages a “garden of objects” in which made 
things have “the variety, complexity, life and blend of beauty and utility of a 
garden, but at the same time, are a product of the real world, a world 
extensively and intensively artificial.”8 This new “ecology of the artificial” 
seeks to integrate themes of quantity and quality. In a strong sense, it lends to 
the artificial the conservative values that appear to be intrinsically embodied in 
the material world, and which ecology reminds us of.  
The problem with this view is that it suggests that the ecology of the 
artificial is a degraded, second ecology that must learn from the distinct, 
                                                 
4 Following Herbert Simon, Victor Margolin holds that it is important to consider the natural 
and the artificial as distinct and non-interchangeable realms in order to limit the ecological 
incursions of design as “the conception and planning of the artificial.” (107) Margolin, The 
Politics of the Artificial 120. 
5 Mau, Lifestyle 85. 
6 Verbeek and Kockelkoren, “The Things that Matter.” 
7 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 228. 
8 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 239. 
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primary ecology of nature.9 For Manzini, “the ecology of the artificial” is 
circumscribed by the dynamic equilibrium that is determined between artificial 
entities in this second world.10 Yet it is the artificial, as design, that governs our 
perceptions and thus experiences of the natural. I have explored thinkers who 
have shown us that ideas are formed in the heart of the world. For Merleau-
Ponty ideas are embodied; for Bateson ideas communicate differences and for 
Heidegger, ideas structure worlds. All of this struggles with a history that 
thinks of things as pure essences and entities, and in discrete terms. The world 
cannot be stripped of its cultural cloaking; it cannot be exposed in itself. One 
might respond to Verbeek and Kokelkoren in this regard that yes, matter 
matters, but this is only insofar as matter means. 
Artificiality then, is not a property of something so much as an issue of 
perception and experience. The experienced ecological ‘misfit’ of design does 
not arise from the proliferation of the artificial and the limits of the biosphere, 
but is a product of design’s capacity to shape people’s experiences of limits.11 
The ‘water shortage’ is for example a shortage only in terms of understandings 
of requirements shaped by design. In spite of the growth of the artificial 
environment, our designed world is largely naturalised. The artificiality of 
designed things is not usually encountered as such in the environments where 
they have a natural force. Merleau-Ponty suggests as much when he says 
resemblance belongs to thought:  
Why should we henceforth puzzle over reflections and mirrors? These 
unreal duplications are a class of things; they are real effects like a 
                                                 
9 Krippendorff uses the biological model of ecology to discuss relations between species of 
artefacts in “On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts or on the Proposition that ‘Design is 
Making Sense of Things’ ”, The Idea of Design, eds. Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995)156-184. 
10 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 229. 
11 The concept of ‘fit’ is an important one in design, from ergonomics to the interrelation of 
product form and environmental context. Christopher Alexander writes “…every design 
problem begins with an effort to achieve fitness between two entities: the form in question and 
its context. The form is the solution to the problem; the context defines the problem.” For 
Alexander, design is this ensemble. Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964) 15. 
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ball’s bouncing. If the reflection resembles the thing itself, it is because 
this reflection acts upon the eyes more or less as a thing would.12  
 
Regardless of questions of quality, the transparency of things 
problematises both the identification of antecedent parameters such as 
environmental limits or experiential reductions in cultural significance. 
Artificiality is less some thing that is available to rein in or control than a 
means of acknowledging that the world breaks through only in designated 
ways. This is particularly significant in current conditions, as design, while 
itself artificial, increasingly diminishes the presence and character of artifice.  
We need to learn to recognise design’s artificiality. The limited 
intrusiveness of many modern designed things often comes with the price of 
amplified though unrecognised environmental effects. Learning to see design’s 
artificiality opens the designed as a consequence of making. The artificial can 
be seen as a modest alienation of the system we are intimately wrapped up in. 
As Winograd and Flores suggest in relation to the experience of the 
breakdown, this also presents an opportunity for design innovation.  
Industrial design has responded to the pressure to absorb ecology by 
making products with a range of environmental attributes — recycled content, 
reusable packaging, socially responsible sponsorship. These products suggest 
that they tread more lightly on the earth than their predecessors. However their 
form of modernisation does not challenge current perceptions and has not made 
a difference to the increasing flow of products. Their cultural significance is 
still governed by rationalist epistemologies. Niklas Luhmann suggests that 
ecological relationality needs to achieve more cultural resonance. He says “To 
the extent that technological intervention changes nature and problems result 
from this for society, greater rather than less competence for intervention has 
to be developed, but practiced according to criteria which include reaction on 
itself.”13 Designers need to develop this competence. 
                                                 
12 Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception 170. 
13 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 14. 
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This brings us to the final part of this chapter, to the idea of the pro-duct 
and the incremental ethics it entails. Bateson’s relational mobilisation of matter 
and ideas — the ecology of mind — tells us that designed things, in addition to 
being measures of the designer’s understanding or misunderstanding about 
systemic complexity, are themselves systemic.  
The systemic nature of the pro-duct can be initially explored by 
considering a range of prospective design strategies proposed by Manzini from 
the perspective of what they are themselves attempting to communicate rather 
than as instructions for environmental problem solving. These strategies aim to 
promote a design sensibility able to interpret the product not just in its own 
self-evident terms, but as a node intersected by streams of other products.14 
Each strategy poses a different interpretation of the matter of the product:  
1.  Minimal matter. The elimination or minimisation of the physicality of a 
product, or dematerialising it by replacing it with a service that requires 
fewer material resources. In this scenario, the product disappears and 
spreads out, becomes a pure commodity, a “product-service”.15 However 
as suggested above, this strategy is easy to decontextualise from its 
material bases, as Manzini knows, and thus must also engender 
relationships far beyond the replacement of product function — as has 
been seen with “the myth of the paper-less office”, human beings are 
attached to material things for a range of cultural reasons beyond the 
function of those things.16  
2.  Eternal matter. Products conceived to last well beyond the human 
lifespan. In this scenario the product overcomes technological or 
aesthetic redundancy to demonstrate superior qualities of cultural 
resilience. The sign here takes a key design role. “It is necessary,” 
                                                 
14 Manzini stresses that innovation arises not in isolation but in society; that the aim of strategic 
design is “not a product or family of products, but a system of relations.” Manzini, “Toward a 
new product-service mix” 10. 
15 Manzini explores this aspect of dematerialisation in Manzini, “Towards a new product-
service mix”. His more recent work on ‘product-service systems’ is listed in a bibliography of 
his works in English, available from the EcoDesign Foundation website: www.edf.edu.au. 
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Manzini says, “… to construct stable and lasting identities that can be 
placed in a recognisable manner in the cultural space in which we are 
immersed.”17 This demands a new aesthetics “that attributes worth to 
materials and products that in some way are able to embody vestiges of 
their earlier existences.”18  
3.  Matter as medium. This third strategy involves the accommodation of the 
self-conscious ephemerality of forms by limited material quota — a 
strategy perhaps best suited to plastic.19 In this scenario the product 
concept achieves an internal flexibility, the design challenge becomes the 
material management of transformation through ‘old for new’ industrial 
processes like recycling, reuse and remanufacture. In these processes, a 
visible relation to the life-span of the product’s material-medium must be 
maintained, through labels with explicit material management 
instructions for example. 
 
On the one hand Manzini suggests that these are negotiation strategies 
after the discovery of limits. They are predominantly about making a better fit 
with reality and closing the gap between the limited perspective of ‘purposive 
consciousness’ and the ecological complexity that the Western culture of doing 
until now “did not want to see”.20 But he also suggests that the most specific 
task of the designer is to make visible new scenarios for quality, to bring them 
into being. These are cultural strategies that seek to change the relationships 
that happen between designers, products and product users. They are not about 
the ‘discovery’ of material limit and complexity, they are about creating new 
                                                                                                                                 
16 See Abigail J. Sellen and Richard H.R. Harper, The Myth of the Paperless Office 
(Cambridge: MIT, 2002). 
17 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 223. 
18 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 236. The Dutch design group Eternally Yours, with 
whom Manzini is involved, focus on ways to increase the cultural durability of products by 
harnessing the identity mechanism of the image, and will be discussed further in Part 3. 
19 Manzini, “The world of materials and the material world.”  
20 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 233. 
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experiences of limit and complexity.21 In the first case however, before another 
product is made, these experiences need to be opened for the designer for 
whom products are still overwhelmingly thought of as material objects that 
have been designed and delivered through mass production.   
The systemic perspective fundamentally challenges the notion of what a 
product is or could be. The idea of design as form, process, and agency opens 
up the product as a conduit for cultural perpetuation or redirection: it “is not a 
closure, is not complete, but rather it is an opening that further facilitates life 
exchange.”22 The pro-duct is ‘what designs’ as distinct from ‘what is 
designed’. It understands that design has implications far beyond the 
immediate designing activity and therefore that design work at the incremental 
and formal level, is also design work at a cultural level. 
The creation of new forms to desire and care for, about and with as well 
as to be cared for by, is undoubtedly an ethical imperative. The pro-duct does 
have a formal ambition: it is conceived as an exemplary embodiment of ethical 
designing, “…a sign, material process and cultural facilitation of change”. 23 
Yet it needs to be acknowledged that we do not yet have the means to deliver 
such a form, to understand what it could or should be. We do not, as Luhmann 
suggests, have the competency for intervention required to make an informed, 
strategic difference. Ecodesign has predominantly decanted its insights into 
prefigured forms that reiterate the status quo of being with things. It has 
certainly not succeeded in the task of facilitating change. The inscription of 
care thus needs to be preceded by description of the careless, as a fundamental 
and elevated part of the design process.  
In this, the visual dimension of the product becomes more than the 
mere rhetorical skin of something, the image that conceals materiality. It 
becomes the key directional force of relationships between products and users 
                                                 
21 “the discovery of limits no longer appears as the reduction of possibilities, but as the source 
for new ones.” Manzini, “Toward an Ecology of the Artificial Environment” unpublished 
manuscript (1991). 
22 Fry, Remakings 176. 
23Tony Fry, “Pro-duct” EcoDesign Foundation Lexicon (unpublished) 1996. 
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— the interface that facilitates understanding and action. The eidos is the 
means to understanding the product’s gathering of natural, artificial and 
hermeneutic elements.  
 
*** 
 
One of the most defining images in Merleau-Ponty's work is of the joint, pivot 
or hinge.24 He says:  
...there are two ways in which we can consider the image — one, a 
reflective, analytic way according to which the image is nothing but an 
appearance in a visible world and has nothing to do with me; the other, 
a global and direct one, of the kind which we use in immediate life 
when we do not reflect and which gives us the image as something 
which solicits our belief. 25
The image is therefore never simply before us, it is “mysteriously inhabited by 
me; it is something of myself” and in its mode of revealing offers themes of 
possible activity for my own body.26  
This brings to presence the fundamental ambivalence of the image: it is 
representational and relational, visible and invisible. In what follows we try to 
preserve this ambivalence by selectively utilising the nominations of image and 
sign. The ‘image’ idealises something discrete, like an icon. The ‘sign’, on the 
other hand, is always indicative; a sign for someone or something. The sign 
indicates the joining of positions and the mutuality of communication. The 
image inclines toward content, the sign toward possible meaningful destinies.27 
                                                 
24 The hinge (la brisure) also figures in Derrida. For him it “marks the impossibility that a sign, 
the unity of a signifier and signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present and an 
absolute presence.” Derrida, Of Grammatology 69. 
25 Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception 132. 
26 Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception 132. 
27 Gregory Bateson’s cybernetic approach to communication helps us understand the sign as 
pro-ductive and prefigurative. “It is, I believe, of prime importance to have a conceptual 
system which will force us to see the ‘message’ (eg the art object) as both itself internally 
patterned and itself a part of a larger patterned universe — the culture or some part of 
it.”Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 132. 
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The image can also be interpreted as a sign of the (in)visible relations it brings 
into being: the ‘smoke’ that speaks of an unseen ‘fire’.28 When I seek to 
emphasise the intentional relationality of the image it becomes a ‘sign’, when I 
want to emphasise the force of representation, it is an ‘image’.  
In summary, the meaning of the ‘ecology of the image’: it is a naming; 
a hermeneutic strategy; an object of critique and a proposal. It is a naming that 
brings into question the ‘naturalness’ of ecology and the ‘artificiality’ of the 
image. It is a hermeneutic strategy that seeks to make apparent the 
transformative agency of the image and the significance of perception and 
interpretation in enacting this agency. It is an object of critique in that the 
agency of the image is expressed in designed things that can be systematically 
observed and described. Finally, it is a proposal for a ‘new’ design recognition 
of the material significance of image ecologies.29  
The focus on the field of product design lends coherence to this 
diversity. Ontological design reveals that design is not a profession but a form 
of world-making. Thus all ‘professional’ and ‘private’ practices are implicitly 
design practices and thus sites for the remaking of image ecologies. However, 
the domain of product design, which converges on everyday life, ‘consumer 
culture’, aesthetics, architecture, engineering, sociology, media studies, 
philosophy to name but a few, is both sufficiently ‘material’ and ‘imaginary’ 
enough to provide a starting point and appropriate example for engaging with 
the ecology of the image. Products are an appropriately incremental focus for 
the broad and often epic concerns of sustainability, but they are also 
undeniably powerful cultural forces that shape life styles.  
                                                 
28 Umberto Eco says “there is a sign every time a human group decides to use and to recognize 
something as the vehicle of something else.” Thus “smoke is only a sign of fire to the extent 
that fire is not actually perceived along with the smoke.” Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics 
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1976) 17. This strategy is the subject of 
Part 3. 
29 This is said in acknowledgement of the danger of evoking the ‘new’ without qualifying very 
carefully what this means. As Heidegger suggests in “The Age of the World Picture”, we are 
too comfortable with this practice and thus the proposal for new ways of thinking, new ways of 
being etc always carries within it a wrenching away from the ground of the ‘old’ as though this 
can be unproblematically effected.  I try to remain conscious of this tendency when I evoke 
‘new’ practices in this thesis. Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture”132. 
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Lastly, a word on the position of this thesis, which as we said sits 
‘between’ design and cultural theory. There is no correct or proper place to or 
from which to speak of the image, though the discourses of art and culture 
already afford the image some primacy and cultural significance, which 
undeniably provides a starting point. The approach of ontological design 
enables one to make significant relational connections that are not available in 
the aesthetic disciplines, which, in preserving the distinction between sign and 
world, mostly foreclose on the possibility of exploring the productivism of the 
image in the way that design allows. This is arguably even more difficult in the 
instrumental discourses of design, where the hegemony of materialism negates 
even the idea of interrogating the image (it is merely a transparent stand-in for 
reality). The assumption I am making is that design needs cultural theory and 
cultural theory needs design; design conceived as an ecological, that is, 
relational practice, offers a way to articulate them. 
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PART 2: THE VISION OF REPRESENTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Allan Tannenbaum, destroyed vehicles in a burning oil field. Northern Kuwait. 15 
March 1991. In the Eye of Desert Storm: photographers of the Gulf War (New York: Harry N. 
Abrams: Professional Photography Division of Eastman Kodak Company, 1991) 33. 
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PART 2: THE VISION OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Seeing is cultural seeing. (Ulrich Beck)1  
 
The TV is already on — we know that 
much.   (Richard Dienst)2  
 
 
The focus of this Part is the televisual as a form and force of ontological 
designing. I elaborate a theory of the ‘being’ of the image in light of key ideas 
on the operation of television developed by thinkers who have read 
representation both from within and outside the hermeneutic tradition. I argue 
that the vision of representation, as a pervasive vision of televisual and human 
perspective, is trained on the realisation of ideas but inherently lacks foresight 
and relational intuition. I offer a view of our age of the image and aesthetic eye 
in which relationality is disavowed by the relentless production of a particular 
form of sensory anaesthesia. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
SNAP SHOT: MUSHROOM CLOUD 
The setting: the Nevada Test site, Nye County, southern Nevada 
anytime between January 1951 and October 1958. The cold war 
extended everywhere, including the South Pacific and Australia, but at 
that particular place hundreds of members of the US military famously 
gathered to watch the spectacle of ‘Able’, ‘Baker’, ‘Charlie’, ‘Dog’, 
‘Easy’, ‘Sugar’ and the rest detonating in the atmosphere and sending 
up that fetish-image of military might, the mushroom cloud. Protected 
by nothing except eyeglasses  — as though the eye were all that 
breached the distinction between sign and world — they watched these 
tests, feeling privileged, momentarily instructed on detonation to turn 
their backs on the “oven door opening on a Sunday roast”. Bodily 
proximity desevered, the shared air, earth and ambience structurally 
                                                 
1 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 14. 
2 Richard Dienst, “Sending Postcards in TV Land” Deconstruction and the Visual Arts, eds. 
Peter Brunette and David Wills (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 296. 
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ignored by the worlding of the world picture. What were seen were not 
dynamic reactions, the forcing of matter into form rising fourteen 
kilometres high and the displacement of millions of tons of earth. Not 
the slow motion fall-out of fine radioactive particulate stretched out 
over the years, nor the release of ionising radiation into the future of 
plant, animal, atmosphere, earth, bone marrow, skin tissue and children 
yet to be born crippled and with heart problems. Not the sign of these 
propensities carried home (in)visibly to excited dinner-time 
conversations, but just the image, the form, a spectacle folding in on 
itself before us, the sign now of the paucity of our vision: the beautiful 
mushroom cloud.  
 
Televisual images of war are a devastating sign of ecological anaesthesia. 
Among the most powerful of recent times are the aerial shots of the burning 
Kuwaiti oil wells that punctuated the war in the Persian Gulf for Western 
television audiences in 1991. The apocalyptic spectacle of these images — for 
me eternally scored by Mahler and Wagner3  — were a focal reality in a 
televisual war dominated by so-called Nintendo aesthetics, and burn still in our 
shared, cultural memory.4 More recent events in Iraq, willed by those past, 
retrace a terrain that in televisual terms we already well know. The Middle East 
is a zone of images forged in ignorance of the (in)visible ecological relations 
that bind us ‘here’ to that mental and historical ‘there’. In his “The Ecology of 
Images”, Andrew Ross suggests that images of the Gulf War speak a culturally 
particular military aesthetic — iconic, dramatic, biblical and remote — that is 
thematically related to other visions of ecological spoliation also involving, 
often enough, that elemental resource of the modern world: displaced oil. The 
ecological damage travelling into and out of the televisual image, while of its 
own catastrophic measure, is neither of the time nor the space of a television 
story.5 More than a decade later, the ongoing, (in)visible effects on 
environments and human lives of this event of war continues.6  
                                                 
3 I refer to Werner Herzog’s documentary film on the visual aftermath of the Gulf War Lessons 
of Darkness (Lektionen in Finsternis) (Canal, 1992). 
4 ‘Nintendo aesthetics’ was a common term used to refer to the TV displays of laser-guided 
smart bombs and simulated points of view during the war. See for example Sygma 
photographers, In the Eye of Desert Storm: photographers of the Gulf War. 
5 Andrew Ross says the stories of the ecological consequences of the Gulf War could not be 
told, “either because of Pentagon censorship or because they require more than a sound-bite 
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When we locate the burden of such problems of ecological ignorance 
with acts of war or even with the military-industrial-media complex as does 
Ross, we underplay the contribution of television as a way of seeing — our 
way of seeing — that is continually made and remade as normative. The ways 
in which ecological problems are articulated are themselves televisual, in a 
world that is increasingly structured in televisual terms. When we saw, and still 
see the Gulf images, we do not see these indelible cultural impressions as 
intensive though cursory glances of a more complex reality. Rather, we see, 
share and comprehend a singular, iconic perspective that powerfully informs 
future encounters via the linkage of mind, image and world. The televisual 
image in its intersection of so many frames of our existence, ‘here’, ‘there’, 
‘now’, ‘then’,  — is a difference that makes a difference.  
 
*** 
 
Television (and here we focus on this particular electronic medium to 
exemplify the broader televisual operation) considered in the frame of 
ontological design, forces a particular kind of vision into being, a vision of 
representation. This vision, which has historically learnt to ignore relationality, 
is world-building: it has colonised our imaginations and our worlds.  
The television that we see and know is a ubiquitous electro-technical 
object that produces for our selective choice explicitly iconic, coherent and 
meaningful audio-visual images. However, what we do not know about 
television, what we cannot hold before our eyes is its (in)visible relationality: 
its ecology. A history of the material, social and cultural impacts generated by 
the industries of the technological image (including the cinema) over the 
course of the last century would provide a rich starting point in considering this 
                                                                                                                                 
analysis and a set of atrocity images.” Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 218. We will look at this 
essay in the context of a critique of the effect of cultural theory in Part 3. 
6For an environmental assessment of these effects, see Green Cross International, An 
Environmental Assessment of Kuwait, Seven Years After the Gulf War (Geneva: Green Cross 
International, December 1998). 
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ecology.7 A comprehensive review of such a history would certainly produce a 
bill of consequences rivalling and perhaps even surpassing the impacts of the 
actual historical events, like wars, that the image-industries have often sought 
to communicate.8 However the ecological impacts of the image need to be 
enframed by the ecology of the image — its own ecological operation — that 
so deeply informs our perceptual capacities. We consider this ecology to be a 
key driver of the overfed styles of life we desire and build in the late modern 
world, which continue to thrive in spite of an apparent growth in the awareness 
of environmental impacts. This is not to reduce the significance of material 
analyses and we turn in this direction soon enough. But in light of the proposal 
that sustainability is a cultural problem, and one in our Western culture that is 
predominantly a matter of perception, the ecology of the image must be 
constituted, first, in these broader terms.  
Television produces discrete, finished forms that while antithetical to 
the allopoietic changes of ecological relationality, nonetheless make relations.9 
                                                 
7 For a socio-industrial history in a Foucauldian frame see John Tagg, The Burden of 
Representation (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
8 Such a history would involve an environmental impact assessment of the (in)visible toxic 
productions, greenhouse and landfill contributions of the photochemical industries and film 
production studios as well as the industries that support them not least, as Paul Virilio shows in 
his 1984 book War and Cinema, the military. Let us glimpse instead however, a less 
spectacular ‘moment’ in film history that brings together the complex relationality of the 
ecology of the image as I am seeking to bring it into view in this Part. In 1999 Danny Boyle’s 
‘eco-aesthetic’ film The Beach (20th Century Fox) starring Leonardo DiCaprio, was shot at 
Maya Bay on the Thai Island of Phi Phi Lay.  In order for the beach to appear ‘more tropical’ it 
was widened and flattened, and the ‘unsightly’ scrub bushes holding the sand together and 
preventing erosion were replaced with 60 alien, mature palms while other native plants were 
uprooted and kept in a nursery. Months later, the beach was deemed ruined by locals dependent 
on tourism revenue after attempts by the film company to ‘restore’ the complex tropical eco-
system as promised to its original state, failed. DiCaprio, a self-declared environmentalist (and 
yet as a celebrity also one of the “great wasterels” whom for Baudrillard embody the seductive 
potential for outrageous expenditure — see The Consumer Society [46]), reputedly remarked 
that “(f)rom what I see everything is okay.  I have seen nothing that had been damaged in any 
way.” What is notable in this example is the dimensional involvements of the image: a press 
report brings into view the environmental impact of a film about the environment, starring an 
‘environmentalist’ with an environmental awareness limited to what he can ‘see’, the impact of 
which emerged predominantly because the livelihood of so many was threatened by the 
aesthetic destruction of a tourist destination.  John Vidal, “DiCaprio film-makers face storm 
over paradise lost” The Guardian 29 Oct., 1999: 1.  
9 In contrast to the intrarelationality of autopoiesis (see footnote 38 in Part 1), allopoiesis refers 
to an interelational process — the making of a material difference by one in another. These 
terms are explained in Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition. 
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I characterise this ecological operation of the televisual as a relationality of 
non-relations. Not least of the televisual’s ontologically transformative non-
relations is its normalisation of the iterability of experience in the “economy of 
the same.”10 Overdetermining a relational vision open to the partiality and 
specificity of things, is a comparative vision that has learnt to verify. Levin 
characterises this vision as an assertoric gaze, a gaze that both watches out for 
and imposes what we know on what we see.11 This assertive quality is not just 
limited to the sight of our seeing, but is an ontological predisposition toward 
things.  
Televisual images communicate a sense of irrepressible abundance, 
proximity, permanence and vitality. They banish the shadows of the (in)visible 
in decisive editorial cuts we learn to see through, and demonstrate a blithe 
ignorance toward the specific context of their appearances and the differences 
these appearances make. The televisual is antithetical to the finitude and 
specificity of humans, things and environments, and as such works against the 
production of experiences of limit, such as advocated by Manzini.  
We find Heidegger’s work on representation provides the most useful 
and appropriate starting point for thinking the problem of the televisual image 
in these terms.12 Heidegger situates representation in the world in a way that 
                                                 
10 The “demanding extractions of technics” subject the ‘other’ to “a stringent ‘economy of the 
same which operates according to the criterion of commensurability and accordingly strives to 
achieve ‘the greatest possible use at the smallest expense.’” This is Samuel Weber’s translation 
of a passage from Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology”, which we find 
particularly illuminates the ecological operation of televisual forms in which exchange works 
to reduce every thing to symbolic equivalence. Weber, “Upsetting the Setup” 69.  
11 After Heidegger, Levin characterises an ontological difference between aletheia — truth as 
unconcealment  — and truth as the correctness of representation, in terms of an aletheic and 
assertoric gaze. The assertoric gaze is the gaze of the ‘will to power’ of our age, an acquisitive, 
focussed, even predatory inclination toward what is encountered. The aletheic gaze is a more 
receptive gaze open to ‘letting things be’ (Gelassemheit). Levin, The Opening of Vision 432-
40. Elsewhere Levin qualifies this difference in terms of a figure and ground distinction. David 
Michael Levin, “Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger’s Reading of the History of 
Metaphysics,” Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) 205. My argument diverges from Levin’s 
with respect to the ‘nature’ of the vision we have and that we need to develop, as will become 
clear below.  
12 A range of perspectives on the relation of Heidegger’s thought to the televisual are 
developed in Fry RUATV? Weber also usefully characterises the ‘difference’ of Heidegger’s 
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enables understanding of how on the one hand, representation and its mode of 
truth has become culturally dominant and self-evident, and on the other, how 
representation obviates a relational dynamic.13 He develops a view of the 
embeddedness of representation in the instrumental technological things of late 
modernity, which in turn gather and disperse ways of being-in-the-world. 
Television brings into view for Heidegger the transformation of proximity that 
constitutes the organising principle of our lifeworlds.14  He says that the peak 
of the abolition “of every possible remoteness is reached by television, which 
will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication… Yet 
the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not 
consist in shortness of distance.”15 Television does not, cannot bring on 
‘nearness’ of understanding. 
Heidegger’s thought is not without its own decisive closures, such as 
evidenced by his personal confrontation with the modern world.16 However the 
forethoughtful nature of his work on technology helps us to think through 
sustainability as a problem of perception in a growing televisual environment. 
This problem is complex and multi-dimensional. It involves the production and 
sustainment of a way of seeing the world deprived of a sense for ecological 
relationality. It also involves the production of images of aesthetic recognition 
                                                                                                                                 
thought on representation: it is ‘intensely practical’ rather than thematic. Samuel Weber, 
“Upsetting the Setup” 56. 
13 Truth as correctness “emerges…entirely from the ‘natural’ way thinking and corresponds to 
it, it has lasted throughout the centuries and has long ago been hardened into something taken 
for granted.” Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’, trans. 
Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1994) 15. 
14 I use the term ‘lifeworld’ here in Don Ihde’s sense. This is developed from Edmund 
Husserl’s fundamental, (pre-cultural) version  — the ‘lifeworld’ as the  ‘only real world’ 
perceived and intuited by everyone. Ihde’s understanding is more relational and flexible, 
intertwining an intimate, sensory-bodily ‘micro-perception’ with a more broadly cultural 
hermeneutic ‘macro-perception’. Our ‘lifeworld’, then, is a way of seeing and acting that is 
always both intimate and more broadly cultural and because of this intertwining is subject to 
cultural changes. Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld 28.  
15 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” 165 
16 Michael E. Zimmerman shows that Heidegger was confronted by technology in relation to 
his experience of home and the ‘homeland’ in Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: 
Technology, Politics, and Art (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) 
209-10. Fry discusses the contradiction between Heidegger’s “feeling of rootedness” and his 
dawning technological insights in Fry, RUATV? 32. 
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and desire in which ‘the environment’ appears as a fully realised and realisable 
place, and in which things happen in fully describable ways. Thus the 
environment in which we imagine, feel, plan, make, work and watch television 
is excluded from the televisual representation of ‘environment’.  
The televisual image takes place with an assertiveness that has no 
understanding of the destructive and transformative nature of its own form of 
disclosure. Crucial to this assertiveness is an understanding of truth as the 
correct correspondence between a statement and a matter.17 Heidegger shows 
how this version of truth overcame ‘truth’ as unconcealment (aletheia)18: truth 
as a revealing dynamic in a particular situation that can neither be generalised 
nor represented.19 Yet it is clear that this overcoming did not take place once, at 
the birth of metaphysical thinking, but is rather a form of work that pertains at 
every moment and, in our modern age, requires a constant remaking. A sense 
for the ecological violence that this remaking entails has been relinquished by 
modern vision.  
Heidegger’s story of representation’s arrival in the modern world takes 
place via an exposition of the Platonic-Aristotelean determination of truth as 
correctness. It is by way of Plato that Western thinking acquired “its decisive 
                                                 
17 ‘Truth as correctness’ is elaborated in Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 8– 
68. 
18 Heidegger indicates that both truth as unconcealment and the latent change in the essence of 
truth (as aletheia withdraws into its Roman translation, veritas) are present in this name. He 
therefore questioned the appropriateness of the usual translation of aletheia as truth because of 
the normativity of the senses of correspondence and ‘correctness’ in the term. He says 
“aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing may not be equated with truth. Rather, 
aletheia, unconcealment thought as clearing, first grants the possibility of truth.” Martin 
Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, Basic Writings 446. As Levin 
notes however, the word aletheia itself comes to reflect Heidegger’s hermeneutical reading of 
the ancients, and so for us becomes a valid sign of ‘truth as unconcealment’. I will follow 
Levin here and take aletheia as ‘truth as unconcealment’. Levin, The Opening of Vision 420. 
19 Heidegger’s translator, William Lovitt, says that many of Heidegger’s terms have a two-
wayness that allows them to indicate at the same time Being and man: “Thus ‘presencing’ and 
‘revealing’ speak simultaneously of a moving into presence or unconcealment and of one 
toward whom that movement takes place, while ‘concealing’ and ‘withdrawing’ tell of a 
movement away and remind of one who is being deprived of that which might be present or 
revealed.” William Lovitt, “Introduction” in Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays xxii. Drawing out this ambiguity in Heidegger is also a special feature of 
Weber’s explicitly bi-lingual reading in Mass Mediauras, which we consider below. 
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stamp” — not as one-off imprint but a form and force of designing.20 Thus 
Plato’s doctrine of truth is historically ‘pre-sent’.21 Heidegger’s elaboration 
does not simply gather the Greeks into the history of metaphysics. Rather, it 
enables us to sense Greek thinking as utterly remote yet relevant to the present 
age. 22  His reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave allows us to understand that 
the verificationism that underlies the televisual proposal has been learnt. From 
Heidegger we learn to tune into the unsaid, to the thought that ‘rules in 
concealment’ and to speculate on how we might have once and could possibly 
again, see things differently.  
We traverse this particular ‘set up’ to find assistance in our 
denaturalisation of television as 20th century hardware. The televisual is a 
design(ing) of vision. The relation between vision and world in the televisual 
environment is one of continual remaking and involvement, yet the “secretive 
goings-on” of televisual operation do away with the possibility of truth as 
unconcealment.23 As Don Ihde indicates, the familiarity of our lifeworlds tends 
to conceal their complex technological texture and the need to look into them 
more closely and critically.24  We want to consider the “sensible view” that the 
televisual realises in the everyday world.25 The sensible view here relates to the 
                                                 
20 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 45. 
21 Heidegger says Plato’s doctrine “… is historically ‘present’…as…the ever-advancing world 
history of the planet in this most modern of times.” Heidegger,“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”181. 
In  “Sending: On Representation” Derrida discusses the implications of Plato’s ‘pre-sent’; the 
destining of representation’s reign without Plato’s thought itself being subject to it. Derrida 
makes way for re-reading the well-trodden ground of the metaphysical lineage in saying that 
this proposal requires an other history of being “no longer regulated or centred on 
representation.” “Sending: On Representation” 120. 
22 “The fact that the real has been showing itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of 
Plato, Plato did not bring about. The thinker only responded to what addressed itself to him.” 
Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” 18.  
23 Weber, “Upsetting the Setup” 73. 
24 The ‘technological texture’ of our lifeworld is not simply available as such. Don Ihde states 
that “simply because of its familiarity, we may overlook both the need for and the results to be 
obtained by a critical reflection upon our lives within this technologically textured ecosystem 
— perhaps better termed a technosystem.” Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld 1–3.  
25 The common call to be ‘sensible’ in relation to television (particularly in relation to the 
viewing habits of children) mostly revolves around the assumption that television is a 
selectable object. Here, after Richard Dienst, I assume that the televisual cannot be turned off. I 
borrow the phrase  ‘sensible view’ from George Myerson, who says after Beck that television’s 
new ecological storylines undermine the authority of the layperson’s perspective (and note for 
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empirical commonsense that we live and feel and intuitively trust, but is also a 
televisual sense that effects, in the words of Beck, an everyday “cultural 
blindness”: in relation to ecological problems, our senses fail us.26 This Part 
asserts that there is a ‘we’ of  ‘sensible viewers’ insofar as we all participate in 
and share this televisual environment.  
Finally I take the televisual problematic to the culture of 
environmentalism, elaborating on our critique of conventional ecology in Part 
1. Environmentalism, broadly indicated as the discourse of communities of 
environmental concern, sees itself as representative of the ecology of the real 
world and to a large extent does not recognise that its nature is a construct of 
technologically enframed human culture.27 Increasingly it is intersected by and 
sensitive to the illuminating light of the televisual: the experiences 
environmentalism dreams of are those only able to be made present in 
televisual form. Environmentalism sees nature as profoundly aesthetic. This 
registers that there is something profoundly natural about experiencing things 
aesthetically. The dualism of nature and culture is perpetuated in the discourse 
                                                                                                                                 
Beck the ‘layperson’ is in each of us). This fails to account for the extent to which the ‘sensible 
view’ is shaped by the televisual. Myerson, Ecology and the End of Postmodernity. 
26 Beck develops this argument in terms of threat of  (in)visible ecological changes:  “(t)he 
normal perceptual tools break down, as do all rules of conduct…Hazards bring about cultural 
blindness —  while the eye still sees, the ear still hears —  because our senses fail us only in 
respect of chemical and nuclear contamination.” Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk 
50. 
27 Davison gives a comprehensive account of the induction of environmentalism into 
technological society. He says, “More than anything else, the combination of the imperative of 
technological development and the ideal of sustainability, with its consequent linking of 
efficiency with ecology, has led to the emptying of environmental discourses of their cultural 
content.” Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 38. 
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of environmentalism, in which the ideal environment takes precedence over a 
human world degraded by artifice. This core understanding raises fundamental 
questions about the efforts and direction of environmentalism and its capacity 
as a popular discourse to contribute to a culture of sustainability in a televisual 
world.
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CHAPTER 4. THE RELATIONALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
 
If I may put the matter dramatically, ancestral 
man had entered his own head, and he has been 
adapting ever since to what he finds there. (The 
Epic of Man) 1  
 
FROM AN OTHER VISION 
In the allegory of the cave, Heidegger notices that in addition to its ostensible 
illustration of the essence of education (paideia), a fundamental but unspoken 
change in Plato’s thinking of the essence of truth is taking place. This is a 
change from a notion of truth as unconcealment  — that which grants an 
opening for the known and unknown — to truth as a kind of double positive 
equation between the intellect (knowing) and the seen (the known): 
correctness.2  
Unconcealment is a sense of truth with an intrinsically relational 
bearing, and is suggestive of a receptive vision wholly different to the object-
driven intent of our inherited ‘rational’ vision.3 Reading through Plato’s grades 
of light and location, Heidegger gives us a sense of the difference between 
these two modes of truth as ways of revealing and of their ambiguousness in 
                                                 
1 Time/Life, The Epic of Man (New York: Time Life Books, 1961). 
2 Hans Blumenberg elaborates the relation between light and knowing in “Light as a Metaphor 
for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept Formation”, Modernity and the 
Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993) 30-62.  
3 Levin, whose project concerns the (re)emergence of a receptive vision, says: “The ground 
will only give itself as ground to our perception only insofar as its giving of itself is 
appropriately received by perception, and that means its being, namely as grounding, must be 
respected, the ground must be allowed to presence as ground, that is, as different from (as 
deferred by, as being in deference to) the figures, the objects on which we focus.  This calls for 
Gelassemheit, an attitude of letting-go and letting-be.” Levin, “Decline and Fall”, Modernity 
and the Hegemony of Vision 205.  
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Plato.4 The change in the essence of truth is not just intellectual, but one that 
involves a change in human conduct toward beings — both the gaze and its 
direction become more correct.5 Heidegger is careful to point out the 
remoteness of aletheia as it informs Plato’s thought. Nevertheless, it implies 
that verificationism is learnt and that a different kind of attunement to the being 
of encountered and designed worlds may also be learnt.  
Heidegger says the very image of the cave — both open within itself 
and hidden from the outside  — indicates that the fundamental experience of 
aletheia, in which beings have charge of their own ‘unhiddeness’, shaped 
Greek thinking. Yet while the allegory rests on unconcealment, it is aimed in a 
new direction, toward the ‘idea’. It is interested in unconcealment only insofar 
as it makes whatever appear “be accessible in its visible form (eidos)”.6  
In the passage between the cave and its outside, aletheia becomes both 
overdetermined by and attached to correctness. The story is set in place by the 
image of the sun  — the highest culmination of the two positive orders: the 
good and the visible. The sun is the image of the ultimate ‘idea’; it is that 
which lets all things appear. By way of this image, truth enters a metaphysical 
realm of supra-sensuousness where it ultimately finds a theological afterlife.7 
In the blinding positivity of the sun's shining, aletheia is stripped of its relation 
to the hidden, the concealed (lethe), the unknow(able) and the (in)visible.8   
Even for Plato, people generally believe that they encounter things in 
the world directly. They do not realise that it is only in the light of ‘ideas’ (or 
the sun’s shining) that the things of the world are enabled to come forth into 
their visible form (eidos) and show themselves. Thus in the allegory, the 
                                                 
4 Heidegger says Plato’s doctrine manifests ambiguity “in the fact that whereas aletheia is what 
is named and discussed, it is orthotes (correctness) that is meant and that is posited as 
normative — all this is a single train of thought.” Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 177.  
5 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 179. 
6 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 172. 
7 Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 181.  
8 Heidegger says that “When Plato says of the idea that she is the mistress that allows 
unhiddeness, he points to something unsaid, namely, that henceforth the essence of truth does 
not, as the essence of unhiddeness, unfold from its proper and essential fullness but rather 
shifts to the essence of the idea.  The essence of truth gives up its fundamental trait of 
unhiddenness. ” Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 176. 
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prisoners held captive within the cave from childhood believe that the shadows 
they see are true beings. When unshackled and turned toward the illuminating 
fire — the source of what they thought was true — they are blinded and seek to 
turn back to the shadows of their familiar reality.  
Real freedom is made possible when the prisoner is taken outside the 
cave and into the true light of the sun, into the region of the ‘most unhidden’ 
where “the things themselves stand there in the blinding force and validity of 
their own visible form.”9 After an adjustment to this new light, these things are 
now immediately accessible to the prisoner. In the last stage of the story (the 
stage that Heidegger notes is most often overlooked), the enlightened prisoner 
descends back into the cave to liberate the others. However, back in the relative 
darkness of the cave, the liberated prisoner displays no evidence of his 
enlightenment, in fact his eyes are deemed ruined and he must succumb to the 
normative condition in the cave or, in pursuing the liberation of the other 
prisoners, risk death.  
What is essential in the allegory for Heidegger is not so much the 
distinction between the environment of the cave and that inaugurated by the 
sun, but the movements of passage between them.10The allegory is organised 
into a series of four different ‘sites of instruction’ articulated by the prisoner in 
which “(t)he things themselves offer their visible form in a certain way.”11 The 
prisoner overcomes a lack of education by becoming accustomed to the light of 
truth as correctness: the passage from one site of instruction to another marks a 
process in which the gaze becomes more correct in relation to the sun. The 
gaze turns toward the good; “(t)he guiding thought is that the highest idea 
yokes together the act of knowing and what it knows”.12 It is an orientation that 
“conforms itself to what is to be seen: the ‘visible form’ of the being.”13 A 
                                                 
9 Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 169. 
10 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 172. 
11 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 169. 
12 Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 177. 
13 Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 177. 
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certain disposition toward things emerges as the ‘idea’ gains dominance over 
aletheia and truth becomes correctness within the propriety of the gaze: 
With this transformation of the essence of truth there takes place at the 
same time a change of the locus of truth.  As unhiddenness, truth is still 
a fundamental trait of beings themselves.  But as the correctness of the 
‘gaze’, it becomes a characteristic of human comportment toward 
beings.14  
Thereafter, as Heidegger puts it in “The Age of the World Picture”, 
things no longer look at man, but man at them.15 The unhiddeness of things 
become relative to how they are seen and thus become a matter of mind.16 For 
something to become unhidden, it must be recognised, that is, it must be 
sighted in advance. It is impossible to see things that are not prefigured in this 
way: a house, a tree or a god are only able to be perceived as such because their 
ideas are already in mind.17  
For Plato the essence of a thing, that which is most unhidden, is what a 
thing is. This ‘whatness’ refers to a thing’s ideal, super-sensuous essence rather 
than its material presence. The ‘idea’ is the eternal and constantly present 
essence of a thing revealed by the eidos.18 The things encountered in the world 
exemplify ‘ideas’, yet the essence of a being is for Plato deformed by its 
entanglement with reality, losing its purity as well as its universality. Things in 
the world change and degrade but ‘ideas’ — eternal and constant — do not. 
                                                 
14 Heidegger, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” 177.  
15Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 131. 
16“Insofar as the access (to the unhidden) is necessarily carried out through ‘seeing’, 
unhiddeness is yoked into a ‘relation’ with seeing, it becomes ‘relative’ to seeing.”  Heidegger, 
“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 173. 
17This is the reminder provided as to the presence of ‘ideas’ in things. Levin says that 
according to Plato, our souls encounter ideas before incarnation, thence forget them whilst also 
retaining the possibility of recollecting them in the encounter with the eidos. Levin, “Decline 
and Fall” 197. 
18 “ ‘To see’ is in Greek idein; what is in sight, precisely as sighted, is idea.  What is sighted is 
what the being is in advance and constantly.  The ‘what it is’, the whatness, is the idea; and 
conversely, the ‘idea’ is the whatness, and the latter is the essence.  More precisely, and more 
in the Greek vein, the idea is the look something offers, the aspect it has and, as it were, shows 
of itself, the eidos.” Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 56. 
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Heidegger shows that Plato’s thought presses in the direction of a 
metaphysical idealism in correlating eidos and ‘idea’.19 He says that in fact the 
coining of the word “metaphysics” is prefigured when Plato says “Thinking 
goes … ‘beyond’ those things that are experienced in the form of mere 
shadows and images, and goes … ‘out toward’ these things, namely, the 
‘ideas’.”20  
Platonic idealism is a precursor of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. For Kant, the phenomena of the world are secured by our 
representational faculties and conform to them. Kant lays out his theory of the 
necessary, a priori principles of experience, and distinguishes between 
phenomena we encounter and the things-in-themselves (noumena) that are part 
of the infinity of objects which are possible phenomena — not yet sensed —
but nonetheless which can be thought without contradiction. Kant follows 
Plato’s understanding of the idea, attributing to it an archetypal a priori value 
though with a practical, regulative power. He says:  
It is not only in morals that human reason shows real causality. Ideas 
also are operative causes of actions or objects. Plato correctly sees clear 
proof of nature originating from ideas. Plants, animals, the ordered 
regularity of the world and presumably, therefore, of all nature, show 
clearly that ideas made it all possible… the philosopher’s spiritual 
movement up from reflection on the physical world as a copy to the 
architectonic arrangement of it by purposes, i.e., by ideas, deserves 
attention and imitation.21  
The thing encountered is the pure idea made sensible, no longer wrapped up 
mysteriously in itself but regulated by the conceptual framework of human 
sensibility. The power of this metaphysical thought was that it peeled away the 
                                                 
19 Blumenberg also shows that light is already metaphysical in Plato’s myth. Blumenberg,  
“Light as a Metaphor for Truth” 30-62. 
20 Heidegger,“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 180.  
21 Immanuel Kant, An Immanuel Kant Reader, ed. and trans. Raymond B. Blakney (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960) 74 –85. 
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unruly ‘in-itselfness’ of things and at the same time the thing-in-itself became 
an actual or potential known.22  
This access to things is now a naturalised capacity of the sciences. 
However the process by which the bearing of vision became more correct was 
not simply a matter of relinquishing truth as unconcealment. In Plato, the 
essential whatness of things is only available upon a painful and somewhat 
dangerous ontological adjustment toward correctness, as the learning prisoner 
finds.23 Correctness is the result of a hard-won process. The work of learning is 
described in terms of the undoing of normative vision— for which beings are 
still self-emerging — and drawing out a vision oriented toward the correctness 
of representation, which prepares for things on the basis of their prefigured 
ideas:  
Liberation …begins as the continuous effort at accustoming one’s gaze 
to be fixed on the firm limits of things that stand fast in their visible 
form.  Authentic liberation is the steadiness of being oriented toward 
that which appears in its visible form and which is the most unhidden in 
this appearing.24
The learning of correctness, the learning to overcome hiddeness and to 
extinguish the unknown as unknown, requires continual effort, but also entails 
confusion, disorientation, struggle and violence:  
(…)the unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness; it must in a 
sense be stolen from hiddenness…the supremely unhidden must be 
wrested from a base and stubborn hiding, for this reason one’s 
                                                 
22 The foundations of transcendental idealism are established in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781 and 1787). 
23 Heidegger explains that the process of ontological (re)orientation in Plato’s understanding of 
paideia can be heard in the German word Bildung, prior to its meaning settling into ‘education’ 
in the late nineteenth century: “Bildung [formation] means two things. On the one hand 
formation means forming someone in the sense of impressing on him a character that unfolds. 
But at the same time this ‘forming’ of someone ‘forms’  (or impresses a character on) someone 
by antecedently taking measure in terms of some paradigmatic image, which for that reason is 
called the proto-type [Vorbild]. Thus at one and the same time ‘formation’ means impressing a 
character on someone and guiding someone by a paradigm.” Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of 
Truth” 166. 
24 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 170. 
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movement out of the cave into the open and into the light of day is a 
life-and-death struggle. Stage four of the ‘allegory’… (the return to the 
cave and the ensuing battle between the liberator and prisoners) … 
gives us a special glimpse into how ‘privation’ — attaining the 
unhidden by wresting it away — belongs to the essence of truth. 25
For Heidegger, metaphysical thinking from Plato onward owes its 
primacy to this move. The idea, already metaphysical in Plato, directs all 
appearance and “the essence of truth as the correctness of both representation 
and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking.”26  Ever 
since, says Heidegger, there has been a striving for truth both in the sense of 
the correctness of the gaze and the correctness of its direction.27 Concurrently 
‘what is’ became a matter of the human intellect “(w)hat takes place in each 
instance is a metaphysically determined revolving around the human being.”28
The ascendancy of the eidos in Plato “is the presupposition, destined far 
in advance and long ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world’s having to 
become picture.”29 Since the moment of Descartes and modern metaphysics, 
beings became the objects of a self-certain subject and,  “what it is to be is for 
the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and truth is first 
defined as the certainty of representing.”30 In our modern times, the idea must 
be recognised, that is, made present. In Basic Questions of Philosophy 
Heidegger puts it thus: 
(…) the ‘idea’ is for us something only represented and imagined, a 
mere thought, and precisely not properly real. Therefore for us today 
‘ideas’ are worthless if they are not realised.31
Even as we still ask about what something is, referring to its generic ‘idea’ and 
excluding its individual, here-and-now presence, being for us is what is present 
                                                 
25 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 171. 
26 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 178. 
27 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 179. 
28 Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” 181. 
29 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 131. 
30 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 127. 
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at hand, what appears. The view here is of the modern world as a world in 
which constant presence — the imagination of the idea — is everywhere 
realised and made available. The constancy in idea has arrived in the modern 
world as image, as Heidegger explains, as:  
(…) the counterpart to, and the result of, a particular apprehension and 
representation. The idea became a mere representation (percipere-
perceptio-idea) and, at the same time, a generalisation from the 
particular (Descartes, nominalism).”32  
This was made possible in the history of metaphysical thinking when idea 
became ‘thing’ (or rather, in light of Kant’s idealism, ‘object’) but a thing 
whose determination would be fated in relation to truth as correctness:  
From the standpoint of the idea, appearing now takes on a new 
meaning.  What appears — the phenomenon — is no longer physis, the 
emerging power, nor is it the self-manifestation of the appearance; no, 
appearing is now the emergence of the copy.  And since the copy never 
equals the prototype, what appears is mere appearance, actually an 
illusion, a deficiency … The truth of physis, aletheia as the 
unconcealment that is the essence of the emerging power, now becomes 
homoiosis and mimesis, assimilation and accommodation, orientation... 
it becomes a correctness of vision, of apprehension as representation.33
But what does it mean that what appears is mere appearance, actually an 
illusion? How could the thinking that rests upon such contradiction be 
sustained? Because, Heidegger shows, the self-certainty upon which 
representation is based conceals ‘the common soil’ of its disarticulating 
structure. Representation opens up its subject-object division in the world. This 
way of thinking then historically opens out as a striving for correctness, 
becoming installed in and as worlding structures. The understanding of 
idealism in terms of a simplistic geometry between idea and real matter is 
                                                                                                                                 
31 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 63. 
32 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 62. 
33 Heidegger quoted in Levin, Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision 196 
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problematised by this explanation.34 We are prepared to read what appears to 
be actual as the inscription of a learnt way of seeing and mode of valuing.  
COMING INTO FOCUS: THE RELATIONALITY OF NON-RELATIONS 
In a world dominated by the calculative impetus of modern science, the 
correctness of representation holds total sway over appearances. For 
Heidegger, the fundamentally decisive event of the modern age is that the 
world becomes “conceived and grasped” as picture.35 The picture means “the 
structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man’s producing which 
represents and sets before.”36 This picture emerges from the trajectories of 
metaphysical thought in which all that is, is represented as object. However this 
picture is not simply a finished form establishing an ontological opposition 
between man and object. It is generative of a particular objectifying disposition 
toward things, a grasping, holding opposite and present to oneself of some 
thing: a “frontal ontology”.37This frontal ontology depends on a fundamental 
erasure and forgetting of a thing’s relationality, because relationality cannot be 
held present in this way.  
Thus the world is opened up as picture. The world picture implies that 
all things can be brought together, set in place, spatially, temporally, 
conceptually synchronised into a panoptic dimensionality of objects. As 
Heidegger argues, every thing is already seen as it a priori fits with the picture  
— and this becomes both natural and self-evident. The scientific practice of 
decontextualising things and then recontextualising them as entities and 
properties of the world picture, bears no mark of artifice.  
                                                 
34 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 16-18. 
35 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 129.  
36 Lovitt informs us that Gebild is Heidegger’s own word.  With the use of ‘structured’ it is 
assumed “Heidegger intends the force of the prefix ge-, which connotes a gathering, to be 
found in the word.” Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 134. 
37 Levin discusses the frontal ontology in The Opening of Vision 119-20. Unlike Levin 
however, I do not follow the ontological reduction in which  “the world in which we live is 
finally reduced to the ontology of the picture — the picture, that is, for us”. As signalled in Part 
1, this reduction needs to be foregrounded as a matter of value rather than of substance. I 
address Levin’s reading of the image below. 
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This understanding of the picture as a disposition rather than a thing, 
allows us to consider the things we encounter as the most visible outgrowth of 
the “hidden ground” of representation.38 The ‘Hidden ground’ can also be 
understood as infrastructure. Infrastructure is (in)visible — it is what 
essentially withdraws in order for any system to function, but it also emerges as 
the design or ‘ground-plan’ of the system.39  Representation, Heidegger tells 
us, is now a going forth, from out of itself, into the sphere of its own design. It 
is an objectifying force “that goes forward and masters.”40  
The world picture opens a sphere in which material entities can move 
and resonate, but which at the same time absorbs their differential natures. 
Things in nature are thus subject to the gaze of correctness, stipulated in 
advance, already known: 
That stipulating has to do with nothing less than the plan or projection 
of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of nature to be sought 
after, be nature: the self-contained system of motion of units of mass 
related spatio-temporally.41
Further, the fitting of things into this ground-plan of nature constitutes the 
conditions by which an event in nature even becomes visible.42 The key term 
by way of which Heidegger now communicates the projecting of correctness is 
vorstellen (representation), which in this context is used to suggest specifically 
“a setting-in-place-before”; an objectifying that brings things to stand as 
object.43 This setting in place is not, however, a pinning down. It is crucial that 
things are enabled to move naturally, as self-revealing entities within the 
objectifying explanation.  
Into the ground-plan of the world picture, one is now inclined to read 
Heidegger’s later explanation of the technological impetus, Enframing (Ge-
                                                 
38 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 18. 
39 I explore the ontological designing of infrastructure in relation to the planning professions in 
“Designing the Ground: The Infrastructure of Productivism” Form/Work 1.1 (1997).  
40 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 150. 
41 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 119. 
42 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 119.  
43 This is explained by Lovitt in a note to “The Age of the World Picture” 120.  
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stell), which he introduces in “The Question Concerning Technology”(1955).44 
Enframing is the mode of setting in place of the modern world picture, linking 
for us here with the televisual operation.45 It is technology’s mode of being, 
illuminating the force of framing up and rendering coherent and the broader, 
technological ‘patterning’ of modern life.46  
While there is very little ‘sending forth’ in the modern world that is not 
implicitly and now explicitly technological, technology here is not 
circumscribed by our commonsense understanding of technological things.47 
Technology is rather a striving for completion and decisively sets things in 
place (gestellt). It designates and mobilises all of man’s procedures and 
apparent freedoms. The insight of Enframing goes beyond technological 
structures to the relentless ‘wresting away’ of the dimensionality of being.48 As 
Weber tells us, Heidegger places considerable emphasis on the strange mixture 
of movement and stasis that characterises Enframing — he emphasises “the 
goings-on of modern technics”.49 Weber thus translates Ge-stell as 
‘emplacement’ which, “understood not only as a static state of affairs but as a 
dynamic process, can serve not just to close down but at the same time to open 
                                                 
44 Though not made explicit until this essay, Enframing is, as Heidegger’s translator Lovitt 
explains, foreshadowed in “The Age of the World Picture”: “In the planetary imperialism of 
technologically organised man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it 
will descend to the level of organised uniformity and there firmly establish itself.” Heidegger, 
“The Age of the World Picture” 152.  
45 According to Levin, it is only by virtue of the way of looking at the world structured by 
Enframing, that television exists at all. Levin, The Opening of Vision 125. 
46 Albert Borgmann, who has problems with Heidegger’s technological thematic but 
nonetheless draws heavily on his work, speaks of technology’s patterning of reality. 
Borgmann’s work is discussed in relation to products in Part 4.  
47 Heidegger tells us “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological”. 
Heidegger, “The Question concerning Technology” 4. In his illuminating reading of this essay, 
Weber explains that the English translation of Technik with ‘technology’ is both too narrow in 
excluding the meanings technique, craft, skill and too theoretical in suggesting that the 
knowledge involved is a form of applied science, which Heidegger explicitly denies. Technik 
precedes science, not the other way around. Weber “Upsetting the Setup” 60.  
48 Heidegger says “Only when insight brings itself disclosingly to pass, only when the coming 
to presence of technology lights up as Enframing, do we discern how, in the ordering of the 
standing-reserve, the truth of Being remains denied as world… Only then do we notice that all 
mere willing, and doing in the mode of ordering steadfastly persists in injurious neglect.” 
Martin Heidegger, “The Turning”, The Question Concerning Technology 48. 
49 Weber, “Upsetting the Setup” 71. 
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up.”50 This structural ambivalence is highly significant, for each individual 
product, in its striving for completion, is fundamentally subject to this dynamic 
process.  
The certain, objective orientation, which is brought out in Enframed 
things is at the same time an impression of vision. Things are secured in their 
self-revealing as objects of human comprehension and yet this relation is 
suppressed: things are experienced as objective, as objectively true. Yet the 
figures (gestalten) of vision are not just the spatial things encountered, “but the 
whole characteristic form impressed on a being from which we read off what it 
is.” This impression is registered as the stamping together of eidos and Gestalt 
that takes place through our vision.51
Enframing, as insight and explanation, underpins our conception of the 
televisual.52 In many ways it is an unforgiving and totalising interpretation; the 
world is made manifest in a way that is able to displace all other modes of 
revealing. Yet as it takes place through our vision, this ‘totality’ presents itself 
in multivalent ways. It is not fixed in place; the uniformity of the objective 
disposition flows into a relational multitude of operations and designed views. 
Enframing encompasses both the tendency to objectify — the perception that 
pulls into alignment man and world  — and its products, the incremental 
instances of its presencing.53   
                                                 
50 Weber,  “Upsetting the Setup” 72. Weber notes that the translation of Ge-stell with 
‘Enframing’ “effaces the tension between the verb and noun that resounds in the German and 
that points to the strange, indeed uncanny, mixture of movement and stasis that distinguishes 
the goings-on of modern technics and upon which Heidegger places considerable emphasis. 
This tension resounds in the word proposed by Lacoue-Labarthe to render Gestell: installation. 
I would like to suggest another possibility, one that has the virtue of pointing to the lexical 
‘root’ of Gestell, stell: emplacement.” In our context the shift to emplacement is unnecessary 
as the ‘movement and stasis’ it seeks to foreground is the subject of our discussion. Weber, 
“Upsetting the Setup” 71. 
51 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. and intro. Albert Hofstadter 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988) 106. 
52 This link is made in many of the essays in Fry, RUATV?. 
53 Levin articulates Enframing as a word to describe our epoch generally as well as the 
character of our vision. The Opening of Vision 365.  
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Things in the world therefore become present as stock ‘standing by’ for 
use by man: they become “standing-reserve” (Bestand).54 In Heidegger’s 
example, technology sets-upon the energies of nature, extracting and 
objectifying products — coal, uranium, iron ore, seed, air and water. These 
things, objectively real, are consequently also fundamentally misunderstood. 
Earth, which Heidegger explains as the concealed sustainment of self-opening 
(poiesis), becomes uniform matter and things become fully apparent and 
calculable.55 It is not so much a human indifference that Heidegger is pointing 
to here, but rather to the structuring of the process of forgetting the openedness 
of beings.56 The consequence of this transformative dynamic, this technological 
world-picturing, is that the ground of the earth, the ground that in its 
incalculable self-opening “cannot be figured out”,57 is forgotten in a manner 
that is both violent and unfelt. 
In the sensible view, the unknown as unknown, as the unexplainable or 
unpredictable, is erased, locked out.58 From our perspective of a world full of 
designed things that design, the ongoing burden and tearing pain of this 
forgetting, which we can connect here with Plato and the burden of learning, 
can be seen to be largely ‘taken care of’ in increments of technological design. 
It is resolutely locked away in products of technological invention and 
innovation, removing from the sphere of human experience the violence of the 
world becoming structured according to correctness and beings becoming 
structured according to functionality.59  
Heidegger provides us with a perspective on the normative production 
of correctness such that we can see that, in spite of our forgetfulness, we are 
never free of the ‘wresting away from hiddeness’ of the modern orientation. 
                                                 
54  Enframing “gather man thither to order the self-revealing as standing reserve.” Heidegger 
“The Question Concerning Technology” 19. 
55 “The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to 
that extent sheltering and concealing.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 49. 
56 Heidegger, “On The Essence of Truth” 147. 
57 Levin, “Decline and Fall” 204.  
58 “Explanation” says Heidegger “is always twofold.  It accounts for an unknown by means of 
a known, and at the same time it verifies that known by means of that unknown.” Heidegger, 
“The Age of the World Picture” 121. 
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The violent tearing pertains at every moment in the ordering of things 
according to anthropocentric values. The projection of the metaphysical 
ground, the fixed ground-plan of the world picture, is explained by Heidegger’s 
translator in a footnote as Grundriss, coming from the verb reissen meaning to 
tear, to rend, to sketch, to design, and the noun Riss, which means tear, gap, 
outline. “Hence the noun Grundriss, first sketch, ground plan, design, connotes 
a fundamental sketching out that is an opening up as well.”60  
This Riss is also discussed in “The Origin of The Work of Art” (1935-
6). Here, Heidegger speaks of the Riss (rift/design) in terms of the structuring 
of a work as a conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of 
world and earth. This Riss, “the intimacy with which opponents belong to each 
other”, is fixed in place and becomes manifest in the figure or Gestalt. Therein 
the tearing apart becomes a tearing together into a common outline, the 
aesthetic form or figure61:  
The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth 
and thus fixed in place is figure, shape, Gestalt. Createdness of the 
work means: truth’s being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is the 
structure in whose shape the rift composes and submits itself. This 
composed rift is the fitting or joining of the shining of truth. What is 
here called figure, Gestalt, is always to be thought in terms of the 
particular placing (Stellen) and framing or framework (Ge-stell) as 
which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth.62  
The Riss is “the dif-ference, the pain of the threshold that joins.”63  
Pain can therefore be considered the “joining agent” of the designed 
artefact. 64 The designed thing is torn into the earth’s matter and at the same 
                                                                                                                                 
59 Such products — telegenic products — will be explored in the last Part of this thesis.  
60 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 118. 
61 Weber, “The Unravelling of Form”, Mass Mediauras 26-7. 
62 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 64. 
63 Albert Hofstadter here connects “The Origin of the Work of Art” to the later  
“Language”(1950) — which was discussed in Part 1 in the context of relationality — in  
 his translator’s introduction to Poetry, Language, Thought xiii. 
64 “Pain is the joining agent in the rendering that divides and gathers. Pain is the joining of the 
rift.” Heidegger, “Language”204. 
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time strives to surmount it by fixing its truth in the figure. The earth, as that 
which withdraws and sustains self-opening, continually ‘bears and juts’ into 
design’s new worlds, in its own time.65  The designing implemented by 
representational thinking forgets this drama, concealing the fundamental 
negotiation of world and earth by design.  
Yet this forgetting entails much work as Enframing is incapable of 
expecting the unexpected. In his reading of Heidegger, Weber portrays the 
work of Enframing in its mode of being a concealing revealing. In the dynamic 
process of Enframing, Weber argues, the places set in place can never be taken 
for granted and must continually be defended, established and (re)secured. 
Thus says Weber, “(i)f the institutionalisation of the subject/object relation — 
the matrix of representational thinking — is a result of the emplacement that 
goes on in and as modern technology, then those very same goings-on 
undermine the objectivity upon which the matrix depends.”66  
The uniformity that Enframing imposes is consistently unsecured by the 
relationality to which each placing is ineluctably subject. Enframing responds 
to this with a frenzy of securing that merely escalates the drama of revealing 
objects.67 The consequence of the structural lack of responsiveness of 
Enframing, is that design plans without consciousness of what is being planned 
in an ecological sense.68 We can conclude here that Enframing’s taking care of 
things, is not a caring for things: 
Enframing sets itself above the thing, leaves it, as thing, unsafeguarded, 
truthless. In this way Enframing disguises the nearness of the world that 
nears in the thing. Enframing disguises even this, its disguising, just as 
                                                 
65 “World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The 
world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the 
Work of Art” 49.  
66 Weber, “Upsetting the Setup” 73. 
67 “(T)he frenziedness of technology has entrenched itself everywhere.” Heidegger, “The 
Question Concerning Technology” 35. 
68 This reminds us of Jullien’s comments on the Western plan that fails to correspond to what 
actually happens. Planning is in this regard the productive projection of the objectivity of 
correctness. As we have briefly mentioned, design has a history of being considered as a 
planning activity.  
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the forgetting of something forgets itself and is drawn away in the wake 
of forgetful oblivion.69  
Enframing is neglectful of beings because it is structurally incapable of 
opening up to relationality, to what in Heidegger’s terms is the ‘being of beings 
in their being’. The “injurious neglect of the thing” under technology’s rule is 
brought about by representation’s blindness to relationality.70 In other words, 
silently, (in)visibly,  things are abandoned in and to their objectivity. Our 
environments, our lifeworlds, bear the consequences of these abandonments 
even as we continue to live rich, full and materially aspirational lives. 
Things appear to continue as normal and in absolute conformity with 
the ways of being promoted by the televisual world picture. Enframing, 
erroneously confident, does not get torn apart but in fact appears in many 
respects to become but more capable of dealing with the disturbing complexity 
of relations. In this respect we cannot underestimate the overcoming of critical 
insight by the sensible view in which the power of Enframing ‘rules in 
concealment’. The televisual image offers a key that unlocks appropriate ways 
of being in a televisual environment. 
                                                 
69 Heidegger, “The Turning” 46. 
70 Heidegger, “The Turning” 45. 
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CHAPTER 5. SEEING A WAY OF SEEING 
 
Power that functions is not perceived. (Ulrich 
Beck)1  
 
What is television, after Heidegger ’s insights? In spite of its cultural 
ubiquity, I agree with Fry and Weber that the nature of television is not known 
and is thus open to hypothesising.2 In this chapter we bring together 
Heidegger’s explanation of representation’s worlding with a systems-
theoretical perspective to frame the televisual operation. We want to 
foreground the importance of this operation for understanding the effective 
power of television and the ways in which it produces reality.  
Television is a cultural form brought into being by a mode of thought 
that well preceded it. It secures a way of seeing that in turn sustains a system of 
communication. It is not however conceived here as “one great machine” 
lowered onto the world.3 Television is ecologically generative. As we explore 
its operation in what follows, television takes on a certain anthropomorphism. 
This is in order to highlight the ongoing directive agency of designed things. 
As Bateson’s cybernetic epistemology reveals, what ‘thinks’ and thus 
communicates is the man plus the product (thing or idea) plus the environment.  
                                                 
1 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press 1999) 96. 
2 Fry indicates the nascent status of knowledge about television as an ontological domain. See 
Fry, A New Design Philosophy 228 - 251. Weber makes a similar point as he contrasts the 
volume of literature on television to the minimal engagement with “the distinctive specificity 
of the medium.” Weber, “Television: Set and Screen”, Mass Mediauras 108.  
3 This dystopian image of television is from Margaret Morse: “In the mall, not only can 
television screens be found in department stores and passages, but the mall as an architectural 
form has begun to sprout ‘video walls’. On the freeway, we can soon anticipate the appearance 
of the virtual video screen or ‘head up display’ which will float in a driver’s field of vision like 
a freeway sign. It seems that soon one will have to speak of one great machine.” Morse “An 
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Tele-vision means ‘seeing at a distance’4 or dis-stance, to borrow 
Hubert Dreyfus’ translation of Heidegger’s ent-fernung. This means for 
Dreyfus “the establishing and overcoming of distance, that is, the opening up 
of a space in which things can be near and far…” Dreyfus indicates that 
Heidegger modifies the assertion that dis-stance means ‘making farness vanish’ 
in a marginal note:  “nearness and presence (Anwesenheit), not the magnitude 
of separation, is what is essential.”5 According to Fry the televisual “has to be 
seen in an ontological geography of dual unlinkable spaces, where distance is 
measured in terms of an awareness of a felt distance rather than the measured 
and thus quantified distance”.6 The relationship between viewer and screen 
draws together ‘there’ and ‘here’ or rather the ‘being-here’ of ‘there’. My 
emphasis is on this engaging presence and the experiences that emerge within 
the unplanned designed environment of the televisual.  
Television’s imposing ongoingness, its ‘economy of the same’, 
presupposes and regenerates the temporality of representation. It assumes that 
its audiences can all experience the same thing in the same way at the same 
time and again. For Luhmann, the mass media are “behind the much debated 
characteristics of modern temporal structures, such as the dominance of the 
past/future schema, the uniformization of world time, acceleration, the 
extension of simultaneity to non-simultaneous events. They generate the time 
they presuppose, and society adapts itself accordingly.”7 What is brought ‘near’ 
to us in the televisual environment is the closure of things, the resolution of 
things into a particular kind of figure-ground distinction deprived of worldly 
location, resonance and sensibility. We are captivated, held and animated by a 
vision that is blind to its violent rendering. And yet we have never seen more 
— the televisual environment draws upon all of the trans-historical and trans-
cultural resources it has at its disposal to make the world available as picture 
                                                                                                                                 
Ontology of Everyday Distraction,” in Logics of Television: essays in cultural criticism 
Patricia Mellencamp (ed) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) 212. 
4 Discussed in Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 113. 
5 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world 132.  
6 My emphasis. Fry, RUATV? 35. 
7 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 21. 
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and to bring more and more into view for aesthetic entertainment. The 
televisual environment is our environment — it is part of the environment we 
are fundamentally involved in. In this environment we don’t just get a feeling 
for what things are but also how, when and why they are. By virtue of 
relationality, every thing is touched by the televisual in some way. We all, even 
those of us trained to read images and who are watching out for the differences 
the image makes, are also ‘sensible viewers’ engaging with an intensively and 
extensively designed world whose nature is increasingly televisual.8 Being 
televisual in this respect involves no human decision; it is the world we were 
born into.9  
In the modern world in which all distances have been abolished, 
sensible viewers are as remote as ever from understanding the ecological 
relationality of things. Heidegger’s statement that “all distances in time and 
space are shrinking” now has the ring of a familiar cultural observation, even a 
sales pitch; the momentum has reversed and become divested of its relation to 
the proximity of understanding.10  
                                                 
8 In the next Part I consider what the special skill of ‘reading’ images can bring to a more 
relationally oriented design practice.  
9 Even if this world did not yet have television, it was a world in which the televisual was 
already implied. This is the point at which my argument departs from the bulk of sociological 
studies that seek to determine television’s impact on behaviour and interpersonal relationships. 
The social learning experiments of Albert Bandura have been particularly influential in this 
regard. Bandura, a social psychologist at Stanford University, led several experiments in the 
early sixties to study the impact of models on the behaviour of children and adolescents. The 
most famous of these was ‘the Bobo doll experiment’ in which children were shown a film of a 
model punching an inflatable doll, a behaviour they imitated when given the same dolls soon 
after. Albert Bandura, Dorothea Ross and Sheila A. Ross “Transmission of Aggression through 
Imitation of Aggressive Models”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63 (1961): 575 - 
582.  More recently, several research projects led by Paediatrics Professor Tom Robinson, also 
at Stanford, found that decreased television watching is associated with less aggression, better 
health and better interpersonal communication between children. See for example Thomas N. 
Robinson et. al., “Effects of Reducing Children’s Television and Video Game Use on 
Aggressive Behaviour: a Randomized Controlled Trial”, Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent 
Medicine 155.1 ( 2001): 17-23. The argument of ontological design does not dispute the role of 
televisual example, or the emotional and physical consequences of solitary, ‘sedative 
consumption’. It does, however, refute the idea of non-mediated interpersonal relationships 
that such studies depend on to identify the difference television makes. The underlying 
assumption is that television is a discrete entity that can be removed from these relationships 
and that uniform judgements can be made about its influence. The issue of causal influence 
needs to be put into the situation of ecological transformation.
10 Heidegger, “The Thing” 165. 
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Instead of shrinking, distances in space and time are being frantically 
opened up by the unending potentiality of market-driven design; products are 
designed to impart the experience of increased safety, acceleration, comfort or 
style for example; they bring further ease to the psychology of disposability, or 
they build in an effort of self-assembly to provide a sense of personal 
achievement. We can also do any number of things that are ‘escapist’.11 The 
total propinquity of things is now normalised to the extent that we need to 
consider the world we encounter as an object of knowledge in different ways. 
Looking into the televisual environment, we cannot see how we have 
been deceived as to the true space and time of things. We cannot establish the 
extent to which farness has vanished, nor the nature of what has been lost in 
this vanishing. Following its ontological incorporation, the question concerning 
the whatness of the televisual  — for example with regard to how it transforms 
the natural limitations of our embodied perception  — is perhaps less important 
than the question of what we do with television and its projections. What 
matters is how we live our understanding of the televisual environment and 
how this understanding informs design practice. 
THE ‘BEING’ OF THE IMAGE 
The manifest discourse of the image depends on what Derrida calls the 
instituting question of Western philosophy: “what is…?”12 When we ask “what 
is an image?” we are re-establishing the conditions of representation. If we no 
longer ask about the image in terms of this whatness, we undermine what holds 
it together as an idea. As Luhmann says in relation to the distinction 
idea/reality, we cannot give up one side of the distinction without relinquishing 
the distinction itself.13 However we do not encounter this whatness of the 
image— the image as image — in the televisual environment. By dint of the 
                                                 
11 These examples are all contrary to the project of making time in the sense of promoting the 
conditions for sustainability, see Fry, A New Design Philosophy. 
12 Derrida, Of Grammatology 19. 
13 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 124. 
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relationship that is entailed in watching, we are not aware of the objectivity of 
the image as we are already inside a relationship with it.14  
Weber observes that “(w)hat television transmits is not so much images, 
as is almost always argued. It does not transmit representations but rather the 
semblance of presentation as such, understood as the power not just to see and 
to hear but to place before us.”15 We do not look at or even see television in the 
way we might look at or see a film. We watch it, and we only watch 
something, Weber argues, whose outcome is in doubt. So if we do not watch 
images as such, what is it we are watching? We are watching the vision of the 
other: the uncanny unfolding of a remote vision into which ‘distance’ and 
‘separation’ have been transposed.16  
 Television operates on the assumption of the meaningful, apodictic 
clarity of its self-enclosed system of reference. It communicates worlds of 
things, people, opinions, situations, lifestyles, environments, catastrophes — all 
of which share an orientation toward self-certain fidelity. Derrida emphasises 
that representation is a rendering present, “a summoning as a power-of-
bringing-back-to-presence”,17which is, we contend, also always a bringing into 
presence for the first time. From this perspective, the ‘deprived object’ that 
draws near in the televisual environment institutes differences and opens 
directions that can never again be closed.  
The televisual image reaches into our ontological domain with an 
assertive confidence that in a relational sense has no idea of where it is going 
or what it will mean beyond the horizon of its own form. Not an openness to or 
consciousness of the particular environment or situation it breaks into, but the 
opening of an objective assumption, an uncanny, one-way conversation 
                                                 
14 “When individuals look at media as text or as image, they are outside; when they experience 
the result within themselves, they are inside.”  Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 115. 
15 Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 117. Television’s reification of the senses is discussed 
in Fry, RUATV?. See for example Fry’s “Switchings” and Eamon D’Arcy’s “The Eye and the 
Projectile” which asserts “tele-visual technologies are relocating vision to a plane severed from 
the eye of the observer.” (104). Weber also discusses televisual audition in “Television: Set 
and Screen”.  
16 Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 122. 
17 Derrida, “Sending: On Representation” 116. 
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blithely indifferent to the relational particularity of those co-present.18 Weber 
speaks of the set as a Trojan horse entering the fortress of the family home, but 
television lacks the quiet caution and planning that underlies this legendary 
strategy.19 Its concatenation of images flood the environment with unlinked 
positive statements that have no hope of controlling the impressions they make. 
Think of the indifferent, merciless bleating of a mobile phone as it extends and 
amplifies the environmental ignorance of the caller and, without any subtlety, 
completely reconfigures the receptive setting. The image makes real a form of 
independent communication, a communication that not only circumvents 
interaction amongst those co-present but effectively renders such interaction 
impossible for the media’s own communications.20 This is something that 
Baudrillard indicated as a key aspect of mass media in the early 70s. In his 
(premature) “Requiem for the Media” he says, “the mass media are anti-
mediatory and intransitive. They fabricate non-communication.” The media 
‘speak’ in a way that “excludes any response anywhere.”21  
Without the thought of design, the relation between this irresponsibility 
and what McLuhan evocatively calls the “indomitable tactile promptings of the 
TV image”22 remains inarticulate. Both Fry and Weber problematise the 
conduct of televisual communication by indicating that the screen that shows 
also filters and obscures.23  
                                                 
18 An example of this blithe indifference: the Miss World competition that has in recent years 
moved to ‘third world’ countries (and in this regard is merely the latest in the continued 
symbolic and material dumping of Western refuse of desire) caused religious riots and 200 
deaths in Nigeria after a press article suggested that the Prophet Mohammed would probably 
have picked one of the contestants as a wife. Unable to see the particular cultural and symbolic 
violence this situation, many of the contestants and the organisers said the riots had ‘nothing to 
do’ with the ostensibly harmless pageant, which in fact ‘focused attention on the issue of 
women’s rights’. Peter Fray “It’s not about your body, it’s how well you look” The Sydney 
Morning Herald December 7-8 (2002): 11. 
19 Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 122. 
20 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 15. On this point see also Myerson, who likens the 
‘independence’ of mobile communication to ‘one hand clapping’. George Myerson, Heidegger, 
Habermas and the Mobile Phone (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2001) 24. 
21 Baudrillard, “Requiem for the Media”, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 
169-70.  
22 McLuhan, Understanding Media 316. 
23 Fry describes televisual perception in terms of three screens that both filter and project: that 
of language, the designed image and that of the image as it is inscribed in memory. Fry, A New 
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In showing, the figurative light of the image reaches out of itself, 
imposes itself and calls for adaptation. This directive aspect of the televisual 
image can be thought as a form of script, an eidetic script (from eidos, the 
visible aspect of something but retaining a relation to the immaterial ‘idea’ in 
Plato’s sense). The televisual ‘script’ prepares a position for those looking at 
it, as does a traffic light or the vanishing point in a Renaissance painting.24 The 
designation of script is a useful way to signal the prefigurative power of images 
as they forge a consensual environment in which design is directed.25  
As a product of design with its own being, the script travels forward 
with an open intent, carrying a potent unpredictability with regard to how it 
might be taken up.26 This idea bears some relation to Luhmann’s exploration of 
the Kantian concept of schemata. Schemata are not images as such, which 
become concretely fixed at the moment of depiction, but are rather rules for 
accomplishing operations, rules that “structure memory but do not determine 
action.”27 Thus, says Luhmann: 
(…) memory does not consist of a supply of images which one can look 
at again whenever necessary. Rather it is a question of forms which, in 
the ceaseless temporal flow of autopoiesis, enables recursions, 
retrospective reference to the familiar, and repetition of operations 
which actualize it.”28
 
                                                                                                                                 
Design Philosophy 239. Weber also describes three screens: that which is watched, the 
screening of editorial operation and that which stands between the viewer and the viewed and 
“covers the separation”. Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 123. 
24 Bruno Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” 
Shaping Technology/Building Society 236. 
25 This prefigurative power is particularly clear in the relation that Virilio has theorised 
between war and cinema. Ross draws out the collusive relations defining the military-
industrial-media complex in “The Ecology of Images”. The September 11 2001 attacks on 
America, which Baudrillard describes as a self-induced missive of televisual desire, can also be 
considered in this frame. See Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, trans. Chris Turner (New 
York: Verso, 2003).  
26 “‘Script’ refers to the special case where temporal successions are stereotyped (for example, 
the fact that we are supposed to buy a ticket before getting on a train).” Luhmann discusses the 
utility of the script in The Reality of the Mass Media 109-110. 
27 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 112. 
28 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 109. 
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This proposal removes the televisual image from the otherworldly domain of 
the mere re-presentation: the copy. Yet the particular operation of the image is 
characterised by its ability to bring on the real, to make relations, without 
unravelling its representational structure. The image is somehow able to remain 
outside reality.  
Luhmann explains that the binary code (sign/world; artifice/reality) is 
not an issue of identity but becomes a foundation for operationality.29 Each 
‘function system’ of society (that is, any system self-actualised by a specific 
and primary function, like that of communication for the media) works out 
what belongs to its system and what belongs to its environment. The binary 
code becomes the integrative factor of a system’s autopoeisis whereby it is 
operationally closed but structurally open at the same time.30  For Luhmann the 
difference opened up within the binary code unfolds the unity of self-reference 
as a guiding difference.31 This does not in any way limit the differences that the 
system can incorporate; in fact the system is ‘steered’ by the problems it 
encounters and solves for itself. Meaning is a function of this internal 
relationality of the code in that it accomplishes the eradication of difference.32 
So television’s ‘economy of the same’ sustains itself by transforming ‘non-
information’ into ‘information’ without exposing itself to the paradox of this 
self-production.33 Luhmann says that the mass media in this way creates “the 
conditions for further communication which do not themselves have to be 
communicated in the process.”34  
Systems manage this ‘coding’ by way of the practice of ‘second-order’ 
observation, which provides a measure of self-reflective ability.35 While the 
                                                 
29 Luhmann calls this “operational constructivism”. The Reality of the Mass Media 5. 
30 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 5. See also John Bednarz Jnr’s introduction to 
Luhmann, Ecological Communication xi. 
31 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 17. 
32 Fry explains this in the context of a discussion on functionalism in Fry, A New Design 
Philosophy 37. 
33 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 77. 
34 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 65. 
35 Second order observation is derived by Luhmann from the ‘second-order cybernetics’ of 
constructivist epistemology. Luhmann credits here the biologist Humberto Matruana and the 
cybernetic theory of Heinz von Foerster. Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 117- 22. 
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perspective of any one system is limited by its own system-environment 
distinction, it can develop a kind of insight and the possibility of self-
transformation by observing the self-observation of other systems. The 
observer can see the environmental horizon that another system has set up for 
itself as an artificial constraint and can thus potentially learn something about 
its own operations through this observation.36 Luhmann stresses however that 
second-order observation does not reveal objective truths about the observed 
system. The observer is always subject to the conditional nature of his or her 
own position, shaped in part by the ‘resonance’ produced by other systems.37 
Luhmann shows that this is a complex problem of a system’s understanding of 
what are problems for it. A system is constrained by its own mode of truth and 
cannot simply see its operational bases as a kind of truth, as an interpretation 
with other possible outcomes. 
For Luhmann the mass media are not but another system amongst many 
in society. The reality of the mass media hangs on this second-order 
observation.38 In watching the effects of actions unfold, Luhmann proposes that 
the viewer is engaged in learning a conduct of observation:  
The sequences of distinction… make a second difference in their world 
of imagination — the difference to the knowledge, capability and 
feelings of the viewers. The issue here is not what impression the text, 
the programme, the film makes on the individual viewer. And neither 
can the effect be grasped with the simple concept of analogy formation 
and imitation — as if one were trying out on oneself what one had read 
in a novel or seen in a film (…) One learns to observe observers, in 
particular looking to see how they react to situations, in other words, 
how they themselves observe. 39  
                                                 
36 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 23 – 4. 
37 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 49. The ‘resonance’ between the systems of mass 
media and politics  — consider the inaugural JFK-Nixon TV debate preceding the 1960 US 
election — is a good example.  
38Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 85. 
39 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 60. 
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By virtue of participation, by engagement and involvement with appearances, 
televisual images have an ontological implication; one learns to use the 
televisual material to observe oneself and others.40 This televisual participation 
is never first initiated but always already going on: 
(…) the mass media are not media in the sense of conveying 
information from those who know to those who do not know. They are 
media to the extent that they make available background knowledge 
and carry on writing it as a starting point for communication.41  
The mass media have generated an apparently indifferent “background 
reality”42 for which there can be no responsibility and thus the viewer is 
naturally inducted into a vision that leaves “the illusion of a cognitively 
accessible reality untouched.”43   
According to Luhmann, the social reality of television depends 
precisely upon a reduction of its social role. While television assumes 
psychological involvement, it attributes to ‘social actors’ their own self-
induced causality.44 The mass media are not burdened by the task of sustaining 
memories; rather they are concerned only with “an ongoing discrimination 
between forgetting and remembering.”45   
The power of the televisual “shows itself and hides itself in the way in 
which everything presences.”46 Television is a Riss that produces erasure, 
forgetting. And as it goes on, inducting the sensible view, it deeply 
problematises the possibility of self-reflection, for we share its memory. 
Sensible viewers live opinions about places and things we have seen on 
television — differences television has made — even while we can diminish 
                                                 
40“Almost imperceptibly viewers come to understand themselves as observers of observers and 
to discover similar or perhaps different attitudes within themselves.”  Luhmann, Reality of the 
Mass Media 59. 
41 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media  66. 
42 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 65. 
43 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 92. 
44 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 72. 
45 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 37. 
46 Heidegger, “The Thing “166. 
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the objective source of these insights as just television, only part of the picture 
and an edited and opportunistically oriented part, at that.  
In its showing, filtering and obscuring, television brings to the fore the 
reality of ambivalence. For Weber “what is ostensibly ‘set in place’ as the 
television set is also and above all a movement of displacement, of 
transmission.”47 In this analysis his earlier elaboration of Enframing is 
important, particularly the dynamic of unsecuring. But, Weber tells us, the 
decisive quality of television also comforts viewers because it powerfully 
recuperates this unsettling tendency: “The more the medium tends to unsettle, 
the more powerfully it presents itself as the antidote to the disorder to which it 
contributes.”48 So what we watch out for in the televisual environment is the 
recuperation of order, an order that is both determined and constantly 
unravelled by television. Weber’s deconstruction suggests that as televisual 
certainty unfolds, human beings are correlatively alienated from the experience 
of uncertainty.  
Avital Ronell captured this complex, ambivalent quality of televisual 
productivism in her analysis of the role of television in the events preceding the 
LA riots in the early 90s:  
(…) television produces the very thing it withholds and erases. So 
there’s a simultaneous sense of it being on “play” and “erase” at the 
same time (...) So what does it mean when television produces the so-
called event of racial violence?  It means there’s closure, things are 
being taken care of, there’s suturing: there’s a kind of obsessive 
suturing of the incomprehensible.49  
                                                 
47 Weber, ““Television: Set and Screen” 125. 
48 Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 126. Baudrillard very early on also notes this tendency 
when he says in The System of Objects; “Every advertising image is a key, a legend, and as 
such reduces the anxiety-provoking polysemy of the world.” Baudrillard, The System of 
Objects, trans. James Benedict, (London/New York: Verso, 1996) 177. 
49 “Interview with Avital Ronell” Now Time (1993):28. In this interview Ronell refers to the 
displacement of the Gulf War — which while being a televisual event, was never actually 
screened — onto the home front by the Rodney King event. This argument is also made in 
Ronell, “TraumaTV: Twelve Steps Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Finitude’s Score: Essays 
for the end of the Millennium (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994) 305 - 
327. 
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The televisual both names and extinguishes the event, disallowing 
reflection and forethought with regard to the consequences of what is shown, 
outside the repeat performance. The metonymic operations of the televisual 
overwrite the specificities of the event.50
The image erases the trace of relationality by way of recuperation and 
restoration. It stitches up the gap between the prefigurative memories of other 
such events and their ‘new’ appearance, doing away with uncertainty.51 We 
experience affirmation in the unfolding of television. Luhmann says “(e)ach 
programme holds the promise of another programme. It is never a matter of 
simply representing the world in any one given moment.”52 In structuring 
vision, memory and background reality — and this is perhaps why so many 
sociological studies assert that television watching is not characterised by 
alertness (as in watching out for something new) but rather by absorption and 
relaxation (recognition) 53 — the image disappears into presence.  
If television can be assigned a responsibility it is perhaps this: to retain 
form, to literally ‘keep things together’ against the unsecuring that it 
exacerbates in making sensible viewers less and less capable of dealing with 
uncertainty. Television’s part in releasing us of the burden of the Riss in this 
regard is one of normalising and securing the view of ‘whatness’. At the same 
time this entails the wilful devaluation of a relational situation and perspective. 
We learn from television to ignore relationality, but this ignorance is not 
constituted in a turning away from reality toward the screen, but in an 
engagement with the reality of what presences.  
                                                 
50 See Ronell, “TraumaTV”.  
51 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 63. 
52 My emphasis. Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 11. 
53 A theme of research particularly relevant here is ‘mood management theory’. This theory 
asserts that people use television to regulate their moods, for example to reduce or dissipate 
anxiety and stress. The key research in this area is by Dolf Zillman and Jennings Bryant, for 
example: Selective Exposure to Communication (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers, 1985); Perspectives on Media Effects, ed. Bryant and Zillman 
(Hillsdale, New Jersey : L. Erlbaum Associates, 1986); “Entertainment as Media Effect”, 
Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers,1994)  437-461. James Lull also discusses the anxiety reducing effects of 
absorbing television in Inside Family Viewing: Ethnographic Research on Television's 
Audiences (London: Routledge, 1990). 
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Given this complex picture of the being of the televisual image, how 
can we develop a form of observation that is capable of making a difference in 
and to the televisual environment, wherein observation itself has become 
objectified? Levin responds to this dilemma by presenting a very different form 
of insight that reserves an always already embodied ontological alternative to 
the everywhere televisual environment. Levin’s argument exemplifies a 
humanist position that takes Heidegger’s thought on technology in a direction 
that disputes the reality of the mass media and contrasts with our understanding 
of the naturalised artificial and the ontological design perspective.  
 
INSIGHT INTO VISION 
In The Opening of Vision, the second book of his trilogy diagnosing the 
potential of human self-development in response to what he calls our age of 
nihilism, Levin seeks to recover the “pre-ontological understanding” Heidegger 
turned from after Being and Time, by way of the gift of our embodiment.54  
As one of the few objects Levin gives us to look at in his text, television 
exemplifies the historical appropriation of our visionary being (that is, our ‘pre-
ontological visual capacity’) under the rule of Enframing. Television is 
untruthful, for Levin, insofar as it “obscures our capacity for authentic 
existence, true subjectivity, being true to ourselves”.55 Yet as a manifestation of 
the supreme danger of Enframing, it also possesses a beneficent capacity in 
that “television is a vision capable of touching and moving its viewers.”56 By 
virtue of its predominance within our realm of vision, television has a capacity 
to show us something real — the social reality constituted in and by a filmed 
and broadcast event, the holding within a frame of an event of actual 
                                                 
54 “(A)s I read him, Heidegger’s conviction that he had no alternative (but to abandon the entire 
‘analytic of Dasein’) derives from the fact that he did not appreciate the human body as an 
organ of Being; as the organismic bearer of a pre-ontological understanding; as the primal 
medium into which this pre-understanding of Being is always first inscribed.” Levin, The 
Opening of Vision 43. 
55 Levin, The Opening of Vision 129. 
56 Levin, The Opening of Vision 122. 
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proximity. Out of the horror of television, the possibility of a disclosive event 
emerges: 
(…) a disclosure of truth by reference to which we could perhaps 
understand more deeply, and more compellingly, the essential character 
of our time… it lets us see more clearly into the concealed essence of 
nihilism. Somehow, it is an event which opens our eyes to the abyss.57
 
Levin suggests that by looking into television in this way we might 
catch a glimpse of the suffering in which we participate. The implication is that 
the televisual event can provide us with insight into the danger of Enframing, 
as it takes place through our own increasingly narcissistic ‘tele-vision’. In “The 
Turning”, Heidegger asks: 
Will insight into that which is bring itself disclosingly to pass? Will we, 
as the ones caught sight of, be so brought home into the essential glance 
of Being that we will no longer elude it? (…) Will we correspond to 
that insight, through a looking that looks into the essence of technology 
and becomes aware of Being itself within it?58
 
The supreme threat of Enframing lies in its autopoiesis, the destiny of which is 
the death of the future.59 However, as it is an explanation of the conditions we 
now find ourselves in, Enframing also constitutes the sole space of redirection. 
Within Enframing, the danger that unfolds, the “saving power” as the 
possibility that can take root and set off in another direction, is also to be 
found.60 Heidegger asks “How can this happen? Here and now and in little 
things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes 
holding always before our eyes the extreme danger.”61  
                                                 
57 Levin, The Opening of Vision 124. 
58 Heidegger, “The Turning” 49. 
59 See Fry on ‘defuturing’ in A New Design Philosophy.  
60 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” 26 –28. 
61 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” 33. 
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The possibility of holding before our eyes the extreme danger seems a 
task of almost perverse impossibility in our late modern world. As we have 
suggested, televisual operation does not call our attention to the specific 
realities it sets in place, but rather uses this material to affirm what we already 
know. Television as shared vision, takes on the role of securing our sense of 
place in simultaneity with the most abhorrent catastrophes imaginable. 
Television does not merely bear witness to natural or socio-cultural disasters, 
nor can it be reduced to this role. It engineers them: the horrors that television 
communicates are also horrors that television designs. We witness that which 
would not have happened in a world that would not have existed without 
television.62  
Thus we can see that the televisual suffering Levin wants the sensible 
viewer to experience does not prompt care as a way of being, but rather exists 
in its afterlife. Television does not promote careful, precautionary styles of life, 
it does not give us the ability to understand the plight of others beyond the 
‘face of suffering’63 encountered in charity advertisements; it does not give us 
anything with which to open the experience of suffering for ourselves even as 
it “call(s) attention to suffering and move(s) its distant viewers to a sympathetic 
response.”64What the televisual description of suffering does do is to generate 
an immunity toward living care-fully. Televisual care is engrossed in 
restoration, closure and ‘taking care of’ things.  
In these terms it is undeniably a struggle to see the televisual event as 
anything but consequence-free, a point Ronell makes when she remarks upon 
the endless televisual production of “corpses that need not be mourned.”65 The 
televisual image  — such as that of the burning Kuwaiti oil wells against the 
                                                 
62 The September 11, 2001 attack on America was such an event. Its televisual nature resonates 
outward in a multiplicity of consequences, not least the manufactured invisibility of its cause 
and the need for counter-images of ‘justice’ in a war waged upon Iraq as a unified and unitary 
enemy. The complex nature of this event and the massive task of televisual restoration cannot, 
however, be given proper consideration here.  
63 Felicity Lawrence writes of the politically motivated lack of vision of the impact of the ‘war 
on terror’ in Afganistan. Felicity Lawrence, “Suffering that has no Face”, Sydney Morning 
Herald, October 13 - 14 (2001).   
64 Levin, The Opening of Vision 122. 
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apparent nothingness of the desert background — cannot but sustain the 
recuperative tendency of the image and memorialise objects for our vision. 
And as we have seen, in its securing of the objective view, television cuts us 
off from developing the ability to respond to the being of what we encounter 
other than in the terms television itself scripts. The ‘gift’ of television is the 
aestheticisation of vision and the recoverability of a world deprived of being.66 
Television gives us, in these terms, a very particular kind of environmental 
awareness, one that normalises the environment as a place outside, a place 
constituted in normative spatio-temporal terms and immune from our 
involvements. The danger we need to hold before our eyes cannot be held 
within a frame, because it is the ontological designing of the televisual.  
This is not the insight that Levin’s receptive look is after. For Levin, the 
real point is to tune into our authentic, primordial being, to look beyond the 
image: 
The ontology of the image produces human suffering. And it deepens 
this suffering by framing it in an image. We need to see beyond the 
image into the depth of the suffering.67
Levin certainly does not expect to encounter the televisual in these depths.  
In The Opening of Vision, Levin constructs a difference between an 
intuitive visionary openness — the pre-ontological visual capacity of human 
beings — and the figure-driven, curious, egocentric vision of every-day seeing, 
which has put us out of touch with our primordial being.  Levin says we “fall 
into the structure, the pathological pattern… and we lose contact with the more 
open dimensionality of the existential field” that is, the ‘true’ ground of our 
experience. 68
For Levin, the harsh artificial light of the technological world — the 
historical manifestation of metaphysics — has suppressed the natural, ambient 
                                                                                                                                 
65 Avital Ronell, “TraumaTV” 308. 
66 This usage draws on Clive Dilnot’s exploration of design’s gift via the work of Elaine Scarry 
in Dilnot, “The Gift,” The Idea of Design, eds. Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995) 144 – 155. 
67 Levin, The Opening of Vision 151. 
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light.  This is not the pure, natural light of the world that is found in Merleau-
Ponty, 69 but a light within ourselves, an inner light shared with the world, 
which awakens our natural capacity for receptive, grounded vision.70 This is a 
light enfolded in the darkness of the night, the night of the sleeping body when 
our visionary dreaming releases us from our ego-logical obsession with 
visibility:  
Under the spell of the night, our vision goes down into the body; goes 
down within the individual, down into the collective unconscious, takes 
leave of the (consensually validated) world and returns for a while to 
the underworld, the realm of the dead, rejoins the experience of nature it 
shares with the animals, and enters into the world of the dreambody.71
In order to get to this more receptive capacity, we need to trust in our intuitive 
visionary ability and involuntary perceptions, glimpses of which are available 
everyday but which are concealed beneath the chronological layers of cultural 
artifice we have succumbed to in the modern world.72 Here Levin draws on 
Heidegger’s discussion in “The Turning” of the disclosing event (Ereignis) as a 
moment of vision, a flashing glance, a look of the world in which Being 
                                                                                                                                 
68 Levin, The Opening of Vision 59. 
69 Levin finds in Merleau-Ponty “no recognition at all that the light in conformity with which 
our vision takes place is not a ‘pure’ light, nor a light entirely belonging to nature, but rather a 
condition of visibility determined in many ways by the world our vision has built for itself.” 
Nonetheless, Levin implicitly posits a relation between primordial openness and a nature 
outside the rational vision we have inherited from metaphysics. Levin, The Opening of Vision 
86 - 93. 
70 In the last book of his triology, Levin characterises his project in terms of an “attempt to 
recollect an experience with the ground — the ‘ground’ of our standing and walking, the 
‘ground’ of our visual experience, the ‘ground’ of our hearing — by virtue of which we might 
be able to learn, to awaken within ourselves, an historically new relationship to the ‘ground’ 
that figures in the Question of Being.” Levin, The Listening Self: Personal Growth, Social 
Change and the Closure of Metaphysics (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) 6. 
71 Levin, The Opening of Vision 351-54. 
72 See Levin’s ontological schema in The Opening of Vision 47-49. Levin elaborates this 
intuitive capacity by drawing on Carl Jung’s notion of the ‘eternal child’ which, hidden in the 
adult  “…is always becoming, is never completed, and that calls for unceasing care, attention 
and fostering.” This ‘child’ that “cries out for recognition and an opportunity to develop itself, 
is what Heidegger would call the ‘authentic Self’: that implicit dimension of our existence 
which is always and already enjoying a primordial attunement to Being-as-a-whole.” Levin, 
The Body’s Recollection of Being 6. 
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truthfully comes to presence.73 The lightning flash offers a phenomenal vision 
of this truth as it amplifies the concealment of the night.74 Such a flash is a 
“healing scission”, a moment in which we share a visual communion with the 
world.  
The metaphors of healing, rejoining and making whole that suffuse 
Levin’s discourse hinge on the exemplary falseness of the image. He forgets 
that dreams are inflected with the light and ideas of the existing world, which 
include the televisual. The vision of representation, our adopted and normative 
vision, is also enfolded into Levin’s vision without presence as psychologically 
gathered memory, projection and desire.75 In reference to photography as a 
manifestation of the technology of vision that occasions the televisual, Levin 
speaks of “a transcription of the lighting of Being as it inscribes itself into the 
flesh of the world.”76 The material with which photography is made possible is 
‘primordial light’. This light is shaped and directed into the photograph where 
the ‘play of light’ becomes fixed, and here it stops, closes up. Levin does not 
attribute to the object thus fixed any ontological agency, yet somehow, the 
image bears upon human beings. He says that technologies of vision within 
which the metaphysics of presence are at work, block “perception of otherness 
and difference.”77  
For Levin, these ontological effects are limited to certain human beings 
who become fused with images and thus lose their reflective capacity. In this 
fusion, pathological conditions emerge:  
In the age of images, esse est percipi. This reduction of human being, 
and of Being as such, to its representedness, its being perceived, its 
being seen (…) links narcissistic epidemiology to the spread of 
nihilism. The narcissistic character lives out, in a mostly invisible 
                                                 
73 Heidegger, “The Turning” 44-45. 
74 Levin, The Opening of Vision 355. 
75 Levin, The Opening of Vision 351.  
76 Levin, The Opening of Vision 122. 
77 Levin, The Opening of Vision 127. 
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suffering, the historical condition of being nothing but an image, 
nothing but what can be seen, nothing but what is visible.78  
 
The most extreme subjectivity under Enframing’s rule is “a false, or sham 
subjectivity caught up in the production and consumption of images.”79 The 
narcissistic individual is stuck within a dialectic of an image-inflamed or 
deflated ego and suffers a reduction of their being.80 We do not get a sense of 
what would makes some people extraordinarily narcissistic beyond a certain 
weakness to resist the temptations of the image. Nor, conversely, what protects 
others from the fall into images and the correlative emptying out of their 
humanity.81 For Levin the image affects a disorder of the character not of the 
culture.  
He says, “…the world in which we live is finally reduced to the 
ontology of the picture.”82 Our senses and capacities are caught up in an image 
and “…what dominates is what glitters, what shines: the image, the illusion, 
the sham, the surface.”83 This resonates with a morality that is itself deeply 
televisual: the deceptive copy is a counterpoint to the Christian democratic 
liberalism which not only shapes the nature of freedom but the moral 
individual in so many televisual scripts.84 We make use of Heidegger in a 
different way: the world picture is the dimensional bodying forth of the world, 
not a reduction of the world.  
The task Levin sets before us is one of the recollection of forgotten 
being, rather than of designing difference into being. Ultimately we need to 
turn away from the dehumanised environments that mirror our objectifying, 
assertoric gaze: 
                                                 
78 Levin, The Opening of Vision 149. 
79 Levin, The Opening of Vision 120. 
80 “(W)e become nothing when the image is the measure of our being” Levin, The Opening of 
Vision 150. 
81 Levin, The Opening of Vision 134.  
82 Levin, The Opening of Vision 119. 
83 Levin, The Opening of Vision 151. 
84 As Luhmann notes the mass media offer freedom without any loss of reality — we are at 
liberty to participate or not. Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 60. 
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If our experience with the night teaches us to see ourselves in the 
objects around us and catch sight of the sense in which these objects are 
mirrors of our own projections, mirrors of our character, and of the 
prevailing sensibility in which we all participate, the sight of their 
violence … will perhaps turn us back upon ourselves, turn us into 
ourselves, to question the individual and collective ‘self’ whose vision 
… brought forth such disturbing objects.  But seeing all this could also 
open this ‘self’ to a different vision…85
Yet we are ineluctably caught up in our engagement with the designed world. 
To accept that we are always already embodied and that we trust our embodied 
intuitions, is not to exclude the ‘hand’ of the artificial in shaping these 
intuitions. Any break with industrial modernity will always be a matter of the 
worlds we construct because our habits are not conscious and must be 
supported by designed things that care for us and embody an understanding of 
our tendency to forget.   
When Heidegger was writing about technology, it was a different 
world. As we have seen, the ontological designing power of the televisual was 
strongly prefigured by the calculative impetus of the modern world in “The 
Age of the World Picture” and the structuring and organising power of 
technology (Enframing) in the “Question Concerning Technology”. But the 
products, materials, events, images, environments and infrastructures of the 
televisually ‘aware’ world that now rise up to meet us, had not yet become 
historically manifest. In this respect, particularly from the perspective of 
ontological design (for which the material conditions of our environments are 
paramount to human conduct), Heidegger is speaking from a place somewhat 
outside our world. While his discourse reveals that he could sense the texture 
of this technologically designed reality, see it coming, and was forethoughtful 
with regard to its ontological significance, he does not bear witness to the 
                                                 
85 Levin, The Opening of Vision 358. 
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world that his thought nonetheless helps us to understand. And Heidegger did 
not want to live in this coming world.86
Many thinkers after Heidegger — particularly those inflected with an 
ecological consciousness — tend to refuse the full inscription of the 
technological in our being-in-the-world and to reserve pre-cultural enclaves for 
being ‘outside’ technology. This affirms an ontological opposition between the 
artificial and the natural and is underpinned by a failure to recognise the 
anthropocentrism of our constructions of the natural environment.87 For Levin, 
this enclave is the self.  
In the last part of The Opening of Vision, Levin takes us with him into a 
darkened hut, cutting himself off from light and interactions with the world for 
seven days and nights, in a Tibetan practice of self-discovery called ‘The Dark 
Retreat’. During this time Levin experiences the undoing of his ‘rational’ 
vision and the inner lightning of the opening of his visionary being. This is an 
undeniably fascinating account of an experience of an alienation of normative 
vision, but this turning in on the self could not provide the sort of glimpse that 
would make a difference to the worlds we now live in and must seek to sustain. 
The questions remain: how does this insight lead beyond the self? How do you 
sustain a different habit of vision? And how does this vision lead us to a better 
world, to the desire for a world of difference?  
  Levin offers an instructive and deeply-felt exploration of 
Heidegger’s insights into the destructive work of metaphysics. His conclusions  
— that the agent of change is the self — does not convince me. The primordial 
promise of an authentic ‘Self’ is not enough in the face of the increasingly 
                                                 
86 Fry notes that “(a)lthough contradicted by his own feeling of rootedness, Heidegger started 
to grasp that modern technology (in which television is but one agency of lifeworld mediation 
and time/space ‘compression’), dissolves the ground upon which there exists a place of 
belonging, one that exists here as home — for us here and there have been replaced by 
everywhere and anywhere.” Fry RUATV? 32. Heidegger’s attachment to the ‘pre-
technological’ environment of his own lifeworld is well known. Borgmann described this 
attachment, which is revealed for him in Heidegger’s few examples of things, as “misleading 
and dispiriting” for a contemporary response to the technological society. We discuss this issue 
in Part 4.  
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flexible will of productivism and the dramatic material reality of modernity. 
From the perspective of ontological design, there is no outside to the world in 
which the structuring of Enframing is embedded and actualised. In a post-
natural world, we can no longer see the technological conditions we are both in 
and of. The only way out of the will to power of technological Enframing that 
Heidegger saw, and that we live, is through it: by design. It is in large part by 
way of the realisation of its ideas that the vision of representation has been 
sustained, and it is therefore the redesign of the worlds we encounter that will 
teach us new ways of being-in-the-world. 
                                                                                                                                 
87Bruce Foltz for example takes our relation to nature as the seat of crisis. Bruce V. Foltz, 
Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature (New 
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995). 
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CHAPTER 6. ENVIRONMENTALISM’S PROBLEM 
 
…(we have made) every spot on earth …artificial. 
(Bill McKibben)1  
 
The environment has become the territory of public and political conscience in 
a productivist, televisual society. Yet the discourse of environmentalism, which 
struggles to bring the environment into visibility and awareness, displays those 
very same characteristics of restoration and recuperation that we find in 
televisual operation. The environment is perhaps the most prevalent ‘pre-
cultural’ enclave and thus functions to provide an important symbolic counter-
point to technological society — it is the standing reserve of and for our 
aesthetically attuned sensibilities. Rather than providing a viable alternative to 
the televisual perspective, the environmental discourse makes the ‘aesthetico-
moral’ anthropocentrism of the age of the world picture acutely apparent. The 
nature, presence and function of the environment, as a transform of (in)visible 
process into place, reveals the power of representation’s interpretation of 
reality. 
For Luhmann, the environment that is recognised by society is designed 
by society. Environmental problems are never blatant objective facts of the 
environment per se but problems the social system exposes itself to.2  The 
changing environment disturbs the system, which must respond, but it can only 
respond in terms of and to its own ideas about the environment.3 Such 
disturbances do not threaten the integrity of the system but in fact steer the 
system’s ongoingness. In this analysis, the nature of the environment that we 
recognise is the environment that is given to us by the system of objective 
vision in which we participate.  
                                                 
1 McKibben, The End of Nature 54. 
2 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 29. 
3 Luhmann, Ecological Communication  15 – 21. 
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Environmental stories have achieved thematic status and now dominate 
the media in documentaries, news items and advertisements.4 Anxiety and 
protest about environmental conditions emerge from the incidental exposure of 
the consequences of industrial and consumer culture, which continue to 
provide more information for televisual ongoingness. The visual aftermath of 
relational effects as environmental news fits neatly with the televisual refrain 
of closure. The exposed problem engenders recognition but not relationality; 
we recognise these stories by way of the limited iconic vocabulary of televisual 
information embellished by the observations of experts. As environmental 
effects such as drought continue to impinge on our taken-for-granted lifestyles, 
there is a growing need for the mass media to communicate about the 
environment — transforming such problems of the non-fit between systems 
and interpreted environments into mines of economic, biophysical and cultural 
information. In this, the construction of the environment is radically concealed 
and the key question of who actually owns and experiences these problems is 
lost. Environmentalism, acting as the representative of the environment within 
society that thinks it has harnessed the media in taking full advantage of its 
metonymic operation, fails to see this designing. 
Environmental problems that are exposed in the media tend to generate 
a disproportionate resonance whereby a small change within a system easily 
triggers an effect-explosion: an over-reading within society and brush fire of 
observations.5 Thus the environment functions to dramatise the most banal 
                                                 
4 One particularly remarkable appearance of the environment in these terms is in the ‘cause 
marketing’ of Dawn dishwashing liquid in a television advertisement that promotes the 
product’s oil-covered seabird cleaning capabilities. As we watch what appear to be diligent 
animal-loving professionals carefully removing the residue of yet another generic oil-related 
environmental accident, what is fascinating is how the violence of ecological destruction is 
normalised (implicitly this kind of use is as everyday as washing up the dinner dishes) at the 
same time as the company is made to look ‘care-full’. The actual arrangement being 
undertaken is that Dawn donates 10c per unit sold to Taronga Park Zoo’s construction of a 
Mobile Bird Washing Unit, (the aesthetics of which cannot help but suggest a travelling 
kitchen sink).  
5 Luhmann, Ecological Communication  15-21. The recent myriad appearances of ‘climate 
change’ in news and current affairs programs, political debate, Hollywood blockbusters, public 
service announcements and scientific discourse are a case in point. Myerson discusses this 
mass emergence of ecology in Ecology and the End of Postmodernity. 
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aspects of everyday life. As Beck puts it: “(t)he lake one was about to leap into 
is revealed as a sewer, the superb, crispy lettuce in one’s mouth turns out to be 
contaminated and foul.”6 The sensible view disavows extrapolation of this 
instance to other possible instances in the environment, investing instead in the 
particularity of the thing exposed, so that, at least for a while, that thing  — and 
only that thing  — is symbolically disturbed.7 The sensible view awaits the 
security of decisive exposure.8 On the other hand, environmental effects with 
multiple ecological implications produce too little resonance if they are not 
coded televisually. In this analysis, the shape of crisis is dictated by quite 
arbitrary intensities of appearance.9   
Such problems are a matter of adaptive work —  “simplifying, 
illuminating and obscuring causal attributions”.10 This is not of the order of a 
distortion of reality, rather of its construction via the coercion of perceptions.11 
Luhmann says: “The ecological imagery, its schemata, its scripts are developed 
on a greenfield site, so to speak, they form a terrain that is not yet occupied.”12 
Because we have no intuitive experience of the effects of environmental 
problems, we are dependent upon schemata that metaphorically correlate 
                                                 
6 Beck, Ecological Politics 55. 
7 The July-August 1998 Sydney water crisis is a case in point. The finding of  ‘high levels’ of 
cryptosporidium and giardia bacteria in the drinking water resulted in a sudden, symbolic 
‘toxification’ of the water-supply. It was largely acknowledged later that this was more a 
rhetorical rather than an actual threat, fanned by the media: “The Sydney Morning Herald … 
prints a graphic coloured photo, a magnified view of giardia lamblia in a human small 
intestine. The huge headline above it reads CONTAMINATION. A sub-head reads ‘A taste of 
the Third World’ and the first line states that ‘Sydney woke yesterday morning and found itself 
in the Third World’. We are having difficulty with the analogy between awful deaths through 
cholera in developing countries and the low levels of giardia and cryptosporidium that seem to 
be the basis for the warnings.” L. Carson and S. White “The Sydney Water contamination 
crisis: Manufacturing dissent”, Science and Public Policy, 25. 4 (1998): 265-271.  
8 This is why the notion of the ‘precautionary principle’ has arisen in public debate about safety 
in relation to consumer products. The precautionary principle promotes the need to act or 
intervene without full knowledge or ‘proof’ of all possible environmental and health-related 
outcomes of a design or political decision. 
9 But one snapshot: NSW, Winter 2002. Emergency wards became crowded with parents 
whose children exhibited the ‘early warning signs’ of meningoccocal disease, a crisis generated 
by media reports of the disease lurking in seemingly benign symptoms. Of course, these 
appearances are not always ‘arbitrary’, as the product market opportunities afforded by public 
anxiety demonstrate. 
10 Luhmann, Ecological Communication 112. 
11 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 7. 
12 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 111-13.  
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ecological effects to recognisable actions. Thus people must activate 
experiences of their own, such as the layer of filth on the car parked outside, 
that fit with the idea of problems like ‘environmental pollution’.  
Beck pinpoints the dangers of a lack of consciousness about the real 
effects of perceptions in a televisual environment. Ecological impacts “takes 
place downright mysteriously, since nothing has changed for the eyes, nose, 
mouth and hands.”13 Events like the Chernobyl accident make conscious such 
effects, but are completely dependent on televisual perception. The cultural 
process of manufacturing explanations for complex ecological problems holds 
society together. “Cultural condensations, magnifying lenses as it were, are 
required to allow one to extrapolate from the small and everyday to the large, 
thus bestowing control in everyday life over that which takes its course beyond 
the horizon of the perceivable and imaginable”.14
Environmentalism fashions impressions of singular, charismatic issues 
that, as Hajer argues, come to determine the public perception of much more 
complex realities.15 The environmental function of the image is, paradoxically, 
to restore sensibility with regard to such problems.16The social and political 
consequences of problems are thus absolutely subject to the whims of 
televisual presentation.17 The media bear no burden for the consequences of 
‘effect-explosions’ as they are, of course, merely reporting on factual aspects 
observed by experts. So a product, place or person that becomes the subject of 
such an effect — regardless of whether it constitutes a justified threat (for 
whom, by whom?) or not — is severed from its infrastructural world of social, 
geographic, economic and historical involvements from which a maze of other 
stories might emerge.18   
                                                 
13 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment  64. 
14 Beck, Ecological Politics 48. 
15 Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse 21. 
16  ““What eludes sensory perception becomes socially available to ‘experience’ in the media 
pictures and reports.  Pictures of tree skeletons, worm-infested fish…condense and concretize 
what is otherwise ungraspable in everyday life.” Beck, Ecological Politics 100. 
17 Beck, Ecological Politics 141-2.  This comment also references Hajer on the rise of 
‘discourse-coalitions’ The Politics of Environmental Discourse  42 – 72. 
18 Beck, Ecological Politics 147. 
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Environmentalism sees its object as the obverse of the artificial. Yet it 
places all its bets on the coherent power of appearances and mediated 
exposure. Environmental groups represent the environment as a counter-image 
against the insecurity of a society becoming more aware of threats. In 
monitoring government and industry actions, issuing public statements and 
advocating or denouncing policy decisions, they seek to restore the normality 
and constant presence of an unharmed environment. All of this work has the 
effect of clearly delineating the domain of environmentalism as a domain of 
appearances. What is the heritage list, for example, if not a transformation of 
the environment into a series of images, appearances that have been forcefully 
impressed by human interpretation and production, into the land? The task of 
preserving, protecting and restoring ‘the environment’ as a series of icons 
cordoned off from human industrial activity and influence, is a PR task that is 
becoming too hard to handle because, these places are also functioning 
environments with social, cultural and biophysical relations traversing them 
that can’t always be hidden or ignored.19 While the image in environmentalism 
actually organises practices and assembles geographical and cultural places, an 
interrogation of images and the ways in which they work on a cultural level has 
no place in environmental discourse. While environmentalism uses images 
relentlessly, for environmentalism, images are simply representations. 
The televisual constitutes the site and sum of mainstream environmental 
politics, precisely because the reality of the environment ‘out there’ is so 
apparently secure. Maarten Hajer calls the approach of environmentalism a 
‘realist’ approach, which: 
(…) assumes incorrectly that the natural environment that is discussed 
in environmental politics is equivalent to the environment ‘out there’. 
                                                 
19 In 1987, the social impact of the Wet Tropics nomination on the timber towns of north 
Queensland was so strongly felt that a 21 member delegation was sent from Queensland to 
Paris in a failed attempt to stop the nomination. More recently, the Jabiluka uranium mine at 
Kakadu prompted an international condemnation of Australia’s handling of its ‘national 
treasures’, including in this case its indigenous populations. The chair of the management 
committee for the Wet Tropics remarked: “we must jealously guard our credit rating as a 
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This assumption fails to recognise that we always act upon our images 
of reality and are dependent on certain discourses to be able to express 
ourselves.20  
This approach depends heavily on the visual documentation of the ‘real’ and 
therefore images — both discursive and visual — have become the modus 
operandi of environmental communication. They make the dilemmas and 
complexities of environmental problems more manageable, consensual and 
finite — from ‘silent spring’ to ‘greenhouse effect’.   
Certain images have been particularly influential in the discourse of 
environmentalism. Two examples come to mind: Peter Dombrovskis’ famous 
‘Rock Island Bend’ that was used extensively in the campaign to save the 
Franklin River in southwest Tasmania from damming in the early 80s, and the 
‘earth rise’ taken during the Apollo VIII mission in 1968, which became the 
calling card of the environmental movement and a missive of cultural change 
in the 1960s. These images, in terms of their content as well as the context of 
their use and production, share certain revealing characteristics. 
Dombrovskis’ deep-focus, grainless images have been credited with 
inscribing the Tasmanian wilderness indelibly into the hearts and minds of 
environmentally conscious people the world over. ‘Rock Island Bend’ depicted 
a view of the Franklin that would be lost should the dam go ahead, and was 
instrumental in forcing the environment to the top of the agenda in the 1983 
Federal election.  Many say that the Labor government achieved power on the 
back of promises to stop the project, which had achieved an excessive 
resonance. This emphatic response reinforced the role of the image in the 
awareness-raising campaigns of environmentalism.  
There is a long history of attributing therapeutic and spiritual 
significance to charismatic places such as Rock Island Bend. They exist in the 
popular imaginary as places of human retreat and renewal and function as a 
testament to our idea of nature captured in an anthropocentrically framed 
                                                                                                                                 
supreme manager of World Heritage and ecotourism.” Murray Hogarth “Unnatural Acts” 
Sydney Morning Herald Good Weekend July 10, 1999 21. 
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window of space and time. As McKibben writes: “Nature, while often fragile 
in practice, is durable in our imaginations”.21 As long as we have an abundance 
of images that depict an untouched, natural world we still in some strong way 
feel that we have that world.22  Similarly, familiar images of environmental 
despoliation threaten the environment as standing reserve. Beck says:  
It is not the despoliation of nature, but the jeopardisation of a specific 
cultural model of nature that provides the sounding-board for the 
ecological alarm of an entire society. The image of nature destroyed, 
and whose destruction is experienced, is the counter-image of the 
hectically mobile, meritocratic, affluent society; and the latter 
jeopardises the enjoyment of what has been achieved by all the tolls of 
progress: cars, roads, consumption, mobility.23  
 
Images of an intact, natural environment remove pressure from 
environmentally destructive ways of living. While many environmentalists 
suggest that there is a growing awareness of the environment, we live, build 
and dream in a world that increasingly wills itself into immunity from 
elemental destruction. Environmentalism shares the objective perspective that 
is made manifest by image-technologies. The refined detail of Dombrovskis’ 
images bears no mark of the human effort of capturing them. In a press report 
following the death of Dombrovskis, Jane Cadzow remarks on the extensive 
hard technology which he needed to take on his solitary wilderness expeditions 
— large format Lihof Master Technika camera, tripods, lenses and additional 
paraphernalia — and reported speculations that it was the effort of lugging this 
gear that might have caused the massive heart attack which killed him.24  
                                                                                                                                 
20 Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse 16. 
21  McKibben, The End of Nature 53. 
22 This point was raised by McKibben in relation to wildlife photography: “How can there 
really be a shortage of whooping cranes when you’ve seen (…)ten times more images than 
there are actually whooping cranes left in the wild?” Bill McKibben “Why the Nature 
Paparazzi should lay off a little” The Australian Financial Review November 14, 1997. 
23 Beck, Ecological Politics 54. 
24 Jane Cadzow “A Lasting Image” The Sydney Morning Herald “Good Weekend” 22 March, 
1997 42. 
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An environmentalist in full flight, weaving aerial views of clear-cut 
scars in the wilderness into his or her discourse, does not stop to question the 
impacts required to obtain these images from the air, nor the conditional reality 
of the view they avail. They do not stop to question the nature of the 
environmental awareness being projected or being generated any more than a 
scientist would interrogate the depiction of a virus as military arsenal in a 
microbiology lecture. The perceived exigency of the communication relegates 
to the image a merely instrumental role, which the image in turn reciprocates.  
When NASA astronauts brought back the ‘earthrise’ image from the 
Apollo VIII mission on Christmas eve, 1968 (according to the NASA archive, 
the image was accompanied by a bible reading from the crew: “God created the 
heavens and the Earth, and the Earth was without form and void”), it is fair to 
assume that it was seen as a record of biophysical fact rather than a missive of 
cultural change. It is now however almost impossible to imagine the world 
before the ‘earth-rise’ (notwithstanding the prescience of Heidegger’s age of 
the world picture or more fundamentally the modern astrophysical world-view 
delivered by Galileo’s instrument).25 The conceptually satisfying globe gave 
shape to the concept of ecology and closed eco-systems, and supported and 
extended the rise of technologies of global measurement. For the first time, 
says Wolfgang Sachs, a view of the planet as an object of management 
emerged, and thereafter, environmental problems could obtain a global 
meaning correlative with the political and cultural impacts of ‘globalisation’. 
“Had not the image of the planet shown that the unity of mankind is not just a 
dream of the Enlightenment but a biophysical fact?”26 The agenda was thus 
also set for the impotence of anything but a global view of sustainability, and 
the commencement of the widespread cultural induction into UN humanism, 
                                                 
25 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) 
261. 
26 Wolfgang Sachs, “Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature” 37. 
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the designing of which we can now discern in any local environmental policy 
or plan. 27
Along with the sense of fragility communicated by the image is an 
impression of incredible anthropocentric power — the point of view from 
space carries the implication that human survival transcends material 
conditions. The earth-rise is not, in this sense, an image of the earth but an 
image that affirms a particular perspective and conviction. It is also, of course, 
deeply ironic that the earth-rise image became a key icon of the environmental 
movement obtained, as it was, on the back of a vast and ever growing fossil 
energy fuelled space program whose launch events — once a source of 
international focus — now only make an impression if something goes wrong 
in spite of the material expansion and normalisation of the program.28  
Transforming the environment into a commodity for televisual 
consumption resolves the paradox of a moral consumerism that wants to make 
changes without being implicated in these changes. With the environmental 
identity secure, television can unproblematically return as a harmless 
instrument of the modern democratic process. By virtue of its ability to 
“introduce an idea to a hundred million or even several billion minds 
simultaneously” it is thought, television “must be enlisted in the cause of 
sustainability, and soon.” Thereby a more environmentally ethical television 
“could rapidly achieve the shared understanding and consciousness needed to 
move toward a more workable and satisfying future.” 29  
The environment is put into reserve by the televisual — it can be saved, 
sponsored and visited, but it will not impinge, threaten or make demands on 
                                                 
27 Hajer indicates that the themes of UN publications and declarations from the 1972 
Stockholm Environment conference were heavily influenced by the planetary image. Hajer, 
Politics of Environmental Discourse  8-9. On the point of top down dissemination, I am 
referring to the widespread influence of the Agenda 21 doctrine that emerged from the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development as an internationally 
implementable ‘action plan’. 
28 Recent private enterprise developments in ‘democratic’ space travel have attributed to the 
hardware of the traditional space program a dinosaur-like weight and stasis.   
29  Duane Elgin, “Sustainable Television”, The Ecology of Media 23 (1989): 26. 
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our lifestyles. The televisual scripts sustaining the environment as object have 
already in numerous ways structured the discourse of industrial responsibility.  
But one telling example of this discourse comes from the international 
advertising group McCann-Erickson, who have produced a high profile UNEP-
sponsored report entitled Can Sustainability Sell? This report presents a range 
of case-studies all of which aim to suture the apparent rift between the values 
of environmentalism and those of consumerism:   
While there is a general confusion regarding the terminology 
‘Sustainable Consumption’, it is clear that young people today have 
strong concerns about the principles that sustainability highlights. These 
fall into three key areas: the protection of the environment, animal 
testing and human exploitation in developing countries. With such 
strong and consistent views from across the globe, why aren’t today’s 
youth doing more? (…) One of the main reasons for inactivity is the 
contradiction in the minds of consumers. They are both hedonists and 
idealists. They want to ‘Have it All’: a sustainable planet and their 
favourite brands. This is the ‘use and throw’ generation, but at the same 
time, they have dreams of a private and wonderful world. Most 
importantly, they are not aware of the consequences of their own 
shopping behaviour. There is a feeling that they are ‘unable to change 
the world’. Yet they want the world to change.30
Of course, this problem can be resolved by the provision of more products. 
This accommodating move can also be read back into the discursive maxim of 
the Brundtland Report: “Sustainable development is development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.” This oft-cited maxim carefully leaves the distinction 
between ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ untouched. 31 It provided industrial culture with 
an ostensible destiny and legitimate environmental purpose, but also with 
                                                 
30 McCann-Erickson, Can Sustainability Sell? (McCann-Erickson World Group, 2000) 10. 
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enough leeway to refuse reflection on its contradictory premises. Wolfgang 
Sachs asks the obvious question: “(I)s sustainable development supposed to 
meet the needs for water, land and economic security or the needs for air travel 
and bank deposits?”32  
For culture to continue to accept that productivism is good because it is 
productive, a meaningful disarticulation from its relational implications must 
continue to be secured and normalised.33 The designing power of the televisual 
resides in its ability to systematically de-realise relationality by normalising 
experiential access to that which lies outside one’s sphere of influence and 
decision-making capacity. At the same time, the damaged environment is never 
pictured as a consequence of televisually generated desires.34  
Understanding the environment as a televisual construct shifts the 
meaning of environmental management considerably. No longer signifying a 
practice of responsible industrial behaviour, environmental management in 
effect becomes a process of carefully managing appearances. 35The coding of 
the environmental ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of industrial activity make every 
problem answerable in ways that promote and secure productivism. Beck aptly 
                                                                                                                                 
31 The distinction between needs and desires have become irrevocably blurred. After 
Baudrillard, Fry remarks,  “…bio-material and symbolic-immaterial ‘needs’ cannot be 
untangled.” Fry, Remakings 47-54.  
32 For a discussion of the semantic ambiguity of ‘sustainable development’ and its history see 
Wolfgang Sachs  “Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature”, Living with Nature: 
Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse 23 -41; also Fry, Remakings 26 –31. 
33 Davison notes “In its 1992 World Development Report, the (World) bank rhetorically posed 
the question, ‘What is sustainable?’ responding, with disarmingly circular logic, that 
‘(s)ustainable development is development that lasts.’” Davison, Technology and the Contested 
Meanings of Sustainability 19. 
34 Very occasionally this relation is at least suggested. Press reports on the fading coral of the 
Great Barrier Reef have for example in recent times tended to indicate the contribution of 
accelerated global warming — producing warmer seas, higher sea levels, more frequent storms 
— to the problem, thus implicating the contribution of the flights of ‘ecotourists’ intent on 
seeing the reef. However this problem is contextualised by the economic threat of the fading 
tourism industry, and as such becomes just another unacknowledged contradiction of affluent, 
late modern life — an object of knowledge but not necessarily a marker of the need for 
behavioural change. 
35 In its 2002 report, Toyota incorporates the quantity of environmental statements that it 
produces as an indicator of environmental performance. 
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calls this organisation of values a process of “symbolic detoxification” 
whereby symbolic disarticulations are effective disarticulations.36  
The oil company Saudi Aramco’s ‘commitment to the environment’ 
was demonstrated in the Can Sustainability Sell? Report by its construction of 
a 600-acre evaporation lake for waste water; “attracting more than a dozen new 
bird species previously unknown in Saudi Arabia and giving the country a 
richer bird life than any other part of the Middle East”.37 Whether this imagistic 
conception of biodiversity was read back into the project as its ostensible value 
or whether it was designed as such, it emerges here as the merely material 
attribute of a corporate identity exercise. A different picture might emerge on 
the basis of a few questions; what was the evaporation lake constructed upon? 
What are the particular characteristics of this wastewater and the impacts of 
leakage into the surrounding land? What are the impacts on the local region of 
this new influx of inhabitants? How will these impacts be assessed, monitored 
and managed over time? How is the lake itself managed? How does this lake 
figure within the total picture of Saudi Aramco’s activities?  
Examples such as this indicate that industrial culture takes full 
advantage of the (in)visibility of ecological problems and their dependency on 
modes of revealing. The impacts and effects that fall off the scientific 
assessment table and re-enter society become attributable either to individual 
scapegoats or to every individual consumer, and thus disappear on the level 
playing field as a cost of living in modern society.38
The logic of environmental credit schemes that have gained support 
from a ‘rainbow coalition’ of big industrial polluters, scientists and 
environmentalists provide another version of symbolic detoxification, whereby 
a company is able to effectively disarticulate itself from its business as usual 
expansion of polluting actions. The idea, for example, that the environmental 
cost of harvesting trees in one location equals the environmental benefit of 
planting them in another, that one can buy the conservation of an ecosystem to 
                                                 
36 Beck, Ecological Politics 51. 
37 McCann-Erickson , Can Sustainability Sell? 12. 
 143
compensate for polluting activity, or that the mining and burning of fossil fuels 
can be ameliorated to any extent by an economic claim on trees as carbon sinks 
or by biotechnological reforestation programs, are interpretations completely 
devoid of an understanding of relational interdependencies, and obfuscate the 
imperative for an overall reduction in the depletion of resources and emissions.  
Such examples delineate the actual territory of environmental concern. 
For Beck, the process of symbolic detoxification is not however 
comprehensive enough to conceal the problems produced by industrial society 
as it begins to sense its own mortality. He argues that ecological impacts are 
pushing us into a new phase of modernity in which industrial culture will be 
forced by its production of multiple, long-range hazards to overcome its own 
limits. This is a vision of a ‘reflexive’ modernity that has learnt to doubt itself 
and to embrace the power to “act without certainty.”39  For Beck, we must 
develop the eyes and ears adequate for this new phase of modernity: 
What people see or do not see is not determined by their visual acuity, 
nor does it depend on their attentiveness, it is essentially codetermined 
by what they know or do not know.  Knowledge unblocks the view.  
Someone who knows more and different things also sees more, sees 
differently, and sees different things.”40  
Moving against the scientific paradigm that has relinquished phenomenological 
knowledge, Beck seeks to mobilise the domain of appearances to effect the 
‘ecological enlightenment’ of the layperson. He speculates: “what if 
radioactivity gave one an itch?”41 It is experience as illustration that he says 
can trigger political reflexivity and raise questions, stir up and enliven doubts 
in the public sphere.42  
From our perspective the project of redirecting accountability for public 
judgement is an important one, but we have to pay more attention to the 
                                                                                                                                 
38 As Beck says, if “it jeopardises everything, … it does not exist.” Ecological Politics 87.  
39 Beck, Ecological Politics 40 – 43. 
40 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 13. 
41 Beck, Ecological Politics 184. 
42 Beck, Ecological Politics 16.  
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designing of structures that carry on regardless, and their perpetuation. As 
Bateson says, we are governed by epistemologies that we know to be wrong.43 
The problem of our vision is shared by the existing designed world that is both 
designed by and conditions our vision. If we can agree that we live in a world 
heavily populated by designed products as well as by the people who use them, 
we need to acknowledge that these products powerfully delimit human insight 
and will only ever promote the way of being of their making, never themselves 
become capable of uncertainty or ‘self-reflective’.44  The ‘saving power’ will 
not emerge from the self — particularly if that self is understood as an 
enlightened being that has achieved environmental immunity — but from the 
designing of a world of difference in which the self is always conditioned by 
the naturalised artificial environment.  
 
*** 
 
We have considered the vision of representation as an historical 
inheritance that is sustained and sustains us in our familiar world through 
televisual operation. We also want to learn to see the televisual image as a 
difference that makes a difference — that communicates beyond what it knows 
or can see. 
The eidos is decisively silent on the material implications of mass 
media production. While the image can picture environmental effects — such 
as the community protest about communications infrastructure being erected in 
a school ground — it cannot reveal the contradictory relations that brought this 
situation into being. We have suggested that the rendered presence of the 
image is never a mere copy, never illusory, but a coherent force that matters 
                                                 
43 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 493. 
44Few involved in the sustainability debate appear to make this connection. Aidan Davison is 
an exception. He says: “…the reality remains that artefacts such as planes and cars are 
representative of political and moral commitments that we sustain by the mere fact of our use 
of them.” Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 103. 
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ecologically. This is what televisual critique, in its desire to get at what 
television is, tends to forget. 
Most thought on television takes place within the bounds of its 
referential system: the media. This is the ‘habitat’ of the image. Weber’s 
critique, informed by a deconstructivist perspective, takes us in a televisual 
direction insofar as television can be seen as an unsettling force. His essay 
opens the television to a range of heterogeneous operations and is unusually 
premised on how little we still know about something so ubiquitous and 
seemingly ingenuous. However in questing after the specificity of the medium 
— even while the answers he provides are never unequivocal — we are still 
caught between the set and the screen. Weber does not meditate on the 
ontological, material and cultural consequences of television implied by the 
televisual disorder he identifies. In this, television is still merely interesting in 
the sense that it can be made manifest, resolved by theoretical attention. 
Weber says the television ‘set’ conceals a heterogeneity of placings that 
can be gathered into three distinct operations: production — the place (or 
places) where the image and sound are recorded; reception — the place (or 
places) where those images and sounds are received; and transmission — the 
place (or places) in between.45 This schema posits the actual and ostensible 
direction of operational communication as the same. The extent to which each 
of these operations is generative of differences, however, also needs to be taken 
up. The cultural transmission of images is also materially transformative.  
Here we need to observe television with a learning disposition. We 
need to look into the eidetic ‘nerve endings’ of the image and connect it to a 
massive material infrastructure of which it is, to recall “The Age of the World 
Picture”, but the most visible outgrowth. This involves catching sight of the 
matter that admits the eidos, and is left in its wake. We have in this chapter 
referred to the televisual image primarily in its iconic mode (which is not to 
                                                 
45 Weber, “Television: Set and Screen” 117. 
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deny or exclude its indexical and symbolic possibilities).46 We have explored 
the image as a form of script with ontological, cultural and material 
implications. Let us now unsettle the televisual icon with some different views 
that anticipate the direction our attention will go in. Through them we glimpse 
new kinds of relations intersecting the passage from production, transmission 
to reception: 
The first view is that of the materiality of the icon — the physical 
assemblage, the image as material thing of light, heat and sound. The second is 
the partiality of the icon — the icon conceals the material, cultural and 
historical conditions of its design and the massive reach of its simultaneous 
appearances. The third is the infrastructure of the icon — all the hardware and 
groundwork that is needed to bring the image into being, and that is regularly 
torn up, altered and expanded according to the desire of the market. The last 
view is the afterimage of the icon — its cultural and material refuse. Each 
technological set is destined to become ‘junk’ and wills its own end into being.  
 
These different views give back to the icon some of the material 
dimensions it denies. Let us focus on but one of these devalued aspects, which 
nonetheless shades into others. The view of the infrastructure of the icon 
reveals the extreme effort required to bring the image, as a disarticulated event, 
into being. The installation of infrastructure requires an extensive labour of 
topographical remodelling. The existing ground is forced to conform to plans 
that are increasingly driven by a remote designing.47The infrastructure of 
transmission (the between place in Weber’s schema) — television towers, 
electrical power stations and power lines, electrical wiring, cables, aerials, 
                                                 
46 Here I refer to the work of American Pragmatist philosopher, scientist and mathematician 
(and contemporary of Ferdinand de Saussure) Charles Sander Peirce. We take up the theory of 
the sign in Part 3. 
47 Foltz evocatively describes the difference in the ‘environmental awareness’ of a computer 
aided construction site for which the earth appears as merely free to work, rather than being 
worked with an openness to the specific nature of the site being engaged. Foltz, Inhabiting The 
Earth 85. In Sydney as elsewhere, the ostensible attractions of water-front development 
locations mask the fact that these sites were often previously highly toxic industrial sites, 
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satellite dishes, satellites as well as the people, processes, and multiple tasks 
and risks involved in designing, making, building, installing and maintaining 
this infrastructure — offers but a glimpse of the material implications of the 
productivism of the televisual.48 Infrastructure reopens a view of the distance 
between the sites of production and reception, which the media force into 
objective closure. The relations are not too hard to see if one is so inclined. 
However such relations do not belong to the culture of the image — in fact, the 
appearance of infrastructure in many instances destroys fictive space.49    
The increasing audio-visual fidelity and information choice offered by 
digital TV, for example, involves massive increases in power consumption and 
infrastructure roll-out, and carries in its wake an extensive and continuing 
analogue product waste-stream for which neither the community nor industry 
was initially compelled to notice or prepare for.50  
The transformation of the ‘screen with a backside’, the cathode ray tube 
with its sluggish hertzian technology, into the clean screen, solid state of the 
LCD is but another advance in technological care-taking in which the increased 
burdens of materials manufacture and tooling, production waste and techno-
                                                                                                                                 
located thus so as to use water as a conduit for pollution, the same water from which fish for 
supper were often (and, in spite of multilingual, pictorial warning signs are still) pulled.  
48 It should be noted here that Levin attempts a relational view of television as a different 
gathering of the Gestalt. However he evacuates the designing power of artificial worlds by 
limiting his vision to the (in)visible people implicated in bringing the product into being. 
Levin, The Opening of Vision 445 – 6. 
49 Luhmann, for example, excludes the materialities of communication from the reality of the 
mass media, as “they are not what is being uttered.” The Reality of the Mass Media 4. Second-
order observation is trained on how systems construct reality, not on the costs or consequences 
of their construction. Luhmann determines system boundaries strictly by the social 
applicability of their elements. This is an interesting aspect of the absolute and rigorous 
integration of his systems theoretical approach because, as for representation, there can be no 
consequences for an autopoietic system that merely perpetuates what it knows and responds 
only to itself. 
50 The energy consumption of digital television was the subject of an article that came out just 
prior to its introduction in Britain in the late 90s, which was incredulous about how the design 
of the first digital devices entailed an avoidable factor 16 increase in power consumption over 
analog receivers. Barry Fox “Wasted Watts” New Scientist  157.2121(1998):8. At this time, the 
EcoDesign Foundation was conducting research into the cultural issue of waste, particularly in 
relation to the ‘blind’ development of new waste streams, and was struck by how few were 
considering this coming problem. An exception was the work of the Centre for Design at 
RMIT on electrical and electronic waste — see John Gertsakis and Chris Ryan, Short 
Circuiting Waste from Electrical and Electronic Products [Melbourne: Centre for Design, 
RMIT,1996]).  
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aesthetic obsolescence are all erased. The lack of interference or ‘ghosting’ 
which, with analogue transmission, served as an interruptive reminder of the 
image infrastructure during viewing, has disappeared completely from digital 
systems. The free rein of digital algorithms that can compose, decompose and 
recompose themselves at will — all with a decreasing need for apriori material 
— further alienates the development of another vision of the burden of 
technological innovation.  
Each new technological thing, in its striving toward the completion, 
communicates a further decoupling of designed experiences from their material 
consequences. In their study of new technologies of vision in the early 90s, 
Tana Wollen and Philip Hayward say that the development of audiovisual 
technologies is driven by an illusionary rather than a realist project. Each 
advent of technological fidelity carries cultural implications as “our notions of 
the ‘real’ are changed by the ‘realisms’ which supersede each other to represent 
it.” 51 Wollen and Hayward question the ways in which developments in 
‘realism’ will skew the entrenched categories of subjectivity and objectivity. 
However rather than being loosened, the grip of rational categories has become 
further embedded by the advancing project of televisual ‘realism’. The fidelity 
of experience is enacted, enhancing the ease of relational disarticulation by 
design.  
In this Part we have shown that the vision of representation does not 
merely facilitate the forgetting of ‘the ground’ or environment from which 
things are torn, into which they are buried and released, it entails a widespread 
task of value management that perpetuates our cultural blindness to 
relationality and has extensive ecological ramifications. The incremental ethics 
of designing for sustainability proposed in Part 1 is thus supplemented by the 
problem of normative vision.  The different views of the icon enumerated 
above suggest the possibility of designing alienations of normative vision. 
These views, which contrast starkly with design’s project of generating 
                                                 
51 Philip Hayward and Tana Wollen eds., Future Visions: New Technologies of the Screen 
(London: British Film Institute, 1993) 2. 
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transparency in all areas of life, anticipate the potential of the sign for design 
practice. The implication is that by way of such critical observations, we can 
practice seeing differently. We can learn to see images as partial without, 
however, evacuating their own substantial reality. The image that shows, filters 
and obscures can also function as a sign of the (in)visible relations it brings 
into being.  
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 PART 3: SIGNWORLDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Parramatta Road, Ashfield 1999.  
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PART 3: SIGNWORLDS 
Without analysis, the sign could not become 
apparent.  
(Michel Foucault)1
 
 (T)he semiologist sees the sign moving in the 
field of signification, he enumerates its valances, 
traces their configuration: the sign is, for him, a 
sensuous idea. (Roland Barthes)2  
 
The task of this Part is to explore how we might begin to develop a more 
relational intuition in light of the televisual. We consider the mechanism of the 
sign and the acquired skill of reading signs, as derived from linguistics and 
taken up by literary and cultural theory, in terms of the contribution that critical 
analysis could make to the reading/researching practice of ontological design. 
De-sign retrieves the sign as a tool for revealing the cultural and material 
construction of naturalised design environments. Informed by the concept of 
defuturing as a “learnt act of critical deconstructive reading”, de-sign is 
integral to the task of learning to design for more sustainable cultures.3 This 
Part explores and tests the theory and politics of the sign as a way of setting up 
the importance of ‘de-sign’. It argues that the sign without de-sign is incapable 
of effecting cultural change.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of the environment causes blind spots in which language and culture 
conceal themselves. It is as though there is some kind of qualitative difference 
between environmental substance and the glamorous, rhetorical surfaces of the 
late-modern world with which the cultural disciplines are so enamoured. This 
is perhaps an expression of an aesthetic need, a basic experiential demand for 
relief from the sensory manipulations of our designed worlds. As Daniel Harris 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973) 61. 
2 Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1972) 209.  
3 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 11.  
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says in the introduction to his book dissecting the aesthetics of consumerism: 
“(…)my life is suspended above an abyss of ignorance. Virtually nothing I own 
makes sense to me.”4 This material ignorance is the underside of the designed 
ease of our everyday lives. We mostly do not know or think about how it is we 
get to do what we are able to do. And this sense of ignorance is certainly not a 
feeling that necessarily wills an effort to see otherwise (Harris, for example, 
goes on to write a semiologically erudite and entertaining elaboration of his 
ignorance).  
The desire to gain an environmental awareness of the designed world 
(that design generally works so hard to suppress) is both reasonable and 
necessary. But turning to the disciplines of the natural world, ground as they 
are in their own representational discourses and histories, does not provide a 
more authentic account of the real. We argue that reality is produced by effects, 
forces and impacts rather than by the unmediated appearances of the scientific 
world picture.5 More awareness about the designing conditions of our familiar 
world is going to require seeing more as Beck says, but this seeing, as we have 
suggested, entails unfamiliar efforts. The argument put forward in this thesis is 
that our current situation of worldly ignorance, burgeoning productivism and 
ecological conflict — a situation of unsustainability — requires imagining and 
bringing into being other kinds of design realities. This ineluctably entails 
interdisciplinary collaborations.  
  In this regard, design theory and cultural theory have something to 
learn from each other. In this Part we ask what design theory can learn from 
the cultural theoretical mode of analysing visual culture, for which the world is 
text and thus a matter of reading.6 Cultural theory removes the dependency of 
                                                 
4 Daniel Harris, Cute, Quaint, Hungry and Romantic: The Aesthetics of Consumerism (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000). 
5 Bateson adopts the Gnostic terms pleroma and creatura to refer to the explanatory worlds of 
forces and impacts (which knows nothing of ideas, distinctions) and that of ideas (which 
equally cannot ‘know’ the nature of nature). Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 461. 
6 The world as text is a fundamental assumption underlying the vocabulary of literary and 
cultural theory. An oft-quoted maxim from Derrida can be cited here: “There is nothing outside 
of the text”. Of Grammatology 158. This resonates with Heidegger’s notion of language as the 
‘house of being’ and links to the (in)visible relationality we explored in Chapter 2. The 
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analytical reading on situations of explicit, technical breakdown as were 
discussed in Part 1. Generally, the realist approach of the sciences renders the 
sign transparent, which is in stark contrast to the approach of humanities-based 
disciplines like philosophy and cultural theory, which tend to deny any 
transparency of meaning. 7  
 Certainly for industrial design, critical analysis of visual culture does 
not produce enough resonance to cause reflection, even while the image tends 
to govern design from concept development to prototype to the telegenic 
values concealed in the pragmatic pressures of the market. The process of 
designing is increasingly dematerialised by the transparent rendering of 
software, in which the matter that admits the eidos is uniformly electronic. 
Despite the increasing ease with which design software projects and assembles 
products of radically different materialities, this matter does not promote 
carefulness, rather, it invites a new abandon in design.8 In the theatrically 
perfect, computer-aided design environment, the differences between product 
materials are rendered as differences of aesthetic texture. The bringing together 
of form and material becomes a matter of image-making skill and is not 
necessarily subject to the designer’s understanding of material interfaces or 
how a material might wear over time in relation to the conditions of its use. 
This has important implications in relation to the judgment of design quality 
and appropriateness. We are reminded of Marshall McLuhan’s description of 
                                                                                                                                 
generality of the ‘Text’ is also explored by Roland Barthes in “From Work to Text” Image-
Music-Text , trans. Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana Collins, 1979). 
7 McHoul makes this comment in relation to ‘the postmodern turn’, which he aligns with 
Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 198. 
8 From the images of 3D modelling and computer-aided manufacturing software, the process of 
‘rapid proto-typing’ can directly produces a 3 dimensional polymer object, bypassing the 
manual negotiation of the object on paper or in the workshop. The pragmatic market driven 
benefit of such 3D rendering is its ability to accelerate the design process, which also enhances 
the tendency to lose sight of the provisional nature of the eidos. We might recall here 
Heidegger’s discussion of the ascendancy of the eidos in The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology: “All production takes place in conformity with an original and prototypical 
image as model…In the antecedent imaging and projecting of the prototypical image, there is 
already a direct grasp of what the product-to-be really is. What is at first thought of as the 
original, prototypical model to be copied in production is apprehended directly in the 
imagining. What constitutes the being of a being is already anticipated in the eidos. That which 
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the television as a ‘cool’ medium, as inherently remote no matter how in touch 
developments such as interactivity might make one feel.9  
 The natural condition of everything in this design environment is 
pristine, changeless newness and behavioural predictability. All of this makes 
tuning in to the matter of things and to the limitations of software in the design 
process a task requiring semiotic skill. Design practice needs more cognisance 
of the designing power of images. Designers needs de-sign skills to develop the 
ability to read into images aspects of the materiality they gather, the designing 
they compel and the perceptions they reveal. Simply put, designers have learnt 
to see design as a process of image manipulation and have little cause to value 
design beyond this work. We will show that the sign can open a relation to the 
effects of design decisions.  
Signs are a matter of communication, of some sort of perceived 
relation. In an interesting twist on convention, scientist Jesper Hoffmeyer 
argues that it is the sign, not the molecule that is the crucial underlying fact of 
scientific reality. Hoffmeyer speaks of a semiosphere — an idea that is echoed 
in a design context by Manzini — to indicate that all organisms live first and 
foremost in an environment of signs, a world of signification, and that the 
biosphere must be understood in terms of the semiosphere and not the other 
way around.10 This environment of signs is, he suggests, undiscovered territory 
because science is caught up in its objectifications and forgets about the import 
of communication to the intent and behaviour of things. This recalls Bateson, 
who showed us that ecological flux is a form of communication that links mind 
and environment. For him information is not just floating around for the 
ordering and securing gaze of science, but is a difference that makes a 
difference. Bateson reveals the complex relationality of the sign in his 
description of two animals at play. The gaming animal’s bared fangs ‘mention’ 
                                                                                                                                 
says how the thing will look or, as we also say, how it will turn out … is already anticipated 
and circumscribed in the eidos.” (151). 
9 McLuhan, Understanding Media 22 – 32. 
10 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe trans. Barbara J. Haveland 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993) viii. 
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but do not mean an attack. This sign of play is in some respects digital — a 
discrete message cut out of the flow of actions, a meta-communicative 
statement. However the playful information is in no sense illusory; it has both 
cause and consequence, and it is in fact these aspects that define the meaning 
of the act. A lack of understanding of the difference between play and pending 
attack might entail a dangerous misreading of the situation.11  
  What is interesting in this a-typical thought on the sign from the 
scientific world-view is its contextual grounding and the primacy it places on 
relationality. In essence the being of something is very much related to what it 
does which is related to its perceptual horizons of understanding and 
interpretation. It is these aspects that govern presence.  
The sign is not for our purposes a type of image, but is rather the 
registration of another perspective on the image that immediately calls upon 
the disposition of a viewer. One might, for example, learn to watch a film as 
historical record, as open text or as a script. Signs are articulations of value, 
dependent on their setting.12 They cut through the background of naturalised 
images and make a connection, make a difference. Images are, on the other 
hand, types of signs. We have spoken about the televisual image as iconic — it 
brings into being a self-referential and objective disposition. As objects of 
design and analysis, images are also indexical (again with respect to Peirce, 
this is not to deny their iconic or symbolic realities), that is, they force 
attention beyond themselves.13 Umberto Eco says “there is a sign every time a 
                                                 
11 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 179-80. 
12 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1977) 54 -57. 
13 The index “like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular 
object intended without describing it.” Charles Sander Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle” The 
Communication Theory Reader, ed. Paul Cobley (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 
58. Peirce’s trichotomy of sign relations — the icon, index and symbol — I read here not as 
kinds of signs, but as shades of interpretation. In spite of the enabling possibilities in his 
schema, I do not deal with Peirce’s work directly. I focus on Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic 
semiology as it is more interested in intentional communicative interaction between subjects 
than in the sign as a geometrical relation, per se. The theorists whose work I find most 
enabling with regard to reading design are also expressly ‘post-Sausserean.’ M.Gottdiener 
argues that it is the ‘idealism’ of Saussure in distinction to the ‘materialism’ of Peirce that 
makes Peirce’s semiotics more relevant to an analysis of material culture, as he places the sign 
‘in’ the objective world as much as ‘in’ the mind (10). As we shall later see however, the 
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human group decides to use and to recognize something as the vehicle of 
something else.” Thus “smoke is only a sign of fire to the extent that fire is not 
actually perceived along with the smoke.”14 A sign in this sense is a form of 
legitimation of the (in)visible. It refers to the non-present but also in the same 
moment becomes the site of its expression; the sign alienates the transparency 
of presence. This is the special power of the sign; it is open, internally enabling 
other associative relations to emerge — or, in light of the particular being of 
the image discussed in Part 2 — other forms of closure.  
In his essay tracing the modern history of representation, Foucault tells 
another story of representation’s transfer into the normative order of things. 
The work of representing became absorbed into the binary structure of the sign, 
which carries a signified, a signifier and also in the latter, the idea of its 
representative role.15 Since the 17th century the sign is both indication and 
appearance, it is both a relation to an object and a manifestation of itself.16 The 
sign that relates therefore also contains a relation. This internal relationality is 
not present as such in the image, which in Roland Barthes’ words is 
phenomenally indisputable, a ‘credible whole’.17 The sign tames the image, 
puts it at a distance. We have seen that the televisual image demands that we 
alienate an other as a form of recognition, and then forget this act of alienation. 
The sign on the other hand is, as such, a matter of analysis and thus always 
implies both a relation to a reader and the internal relation that makes it a sign. 
To declare that some thing is a sign will invariably demand a closer look and 
an attempt to discern its intended meanings. And again, meaning never stands 
                                                                                                                                 
materialism of idealism is commonly missed, as it is in this work. M. Gottdiener Postmodern 
Semiotics: Material Culture and the Forms of Postmodern Life (Cambridge and Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995) 3 – 33.  
14 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 
1976) 17. 
15 Foucault notes that the ‘psychologistic’ tone of Saussure’s thought is a rediscovery of the 
Classical condition for setting up the binary structure, that is, doing away with resemblance as 
it belongs to thought. Foucault, The Order of Things 67. 
16 Foucault, The Order of Things 65. Barthes also mentions this genealogy in Elements of 
Semiology 35. 
17 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977) 117-
18. 
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on its own, but is always a relation between the arrival of a difference and the 
difference that this arrival makes.  
For Heidegger, a literacy with regard to signs is intuitive, not a matter 
of comprehension as such. Signs are orienting features within the surrounding 
world: “The sign applies to the circumspection of heedful association in such a 
way that the circumspection following its direction brings the actual 
aroundness of the surrounding world into an explicit ‘overview’ in that 
compliance.”18 Signs bring the world into view in that compliance. The 
indicative nature of signs means that they are never just relations but types of 
equipment: “…useful things which explicitly bring a totality of useful things to 
circumspection so that the worldly character of what is at hand makes itself 
known at the same time.”19
Heidegger uses the example of a car indicator which, while generally 
understood as a sign, particularly stands out as a matter of concern for the one 
indicating and for those in its immediate environment. It announces intentions 
and directs action.20 In our extensively and intensively designed environments, 
signs can be understood as indicating a confused cacophony of directions that 
we learn to negotiate, screening out what doesn’t concern us. We implicitly 
trust in the directions we are given: design shapes our lives. But design doesn’t 
necessarily deserve our trust. We need to discern whether the trust we place in 
things is misguided. The ability to read the designedness of the directions we 
are given, in their withdrawn condition of orienting, is vital.  
In what follows we seek to mobilise semiological methodology to 
develop our awareness of the designed environment. The image understood as 
visual sign becomes an intentionally relational form of communication. The 
sign disrupts the apparent immediacy of appearances, installing a metaphorical 
distance that can help us to sense the artificiality of appearances, their 
                                                 
18 Heidegger, Being and Time 74. 
19 Heidegger, Being and Time 74. Dreyfus explains Heidegger’s ‘signs’ as a type of equipment: 
“Heidegger is mainly interested in signs as illuminating the way equipment is what it is only in 
a context and only when it is actually taken up and used.” Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World 100. 
20 See on this point Donald Norman’s essay of the same name in Turn Signals are the Facial 
Expressions of Automobiles (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 1992) 129.  
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‘madeness’ and thus the possibility of remaking them. Semiological analysis is 
a potentially powerful and enabling form of cultural observation in a design 
context. 
This is not to suggest we afford a special primacy to the semiological 
method as a kind of science able to lay design bare. In the framework of 
ontological design, cultural reading is a critical practice that is always 
constrained by interpretation and partnered by the problem of making 
otherwise. As it has been taken up as a tool for analysing and making visual 
culture, sign theory has been attributed a particular role of unveiling the truth. 
The central concern of semiology has been defined as understanding the social 
effect of the meaning of images — conceived as limited, representational 
systems.21 In art and visual design for example, interpretation carries an 
element of connoisseurship; the skilled reader reveals truths about the image 
via the quality of aesthetic judgment. There is also a strong tendency in these 
disciplines to elide the social and political insights of theory in promoting the 
ascendancy of formal style — to ‘represent’ theory.22We shall argue that the 
analytical tendency to reinvest in objects disables political strategies of social 
change, and further that this is a cultural problem of disciplinary identity. We 
are interested rather in the sign’s specific effects, its uses.23 The merit of sign 
theory as a theory of cultural communication lies not so much in the ability to 
discern meanings fixed in the image, but to discern the directions opened up by 
the image, how the image contributes to the reality of environmental 
orientation in Heidegger’s terms.  
In the genealogy of sign theory is an ambition for the sign that is 
foreclosed by the culture of its theorisation. Saussure’s dream of the science of 
                                                 
21 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 2001) 70. 
22 In speaking of the influence of poststructuralism at Cranbrook Academy of Art, Michigan 
for example, Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller tell us “(t)he response to post-structuralism … 
was largely optimistic, side-stepping the pessimism and political critique that permeates the 
work of Barthes, Foucault and others. (Katherine) McCoy used the architectural theory of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown as a ‘stepping stone’ to post-structuralism, enabling 
her to merge the Pop appreciation of the commercial vernacular with post-structuralism’s 
critique of ‘fixed meaning’.” Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller, Design Writing Research: 
Writing on Graphic Design (New York: Kiosk, 1996) 8. 
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signs as a metatheory turned out to be pre-empted, frustrated and deferred by 
the discipline of linguistics. The sign posed a deep challenge to linguistics. In 
our review in the first chapter of this Part we show that the value of sign theory 
lies as much in its failure to amount to an effective explanatory system as in the 
potential of its method. Our emphasis is on the destiny of analysis; does our 
mobilisation of the sign merely defer the metaphysical plenitude that Derrida 
deconstructs, and insist on closure in any case, or can the sign contribute to our 
making otherwise and become an effective strategy for relational design?  
We then look at the erosion of the sign’s potential in the closed 
discourse of cultural theory that has, in many respects, not moved beyond the 
representational paradigm. This is a complementary problem to industrial 
design’s cultural blindness toward the material implications of the sign, which 
will be further explored in Part 4. Next we consider an important destiny of 
sign theory, the recent rise in popularity of oppositional tactics such as ‘culture 
jamming’. Strategies of visually-based politics are strongly reminiscent of 
Beck’s call to mobilize appearances in a redistribution of responsibilities for 
hazard production, effecting change through exposure. The structural 
implications of such political strategies lead us to consider what a more 
sustainable form of visual communication might be and how ‘deep’ it should 
go. In response to these problematics, we ask how sign theory might contribute 
to the development of cultural sustainability.  
                                                                                                                                 
23 This is what Alec McHoul pursues in his Semiotic Investigations, discussed below.  
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CHAPTER 7. WHAT IS ‘THE SIGN’? 
 
“What is the sign?” To this question Jacques Derrida answers, inevitably, 
‘presence’.1 However the sign is also the structure of difference for Derrida. 
And “(b)y definition, a difference is never in itself a sensible plenitude.”2 The 
structure of the sign breaks open the plenitude of presence even while it aims at 
a more radical suture. In “Force and Signification”, Derrida distinguishes a 
difference of force from a difference of form. And as we shall see, the 
Saussurean schema for all its potentiality carries the curious lifelessness of the 
scientistic world-view, devoid of a sense of dynamic reality. “(O)ne can 
glance”, says Derrida “over the totality divested of its forces, even if it is the 
totality of form and meaning, for what is in question, in this case, is meaning 
rethought as form; and structure is the formal unity of form and meaning.” 3 A 
difference that makes a difference refers to the force that vitalises form, the 
ecological relations that are gathered in the form and sent on by it. The 
following exposition focuses on how the potential of the sign as a structure of 
difference, and an explicitly interpretative mechanism, escapes the whatness of 
the image.  
                                                 
1 “The formal essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of its proximity to the 
logos as phonè is the privilege of presence. This is the inevitable response as soon as one asks: 
‘what is the sign?,’ that is to say, when one submits the sign to the question of essence, to the 
‘ti esti.’ The ‘formal essence’ of the sign can only be determined in terms of presence. One 
cannot get around that response, except by challenging the very form of the question and 
beginning to think that the sign ‘is’ (sr) that ill-named ‘thing’(sr), the only one, that escapes the 
instituting question of philosophy: ‘what is…?’” Derrida, Of Grammatology 19. 
2 Derrida, Of Grammatology 53. 
3 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1978) 5. 
 161
THE LANGUAGE OF THE SIGN 
Although in the United States Peirce founded a tradition of semiotics based on 
pragmatism — it was Saussure’s linguistic theory of semiology and the schema 
of the sign that became particularly influential in a diversity of European 
studies of culture from the 1960s.4 The structure of Saussure’s linguistic sign 
invited new ways of understanding how the world, in social, psychological and 
political terms, worked like a language. The evocative analyses of Barthes’ 
early work were marked by a contest between scientifically-oriented 
structuralism and cultural theory.5 It moved from an orthodox development of 
Saussure’s ‘science of signs’ (Mythologies, 1957; Elements of Semiology, 
1964) to a more self-reflective, interpretative form of critical analysis (S/Z, 
1970).6  
A more systemic understanding of structural relations emerged with the 
cultural theory of Baudrillard (The System of Objects, 1968; The Consumer 
Society: Myths and Structures, 1970 and For a Critique of the Political 
Economy of the Sign, 1972) in which the sign departed science and obtained 
worldly significance and effect. Baudrillard theorized the sign in terms of its 
powerful work of rendering equivalence. A broader contextual imperative for 
both these thinkers, as well as many others of the milieu, was cultural Marxism 
which redrew the political geography in post-World War II French intellectual 
life. The notion of writing as “the continuation of politics by other means”7 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that Barthes quickly abandoned the project of setting forth the rules of the 
‘new’ science of signs in subsequent work, saying that in the early 60s he had “passed through 
a euphoric dream of scientificity.” He came to see semiology as that which actually undoes 
linguistic limits — it is a study of how language articulates the world. He later wished to 
present his semiology as an attention to all aspects of meaning that resist scientific analysis. 
Barthes quoted in Culler, Barthes 73 – 77. 
4 Jonathan Culler notes that in the 1960s “anthropologists, literary critics and others, impressed 
by the success of linguistics, sought to profit from its methodological insights and found 
themselves developing the semiological science that Saussure had postulated.” Jonathan 
Culler, Barthes (London: HarperCollins, 1990) 70. See also Umberto Eco, “Introduction: 
Toward a Logic of Culture”, A Theory of Semiotics 3 – 31. 
5 Though this contest is perhaps best exemplified by the work of Umberto Eco, who said, “the 
whole of culture should be studied as a communicative phenomenon based on signification 
systems” Eco, A Theory of Semiotics 22. 
7 Philippe Sollers quoted in Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Methuen, 
1977) 148.  
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was critical to this milieu, particularly in the context of May 68 and its ultimate 
failure to create and sustain difference.8 The Marxian context was also 
foundational for the work of English theorist Judith Williamson (Decoding 
Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising, 1978), which took up 
the tradition of demythologising cultural texts as political action. Williamson 
drew heavily on the anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss and his 
understanding of the relation between structures of language and human belief 
and behaviour,9 and on the Lacanian description of the ways in which 
ideology, both active and invisible, “works through us.”10 While by no means 
clearly representative of a kind, moment or location of sign theory, the work of 
these three thinkers recognised the political agency of the sign.  
In response to the growth of semiological material Barthes says “(t)here 
is at present a kind of demand for semiology, stemming not from the fads of a 
few scholars, but from the very history of the modern world.”11 This was in 
1964. While media literacy is now just an everyday visual sophistication (many 
semiological decodings of the 60s and 70s now appear somewhat obvious and 
didactic, if appealingly serious and earnest),12 Barthes’ observation still has 
currency — though semiology has not answered this need.  
                                                 
8 A foundational point of reference for cultural theory, the student uprising of May 1968, which 
spread into a nine million strong workers’ strike and eventuated in De Gaulle’s fleeing France 
only to be returned to Government with a majority soon after, was seen as a break through of 
the representationalist paradigm that split ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ or the insides from the 
outsides of the University. Bill Readings notes that a common thread amongst student claims at 
the time “was a resistance to the imposition of an analogy between the production, distribution, 
and consumption of commodities and the production, distribution, and consumption of 
knowledge.” Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, 1996) 146.  
9 For the location of the work of Lévi-Strauss in this history see for example Hawkes, 
Structuralism and Semiotics 32– 58. 
10 For Williamson ‘ideology’ is the ‘invisible cloak’ connecting semiology and psychology. 
She constructs her central argument about the self-fracturing and reconstituting work of 
ideology around Lacan’s reworking of ‘consciousness’ in the ‘mirror-phase’. Judith 
Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (New York and 
London: Marion Boyars, 1983) 41; 60-70.  
11 Barthes, Elements of Semiology 9. 
12 In her 1982 Preface to a later edition of Decoding Advertisements, Judith Williamson 
suggests that the growing ‘self-consciousness’ of advertisements reflects a popularisation of 
semiotic skill. She remarks, “many of the formal practices of advertising which in this book I 
felt I was teasing out as implicit in the ads, are now explicit. When I talked of ads ‘hollowing 
out’ a social space and inserting the product in it, I had no idea that Benson and Hedges would 
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The sign’s linguistic inheritance reveals the potential that Barthes 
identifies as well as the nature of its foreclosure. Saussure’s Course in General 
Linguistics projected semiology as a science that would study the life of signs 
within human society.13 His ambition was for semiology to determine the 
systems of meaning underlying society’s heterogeneity of ‘non-linguistic’ 
signifying practices: customs, conventions and cultural artifacts — in fact, all 
aspects of expressive signification or what he called the ‘living language’.  
As the master-pattern for this greater-though-yet-to-be science, 
linguistics would classify the mass of semiological data within society. In order 
to do this, the system of language had to be separated from the processes of 
speech and writing. It then had to be studied properly, in itself and, as an 
independent and well-defined system, could be used to establish the laws of 
semiology.14 Saussure’s system made a series of decisive cuts into language 
that stood for both its ordering and elevation.15 The suppression of its 
phenomenal character particularly appeared to solve many problems. In 
Saussure’s text, language (langue) is immutable, holistic, closed to social 
practices and indifferent to its performance in speech and writing. Language 
belongs to history. Speech (parole) on the other hand is open, many-sided and 
heterogeneous. Speech is unable to be classified because it belongs both to the 
individual and to society. For Saussure writing is simply a static representation 
of speech, completely separate from it and as such is inauthentic and artificial 
— an illusion that often dupes the speaker and therefore should be excluded 
from the system of language.16  
                                                                                                                                 
soon be using a cigarette packet as a Pyramid or an electric plug…literal manifestations of 
what I had seen as merely a formal theory.” (p. 7).  
13 We note that the Course is a work of interpretation compiled by students from various notes 
taken during the three courses in linguistics Saussure taught at University of Geneva from 1906 
-1911. 
14 “(F)rom the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language 
as the norm of all other manifestations of speech”. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General 
Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966) 9. 
15Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1966) 111-13. 
16 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 23. For Derrida, Saussure’s system hinges on this 
exclusion of writing. Writing “…sensible matter and artificial exteriority: a ‘clothing’  
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Saussure’s system is thus established in terms of an essential 
bifurcation between speech (and writing) and language. Saussure recognised 
that at a basic level language is present in states of speech. However it is as 
though the individual agent who writes and uses language also obstructs the 
view of language in its pure form. Further, while ‘the sign’ is the basic unit of 
meaning and communication, a “concrete entity”, it also means nothing in 
itself — its ‘value’ is only realised in its relation to other signs, in its difference 
from them.17
Saussure certainly had to make the sign bend over backward to enable 
communication through these linguistic demarcations. Signification for 
Saussure was a purely psychological event. Someone hears a sound or reads a 
word — the sound-image (the signifier) forms a psychological imprint, which 
is associated with a mental concept or idea (the signified). Communication 
then entails the complex physiological processes and phonetics of speech, 
which releases the “inner image” of discourse.18 The associations between 
signifiers and signifieds are “deposited in the brain of each member of a 
community, almost like a dictionary of which identical copies have been 
distributed to each individual.”19 These associations are neither rational nor 
open to individual interpretation; they are arbitrary social facts, established via 
convention across the course of history. This arbitrary nature of the sign is 
critical in Saussure’s system because it protects ‘the language’ from any 
attempt by speech and writing to modify it. The language used by the 
community of speakers is thus also intangible to them. While they have no 
access to language as an historical force and fact — apart from the identical 
dictionaries of images they carried about in their heads — they equally seem to 
be granted no access to their own histories, memories or interpretative agency.  
                                                                                                                                 
becomes the ‘scapegoat’ (pharmakos) of metaphysical thinking whose exclusion (repression, 
forgetting) allows metaphysical closure.” Derrida, Of Grammatology 45.  
17 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 102.  
18 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 66. 
19 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 19. 
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The sign, linearly ordered in this way, brings everything into the same 
temporal dimension in order to represent the event of signification. The 
complex relationality of the non-linguistic event, whose unity cannot be 
discovered because of the infinite nature of linguistic expression, needs the 
structuring of representation in order to restore what is forgotten and 
misunderstood in current usage: the concept or idea carried by the sign.20 So 
out of the mass of ever-changing signifying practices a natural order is 
extracted that then becomes the tool with which to understand the mass.  
The sign was designed as an interpretative mechanism to throw light on 
signifying practices in society and return them to ‘the language’.21 While the 
sign sought to understand extra-linguistic languages, it always needed to read 
them in the terms of a strictly ordered and homogenous linguistic system. This 
curtailed the ability of the sign to move beyond itself to become a means of 
understanding social signifying practices, which was Saussure’s original 
ambition. The capability and ambition of the sign exceeded the ground-plan 
linguistics mapped out for it.   
Structuralist semiology, underwritten, as Derrida shows in his reading 
of Saussure, by the metaphysics of presence and the suppression of the 
artificial, persisted with its scientific pretensions and thus sustained this self-
foreclosure.22 There remained, particularly in the texts of structuralism, a 
struggle to come up with a way to deal with signifying practices that were 
extra-linguistic. This problematic is very clear in Elements of Semiology where 
Barthes attempts to push Saussure’s general semiology into a more worldly 
shape, emphasizing articulation over conceptual correspondence. Barthes 
introduces a third pre-signifying element to characterise the semiological sign 
in addition to language and usage; “a matter or substance providing the 
                                                 
20 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 67. 
21 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 17. 
22Alec McHoul cites as examples the ‘quasi-ethnomethodological’ version of the social 
semiotics of Michael Halliday (1978) and Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (1988). He says of 
this work that the project was “to attach a social geometry to a pre-existing Saussurean 
linguistic geometry — producing an always divided theory rarely able to cope with the 
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(necessary) support of signification.”23 Thus it is the process of signification 
that gives rise to the sign and not the other way around. Even in this early 
scientific phase, Barthes said signs are everywhere, and they always mediate 
our relationships with things.24 Considering why it was that semiology had not 
fulfilled its potential, he observed: “...it is far from certain that in the social life 
of today there are to be found any extensive system of signs outside human 
language...though working at the outset on non-linguistic substances, 
semiology is required, sooner or later, to find language (in the ordinary sense 
of the term) in its path.”25 What was implied was not that everything is 
reducible to language, but rather the opposite, that language is the very basis of 
our encounter with the world. In order to understand the nature of the sign, it 
must be put back into socio-cultural circulation: the signifier and the signified 
must be made representative of the actual order of signification from which the 
unity of the sign first arose.  
Yet Barthes still insisted on deferring the reality of the semiological 
sign until it could be exhaustively modelled. He sought to answer Saussure’s 
demand to break things down, to distribute them correctly, and to determine 
the internal order of the structure.26Elements of Semiology is a text that 
documents the struggle between Barthes’ cultural insights and scientific 
pretensions as he labours to build an accurate simulacrum of signification from 
the ground up and to discern the rule through the actuality of signification. The 
paradox in the establishment of a theory of a living language by way of a 
forceful imposition of structure and the removal of the object from worldly 
                                                                                                                                 
fundamental idea that semiosis is never not social.” Alec McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 
xviii. 
23 Barthes, Elements of Semiology 34. 
24 Semiological signs arise from everyday usage: “as soon as there is society, every usage is 
converted into a sign of itself.” Barthes, Elements of Semiology 41. 
25 Barthes, Elements of Semiology 9-10. 
26 For Derrida, Barthes submits semiology to a ‘translinguistics’ which “leads to its full 
explication a linguistics historically dominated by logocentric metaphysics, for which in fact 
there is not and there should not be ‘any meaning except as named.’” Derrida, Of 
Grammatology 52. Barthes responds to this in his later essay “From Work to Text” in which 
the security of positions, of both Author and Reader is dismantled: “The Text is …a passage, 
an overcrossing; thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, 
a dissemination” Image-Music-Text 155-64.  
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conditions of signification, was painfully clear. As we have seen, the more 
forcefully structure imposes itself, the more work it must do to suppress the 
relationality that unsecures it.  
It is precisely this struggle in semiology with insurmountable paradox, 
with the excessive character of the sign, that shows up the value of Saussure’s 
theory. Poststructuralist theory shows that deconstruction occurs within the 
heart of the sign structure. In Derrida, the binary sign is a structure of 
difference, always already provisional. The sign therefore both locates and 
points a way out of the metaphysics of presence: 
Saussurian semiology noted, against tradition, that the signified was 
inseparable from the signifier, that (they) are the two faces of one and 
the same production…by desubstantializing at once the signified 
content and the ‘substance of expression’…Saussure contributed greatly 
to turning against the metaphysical tradition the concept of the sign he 
borrowed from it.27 
In discerning an apparently ‘natural’ structure, the theory of the sign also opens 
a view on normative conditions, denaturalising them. 28  Foucault tells us that 
Saussure’s general semiology itself was a rediscovery of the Classical binary 
structure linking a ‘sound-image’ to a mental image (concept) as a distinction 
between signifier and signified.29  
The denaturalising capability of semiological analysis is its key value, 
one that was taken up by Barthes as he began to use sign theory to discover 
motivated cultural meanings and one that has survived the deconstruction of 
formalist semiology.30 A theory of language became a potential activity of 
political significance. 
In a recent project that attempts to retrieve semiotics from its retreat 
into aesthetics, this denaturalising capability of sign theory in relation to 
                                                 
27Derrida quoted in the Translator’s Preface to Derrida, Of Grammatology 1viii. 
28 Derrida, Of Grammatology 38-39.  
29 Foucault, The Order of Things 67. 
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cultural situations is demonstrated. Alec McHoul reads the signifying practice 
of a children’s schoolbook primer that describes a normal domestic situation 
from which the magic and discriminations of fiction have been purportedly 
erased:  
(These homes) speak to us as if they were actual homes, but they are 
always overneat, overly well lit, well laid out figures of the imaginary. 
They are just like advertisements in this respect, and they retain 
something of the politics and ethics of advertising. What they advertise 
is a model of the modern home. They show that a certain architecture 
(the children’s and the parent’s bedrooms being separate, for example) 
is good; that a certain set of domestic relations is good; that it is normal 
and expectable for there to be television, good sewers, hot and cold 
running water, visits by doctors, good and beneficial relations with 
older generations, plenty of nourishment, no scarcity of basic essentials, 
gas and electric power, heating and warmth, a roof that doesn’t leak.31
This reading isolates a powerful process of social induction, bringing into relief 
a situation uninflected by a Foucauldian cognisance of institutional and 
architectural power structures.32 It reveals how the schoolbook primer makes 
redundant other domestic possibilities and invites a condition of comparison: 
“The classroom is where one both finds oneself and finds oneself wanting.”33
While this might strike the cultural theorist as obvious, it is a disclosure 
that could hardly be less significant in the domain of industrial realization, 
which is largely responsible for producing institutional environments and their 
props. In our world in which design is hidden and the televisual has become the 
primary instructive feature of the child’s environment, I think there is 
considerable value in this semiological process for design practice.  
                                                                                                                                 
30 There is a relation here to the movement of the trace in Derrida in terms of the ‘becoming-
unmotivated’ movement of naturalisation and the ‘becoming-sign’ movement of 
denaturalisation. Derrida, Of Grammatology 47.  
31 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 79. 
32 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 77. 
33 McHoul quoting Ian Hunter in Semiotic Investigations 83. 
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THE SEMIOLOGICAL TOOL-BOX 
Semiology asks us to distrust our first look, to accept the possibility of the 
partiality or poverty of what we immediately encounter; it suggests that there is 
more to what we see than meets the eye.34 It was impatience at the naturalness 
of designed appearances — the ‘falsely obvious’ — that inspired Barthes’ 
classic semiological study of mediated bourgeois French culture, 
Mythologies.35 In this most famous text, the sign is expanded into a system, 
given complexity and dimension. The sign becomes a signifier not just of pre-
established mental concepts but also of cultural values. In it Barthes applies 
structural linguistics to the realm of myth to denaturalise the proliferating 
cultural store of magical/analogical appearances within which a disturbing 
politics of the natural lurks. Cultural objects are analysed as cultural signs, 
motivated condensations of ideological positions.36  
Williamson, who met with the French structuralist milieu from the 
outside, developed this project. Like Barthes she was informed by a Marxist 
critique of the disingenuous ideology of capitalism; she said that signs — in 
her case the overt forms of advertisements — become objective (naturalised) 
correlates: simply “what is”.37 Williamson explains this in terms of the work of 
ideology, which for her is “the meaning made necessary by the conditions of 
society while helping to perpetuate those conditions.”38Advertisements as 
ideological signs thus obscure “the real structure of society by replacing class 
with the distinctions made by the consumption of particular goods”.39 
Williamson takes the image very seriously in terms of these ideological 
effects: they are designed things that require a careful, analytical unpacking. 
However, as post-structuralist thought has taught us, semiology demands that 
this unpacked meaning must be returned to presence, reinvested in the object as 
                                                 
34 Barthes, Mythologies 118.  
35 Barthes, Mythologies 11. 
36 Barthes, Mythologies 122. 
37 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 29. 
38 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 13. 
39 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 13. 
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its truth. So there is danger in how, why and for whom signification is made, 
the ways in which redundancy is reached and undecideability denied. 
Williamson has been criticised on many counts for her objective 
approach, her assumption that what she sees is what is actually there.40 This 
issue becomes less significant in design because production is its modus 
operandi. We do not so much wish to question the validity of semiology in its 
own terms but rather to reclaim an approach capable of breaking open the 
pervasiveness of design in terms of both the production of things and the 
induction of habits of interpretation. 
So notwithstanding the problematic nature of the structuralist approach, 
let us open the semiological toolbox to view some of its contents, which can be 
remobilised in the reading activity of ontological design: de-sign. This will 
point beyond a reinvestment in the image to a designing that can remake with 
the ‘de-signed’. 
Gillian Rose indicates that semiological tools are forms of description: 
“they refer to processes that are not easily described otherwise...(its) 
neologisms are thus worth persevering with, no matter how clumsy their use 
might feel initially.”41 Semiology clearly wants to be used. This is particularly 
the case with Williamson whose work appears driven by a need to establish 
shareable reading methods to meet the naturalised, shared values of capitalist 
culture. For her, learning to read signs, to sense the inducting power of 
everyday appearances, is a political imperative and she likens her decodings to 
the dismantling of cars for which she has provided a handbook.42 This practical 
orientation was not widely shared by the milieu of theorists of the sign and has 
not survived the development of the cultural connoisseur. While the tacit 
objectivism of this form of sign analysis requires careful negotiation, the 
                                                 
40 These critiques are cited in below.  
41Rose provides an excellent exegesis of these tools. Rose, Visual Methodologies 69 – 99.  
42 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 9 -10. Her desire to emphasise the use-ability of her 
book is reinforced in her preface to the fourth impression, 1982. This emphasis contrasts with 
the forward projection of the science of semiology, which in Saussure, early Barthes and in the 
film theory of Christian Metz is always deferred, “scarcely begun” even though they all 
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ability to unpack the design environment is increasingly important as our 
material ignorance grows.  
A key assumption of semiology is that we can read images as texts. 
This demands a careful and informed looking and suggests that images, so 
apparently ingenuous and complete, actually entail hard work to understand, 
precisely because we so quickly think we understand them.43 Semiology 
mobilises a diverse series of inventive, interpretative devices to assist in this 
work. While the sign in Saussure is always denotative, always entails a natural, 
unproblematic and direct association to its signified meaning, in Barthes this 
relationship is broken up by the second-order dimension of connotative 
meaning. Connotations are motivated cultural associations that pry open the 
relation between signifier and signified and allow ideology to insinuate and 
naturalise itself, reworking the denotative content. The methods of assessing 
the denotative and connotative meanings of images require some kind of 
diegetic mapping whereby the formal elements of an image are enumerated. In 
a well-known example from Mythologies, Barthes tells us: 
I am at the barber’s, and a copy of Paris-Match is offered to me. On the 
cover, a young Negro in French uniform is saluting, with his eyes 
uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the 
meaning of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well 
what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, 
without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and 
that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism 
than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors.44  
                                                                                                                                 
already speak it. J.Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories (London and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976) 235. 
43Christian Metz (Language and Cinema, 1971) for example made much of the deceptive 
formal ‘easiness’ of the film image, saying, “A film is difficult to explain because it is easy to 
understand.” This set up his semiotics of the cinema the aim of which, after Saussure and 
Peirce, was a ‘science’ of cinematic signification. Metz quoted in James Monaco, How to Read 
a Film: The Art, Technology, Language, History and Theory of Film and Media (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 128. 
44 Barthes, Mythologies 116. 
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The meaning of the picture in Barthes’ terminology is its unequivocal elements 
— young, male, black soldier, salute, upturned eyes — that the analyst chooses 
to articulate (what is declared as a denotative element depends on the reader — 
as Barthes himself shows, what remains unremarkable also remains natural).45
The implication is that there is no work of recognition involved in discerning 
denotative elements — they are just literally what is there. The second part of 
the analysis elaborates the connotative elements that Barthes sees. These 
elements open the ‘mythical’ system, the dimension of intentional relationships 
that render the image a questionable text. Connotations are culturally 
determined. The flag is usually situated above eye level and calls for the act of 
right-armed salutation. They are also paradigmatic in that this image calls on 
our recognition of the family of images it belongs to in order to read it, and 
syntagmatic — the cover appears as an edited moment in a series of image-
choices associated with the magazine Paris-Match, declaring its ideological 
position.46 Such semiological mapping feeds these connotations back into the 
image that we see, making it the destiny of an overt intention: meaning is 
made, ‘cut out’ and reinvested in the image.47
In the post-structuralist mood of the later S/Z, an essay on Balzac’s 
Sarrasine, Barthes picks up on the self-concealing loop of analysis by inverting 
the hierarchical layering of denotation and connotation. The denotative 
moment becomes the final connotation, the point at which connotation is 
embedded, naturalised. Thus “denotation is not the first meaning, but pretends 
to be so; under this illusion, it is ultimately no more than the last of the 
connotations (the one which seems both to establish and close the reading).”48 
There is never a naturally arising, pre-cultural denotation. But this does not 
mean that the idea of describable, denotative content is extinguished, and in 
                                                 
45 Barthes, Mythologies 138. 
46 Barthes, Mythologies 138. Though Barthes does not do this, one could persist with the tools 
in that the image is a metonymic sign — the saluting man ‘names’ for Barthes ‘French 
imperiality’ (125) and a synecdoche — the saluting man stands for many. 
47 After Saussure, Barthes says meaning is “above all a cutting out of shapes”. Barthes, 
Elements of Semiology 56.  
48 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 9. 
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fact the icon continues to secure itself under the representational rule of this 
idea. This last move of Barthes, the interpretative transformation of denotation 
back into connotation, is an important one. It is in this movement of symbolic 
closure that the sign’s designing power is revealed.  
Semiology clearly had very high ambitions for what appearances make 
evident, particularly concerning the ideological structures of knowledge as 
conditions informing the design of meaning. Barthes dissects the apparent 
transparency of the image by asserting after Marx the privation of history 
entailed by the mythic (ideological) sign. “All that is left for one to do is to 
enjoy this beautiful object without wondering where it comes from…Nothing 
is produced, nothing is chosen: all one has to do is to possess these new objects 
from which all soiling trace of origin or choice has been removed.”49 This 
miraculous evaporation of history is but one aspect of image culture that 
semiology invites us to rework in a design context. We are reminded of the 
privation that belongs to truth as correctness. In this, and perhaps moving away 
from Barthes’ unsecuring of the hold of history in his later essay “The Death of 
the Author”, 50 we can say that the image is authored by its design history as 
well as by its readers and that this is part of the matter of the text we need to 
learn to de-sign. 
Semiology also gives the image a determinacy. In Barthes for example, 
everything obtains an interpellant speech, particularly in the system of mass 
communication, which again poses problems for the semiological prospects of 
Saussure’s divisive categories. The sign offers a real call that comes and seeks 
me out.51And even though the message of the ideological call may be 
contentious, the call itself is not. After Barthes, Williamson borrows Louis 
Althusser’s notion of interpellation to describe the ideological intention of the 
advertising image in constituting individual subjects.52 She quotes Althusser: 
                                                 
49 Barthes, Mythologies 151. 
50 Barthes, “The Death of the Author” Image-Music-Text 142 - 48.  
51 Barthes, Mythologies 125.  
52 J.G. Merquior writes that Barthes’ equation of ideology with interpellation predates 
Althusser’s. Merquior, From Prague to Paris 175; 116. 
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All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete 
subjects, by the functioning of the category of subject (…) ideology 
‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
individuals (it recruits them all) or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I 
have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along 
the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 
‘Hey, you there!’(…)Assuming that the theoretical scene I have 
imagined takes place on the street, the hailed individual will turn round. 
By this (…) he becomes a subject. Why? Because he had recognised 
that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was really him 
who was hailed’.53  
Williamson situates this call in the space between the signifier and signified 
where the individual is invited to become the creator of meaning, but only 
insofar as she/he has been called upon to be so; advertisements hail us and 
invite us to complete ourselves in them.54 She says the ‘you’ in the 
advertisement is always transmitted as plural but received as singular, thus we 
are interpellated en masse.55 Barthes describes the ideological intention of the 
advertising image-assemblage thus: “the text directs the reader through the 
signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid some and receive others; by 
means of an often subtle dispatching, it remote-controls him towards a 
meaning chosen in advance.”56 This directive agency of the sign is constituted 
not only in its saying, but also in its denying, its making redundant: the sign 
assembles things into background and foreground, informing a particular, 
expressive gestalt.57  
                                                 
53 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 50. 
54 The formal invitation here pertains to what Williamson calls after Lacan the ‘Ego-Ideal’, the 
impossible (re)unification of the self in the ‘Imaginary’. Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 
65.  
55 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 42 – 51. 
56 Barthes, Image-Music-Text 40. 
57 The significance of ‘the negative’ in the language of the sign, what it holds itself apart from, 
grows with the move of sign-theory away from formalism. Alec McHoul says for example that 
for any community of sign users what is ‘not-sign’ (ie referent) is both securing and mobile, it 
 175
This ideological interpellation does not however impose a monoculture 
or extinguish the individual. It is taken up in specific uses and practices. In 
light of this we might substitute the somewhat monolithic and objectifying 
view of ‘capitalist culture’ in the semiological discourse for the world in 
Heidegger’s sense, as a context of shared practical activity. 
Critiques levelled at the post-Saussurean semiological method take aim 
at its radically internal nature, arguing that what it finds are merely the 
impressions of a privileged observer and thus cannot be extrapolated. The key 
argument is that formal semiology does not reflect upon its inventiveness.58 
This is certainly a legacy of its scientistic pretensions which preserve the 
transparency of representation. In Saussure for example, representation is used 
to show how something works: there is a strong sense that he is merely 
describing the true process of communication. The reader is being taken 
through a process, rather than learning an interpretation of a process, and this 
sense is also very strong in both the early Barthes and Williamson.59  
While Saussure recognised that signs do not function in isolation but 
gain value only in relation to other signs, the method developed in a way that 
was much more keen on making fully rendered examples than in mobilising a 
worldly discourse of signs. Saussure gave us a sense of language as it acts upon 
                                                                                                                                 
is not a ‘universal’ outside-the-space-of-the-sign but orients particular uses at particular times. 
McHoul Semiotic Investigations 55-64 For Baudrillard, the negative is within the space of the 
sign, as that which ‘off-sets’ sign value in environments entirely arranged by the sign. We 
discuss Baudrillard below. 
58 Gillian Rose notes that Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson emphasise the need for semiology to 
reflect upon its own meaning-making tactics. She also cites criticisms levelled at Williamson’s 
work by W. Leiss, S. Kline and S. Jhally, who raise the question about the representativeness 
of Williamson’s analyses. This of course raises the expectation of precise, semiological ‘rules’. 
Rose makes the point that Williamson is using particular images to forward a more general 
argument, not to reveal the ‘truth’ of those images. However one can see that Williamson’s 
formalism sets up such a demand in the tacit promise of its objectivity. Rose, Visual 
Methodologies 97. 
59When Barthes suggests the ideological image anchors a particular kind of perception, his 
analysis also performs a similar kind of anchorage — though he becomes more self-reflective 
on his methods, as we saw above. This change is also strongly evident in “Change the Object 
Itself: Mythology today,” Image, Music, Text 165-69. In Williamson the application of 
contravening, politically subversive values to the image is concealed in the formal 
semiological ‘decoding’. 
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‘the linguistic community’ who uses it, yet ignored the determinacy of 
communal use and how this might act back on language.60  
It is this practical context that McHoul’s semiotic investigations focus 
on. McHoul foregrounds the ambiguity of signs: they are always determinate 
and indeterminate, local and historical and pervaded by destabilising relations 
that decompose the anchorage points of analysis. He says, “Traditionally, 
semiotics has asked, what is the relation between an expression (signifier) and 
what it expresses (signified)? What I ask instead is, what is the relation 
between an expression and its effect?”61 This shift is significant in terms of an 
analysis of the signworlds of design, which does not receive enough practical 
assistance from post-structuralism’s “constant absence”.62  
McHoul emphasises meaning as the effect of sign-use by communities 
for whom they are signs.63 He argues, “‘sign’ (like ‘event’) is always already 
an activity, a practice, an action, in play, a carrying through or a living out.”64 
According to McHoul, each semiological investigation must start anew and in 
response to a sign that is always both practical and historical.65 ‘Effective’ 
semiotic investigation must inquire into the practices of specific sign-users, 
who are situated nonetheless in “a broader social, political, and historical 
space.”66  
McHoul’s focus on the effects and uses of different communal and 
analytical practices creates a space for the possibility and necessity of simple 
observation of the ‘ontic’ (or ‘what [apparently] is’) within the broader frame 
                                                 
60 Barthes pointed out that languages “ (…)are subject to the determination of the community 
(for example) when new needs are born, following the development of societies” Barthes, 
Elements of Semiology 32.  
61 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations xvii. 
62 Merquior, From Prague to Paris 174. 
63McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 62. 
64 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 9. 
65 McHoul poses an analytical pathway between ethnomethodology and Foucauldian 
genealogy. This is, he suggests, a more appropriate methodological direction answerable to the 
micro and macro tendencies in both. “ If we have to work from the available analytic 
traditions, then effective semiotics might be thought of as a Foucauldian ethnomethodology, or 
else as an ethnomethodological genealogy. The terms matter less than the idea of a direction 
for semiotics as it is (necessarily) situated in its own moment of analytic history.”McHoul, 
Semiotic Investigations 86. 
66 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 85. 
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of an ontological approach. It challenges both the structuring explanations of 
formal semiology and the final indeterminacy of poststructuralism. Yet as we 
shall discuss in the next chapter, McHoul does not take account of the directive 
power of design in his critique of cultural theory’s take-up of the sign. 
Indeterminacy is decisively eclipsed in my view by the design(ing) of worlding 
structures and cultural forms, like television, as they function in agreement 
with the rationalist world-view.  
Televisual semiosis, which as Baudrillard indicates plays on a 
presumption of collectivity, must be engaged at this level.67 As cultural 
observers and participants, it is we who make the symbolic closures that allow 
for televisual semiosis to flourish. Visual culture calls on us to develop 
advanced synecdochic abilities, which means that the task of opening 
structures to indeterminacy is not just competing with visible things but with a 
broader, ontological tendency toward conceptual closure. As Williamson 
remarks in a later edition of her book, contemporary visual culture reveals a 
literal manifestation of what she had previously seen as formal theory. The 
growing ‘self-consciousness’ of advertisements reflects for her a popularisation 
of semiotic skill and a dramatic increase in the internal ‘space’ of images — 
the level of actual partiality that can rely on the visual sophistication of 
observers to complete.68  
This situation poses another challenge to indeterminacy regarding the 
destiny of analysis. In McHoul and Barthes it is not clear where analysis 
travels, how it might for example inform effective decisions, which we argue is 
a necessity in current conditions in which the naturalised artificial environment 
                                                 
67 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 178. While McHoul does not speak of the televisual as a 
source of semiosis, such a common ground is hinted at in his investigation of the photograph of 
Sarah Burge, a child kept in Barnado’s Homes in the 1880s. He comments on its ‘film noir’ 
aesthetics, and on the ‘deeply striking resemblance’ that the image bears to the icon of the 
popular 1990s stage play ‘Les Miserables’. These comments arguably reflect the common 
culture of us ‘sensible viewers’ — a point underscored, I think, by my young child’s 
understanding of the photograph as ‘dark and scary’. McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 19 – 40. 
68 Gestalt psychology uses the term Prägnanz to explain the tendency toward perceiving 
coherence, for example ‘remembering’ a broken circle as closed. Gordon, Theories of Visual 
Perception 64 –5. In terms of what we explored in Part 2, this also recalls the unfolding 
verificationism of televisual recognition.  
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does not sustain our lives with care. McHoul sets up the project of his book by 
floating the question of the effectivity of analysis; that it may be of no use to 
anyone but the analyst and that what it might finally make apparent is merely 
the limits of an empiricist ethics.69 One can imagine the later Barthes being 
comfortable with this, particularly in light of his tendency to attribute, in 
Merquior’s words, ‘moral virtue’ to the arbitrariness of the sign.70 There is an 
assumption here however that analysis can escape the practical context, that it 
does not necessarily go on to make anything. This is an assumption that 
ontological design contests when we consider that ideas and books are 
themselves forms of design(ing). As much as reading is a form of production, 
the book-thing is a certain way of the text, a certain communicative 
commensurability of idea and thing that can claim to make a difference.  
Williamson offers a much more strident project vis-à-vis the provision 
of analytical arms, the destiny of which we explore further when we look at 
visual political strategies.71 There is however, in all of these semiological 
approaches a passing over or evacuation of the designing of the artificial. 
While the theory of interpellation gives the sign a distinct kind of 
agency in both Barthes and Williamson, the artificiality of the sign is expressly 
not its designedness but its ethically contentious, ideological falseness; the sign 
in its uncontested naturalness actually lacks nature.72 For Williamson, the 
significant thing in the sign is its semiotic structure and only its semiotic 
structure — its ability to mobilise the transfer of significance from form to 
form as per the dictates of capitalism.73 In Williamson and Barthes the 
                                                 
69 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations xvi.  
70 Merquior, From Prague to Paris 183. He links Barthes to Sartre, saying “…by endowing the 
arbitrariness of the sign with a fierce ‘ethical’ temper, by depicting as sinful and impure every 
meeting (let alone matching) of sign and reference, Barthes was ultimately ‘existentializing’ 
the Saussurean view of the sign.” 183-84. 
71 At the end of her book Williamson says that the point of semiology is not to change ads, but 
to change society, that semiology is a matter of a politics. Naomi Klein’s No Logo also 
ostensibly takes issue with the ‘increasing subtlety of capitalism’s ideological processes’ and 
we address her text below. We can compare the strident, Marxian discourse of Williamson to 
Klein’s popularly pitched ‘revoutionary’ rhetoric to perhaps discern where a politics of visual 
culture has finally led. 
72 Barthes, Mythologies 142. 
73 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 167-68. 
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advertisement distorts reality and thus the semiological project must help to 
distinguish between the ‘ad world’ and the “real world around the screen and 
page”; 74 the image is not as an integral feature of our environments but is an 
artificial veneer “posted over our urban surroundings.”75
The contentious nature of the image is also evident in Barthes’ notion 
of myth. For Barthes, myth is depoliticized speech. He evokes the political as 
“the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of 
making the world.”76 So the sign’s speech is very much conceived as an 
embalming and obscuring of real relations — “man is stopped by myths” — it 
is not world making like real, political activity.77 While Barthes discovers the 
motivated nature of cultural signs, it is of interest that he sees this motivation 
as intrinsic to the reality-depleting dangers of myth from which the arbitrary, 
linguistic sign is protected:  
What is disturbing in myth is precisely that its form is motivated. For if 
there is a ‘health’ of language, it is the arbitrariness of the sign which is 
its grounding. What is sickening in myth is its resort to a false nature, 
its superabundance of significant forms, as in these objects that decorate 
their usefulness with a natural appearance. The will to weigh the 
signification with the full guarantee of nature causes a kind of nausea: 
myth is too rich, and what is in excess is precisely its motivation.78  
This analytical tendency wants to vaporise the intent of the sign with the power 
of analysis, or rather to invest in it only to the extent of fulfilling a perspective 
on the object in view. This perspective, the semiological unconcealment of 
myth per se, is attributed significant social and political agency in Williamson 
— for her this process has the potential to change society.79 What people need 
                                                 
74 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 11. 
75 Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 11. 
76 Barthes, Mythologies 143. 
77 Barthes, Mythologies 146-55. We are reminded of Levin’s reading of the photograph in and 
by way of which the primordial play of light is stopped. 
78 Barthes, Mythologies 126. 
79 The point of pointing out “the very real material bases and substructures of images” is to 
extinguish the false nature of our concert with things. Williamson says at the end of her book: 
“We re-create ourselves every day, in accordance with an ideology based on property — where 
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in order to become politicised is the information ‘behind’ the compelling 
surfaces of everyday life. But as Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller note:  
An audience can recognise ‘mythic speech’ as ideological, but 
recognition does not necessarily defuse the power of the myth. We can 
consume stereotypes and clichés knowingly, but this knowledge does 
not preclude the ability of such images to shape beliefs.80 
As with Levin’s call for empathy toward the plight of televised others, or with 
Daniel Harris’ elaboration of his material ignorance, what we do with what we 
know is a complicated business and certainly does not, on its own, 
automatically engender a difference in behaviour, habit or desire  — we are 
governed by epistemologies that we know to be wrong.81 We have learnt to 
habitually ignore relationality and therefore need to learn to receive new 
signals in an adaptive way, a way attuned to effecting changes in our habitual 
ways of living.82This demands an engagement with design.  
 
WHAT BAUDRILLARD DE-SIGNED 
While drawing on and learning from Barthes’ insight about the cultural life of 
signs — that it is through signs that “the environmental world invades the 
system”83 — Baudrillard’s work contests the reality-depleting tendency of the 
sign as ‘myth’ or ‘false ideology’. In this his work relates to a crucial 
Heideggerean observation about signs-in-the-world: “The sign itself can 
represent what it indicates not only in the sense of replacing it, but in such a 
way that the sign itself always is what is indicated.” 84 Signs are a form of 
concretion of the indicative ‘in-order-to’ — they both say and are what they 
                                                                                                                                 
we are defined by our relationship to things, possessions, rather than to each other.” 
Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 179. 
80 Lupton and Miller, Design Writing Research 113. 
81 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 493. 
82 “Learning denotes change and change denotes process which is itself subject to change.” 
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 283. 
83 Barthes, Elements of Semiology 91-2. 
84 Heidegger, Being and Time 76-77. 
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are. Baudrillard’s concept of simulation, as we have said, is not a de-realising 
tendency, but rather points to the very realisation of the world.85  
In Baudrillard the sign obtains a cultural agency that is only implicit in 
the work of Barthes, who, like Williamson, relies on particular, iconic 
examples where formal analysis fills the sign/icon with the rich content of 
ideological speech. This process emphasises the discrete nature of the image 
and effectively disarticulates the complex relational determinations that bring 
the sign into being. In Baudrillard, the sign moves beyond itself as the primary 
unit of structuralism and becomes the means of a critical analysis of structures. 
The sign both conditions networks of communication and exists within them: it 
both explains and is embodied in cultural forms.86 It is sign value — the 
rhetoric of appearance and designed references — that becomes the very 
mediatory principle of the social. The worldly, social life of signs — the object 
of Saussure’s original ambition — is directly theorised in a way that formal 
semiology could never approach.  
The sign, born of structuralism, now has its own post-structural life — 
it is a thing that worlds, that enters into the political economy of exchange.87 
By giving the sign volition — by mobilising it as constitutive of society 
through the process of collusive, cultural circulation (intended acts of 
exchange), Baudrillard also opened the way for an unintended series of 
exchanges. The sign economy — the exchange of signs as signs — gives way 
to the emergence of a sign ecology — the unintended consequences and effects 
of this exchange.  
Baudrillard’s critics, particularly those inflected with an ecological 
consciousness, tend to miss this challenge in his sign theory. He is accused of 
idealism and symbolic reductionism particularly in relation to his later work 
                                                 
85 Butler, Jean Baudrillard 23-4. 
86 For Baudrillard “the structure of the sign is at the very heart of the commodity form.” 
Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, 146. 
87 As we mentioned in Part 1, Baudrillard marks an actual point of departure for this economy 
with the Bauhaus, which produced not ‘things’ but ‘functional objects’ as calculi of 
signification. Baudrillard, “Design and Environment” 186. 
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where real objects and environments give way to images.88 From our 
perspective this is somewhat of a misreading of Baudrillard’s radical approach 
to material culture. Baudrillard’s work in fact grounds semiology’s atomistic 
idealism.89 While he himself later abandons this project, his work suggests that 
what is needed is a materialist account of idealised culture. In Baudrillard the 
sign does not simply show, it designates.90 This is supported by comments 
made by Charles Levin who suggests that Baudrillard proposes “a 
phenomenology of structuralism itself.”91 He says Baudrillard “attempts to 
shift the stance of critical theory by understanding the social, in its totality, as 
emphatically mediated by the predominant forms of its own self-
understanding.”92 This project, reminiscent of Bateson, gestures towards a 
cultural theory of design that potentially does away with the binary structure 
still very much ruling in concealment in design theory’s materialist ‘turn’ from 
the Platonism, which we discussed Part 1.  
We do not here seek to justify Baudrillard’s project in ecological terms. 
What we want to suggest is that Baudrillard has ‘de-signed’ the sign in such a 
way as to make it possible to understand it ecologically – that is, in its 
condition of relationality. It is not the total coherence of his arguments, nor 
where they eventually lead, but how his ideas enable understanding in a 
practical context that is important.93  
                                                 
88 M. Gottdiener for example, contextualises Baudrillard as a promising postmodern thinker 
who lost his way by following in the ‘idealist’ tradition and as such is guilty of ‘symbolic 
reductionism.’ Gottdiener, Postmodern Semiotics 24-5. 
89 In his book on Baudrillard, Rex Butler locates the attempt to follow both the logic of 
idealism and its problem as precisely the authenticity and novelty of Baudrillard’s thought. Rex 
Butler, Jean Baudrillard. 
90In Heidegger, this power of the sign relates to the transformation of the essence of ‘truth’ by 
way of which the sign is altered from that which shows to that which designates. Heidegger, 
Basic Writings 402. 
“What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culminate in 
a system of signs. Rather all signs arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose 
purposes they can be signs.” Heidegger, Basic Writings 410. 
91 Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 11. 
92 Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 21. 
93 Thus the risk of not reading Baudrillard ‘in his own terms’, which Butler insists is necessary. 
Butler’s reading simulates the paradox of the sign, which, he argues, Baudrillard encounters 
after the System of Objects and thereafter cannot forget. The down-side of this recognition is 
the trap of analysis that cannot but follow the groove of the logic it has discovered.  
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For Baudrillard the crucial thing is that the carefully preserved 
separation of sign and world is a fiction. This implicates the fictionality of 
everything otherworldly in Saussure’s schema that came to trouble Barthes, 
including in particular the indifferent equivalence of the two sides of the sign 
binary and the unidirectionality of the sign’s unfolding, as well as the tabula 
rasa upon which psychological impressions are formed. Yet at the same time it 
complicates the very notion of the fictional. The forgotten/assumed referent in 
both Saussure and the early Barthes becomes in Baudrillard the effect of the 
sign. It is the sign that is actual, an “operational structure.”94
The process of signification is not just motivated, as it is for Barthes, by 
the signifier — the visible or audible form of the sign — it absorbs the 
signified. Therefore it is the form of the sign, not its content or concept that 
does the communicating. The signified and referent work together in the 
process of signification to provide what Baudrillard calls a substantive alibi — 
content for the sign.95 The idea here is that sign value (which belongs to form) 
is sustained by the effect of reality borrowed from the correlation of the 
signified and the referent. This is how the sign obtains authenticity. He says: 
(l)ike the sign-form, the commodity is a code managing the exchange of 
values. It makes little difference whether the contents of material 
production or the immaterial contents of signification are involved; it is 
the code that is determinant: the rules of the interplay of signifiers and 
exchange value.96 
The matter of the world is not hidden or attenuated by the sign, but rather the 
sign elaborates the world, directs it and makes it speak.  
In this light, each product of design is an incremental instance of a 
broader televisual orientation towards the declarative and verifiable — cultural 
                                                 
94“The sign is an operational structure that lends itself to a structural manipulation compared 
with which the quantitative mystery of surplus value appears inoffensive.” Jean Baudrillard, 
The Mirror of Production, trans. by Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975) 122. 
95 The notion of the semiological alibi is raised by Barthes in relation to myth. However the 
‘perpetual’ alibi of myth and the ‘constantly moving turnstile’ of connotation gives way here to 
a more substantive notion of the sign-form. Barthes, Mythologies 123. 
96 Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 146. 
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values they are made to speak and locate. The telegenic product, a 
manifestation of the symbolic management of value, registers itself as a kind of 
normative individual — to recall Barthes on the fashion system — designed to 
display its canonic generality in spite of the particularity of its material 
presence. 97
Baudrillard’s first book, The System of Objects, teaches us to hear this 
particular speech of things and to chart their flight from the 
instrumental/technological to cultural systems.98 The sign assembles the 
designed (and designing) disposition of products and environments.99 The 
sign/world transformation is a result of the work of design, a work squarely 
shared by humans and things, and that constantly shifts between technical and 
cultural scenes.  
This is a radical reinterpretation of the sign’s agency and is supported 
by Heidegger’s understanding of the interpenetration of language, things and 
worlds. In the main however, the sign is reduced to the domain of language and 
mental imagery while the intractable meaning of the material world outside the 
space of the sign is secured.   
This position is exemplified by the theory of product semantics, the 
study of meaning in design, which elevates and reveres the eidos as evidence 
of design knowledge.100 Klaus Krippendorff, probably its leading proponent, 
goes to great lengths to disassociate product semantics from the sign and its 
ambiguous, fluid, referential character. For him, a semiotic approach to design 
encourages products that further emphasise a division between sign and world. 
                                                 
97 “…the language of fashion must here be inferred from a pseudo-real garment, and on the 
other, the wearer of the garment (the photographed model) is, so to speak, a normative 
individual, chosen for her canonic generality, and who consequently represents a ‘speech’ 
which is fixed and devoid of all combinative freedom.” Barthes, Elements of Semiology 27.  
98 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 8. 
99 This is something that is taken up in the semiotic study of machines in the work of 
Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour, which we have cited elsewhere. 
100 Product semantics arrived via the take up of semiology in architecture, such as was studied 
at the New Bauhaus at Ulm from the late 60s. The most influential text in English on 
architecture and semiotics at the time was Charles Jencks and George Baird (eds) Meaning in 
Architecture (New York: Braziller, 1969). 
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 Such products “hide their operation behind unrelated facades” or 
“deceive users with fake symbolisms” suggesting capabilities that are not 
there.101 He says “this kind of semiotization of material culture alienates people 
from participation in the real world”.102
For Krippendorff form follows the identification of meaning; the 
designer must seek to understand the cognitive context of projected users and 
embody these authentic meanings in the object. Good semantic design is, he 
says, “simply self-evident”, a transparent form of communication.103 This 
directive reduces the being of the designed and manufactured object to a 
merely symbolic presence far more comprehensively than does semiotics, 
whilst it also streamlines the user to a very limited set of concerns. 
Design needs a theory of the sign that is able to recognise the 
interpenetration of language and world and the relationality of meaning. 
Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour for example understand semiotics as a 
study of ‘path building’ that can be applied to machines, bodies or texts and 
that moves from “signs to things and back.” 104  This approach has a precursor 
in Baudrillard, for whom things do not represent but become representational, 
ideology becomes “practical”.105 While the system is (in)visibly relational, 
objects absorb relationality by way of their rhetorical claims. Baudrillard 
mythologises this, suggesting that relationality has been extinguished and has 
had to be designed back in from a situation of digital exclusion. He says: 
So what is consummated and consumed is never the object but the 
relationship itself, signified yet absent, simultaneously included and 
excluded; it is the idea of the relationship that is consumed in the series 
of objects that displays it. The relationship is no longer directly 
                                                 
101 Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts”, The Idea of Design, eds. 
Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan 166. 
102 Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts” 158. 
103 Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts” 166. 
104 Akrich and Latour “A Summary of Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and 
Nonhuman Assemblies” 259. 
105 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 10. 
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experienced: it has become abstract, been abolished, been transformed 
into a sign-object, and thus consumed. 106  
The connotative whims of the sign become concrete and denotative, and the 
rhetoric of the object is now the feigning of relationality in its gestures toward 
interfacing with human ‘consumers’. So this rhetoric of relationship conceals 
that things actually operate under the assumption of their objective 
independence. 
The object that absorbs and re-works relationality, and which is 
thereafter naturalised under an assumed denotative function, demands a 
particular understanding from its human users. As more and more objects 
entirely depend for example on the standing reserve of electrical power and its 
earth wrenching infrastructure, at the same time they become ever more 
substantially rhetorical, denotatively ‘stand-alone’. Baudrillard says:  
(…) no sooner do we lose sight of the route taken by energy, feel 
energy to be intrinsic to the object, become the non-responsible 
beneficiaries of an absence (or near absence) of any need for gesture 
and physical effort, then we are surely justified in believing — indeed 
are obliged to believe — in an absolute and limitless functionality, in 
efficacy as the virtue of signs.107 
Baudrillard gives us many astute examples of this semiotic 
reproduction. Looking at car tail fins, perhaps (his critical gaze oriented often 
enough at the spectacle of ‘America’) at some designed by one of the first car 
stylists General Motors’ Harley Earle — who coaxed metal into behaving like 
the clay curves he made in his studio — Baudrillard remarks that: 
The car’s fins became the sign of victory over space — and they were 
purely a sign, because they bore no direct relationship to that victory 
(indeed if anything they ran counter to it, tending as they did to make 
vehicles both heavier and more cumbersome)(…)Tail fins were a sign 
not of real speed but of a sublime, measureless speed. They suggested a 
                                                 
106 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 201. 
107 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 57. 
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miraculous automatism, a sort of grace. It was the presence of these fins 
that in our imagination propelled the car, which, thanks to them, 
seemed to fly along of its own accord, after the fashion of higher 
organism.108 
And it is this sublime speed, this simulation of space-time transformation, that 
directs not only the design of the car, but the culture of use associated with it: 
driving becomes a logical expression of this design.109 As McLuhan’s 
commented, in the age of human extension by design, “we actually live 
mythically.”110
The speech of sign value, which now becomes positivised, iconic, is 
also a kind of referentially universal or monocultural speech. Baudrillard says 
“(t)he coherence of the functional system of objects depends upon the fact that 
these objects — along with their various properties, such as colour, form and 
so on — no longer have any value of their own, but merely a universal value as 
signs.”111 Thus a new form of environmentality is forged upon the atomistic 
sign value of things, in which, as Butler explains:  
(…) the system precedes the possibility of any single object, the series 
which produces the uniqueness of any particular model. And similarly, 
we as consumers do not so much directly desire any specific object as 
desire only in a competitive relationship with others (as mediated by 
such things as status and prestige). We desire only another’s desire.112  
What Baudrillard de-signs is the effect of the decoupling of productivism from 
materialist values, opening a view on the collusive relation between capital and 
sign. The understanding and agency of the human user vis-à-vis his or her 
                                                 
108 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 59.  
109 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 65-69.  
110 McLuhan, Understanding Media 4. 
111 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 64. 
112 Butler, Jean Baudrillard 27. 
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designed environments is diminished, and we are rendered dysfunctional, 
becoming the open signifier of design intention.113  
While the Marxian analysis of the domination of capitalist exchange 
value and the fetishism of objects forms the basis of his critique, the impact of 
the overwhelming mediatory power of the sign in the political economy of 
exchange, raises questions as to the literal relevance of Marx’s thought in the 
contemporary product environment. When Marx was writing in the nineteenth 
century the function and technology of the sign had not yet developed as a tool 
of commodification, particularly as consciously mobilized by design. In Marx, 
exchange value suppressed the denotative use value invested in products 
“soaked in labour”.114 In Baudrillard however, material (that is both the 
materiality of objects and of ‘real human needs’) and use value are actually 
induced by sign value, become functions, and we can no longer reach the 
natural value of things.115  
Use value as functionality is a sign: rhetorical content. Sign value calls 
upon our need to acquire some thing of a particular function, thus (designed) 
desire and things appear to arise simultaneously. Conversely, a wasted thing is 
divested not of potential usefulness but rather of sign currency: it becomes 
refuse of desire. The material thing without a perceived future is destined for 
infertility.116  
To recall our discussion of Winograd and Flores’ case study of 
ontological design in Part 1, the breakdown provides an opportunity for 
                                                 
113 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 57. The ontological effect Baudrillard finds, in light of 
the psycho-sexual timbre of his text, is one that travels in the direction of the suppression of 
instinctual drives, a ‘moral refusal of the instinctual’. We read this in another direction, in 
terms of the production of ways of desiring and doing things. Baudrillard, The System of 
Objects 62. 
114 Marx quoted in Scarry, The Body in Pain 247.  
115 Baudrillard explicates the designed-ness of need in “The Ideological Genesis of Needs” 
(1969). He writes “consumption does not arise from an objective need of the consumer, a final 
intention of the subject towards the object; rather, there is social production, in a system of 
exchange, of a material of differences, a code of significations and invidious (statuaire) values. 
The functionality of goods and individual needs only follows on this, adjusting itself to, 
rationalizing, and in the same stroke repressing these fundamental structural mechanisms.” 
Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign 75. 
116 Tony Fry, Green Desires: Ecology, Design, Products, (Sydney: EcoDesign Foundation, 
1992) 11. 
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innovation (both at the level of the object and the culture of use it promotes) 
that is overlooked by the concern of the user for functional delivery. With the 
designation ‘waste’ there is a quite amazing material transformation that 
concurs with Baudrillard’s charting of the flight between instrumental and 
cultural systems. Waste is a cultural, rather than a material category.117 In the 
food hall of any shopping centre we can observe a disappearing act taking 
place — virgin food packaging leaves the counters for the hands of consumers 
who throw them into the huge rubbish skips circulating the tables.118 Moments 
before, these very same material items — which will take scores of years to 
decompose in landfill — were a critical symbolic element in the exchange of 
food for money and the discourse in hygiene, quality and service it entails. On 
the other hand, the practice of leaving unwanted products on the street for 
perusal by passers-by, has the effect of placing a question mark over the 
materials, leaving them open for reconversion into usefulness. Waste is simply 
matter out of place.119
The sign entails a “whole labour of disassociation” and a remobilisation 
of ‘environment’ in the delimited terms of its own logic.120 Baudrillard says of 
the now ambient sign “(e)verything has to intercommunicate, everything has to 
be functional — no more secrets, no more mysteries, everything is organised, 
therefore everything is clear.”121 The way of things, so seemingly open is 
actually strictly circumscribed. Baudrillard’s analysis shows up contemporary 
circumstances in which the ‘abyss of ignorance’ directively enables rather than 
disables lifestyles. We operate undisturbed by our ignorance and under the 
assumption that we are agents of ‘free choice’ in a designed and designing 
environment. In these conditions in which sign-forms are allowed to regenerate 
without ostensible cause or consequence, it is the (re)invention of denotation or 
                                                 
117 See Waste not Waste, eds. Tony Fry and Anne-Marie Willis (Sydney: EcoDesign 
Foundation, 1997).  
118 The planned ‘death’ or built-in obsolescence of products was brought to public attention by 
Vance Packard in The Waste Makers (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963). 
119 See Fry and Willis eds. Waste not Waste. I consider the problem of ‘telegenic waste’ in this 
collection  (27-45) . 
120 Baudrillard, “Design and Environment” 187. 
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descriptive content that a theoretically informed design practice might invest 
in. This task can be seen as one of intervention as the ‘text’ must first be 
opened in terms of being relationally impoverished, which is not something we 
normally ‘see’.122
Ezio Manzini learned from Baudrillard that while something might be 
here before us and could not possibly be more objectively present, it is at the 
same time quite often materially if not semiotically indeterminate. As he 
suggests, even the name ‘plastic’ is a kind of euphemism for ignorance. There 
are numerous examples of everyday encounter with things in which we defer 
the decision of care (us of them and them of us) to the sign: “(a)n object is now 
made of what it seems to be, and of the performances which it offers.”… “(I)f 
one were to recognise the surface of a table as being made of ‘wood’, it meant 
that one could also predict its behaviour, its rate of aging, its reaction to fire, 
the maximum acceptable load, and so on.”123 It is therefore, as Manzini tells us, 
the intelligibility rather than the reality of things that is increasingly at stake.124 
And it is this lack of intelligibility, in terms of material, historical, culturally 
directive relations, which constitutes the contestable reality of the image.  
Baudrillard challenges us to see this designing power in the image; 
while the image in semiology appears as the reification and concentration of all 
that is not real, all that needs to be seen through, it has this material effectivity. 
The challenge is not to struggle to see what meaning the image hides — as we 
have already seen meaning is not inside things but is always already relational 
— but rather to detect in the sign this materially transformative possibility. 
We might look to Baudrillard’s later book Simulations (1983) — which 
marks for some his ostensible departure from reality — to emphasise this 
insight into the designing impetus of the sign.125 In “The Precession of 
Simulacra” Baudrillard utilises the relation between map and territory to 
                                                                                                                                 
121 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 29. 
122 We make this intervention in Part 4. 
123 Manzini, The Material of Invention 31 –2. 
124 In a comment recalling Beck, Manzini says “Memory, experience, and intuition no longer 
help.” Manzini The Material of Invention 31. 
125 For example Verena Andermatt Conley. We address her critique below. 
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illustrate the fictional division between sign and world. In this text the sign 
legitimates the real world at the same time as the real world is established by 
the sign. This correlative legitimation is no simple reversal, as Baudrillard 
shows. Simulacra  — sign forms — precede the real world, determining our 
relation to what is encountered in the same way as the map precedes the 
territory. I read the following passage as an explication of design agency:  
Abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or 
the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential 
being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without 
origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, 
nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory — 
PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA — it is the map that engenders the 
territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it would be the 
territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map. It is the real, 
not the map, whose vestiges subsist here and there, in the deserts which 
are no longer those of the Empire, but of our own. The desert of the real 
itself.126 
It is this notion of the real disappearing that so bothers some theorists. 
Baudrillard seems to be suggesting that the real is replaced by the simulacrum, 
the world ‘consumed’ by the image. And thus when the world does appear to 
be calculatively organised, coerced to behave in a particular way, the ‘truth’ of 
Baudrillard’s sign theory is most strongly felt.127 Everything loses spontaneity, 
becomes design. If Baudrillard suggests that signifieds no longer exist or that 
there is no “exo-semiotic” material, this does not mean however that there is no 
‘real’.128  
                                                 
126 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations 2. 
127 For example in Andrew Ross’s account of the public reaction to the televised war in the 
Persian Gulf. He writes “Everyone seemed to become a media critic. Many even became 
Baudrillardians without knowing it, repelled by everyone else’s (and never their own) 
fascination with the simulacra of war cooked up by the Pentagon and the networks (a simulated 
aerial view of Baghdad from an F-111 pilot’s perspective — who would not want to see 
that?).” Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 216.  
128 In his materialist critique of the post-System of Objects Baudrillard, Gottdiener implies that 
Baudrillard suggests precisely this. He says, “As in the case of Barthes, something happens to 
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In his book on Baudrillard, Butler shows that there is another 
interpretation of simulation and of Baudrillard’s entire project. For Butler, 
Baudrillard does not abandon reality, as many of his critics assert, but in fact 
his entire work is a defence of it.129 Simulation is not an attenuation of the real, 
but the bringing to reality of the real. Baudrillard is trying to show an 
operational rather than representational real, a real from which the ‘naïve 
charm’ of representation has been extinguished.130 And here Baudrillard can be 
seen in light of the systems theory we have explored, in which the system is 
operationally closed but structurally open at the same time. This is what 
Baudrillard means by simulation: simulation brings the world into being, it 
operates, it is world-making. The ‘desert of the real’ that is ‘our own’ refers to 
the unintelligible surface(s) of the everyday. Baudrillard here marks the 
simulacrum with the operative ignorance of productivism. This also concurs 
with Luhmann but also with Beck, in that the sign is the actual, is what literally 
makes sense when so much of the world is and is made (in)visible.  
Following this, I read Baudrillard’s version of the truth of simulacra 
instead as a de-sign tool, as a way to read the ‘becoming-natural’ of the 
designed world. It is the (in)visible at work here, the vestiges of the real are the 
relational irruptions of ecological effect that design works so hard to suppress. 
The map/simulacrum is not merely benignly inauthentic. The simulacrum as a 
designed thing that ‘thinks’ it follows the real is attended by an entire and 
distinctive aesthetics of transparency, lightness, thinness, false perfection, not 
only ‘unreal’ but with reality-depleting capabilities. These are however 
                                                                                                                                 
Baudrillard in the 1960s, and he moves to a deconstructionist position, not because of the 
critique of Saussure, as in the former case, but because of an extreme vision about the 
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Gottdiener, Postmodern Semiotics 48.  
129 Butler suggests that ‘the real’ is constituted in Baudrillard’s refusal to forget the paradox of 
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representing the world that he can show what they cannot represent.” Butler, Jean Baudrillard 
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130 “Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference between (the map and territory) that 
was the abstraction’s charm.” Baudrillard, Simulations 3. 
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ecological matters: designed things — simulacra — are, as Fry’s theory of 
defuturing shows, indeed capable of depleting the future of reality. Baudrillard 
takes on the point of view of the simulacrum vis-à-vis ‘the real’.131 The poverty 
and destructive capability of the simulacrum are measures therefore of the 
‘self-understanding’ and agency of the simulacrum itself. The domination of 
sign value does not indicate the closure of materiality or a disregard for it, but 
its dangerous (in)visibility. The danger subsists in the generation of simulacra, 
which re-install the representational ‘difference’ — the ‘charm of the real.’132
This is not how cultural theory in the main, and particularly in 
ecologically informed circles, read Baudrillard. For Verena Andermatt Conley, 
Baudrillard moves from a nascent critique of environmental damage in his 
early analysis of the political economy of signs and objects to a version of the 
real that merely perpetrates the illusory separation between systems of signs 
and nature.133 For Conley, Baudrillard’s operational sign is divested of 
environmental relations because he fails to critically emerge from the seductive 
logic he has discovered. By Simulations she argues, Baudrillard “carries his 
readers off into a world of simulacra that leaves matter far behind.”134 Her 
critique is intent on discerning this critical irresponsibility in Baudrillard; the 
tendency to dwell on the ‘sanitised and aseptic’ world of simulacra and a 
concurrent style of analysis that relinquishes the intervention of responsibility: 
his persiflage. 135  
While Conley does have a point about the provocative play of 
Baudrillard’s work — which we will take up in relation to his dwelling in the 
simulated environment of cultural theory — her critique is circumscribed by its 
                                                 
131 This might also be heard in Baudrillard’s explication of the designing of Bauhaus 
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own bifurcation of the ingenuous real of ‘the environment’ from the simulacra 
which forecloses upon the ecological life of the image. She says: 
The ‘real’ world is much farther from Baudrillard’s pen than he would 
like us to believe. He does not begin with real facts or detail, with 
concrete objects or the type of thinking they require, as do biologists, 
botanists, cartographers, feminists and ecologists.136 
Conley sees the real world as a mess of material relations, of ‘different 
ecological speeds’ and directions, visceral effects and physical events: “Every 
order is but a temporary configuration coming out of disorder that is forever off 
balance.”137 In her eyes, Baudrillard relinquishes this world in favour of that of 
the ‘limpid, clean’, ‘dream-world’ of simulacra: “When models generate 
simulacra they detach from a referent; they break off from the physical world 
itself and become autonomous.”138 Conley’s suspicion as to the ‘predictive 
models’ Baudrillard employs does not see the view he opens on the predication 
of ecologies by the image. For Conley, Baudrillard has simply turned away 
from the environment and its material exchanges. 
The ‘autonomy’ of the simulacrum in Baudrillard is not merely 
provocative, but indicates the operational reality of the designed thing, the 
thinging of simulacra, which is blithely indifferent to relationality. This 
analysis can be discerned even in his more ‘materialist’ works between 1968 - 
72. In ‘writing off’ Baudrillard on the basis of his failure to constitute an 
explicit environmental destiny in his work, Conley misses the opportunity to 
bring his ideas to bear on the cultural determination of designed environments. 
Finally, Baudrillard’s abandonment of a certain “style and spirit of 
analysis” does not have to be ours. In fact to forget Baudrillard is to assume the 
representationalist perspective of environmental discourse (which gives the 
environment an identity that can be recognised in advance), as well as to 
abandon the design agency of ideas. An environmental analysis responding to 
                                                 
136 Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics 38. 
137 Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics 36. 
138 Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics 30. 
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the agency of the sign — made manifest for example in the technologies of 
simulation that so seduced Baudrillard — is there to be taken up, which we do 
in Part 4. 
If we are to engage with Conley’s critique — and we must since it 
detects an important foreclosure in Baudrillard’s work — then it needs to be in 
terms of the analytical culture that circumscribes his work, and cultural theory 
more broadly. In these terms Baudrillard has not lost touch with ‘the real 
world’ so much as lost interest in speaking to it in political terms. The culture 
of analysis sustains and encourages precisely the kind of cultural fascination 
that Conley finds so abhorrent and irresponsible, and reinvests in it. Cultural 
theory has simulated a culture of aestheticism that relies on the detachment of 
representational objectivism. Baudrillard’s ostensible ‘shift to idealism’ can be 
thought in terms of his absorption by a culture that has encouraged him to lose 
sight of the dangerous (in)visibility of simulacra, a culture his sign theory 
could precisely contest as an ecological effect of the image.
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CHAPTER 8. SIGN/CULTURE  
 
In this chapter we elaborate the failure of cultural theory to develop an 
effectively critical reading of the signworlds it is, nonetheless, particularly 
capable of discerning. First, we look at an essay by Andrew Ross entitled “The 
Ecology of Images”. This essay exemplifies for me what is most promising and 
frustrating about cultural theory and the acute, non-transferable nature of its 
‘vision’. We then turn to Alec McHoul’s critique of cultural studies in order to 
think through the limits and opportunities of an internal critique of 
representationalism. Both these theorists, like Baudrillard, can be characterised 
as attempting to read the sign beyond the limits of the representational 
paradigm and thus help to articulate the problems and opportunities of the 
cultural theoretical approach. 
THE EFFECT OF CULTURAL THEORY 
Andrew Ross is a cultural theorist whose work over the last fifteen years has 
been consistently informed by ecological issues.1 In “The Ecology of Images” 
he approaches the televisual event with a series of observations that place 
ecology both inside and outside the frame of the image. This essay opens the 
question of the ecological relationality of the image and yet ends up being 
unable to resist enlisting its cohering force. Ross reinvests his exposure of the 
limitations of representation in a representational paradigm, which affirms the 
aesthetic destiny of his work and undermines its political potential.2  
                                                 
1 See for example Andrew Ross, Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age 
of Limits (London and New York: Verso, 1991); Andrew Ross ed. No Sweat: Fashion, Free 
Trade, and the Rights of Garment Workers (London: Verso, 1997). 
2 The title of the book this essay is later published in firmly establishes this destiny: Visual 
Culture: Images and Interpretations eds. Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith 
Moxley (Hanover: University of New England for Wesleyan University Press, 1994). 
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The Gulf war in the early 90s was the first war embedded in the media 
and as such brought home the powerfully ambiguous productivity of the 
televisual.3 Yet while it was televised, the images that Western audience did 
see — which were compared to a Nintendo game — packaged the war in way 
that required substantial translation.4 This made it an important moment for 
cultural theory and criticism, providing it with an opportunity for a counter-
cultural role in generating transparency through semiotic analysis. In “The 
Ecology of Images” Ross considers the ecology of image production and 
consumption underscored by the military-industrial-media complex:  “(We) 
cannot forget” he says, “that the nightly firework display in the Gulf skies and 
the spectacle of laser-guided smart bombs homing in on their targets were also 
an explicitly seductive advertisement for another thirty years of the permanent 
war economy, sustained by the uninterrupted flow of cheap fossil fuels.5  
Ross shows how certain iconic images were made to present the war to 
a public whose vision of ‘actual’ on-the-ground warring was curtailed.6 The 
image of the Kuwaiti oil slick spilling into the Gulf, for example, embodied 
“(oily) Arab treachery, whether it signified the dark, inscrutable evil of Saddam 
Hussein or the sinister, inexorable spread of Islam.”7 The slick served, Ross 
explains, as a target for the US air-force to remake itself as an ‘eco-warrior’ 
waging war against eco-terrorism, in spite of the military’s status at home as 
the biggest polluter in the world’s biggest polluting country.8 Ross also writes 
about the image that effectively ‘branded’ the Gulf war — the burning oil 
wells. He identifies the considerable ecological damage inflicted by this event 
to the desert, which itself functions often enough as a metaphor of nothingness 
and abandonment. In his analysis Ross reveals the visceral and ecological 
                                                 
3 Ross notes that Virilio’s War and Cinema was highly prescient of the Gulf War. “In Virilio’s 
history, the camera is a material participant in the apparatus of destruction.” “The Ecology of 
Images” 227. The televised war was also a particularly provocative example of simulation. See 
Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not Take Place, trans. Paul Patton (Sydney: Power 
Publications, 1995). 
4 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 215. 
5 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 216. 
6 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 217. 
7 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 217. 
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realities concealed in and by the image and helps us to see these images not 
merely as memoria — which is certainly the emphasis of Werner Herzog’s 
film on the visual aftermath of the war — but as signs of ecological causality. 
Ross ambitiously calls for a green cultural criticism in response to the 
ecological effects of images:  
At the start of a decade that will play host to a green cultural criticism, 
redirecting attention to the suppressed (at least in the last twenty years 
of cultural theory) ‘nature’ side of the nature/culture equation, nothing 
seems more important than to debate the ecological role and character 
of images; not only the use of images to tell ecological stories, but also 
the ecology of the image industry itself, considered in all aspects of 
production, distribution and consumption.9
He goes some way to inaugurating such a project in his discussion of the 
ecological underside of the image industry and its use and dispersal of photo-
chemicals and other toxins, material resources, energy, landmass, and, we 
might add, the production of biophysical and semiotic ‘waste’.10 However, a 
promising materialist critique of the image gives way to his main argument that 
calls for the ‘democratic’ availability of uncensored information. Thus what is 
asserted as ecologically destructive and culturally coercive on the one hand, is 
seen as cultural ‘food’ on the other.  
This tendency to rest one’s faith in the ‘good’ of communication is 
what Baudrillard calls a kind of cybernetic idealism: in certain cases it would 
seem possible that only the use value of the sign is retained. He says: “The 
eternal humanist metaphor (is) the more signs there are, the more messages and 
information there are, the more one communicates — the better it is… Now we 
have cybernetic idealism, blind faith in radiating information, mystique of 
information services and the media.”11  
                                                                                                                                 
8 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 218. 
9 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 219. 
10 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 226-27.  
11 Baudrillard, “Design and Environment” 199. This problematic tendency in Ross’ argument 
is underscored in his reading of ‘blockbuster’ movies upon which he overlays the 
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In fact Ross puts a fair amount of effort into saving the image from a 
materialist critique, suggesting that because images are not ‘things’, 
consumption of them is of a different order than the consumption of material 
market goods.12 This position is problematised by the precession of sign value 
in the product market and, as we have seen, can ultimately be undone with a 
careful consideration of the materiality, infrastructure, design history and 
afterimage of the icon, which clearly reveals the sign in its material denotative 
dimensions. But the limits of the image are always a matter of interpretation. In 
a comment that resonates somewhat with the position of environmentalism vis-
à-vis the image, Ross says:  
Ideas and images are constitutive of the world in ways that can counter 
their role as technological recruits in the war against environmental 
reality. And that is why a discussion of the ecology of images (…) must 
make room for some understanding of the role played by images of 
ecology (…) In short, images of ecology are also produced, consumed, 
and used in ways that can help to counteract the destruction of the 
natural world. 13
In making room for representation, for an ecological project for the image, 
without folding this back into the question of the representability of ecology 
that he himself has raised, Ross selectively disavows the (in)visible 
relationality of the ecology of images. This reveals an odd blindspot in his 
approach. As with Conley, there is an assumption about the nature of ecology 
and materialism undisturbed by the concrete artificiality of our naturalised 
                                                                                                                                 
environmental lexicon of industrial culture. He abhors the ways in which Hollywood ‘recycles’ 
old narratives and events in a ‘conservatism’ that “runs directly counter to the ecological spirit 
of preserving and encouraging diversity. The results more and more resemble an image 
monoculture.”(225). To this he adds the ‘extinction’ of the cultural ‘diversity’ represented by 
art houses and revival cinemas, and speaks of the technological ‘obsolescence’ of special 
effects driven movies.  
12 He says: “If it makes any sense at all to talk about the image ‘waste stream’, then our own 
position as consumers within the watershed of the stream, is quite different from our position 
in the material, consumer product waste stream. Images can be used, and reused, in ways that 
most consumer goods cannot.” Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 226. We address the question 
of ‘thingliness’ in Part 4. 
13 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 228. 
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world. Ross misses the transformative relationship between immaterial and 
material environments. In this respect Ross’ ecology of images, with its focus 
on the schema of production and consumption, lacks an operational 
perspective.  
This selective materialism is, I think, an issue of the discipline within 
which he is operating, in which the complex relationality of symbolic, cultural 
and biophysical ecologies remains somewhat at arm’s length. We might here 
recall some remarks of Barthes in relation to the practical limits of 
‘mythology’: “Justified by the political dimension, the mythologist is still at a 
distance from it. His speech is a metalanguage, it ‘acts’ nothing; at most it 
unveils —  or does it? To whom? His task always remains ambiguous, 
hampered by its ethical origin.”14 The cultural theorist is “condemned”, albeit 
comfortably, to metalanguage. Ross’ ecology of images is indelibly attached to 
images themselves. It is as though his foresight extends only as far as the 
horizon of the image-event itself.15
In the context of his political invocations, this problem is striking. Yet 
in the context of cultural theory it is expectable that Ross’ essay reaches its 
denouement in the images, plot and characters of contemporary 
environmentally-themed films, which thereby become the uncannily apt 
destiny and summation of his entire argument. This is how he chooses to 
finally brand his analyses: with an Arnold Schwartzenegger film and the 
“ecological camp” of director David Lynch.16 If he mobilises these examples to 
                                                 
14 Barthes, Mythologies 156. “The mechanic, the engineer, even the user, ‘speak the object’; 
but the mythologist is condemned to metalanguage.” (158-59). Barthes calls here for a 
‘reconciliation’ or synthesis between description and explanation. We will see in the next Part 
that it is rather the continual negotiation of the passage from ‘text to thing and from thing to 
text’ that constitutes design and holds apart the resolution Barthes here desires.  
15 The culturally appropriate nature of the impacts he selects to see, also affirms both the 
special insights and non-implication of the theorist: “Cinephiles, archivists, and media critics 
have long been horrified by the scandalous lack of conservationism within the film and TV 
industry: the studios’ throwaway attitude toward film prints (the melt-down of Erich von 
Stroheim’s Greed for thirty cents of silver nitrate is the mythical horror story par excellence), 
the instant obsolescence of TV film, and the cavalier decisions about the use of capital and 
resources that that are made in pursuit of the final cut.” Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 226. 
16 Ross says his essay would ‘not be complete’ without the example of the television series 
Twin Peaks (1990-91), directed by Lynch, which he reads as “a commentary about 
environmental and ecological questions”. Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 234. 
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reveal the irrelevance of disciplinary closures, then the structure of his 
argument conceals this intent. Like the perfect formalist analysis, the image 
ends up profiting from its own deconstruction. We can also see that this 
analysis is destined to remain rhetorical, even when directed at ecological 
questions, as they are ultimately curtailed by a restricted economy of the image 
that has a priori relinquished its ecological agency.  
In light of Ross’ analytical return home to the image, one might ask 
how his proposed green cultural criticism, his difference-making ecology of 
images is going to emerge? 17 While no less necessary, more than a decade 
later Ross’ call for an ecologically-oriented critical practice still seems 
ambitious and raises questions about the effectivity of cultural theory. Here we 
have a domain of thought rich with possibilities for exposing alternative views 
of the world picture. But what do we do with our newly acquired insights into 
the meaning of images? Our literacy of visual culture is honed, but we have no 
project, no critical burden, no sense of how to put this reading into effect. The 
effect of the critique is the sustainment of the object in view. Our reading is not 
called upon to intervene in the material it analyses nor in the analytical culture 
it is part of. What can we do but read on, ultimately profiting from the 
worsening ecological effects of the culture of representation? Reinvesting in 
the image takes the interpretative agency out of the hands of the 
reader/researcher who might otherwise be encouraged to develop their own 
tools for the reinvention of cultural ‘signifieds’. Ross’ analyses show why there 
is a need for cultural theory in a televisual environment. Yet for this need to be 
appropriately met, cultural theory clearly needs to reinvent a political destiny 
for itself.   
 ‘CULTURE’ BEYOND REPRESENTATION  
It is the use of signs that characterizes McHoul’s semiotics and 
distinguishes his work from the tendency in cultural theory toward aesthetics. 
For McHoul, it is not the analytical culture per se but rather the monolithic 
                                                 
17 Ross, “The Ecology of Images” 223. 
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notion of culture itself — as a sign in its own right — that sustains 
representationalism in the cultural disciplines. Culture as a sign has a strong 
element of normativity about it, which means it is used to not only account for 
human practices but also to prescribe them.18 Culture in this sense is akin to 
ideology in the semiology we have reviewed, supporting a kind of 
indiscriminate opportunism, concealing itself in what it names as other. 
McHoul explains: 
(A)lmost all hitherto existing theories of culture have started out from 
representationalist premises. That is, they treat cultures, cultural objects 
and events as remorselessly representational of something else; as 
representing something more fundamentally present than themselves, 
something outside themselves, something more primary still: the ‘real’ 
phenomena that make culture, by contrast, always epiphenomenal.19 
This observation affirms Heidegger’s comments in “The Age of the World 
Picture”, that human activity conceived and consummated as ‘culture’ is an 
explicitly modern phenomenon and a realisation of humanist values.20  
For McHoul, the birth of the discipline of cultural studies — premised 
with the best of political and social intentions on the demarcation of a new, 
Marxist foundation for the analysis of cultural affairs — backfired as culture 
obtained this reified, monolithic status. The discipline, which emerged in part 
from a theorisation of a relation between culture and economy, had the effect 
                                                 
18 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 47. The practice of cultural planning, for example, tends to 
reify culture in the production of public ‘places’ for cultural activities. The representationalist 
disposition can be shown with reference to one cultural planner who suggests that ‘local colour 
and identity’ are often not adequately represented (in a development’s design) and because of 
this “the special needs and dreams of unrepresented or marginal groups are not addressed.” 
Marla Guppy, “Communities, Environments and Cultural Identity” Places not Spaces (Sydney: 
Envirobook, 1995). I connect the reifying tendency in planning to the theory of the ‘world 
picture’ in “Designing the Ground: The Infrastructure of Productivism.”  
19 Alec McHoul, “The Being of Culture, Beyond Representation.” 20 pages 
<www.murdoch.edu.au/~mchoul/being.html>. The paper is no longer accessible at this web 
address.  It was slated for publication in Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 
12.2 (1998): 233-242, but this did not eventuate. It is listed on McHoul’s homepage under 
publications at wwwmcc.murdoch.edu.au and is available from the author. A similar argument 
is presented in terms of the spectacularisation of the everyday in Toby Miller and Alec 
McHoul, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (London: Sage, 1998). 
20 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 116. 
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of reifying both and further, of reinscribing culture into the domain of 
aesthetics from which it had sought to release itself.21 Culture became an ur-
term that opened up the world as a limitless source of objects of analysis. But: 
 (…) instead of an analysis of signs, we get a kind of creative 
writing…(a)nalysing signs in terms of their cultural locations means, 
effectively, returning them to their ‘authenticity’, which then takes on 
the position of another essence or center. The concept of ‘culture’ can 
be so broad, then, that almost anything can be placed within it.22  
Raymond Williams identifies a distinction in his etymological history 
between the independent and abstract noun ‘culture’ as a sign of aesthetic 
development, and its early uses as a noun of located process in agricultural 
cultivation.23 Williams notes that in modern usage “the idea of a general 
process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development was applied and 
effectively transferred to the works and practices which represent and sustain 
it.”24 In light of their inclusive inclination, the identity of the cultural 
disciplines depends on this transference to objects. As Heidegger suggests, the 
politics of culture is to nuture itself.25 For Williams as for McHoul, culture 
begs context — its meanings are deeply connected to usage. Without a focus 
on the context of usage, McHoul argues that “culture is only ever dead on 
arrival, corpse not corp(u)s”.26We can hear in this the kind of finality 
exemplified in the collection, store and exhibition of artefacts as they pass from 
cultural life to encapsulated history. In the flourishing of the ‘ur-term’, usage 
as a concern inevitably retreats, as does the possibility of the object’s 
                                                 
21 McHoul refers here to the establishment in the 70s of the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. The Centre sought to take the analysis of cultural affairs “out 
of the hands of English Departments, appreciationism, aestheticism.” McHoul, Semiotic 
Investigations 43. It has been pointed out to me by Tony Fry (who spent five years at the 
CCCS) that the development of Cultural Studies was far more diverse and conflictual than this 
view suggests, not least between those who were setting out to constitute a new discipline and 
those striving to make a counter-hegemonic practice.  
22 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 44. 
23 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983) 87. 
24 Williams, Keywords 90. 
25 “It lies in the essence of culture…to nuture itself in its turn and thus to become the politics of 
culture.” Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 116. 
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ongoingness, or, to put it into the Derridean lexicon favoured by McHoul, its 
‘becoming’.  
This goes some way to explaining the problem with the object-
orientated ‘groove’ of cultural analysis, which is merely augmented by the 
structuring operation of the mass media. Luhmann reminds us:  
Without mass media culture would not be recognisable as culture. And 
the fact that this reflexive culture, this culture which knows itself as 
culture, produces its counter-conceptuality of ‘authenticity’, ‘actual-
ness’, ‘sponteneity’ etc., just serves to confirm that what is involved 
here is a universal phenomenon which includes self-reference (…) 
Particular experiences and communications only become culture by 
being offered as signs of culture, and it is this that goes back to the 
institutionalisation of second-order observation in the system of the 
mass media. 27  
In a pervasively televisual environment of finished forms and meanings we can 
understand McHoul’s desire to relinquish the notion of culture in favour of 
thinking through signs in terms of the specific practices of certain communities 
of sign-users. He says ‘community’ “…may be the concept with which an 
effective semiotics handles the space around the sign, its framing.”28 The sign 
in these circumstances functions as a meaning-for-now rather than as an 
objective truth.  
Certainly, the life and specificity of human practices are not 
representable in objects. Cultural artefacts are not just components of a broader 
culture, the result or end of cultural activity (which the museumification of 
culture tends to communicate) but have a located cultural agency all of their 
own. And neither are practices simply born amongst people; they emerge from 
habitual engagements with designed things that script via their sign value and 
‘affordances’ (or cues associated with the product interface), particular cultures 
                                                                                                                                 
26 McHoul, “The Being of Culture, Beyond Representation” 13. 
27 Luhmann, Reality of the Mass Media 86. 
28 McHoul, Semiotic Investigations 52. 
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of use.29 In fact, the anticipation of use in modern technological products is the 
hallmark of ‘good’ technical design. 
  In this respect, design calls for an analytical practice that can respond to 
the relational assemblage of the encountered product as it calls upon situated 
usage and signals the conditions for its ongoingness. The singular disposition 
of the designed thing has an orientating power as it meets the variable nature of 
the existing designed world. It has its own cultural propensity set by the 
interpretations of its makers and the conditions informing them.  
In many cases one can see that design has a critical role in orienting 
communal practices. Consider the take-up of mobile technology by school 
children travelling out of sight of the concernful eyes of parents whose vision 
is surely inflected by televisual fears. In such a situation design is far from 
being merely a benign object, open to the decisions of the community. Rather, 
the community is captured by design, held by its powerful structuring of 
communication. 
In relinquishing culture, McHoul overlooks the common ground of 
televisual semiosis and does not merit the role of simulacra — designed things 
— that put culture as a monolithic abstraction into specific places and 
practices, sometimes with a quite literal levelling power.30 He thus misses the 
important agency of design’s designing, by way of which the structuring of 
representation circumscribes what he calls the ‘broader social, political, and 
historical space’ occupied by communities of sign users. Design has 
fundamentally redetermined this ‘broad space’, so that cultural understandings 
of the sites of political discourse and action have become subject to decisive 
closures. In this sense, the cultures of design precede ‘community’ and demand 
to be read as such.  
                                                 
29 On the concept of product affordances, see Donald Norman, The Design of Everyday Things. 
Norman borrows this concept from J.J Gibson’s theory of visual perception. For more on this, 
see footnote 49, chapter 2 above. 
30 The development of environments for cultural activity is an example (see footnote 18 
above). 
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Far from being understood as the very ecology of the environment of 
human dwelling — what is manifestly and potentially shared between people 
including attitudes, ideas, things and experiences — the mobilization of culture 
in much cultural theory, as McHoul argues, assists in sustaining the 
representationalist premise, and demarcating ever more firmly a non-relational, 
politically exhausted domain that nonetheless plays hosts to ‘everything’.31 In 
the current climate of unsustainability, in which systems of design speak at 
ecological cross-purposes, we want to retain the sign ‘culture’ — which in our 
view is at once more broad and possessed of a less humanistic cast than 
‘community’—to reference the specificity of our general televisual conditions 
as they are lived and shared.  In this we do not seek to reify culture in things, to 
pin them down with pseudo-anthropological intent, as much as to consider the 
cultural quality of reification. When Heidegger said “for us today ‘ideas’ are 
worthless if they are not realised”, he identified a problem of the metaphysical 
trajectory but also a condition that needs to be understood and negotiated.32  
Designed things are active culture makers, specific articulations of the 
televisual inclination of the ‘official culture’ of our Western, late-modern 
world. They produce and affirm culture. As we seek to denaturalise this culture 
dominated on the one hand by the (in)visibility of the televisual and on the 
other by the burgeoning materialism of the sign, there is a need to acknowledge 
that what we have in common is perhaps more what we have learnt to ignore 
                                                 
31Readings, The University in Ruins 17. Readings uses the term ‘dereferentialization’ to speak 
of the process whereby ‘culture’ is emptied of specific meaning and is therefore freed up to 
mean anything. For Readings, this process marks the University’s loss of a cultural function. 
32 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 63. 
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rather than what we consciously share. Design brings us together.33 We do not 
yet have a cultural theory that can appropriately accommodate and respond to 
the materiality and agency of design.  
                                                 
33 Aidan Davison provides an apt image of this when he describes the diversity of passengers 
who might become grouped together on a plane: “…each these days, liberated from the other, 
as much as from the earth beneath them, by the marvels of autonomous multimedia in-house 
entertainment systems repeated in every seat.” Davison, Technology and the Contested 
Meanings of Sustainability 131.The design of the modern plane is perhaps one of the most 
explicit examples of designed-in environmental ignorance. 
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CHAPTER 9. SIGNWORLDS  
 
“Humanist” neo-functionalism has no chance 
when faced with operational metadesign. The era 
of function and of the signified has revolved, the 
era of the signifier and the code is beginning. 
(Jean Baudrillard)1 
 
 
The challenge for cultural theory is how to make the interference it creates 
resonate outside its own culture, in the world in which the autopoietic 
proliferation of autonomous things, things that instigate forgetting, escape the 
effect of theorisation. The almost uncanny transference of theoretical models 
such as the sign into real world examples and the related popularization of 
semiotic skill — which took Williamson by surprise — is a function of 
televisual designing, and indicates an ostensible political opportunity for 
cultural theory to move beyond its representational limits. 
We have considered the sign as a matter of perception and, via 
Baudrillard, the sign’s agency in transforming experiences of material culture 
in a designed environment. In this chapter we consider the question of what 
would constitute an effective political strategy in this “era of the signifier”?  
We look at semio-literate political strategies that consciously attempt to 
mobilize the sign as a cultural change agent in a world in which sign value 
precedes economic value. These practices acknowledge the concealed 
complexity of industrial culture and thus bear a relation to Beck’s call for 
strategic interventions that mobilize aspects of modern industrial society 
against itself.  
                                                 
1 Baudrillard, “Design and Environment” 198. 
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We first look at the strategy of culture jamming and consider the 
effectivity of its form of political communication. Culture jamming is acutely 
aware of the conditioning features of context and usage; it exploits a 
generalised semiotic literacy to expose the cultural domination of the image in 
its own language. A far less sophisticated take on the efficacy of visual 
communication is found in the project of communicating sustainability. As we 
have seen, environmentalism relies heavily on the transparency and radiance of 
media images. Here we consider the role of signs in reducing the macro-
perception of the environment to the order of the product. In our object-filled 
yet (in)visible conditions, we consider the validity of simulating sustainability, 
of designing into being a sustainable brand or identity that can carry different 
cultures of use into effect. Under what conditions would such a strategy be 
useful in the context of pro-duct design: could it appropriately negotiate the 
impossibility of reducing the (in)visible to the visible, or would it merely be 
another attempt to defeat this (in)visible? 
CULTURE JAMMING: ACTIVISM AND AESTHETICS 
We have established that the ‘thousands of cultural details’ that make up our 
naturalised environments need de-signing. One key extension of the purview of 
the semiological project, which might be seen as an attempt at a wide scale de-
signing, is the practice of culture jamming. Culture jamming constitutes itself 
as an actual political unveiling, a way of breaking through the (in)visible.2 It is 
also a re-branding strategy, a semiotic practice that infiltrates the indexical 
potential of the sign to expose, rather than conceal, its ideological intentions. 
There are thus few better examples than culture jamming — what journalist 
Naomi Klein calls “semiotic Robin Hoodism” — to test the limits and 
possibilities of re-negotiating the visible in its own terms.3
Aesthetic activists see the image as the sole locus of political efficacy in 
a world in which there are no longer countries and cultural difference as such, 
                                                 
2 Vis-à-vis semiology, Williamson certainly sees her project in this light. Things are a little 
more ambiguous, as we have seen, for Barthes.  
3 Naomi Klein, No Logo (London: Flamingo, 2000) 280. 
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but rather multi-million dollar brands.4 While their rhetoric is full of 
revolutionary references to taking down corporate giants and building new 
cultures on the ruins of the old, it is a war conceived at the level of the image 
and waged in the realm of the idea.5 The advantages of this interpretation of the 
dematerialised political arena are numerous. If an action is the same as a 
perceived action, as Beck maintains, and if an ‘effect-explosion’ can be 
generated by the strategic placement of single acts, then there is a significant 
reduction in the need for a critical mass and the hardware to serve it.  
Aesthetic activism has an historical forebear in the performance art of 
the Situationists, who were declared ‘muses’ of the student eruptions of May 
1968 in which the effective crossing of the idea from theory to practice was 
enacted.6 In its dialectical re-mobilisation of fragments of televisual culture, 
culture jamming draws on what the Situationists called a détournement — “a 
perspective-jarring turnabout in your everyday life.”7 Contemporary jammers 
reuse the iconography and phraseology of corporate culture to generate this 
turnabout, creating new, critically reflexive signs in public loci that aim to 
disturb, where possible, the verificationism willed by branded environments.  
For Klein “(a) good jam… is an X-ray of the subconscious of an (ad) 
campaign, uncovering not an opposite meaning but the deeper truth hiding 
beneath the layers of advertising euphemisms.”8 While such a statement is 
reminiscent of Williamson and the capability she sought to motivate in her 
readers, there is a major difference. Williamson did not see the image as the 
site of the expression of a radicalized politics.  
The culture jam is meant to cause a moment of intractable reality for 
the observer, a shock or insight that breaks through the smooth operativity of 
                                                 
4 Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: How to Reverse America’s Suicidal Consumer Binge —  and Why 
We Must (New York: Quill, 2000) xii. As I was researching this material, I caught a snippet of 
a radio program on multinational companies in which Finland was described in matter-of-fact 
tones as “nothing without Nokia”. 
5 As an example of this rhetoric, Lasn dedicates his book to his “mortal enemy, Philip Morris 
Inc., which I vow to take down.” Lasn, Culture Jam. 
6 For more on the context of May 68 see footnote 8, chapter 7 above. 
7 Lasn, Culture Jam xvii. 
8 Klein, No Logo 281-2. 
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consumer culture, a little like the Barthesian ‘punctum’.9 However this moment 
of truth (which Kalle Lasn, founder of the culture jamming group Adbusters 
Media Foundation, likens to Buddha’s glimpsing of the real world through the 
palace walls), does not involve the confusion, the tearing pain or struggle of 
ontological reorientation.10 As a glimpse, a twist in the fabric of culture, the 
jam places an inordinate emphasis on visual revelation. The belief Lasn 
expresses is that from such glimpses insight will grow, building upon itself 
until at a certain point of exposure we are released into a “free, authentic life” 
from which the image has been evicted.11  
Writing twenty years after his influential The Society of the Spectacle 
(1967) was first published, Guy Debord explains that the book was written 
“with the deliberate intention of doing harm to spectacular society”.12 In what 
now reads more like a series of media-ready sound-bites than a “revolutionary 
user’s manual”13 — a perception not discouraged by the new Bruce Mau/Zone 
Books styled edition — Debord conceives of the sign as a different order of 
reality to the world, and yet as it stakes its claim upon the truly real, “manifests 
itself as an enormous positivity, out of reach and beyond dispute.”14 For 
Debord, the spectacle is the “celebration of a choice already made in the sphere 
of production, and the consummate result of that choice.”15 That is, it is the 
                                                 
9 Barthes introduces this idea in Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. R. Howard 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). The implication that there are aspects of a photograph that are 
beyond signification, has been criticised by some theorists. However what is missed in this 
critique is the relationality of the event — it is not some thing in the photograph that is 
substantively different to its other aspects, rather there is an event of meaning that takes place 
between the image and the observer. The ‘punctum’ can be seen as an experience of the force 
of relationality. For critique see Rose, Visual Methodologies 83. 
10 Lasn, Culture Jam 108. 
11 Lasn, Culture Jam 182. Lasn’s revolutionary ambition for culture jamming to bring the 
‘image factory to a sudden, shuddering halt’ is lampooned by Klein even as she elaborates a 
similar destiny for the as yet invisible, but building global front of anti-corporate opposition. 
Klein, No Logo 295. 
12 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone 
Books, 1994) 10. Debord reflected on this book in the late 80s in Comments on the Society of 
the Spectacle, trans. Malcom Imrie (New York: Verso, 1991). In this book he redefines the 
spectacle as that which is capable of both concentrated and diffused form. This notion of the 
‘integrated’ spectacle aligns with the image-as-infrastructure argument that Klein proposes.  
13 Mau, Life Style 129. 
14 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 14-15. 
15 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 13. 
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celebration of design over freedom. In this, the spectacle “manifests the 
essence of all ideological systems: the impoverishment, enslavement and 
negation of real life.”16 We have argued that ontological design offers a better 
explanation of this coercive force than does the idealist epistemology, for 
which the image depletes reality by vacuuming meaning from the world. 
However the idealist understanding of the image constitutes an important 
theoretical basis for the ‘new’ forms of aesthetic activism, and as such merits 
serious consideration.  
In spite of this relation to the Situationists, Naomi Klein — whose book 
No Logo (2000) popularised the thesis of world branding — tries to decisively 
remove contemporary activism from the realm of aesthetics and the tag of 
“transcendent art”.17 No more paint hurling tactics, but extreme, media-savvy 
hacking and strategic appropriations of the corporate voice. No more Dada-like 
manoeuvres and ‘happenings’ but planned, electronically serviced groupings 
resulting in the insistent repetition of spectacular ‘G-8’ protests. Foregoing the 
Situationist rhetoric of profitless activity, it is the assertoric format of the 
image that is called upon to represent and empower a culture of difference. In 
her book, an image of global resistance meets head-on and dismantles the 
iconic brand, which has grown fat on its reality-grazing. Yet this obviation of 
the aesthetic conceals an unequivocal return to an embedded idealism on 
whose ground the radicality of opposition is enabled. 
No Logo is a powerful exposition of the structural disingenuousness of 
multinational brands. In new, hollowed-out companies, Klein explains, a 
pseudo-Platonic revolution has taken place; the brand as idea has taken centre-
stage, unencumbered by the material constraints of production. This material 
burden is now taken up by the faceless ‘B2B’ contractors and sub-contractors, 
home-workers and manufacturers in the Philippines, China, Mexico, Indonesia 
and Australia, who vie — now as legally independent agents exercising their 
‘free-choice’ rather than as workers for Nike or Country Road — to produce 
                                                 
16 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 151.  
17 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 136. 
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brand content at ever cheaper prices.18 This structural erasure allows the 
corporations, as mere designers, marketers and ‘ ideas’ people, to conceal the 
worlds their signs assemble and to make claims such as “Apple does not have 
any chemicals intensive manufacturing operations.” Because their 
‘manufacturing operations’ are symbolically reduced to final assembly, Apple 
is disburdened of the manufacture, for example, of the virgin plastics they use 
in all of their computers. What better example of the destructive ecological 
consequences of the worlding of sign value than the erasure of productive 
infrastructure in the ascendancy of the brand?  
Klein’s analyses effectively portray corporate culture’s dependence on 
relentless symbolic detoxification. However rather than considering how the 
productive issue of a corporation actually carries this hidden news, she 
relinquishes the design agency of the product altogether.  It becomes mere 
stuff, the benign issue of corporate behaviour and can even be consumed 
without contradiction.19 For Klein, it is the inexorable spread of the image, 
exemplified by the hollow brand, which must be subjected to political 
contestation.  
One of Klein’s key examples of the new strategies of world branding is 
the Disney sponsored town of Celebration in Florida. This is a fully-fledged 
small American town, which Klein describes as a three dimensional brand that 
you can pack up, move into and slam the door behind you. Klein characterises 
Celebration as a “brand cocoon”, a hyperreal simulation of a pre-Disneyfied 
world replete with the very unbranded and now nostalgia-tinged public spaces 
that Disney has so voraciously digested everywhere else.20 Real life is the 
brand content and the brand itself the cultural infrastructure. For Klein this 
tendency spells the end of advertising for the ultimate goal has been reached, 
                                                 
18 Klein, No Logo 21-6.  
19 “…you can like the products and not like the corporate behaviour; because the corporate 
behaviour is a political issue and the products are just stuff.” Klein interviewed in Katherine 
Viner, “Hand-to-brand Combat”, Sydney Morning Herald Good Weekend November 11, 2000 
71. 
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the image has gone underground, the brand has become ‘life itself.’21 Such a 
neat example of the hyperreal carries its own critique, and as such has found its 
way into other sites. An image of Celebration opens the Bruce Mau Design 
Studio’s anthology, Lifestyle (2002), as a sign of the book’s critical stance in 
relation to the “regime of the image” of which it is so clearly a part.22  
Corporate ethnographic researchers or ‘cool hunters’ have developed 
expertise in pre-empting aspects of cultural protest for marketing ends.23 Iconic 
examples of symbolic detoxification, such as the exposure of the garment 
industry’s reliance on sweat shops — the humanist appeal of which effected 
considerable though momentary retail re-direction in the mid-90s — is now so 
ubiquitous that the located horror of its incremental events have become 
reabsorbed by televisual culture.24 The effect is of rhetorical generalisation and 
foreclosure rather than of sustained and focused dissent.  
In spite of Klein’s strategic use of the past tense in relation to the 
cultural power of product corporations, it is clear they can handle such 
exposure and even turn it to their advantage. As a problem is exposed and 
shaped, the corporation is handed a manageable alienation of their perceived 
irresponsibility, allowing them to more accurately rework the cultural fit of 
                                                                                                                                 
20 From Klein’s 2001 Sydney lecture broadcast on ABC Radio National Media Report 17th 
January 2002. In No Logo (149) Klein characterises Disney as the first ‘brand’ in this new, 
global mode. 
21 Klein, No Logo 155. 
22 Lifestyle is a large, heavy, hugely materially intensive book/object covered in a series of 
‘limited edition,’ fabric covers including hot pink satin and red brocade. It is meant to 
communicate a notion of ‘preciousness’ borrowed not from a conservative aesthetic, but from 
the art object, which the design of the book’s largely repetitive, 600 odd full colour pages 
reveals. Ironically, then, the book’s ‘thud effect’ resounds merely with rhetorical substance. 
23 The co-option of oppositional tactics is the theme of a documentary lauded by Klein, 
Merchants of Cool, which traces the ways in which multi-national corporations mine ‘true’ 
culture in a range of anthropological practices, in order to reproduce it for sale. Merchants of 
Cool, produced by Douglas Rushkoff and Rachel Dretzin and directed by Barak Goodman, 
aired on SBS television 17th July, 2001. 
24 The ‘cops’ in a North American television show pause in a sports store in the midst of 
investigating a crime to discuss the profit margin of sneakers at the expense of ‘sweatshop’ 
workers. What workers, where? Klein details several horrifying stories, like that of the 
production of the Nike shoe in No Logo 365-79. She also tells us of the organisation 
‘Sweatshop Watch’, whose president, Lora Jo Foo says this issue “is so direct, so emotional 
and so human that people contact us and say ‘How can I help?’ In this work, we’re not having 
to say ‘There’s a problem.’ We’re mostly saying, ‘Here’s a productive way you can direct your 
outrage.’” Klein, No Logo 347-8.  
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their icons.25 In tandem to this, it is also much easier for consumers if we can 
have pointed out for us that this toy, shoe or piece of architectural formwork is 
ethically off limits. The image infrastructure is in all of these ways far easier to 
get a hold of than relationality, than an ecology of the image. 
Klein’s book, which has been taken up as the “bible for anti-corporate 
militancy”,26 brings the ‘anti-corporate movement’ into a coherent shape and at 
the same time fills out the disingenuous corporate landscape with satisfyingly 
persuasive research. While Klein articulates culture jamming as but one 
graphic interventionist tool of anti-corporate culture, her entire project can be 
seen in terms of a twist in the fabric of representationalist culture. At the same 
time as evoking the promise of a coming revolution, her text places all its faith 
in the power of representation and the seductive ontology of the “outsider 
stance”.27 It is the brands themselves that give us a crash course in outlining 
oppositional politics.28 The oft-cited Seattle demonstration, in which 50,000 
protesters prevented a WTO meeting from taking place in November 1999, 
created an effect but did not make a sustained intervention. Such protest has no 
project beyond reiterative confrontation and televised protesters never fail to 
get decanted into pre-existing forms. There is no awakening from the sedation 
of the image, from the “bad dream of modern society in chains”.29 This 
situation cannot be undone by willing into being a global opposition as live 
content for the humanist rhetoric of ‘freedom’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘self-
determination’, which have no resonance outside the space of the sign. 
Each political opposition must construct its actions in response to an 
increasingly well-informed and culturally prepped enemy. Strategies of visual 
politics — the graphic jams of BUGAUP (Billboard Utilising Graffitists 
                                                 
25 Ross tells us of talk-show host Kathie Lee Gifford’s re-appropriation of humanist concern 
upon the exposure of her clothing label’s use of ‘sweatshop’ labour. “(A) perfect foil for 
revelations about child labor” Ross writes, “(i)t took Gifford only two weeks to ascend to the 
saintly rank of labor crusader.” Ross, No Sweat 27. 
26 This quote is taken from the list of review excerpts printed in the front of Klein’s No Logo.  
27 Klein, No Logo 283.  
28 Klein, No Logo 442.  
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Against Unhealthy Promotions) or Adbusters; mass reverse interventions like 
‘Buy Nothing Day’; the attempt to force speech from the silence of the Reagan 
administration on AIDS via ‘agitprop’ images by activists Gran Fury; the mass 
demonstrations, events or targeted media protests of ACTUP (AIDS Coalition 
To Unleash Power) or Greenpeace — are all subject to the same assertoric 
structure that incapacitates sustained transformation, in spite of the growing 
disparities and injustices they identify, and the highly incisive cultural critique 
they may motivate.30 Political dissent becomes a look.31 A consideration of any 
one case study of aesthetic activism and its attempts to push silent problems 
into tangible shapes, turns up heart-warming successes and blood boiling 
failures. But none has effected cultural re-direction.  
To see the designing power of semiotic environments and identify 
opportunities to intervene in them, to remobilise signs to new ends, to intuit the 
cultural ‘pitch’ of things and use this literacy to rework cultural forms — are 
all tactical possibilities for culture jamming.32 However these de-sign 
capabilities are squandered when the image becomes the endgame and the only 
possible site of cultural negotiation. 
The culture that culture jamming jams does not concern the complex 
televisual configuration of self, thing and world, but that of the image that is 
                                                                                                                                 
29 Debord writes: “The spectacle is the bad dream of modern society in chains, expressing 
nothing more than its wish for sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of that sleep.” Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle 18. 
30 One of the best examples of the critical negotiation of crisis by cultural theory is to be found 
in Douglas Crimp ed., AIDS: Cultural Analysis Cultural Activism (Cambridge and London: 
October/MIT, 1987). 
31 An example is ACTUP’s famous logo “Silence = Death”. This was a ‘culture-jam’ by the 
Silence = Death Collective which ‘reclaimed’ a sign from Nazi iconography and spoke so 
directly of the initial Western hit of the AIDS crisis in the early to mid 80s. It is now a sign of 
its time rather than a prompt for the recognition of the ongoing crisis of AIDS. 
32 To evoke Michel de Certeau’s famous distinction between invisible, spontaneous tactics that 
‘make do’ with what is to hand and planned, visible strategies, culture jamming might be 
understood within a tactical framework. Each ‘tactical’ manoeuvre has a precise window of 
affect circumscribed by the specific context of its appearance and the horizon of the image, and 
is only tenuously related to other such events. The distinction is complicated in a televisual 
culture where tactics become strategies which then become the basis for ‘new’ tactics (a 
process documented in the film Merchants of Cool, cited above). On this distinction see Michel 
de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988). 
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always encountered, understood and underwritten by the assumption of the 
transformative power of the momentary encounter. Aesthetic activism is 
ultimately foreclosed by its own ‘frontier’ tactics, by its demand for complete 
transparency, its tacit idealism, its own finger-pointing and misdirected politics 
hinged on the notion of democratic freedom unconstrained by design. The sign, 
without an understanding of design, is simply not up to the task of generating 
desired cultural change.  
Returning to The Society of the Spectacle, we can see that although 
many of Debord’s comments sound relevant, it is precisely this relevance that 
reveals the lack of agency of a political project conceived without design. 
Nothing has changed vis-à-vis the productivism of the televisual. In fact the 
comment that appear on the dust-jacket of the Zone publication of The Society 
of the Spectacle lists the most important change in the last twenty years as “the 
very continuation of the spectacle”, the confirmation of the prescience of a 
cultural argument embalmed in postmodern hyper-styling. Here we have a 
clear example of the problem of the theoretical benefit of worsening cultural 
conditions. The attempt to mobilize theory to effect change, to move from 
‘theory’ to ‘practice’ in the strategies of a reinvented aesthetic activism, merely 
asserts the vast gulf between them. 
 ‘GREEN DESIRES’ 
Green desires are desires remade in the shadow 
of ecological danger…this desire has to be 
turned into things we see and want. (Tony Fry)33
 
How might semiotic strategies contribute effectively to the broader project of 
changing the set of cultural propensities? The mobilisation of signs of 
sustainability in the context of particular products warrants consideration, in 
terms of embodying relations of production, consumption and waste, and 
scripting alternative cultures of use.  
                                                                                                                                 
 
33 Fry, Green Desires 12-3. 
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Let us start with one of the most recognisable visual signs of cultural 
difference in product design — the interlocked arrows that signify recycling. I 
found an example of this ubiquitous sign adorning a label I took from a 
package of flexible, low-density polyethylene that lay in a bin destined for 
land-fill. Recycling depends upon a lifecycle responsibility involving 
producers, product users and an adequate post-use collection infrastructure. 
This misplaced destiny is therefore not uncommon, because such a sign is 
incapable of bringing the conditions for sustainability into being. It belongs to 
a culture that is not yet with us. 
 The green sign emerged as a symbolic resolution of the complexity of 
macro-environmental issues that surfaced in the 70s, and the tenuous 
intelligibility of their connection to everyday products. In the early 90s Nigel 
Whiteley said “(w)hile the route from an awareness of macro-issues to micro-
consumption is relatively established, the significant change has been from 
micro-consumption to the possibility of macro-understanding.”34 The purpose 
of the green sign was to manage this change, disseminating a broad awareness 
and sensitivity to the environment. Thus in some respects the complex project 
of cultural denaturalisation hinged on a functional colour, a sign of the 
participation of the idea of nature in the system of exchange.35 The green sign 
has persisted as a sign of moral consumption, yet it has failed to bring into 
effect the background greening of culture because of an imprecision in 
contextual understanding and directional purpose.36  
Whiteley expressed the fear that after the novelty had gone, the green 
sign would retreat like some over-the-hill celebrity to appearances in the 
occasional magazine article.37 On the contrary, however, the mode of retreat of 
                                                 
34 Whiteley, Design for Society 51. 
35Baudrillard shows how the ‘natural’ is re-born within the sign system endowed with both 
morality and functionality in The System of Objects 31-34; 58-62; also throughout the essays in 
For a Political Economy of the Sign, for example “Sign Function and Class Logic” (46-7) and 
“Design and Environment” in which he writes: “Nature (which seems to become hostile, 
wishing by pollution to avenge its exploitation) must be made to participate.” (201). 
36 Whiteley remarks that ‘green’ purchasing engenders consumer demands for “financial 
incentive or a personal reward for their ‘enlightened’ choice.” Whiteley, Design for Society 53.  
37 Whiteley, Design for Society 49. 
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the green sign has been its expansion and normalisation. Nowadays it is just as 
likely to be used by an honest, though culturally naïve environmental group as 
it is by corporate ‘citizens’ in their public relations exercises. Further, there is a 
proliferation of green products attempting to cash in on the last gasp of the 
sign’s interpellative power.38 Whiteley’s prediction that “(g)reen aesthetics will 
become as diverse as people’s tastes” did not anticipate the integration of 
informed consumer behaviour, but rather the bankruptcy of the green sign’s 
moment.39 Instead of pointing to the key requirement of a reduction in the net 
throughput of products, the green sign now contributes to the expansion of the 
psychological space of consumerism and the naturalised myth of product-based 
well being. It has become simply another consumer aesthetic predicated on an 
infinite referential flexibility and symbolic satisfaction.  
Rebecca Tanqueray’s Eco Chic: Organic Living (2000) is but one 
example of the depoliticised destiny of the green sign.40 This glossy, ‘lifestyle’ 
manual reloads extant signs of the affluent good life with a grab bag of 
environmental/natural signifieds.41 From the close-up shot of uniform, flawless 
cherries and blueberries in the organic eating section, (images that fetishise the  
‘fresh’, ‘pure’ and ‘delicious’ ideals of organic food without any of its 
unpredictability)42 to the huge, stylishly sparse kitchen and other interiors shot 
in ways that emphasise the desirability of clean, open space, these images revel 
                                                 
38 We might cite here any number of ‘environmentally-friendly’ products, for example the 
biodegradeable dish-washing liquid with the dolphin-adorned label, corporate sponsorship 
program, ‘green’ colour and lingering, ‘environmental’ fragrance. 
39 Whiteley, Design for Society 92. 
40 Rebecca Tanqueray, Eco Chic: Organic Living (Sydney: New Holland Publishers, 2000). 
41 Judith Williamson analyses signs of nature using structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ paradigm of ‘the raw and the cooked’. “Nature is cooked by culture, fed into it to 
provide fodder for ‘Science’ in the sense…of a metaphysical organiser: through ‘Science’ we 
may see ordered nature; in the transparency of its own workings we see what is ‘natural’.” She 
explicates a range of examples from advertisements that demonstrate the mimetic completion 
of nature in products. Williamson, Decoding Advertisements 127. A very different reading of 
‘the natural’ aesthetic is made by Daniel Harris, which is driven far more by the pleasure of the 
text than by the ‘workmanlike’ deconstruction of ideology in Williamson. Harris, Cute, Quaint, 
Hungry and Romantic: The Aesthetics of Consumerism 179 – 208.  
42 The organic food industry is hampered in its growth by the unpredictable quality and 
seasonal dependency of its produce, which calls upon a careful disposition in selecting, storing 
and planning the preparation of food. This is a culture that is in some senses quite unlike that of 
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in the erroneous modern desirability of never-been-touched newness. In spite 
of its advocacy of recycled timbers, unbleached post-consumer papers, low 
impact textiles and energy and water-saving devices in kitchens and 
bathrooms, the aesthetic packaging of these new lifestyle ‘descriptors’ presents 
them as moral acquisitions that normalise aesthetic obsolescence. In addition, 
the layout of the book displays as luxurious a relation to packaging as exhibited 
in any up-market department store, where tiny bottles of perfume and potion 
need to be swathed in reams of tissue, bleached, inked and waxed cardboard 
and non-recyclable cellophane to signify luxury and preciousness, and to 
maintain their sign value against an ever increasing array of competitors. Each 
double page has barely a paragraph of text (magazine-style, key paragraphs are 
enlarged and repeated for graphic effect) and is dominated by glossy, show-
room photographs of uninhabited spaces and pristine objects naturally spaced 
to allow them “the ‘luxury’ of breathing”.43 Such an example points to the 
affirmative nature of the failure of the green sign. 
More than backfiring on those keen to promote cultural change, the 
moral coding of the green sign has generated a strong backlash against the 
unfinished ‘eco’ aesthetic. Once a powerful sign of cultural difference, 
recycled paper for example is now aesthetically passé, difficult to source, 
lacking in technological ‘performance’ and expensive. This is partly due to the 
removal of subsidies on paper recyclate, but also more importantly to its 
diminished sign value, the passing of its cultural visibility. While paper should 
have become more precious, and new technology designed to enable 
comfortable paperless communication, the opposite has happened. Office paper 
recycling bins overflow with the success of recycling programs. The 
                                                                                                                                 
the early picked, over-refrigerated, gassed ‘freshness’ of mainstream produce, whose constant 
availability and televisual uniformity often works to disguise inedibility. 
43 Baudrillard insightfully de-signs the ‘natural’ semiotics of modern spac(ing). He says: 
“The fact that space itself has the connotation of emptiness … creates a ‘natural’ effect: we say 
that it is ‘airy’. This is the temptation of emptiness, as when unadorned walls indicate culture 
and luxury. An objet d’art may seem more precious when it is surrounded by empty space. 
‘Atmosphere’ is thus very often created merely by a formal arrangement which ‘personalises’ 
particular objects through the disposition of empty space. In the case of serially produced 
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commercial potential of new printers is based solely on their ability to 
accelerate the churn-rate of ‘consumables’ such as paper and toner. Recycled 
paper, which was once identified by carrying a visible trace of its past and 
potential future, has been reduced to a green sub-set of papers with recycled 
content, generally derived from the off-cuts of paper production, sandwiched 
between layers of virgin bleached pulp. It is now the brightness, whiteness, 
thickness and technological consistency of papers that is marketed as desirable.  
Certainly the limited efficacy of the sign is not lost on media and social 
marketers who widely acknowledge the failure of conventional marketing to 
effect behavioural change.44  As we have seen, representational exposure and 
description will not necessarily change what people choose to make or do with 
this information. The Saussurean assumption that people carry identical 
information in their heads in some kind of evenly lit catalogue until they need 
it, breaks down with the recognition of the power of habitual lifestyle grooves. 
Marketing grows evermore strategic in its attempts to create product visibility, 
as culture jammers know, evermore ‘counter-representational’.45 The 
prevailing thought is that people will not change, in spite of the growth in 
information about environmental problems and their cultural sources.  
Recognition of the power of the symbolic playing field has sent 
environmental marketing further into televisual culture. This explains the 
current popularity of ‘cause marketing’ campaigns, where success can be 
claimed for extremely modest and extremely over-dressed issues. While 
Unilever produces 150 million personal care and snack food ‘necessities’ a 
day, Planet Ark use pop star Kylie Minogue to promote the recycling of 
                                                                                                                                 
objects, conversely, a shortage of space destroys atmosphere by depriving objects of the luxury 
of ‘breathing’.” Baudrillard, The System of Objects 61. 
44 See for example Doug McKenzie Mohr and William Smith, Fostering Sustainable 
Behaviour: an introduction to Community-Based Social Marketing (New Society Publishers: 
Gabriola Island, 1999). This text provides some suggestive ideas for the design of effective, 
contextualised communication strategies.  
45Examples of ‘counter-representational’ marketing strategies include public transport 
‘bombing’ which entails ‘canonic’ people talking loudly into their mobile phones and feeding 
product recommendations into the conversation or attaching personalised, anonymous notes of 
recommendations onto torn-out magazine advertisements and sending them to potential 
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Christmas cards to great effect.46 Adorning the environment with retail 
glamour seems to be a final, cynical gesture toward cultural change. Instead of 
cultural re-direction, the unimpeded continuance of the business-as-usual 
growth in materials intensive ‘consumer’ lifestyles is secured.47  
A model for a different culture of the green sign may be found in the 
‘production side’ culture shift to re-manufacture where product components are 
reclaimed and refurbished for reuse. In this situation, the sign serves a decisive 
and critical role in scripting actions with materials that are, as Manzini tells us, 
increasingly difficult to visually identify. Each part of a plastic product may be 
marked with a materials code that instructs as to the nature and correct 
handling of the specific plastic material to which it refers, so that when it is 
reclaimed and disassembled, each part is sent in the right direction. Such a sign 
is encountered in the stream of targeted actions or in the existing culture of use 
surrounding a product.  It therefore has a more effective role to play than the 
‘catch-all’ green label or eco-label as it joins with and recognises design 
trajectories outside the space of the sign.48  
We have shown that in televisual culture the key role of the sign has 
been to conceal the finitude of things and to absorb the burden of material 
complexity in the promotion of product-based well-being. Yet between the 
unfulfilled promise of the green sign and the sign as pragmatic equipment to 
direct use, what redirective power might there be in alternative scripts — 
                                                                                                                                 
consumers. These strategies are presented in the Barak Goodman documentary Merchants of 
Cool (2001) cited above. 
46Unilever statistic given by Henry King, an environmental manager with Unilever at Life 
Cycle Decision Making for Sustainability Conference, Broad Beach, July 2002. 
47 For a study on the status quo of ‘sustainable consumption’ see Chris Ryan, Sustainable 
Consumption: A Global Status Report (United Nations Environment Program, 2002) July 14, 
2004. <www.uneptie.org/pc/pc/gs2002.htm>.  
48 The eco-label is a mark of the scientific verification of a product in terms of standards of 
‘environmental performance’ in energy or water efficiency, for example. It is still widely seen 
as key communicative tool capable of driving more sustainable relationships between products 
and product users. As a catch-all marker of the (in)visible environmental sensitivity of a 
product, the eco-label succumbs to the limitations of representation we have explored, 
including the tendency to abdicate relational responsibility — this product is ‘green’ for 
whatever reason — which pertains equally to the side of ‘production’ or ‘consumption’.  The 
eco-label also effects the perceptual reduction of massive impacts to a singular discrete entity 
— the label is silent as regards the total impacts of the series to which it belongs.  
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scripts for seeing and wanting things differently? Is there a role for cosmetic 
alchemy, for the sign’s capacity to both make something out of nothing and to 
erase material thingliness? 
This possibility is explored in the project of a group of designers 
established in the mid 90s in the Netherlands, with whom Manzini is involved. 
This group — Eternally Yours — have attempted to use the sign to hasten 
cultural change. They focus on ways to increase the ‘psychological life span’ 
or cultural durability of products in response to the problem of the loss of 
experiential limit. In this they attempt to design ways to culture jam the 
modernist aesthetics of newness, youth, magical appearance and structural 
closure that semioticians like Williamson have so carefully diagnosed, and 
which manifests in the aesthetic obsolescence of things.49  
Eternally Yours: visions of product endurance is a series of proposals 
for this counter-project, named ‘product life extension’. The group initially 
scanned human culture for existing signs of desirable durability that could be 
appropriated in a design context. Lasting human relationships and their 
connotations of care, dependency, fidelity, recognition, preciousness and 
commitment became the focus of the project. It explored how such values 
could be designed back into the devalued and ephemeral products of everyday 
life, to promote a carefulness with things, a willingness to maintain, repair, 
keep, upgrade, share or reuse them.  
The proposals included giving products anthropomorphic attributes like 
personal histories, well-planned careers, life-changing, character-building 
experiences, ritual celebrations like birthday parties and ‘dignified’ retirements. 
After ‘death’ products might become heroic organ donors for other products. 
Narrative or contextual enframing enhanced product aesthetics derived from 
the processes of production, wear and use. An example from the book is a 
promotional image that shows a Nikon camera that has spent some time at the 
bottom of the sea. The image is anchored by the slogan: “This camera works.” 
The promise of utility is enhanced by the apparent age and experience of the 
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camera and in this, a new form of desire is promoted.50 So the suggestion is 
that a product might be promoted as transcending generations or seasons, as the 
start of a ‘new’ tradition or as a way to salvage an old one.  
These proposals are presented as ideas for design appropriation rather 
than as definitive solutions to the culture of unsustainability. The aesthetic 
difference emerging from duration and useful engagement, is in sharp 
distinction to the naturalised, resource-intensive fetishism that sustains the 
modernist perfection of possessions such as cars, homes and lawns or even the 
loving attention bestowed on remote televisual celebrities.51  
The approach of Eternally Yours treats culture like a design work-book, 
as a source of cultural values centred on what sustains and is sustained. It 
contests the idea that things should be rigorously ‘authentic’. In a world of 
(in)visible artificiality, of complex and often untraceable design lineages, 
which is also a world in which sustainability has as yet few incremental forms, 
the question emerges as to whether the history of a product has to be its own 
history.  
The motivated nature of myth sickened Barthes “from the point of view 
of ethics.” 52 However design problematises the possibility of unmotivated 
relations. Certainly the operation of myth should inspire a healthy caution in a 
televisual environment filled with scripts designed by marketing. However, 
strategies of cultural intervention have no choice but to reinvent the ground that 
memory has abandoned and in many cases, as Beck suggests, relinquished all 
ties with. 53 The ethical imperative is to do this in recognition of the productive 
force of interpretation. One is reminded of the shoes of Van Gogh, which 
Heidegger ‘misrepresented’ as peasant shoes yet made speak so rewardingly of 
                                                                                                                                 
49 van Hinte, Eternally Yours 56. 
50 van Hinte, Eternally Yours 55. 
51 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 84-5. 
52 Barthes, Mythologies 126. 
53 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 14. 
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things thinging, of the peasant and of a life lived in relation to the land and the 
ever-present menace of death.54  
The Eternally Yours project suggests that the sign, which can pull a 
product into obsolescence, can equally be harnessed to cultivate a sustainable 
sensibility. The pragmatic thinking behind the project was that making 
sustainability culturally desirable would in turn generate businesses and 
markets centred around and supportive of this culture — this has not happened. 
The project remains disarticulated from industrial productivism. Eternally 
Yours has been criticized for its idealism and lack of results. In all their 
strategies, Verbeek and Kockelkoren argue, “the products themselves, as 
material objects, are hardly relevant anymore…reduced to something 
nonmaterial: to signs, to actors in a story, to ‘character’.”55 There is, they 
suggest, a kind of Platonic ‘one-sidedness’ in the project’s thinking, an 
abandonment of material wholeness. We have already mounted a critique on 
the embedded idealism of this view, which we will take further in Part 4.  
Rather, the sign cannot function as a self-fulfilling prophecy of cultural 
change because its ‘vision’ is circumscribed by the fixed horizon of its 
materialised form. The mobilization of signs of difference — such as the recent 
attempt to promote the preciousness of water — inevitably confronts the 
problem of the embedded material consequences of prior symbolic abundance 
in infrastructure, architecture, industry and lifestyle habits. The value in the 
Eternally Yours project, a recognition that in my view is vastly underplayed in 
                                                 
54 Heidegger notes that there are no immediate visible signs that tell us definitively of the use 
of these shoes. Yet “(f)rom the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread 
of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated 
tenacity of her slow trudge through far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept 
by a raw wind.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 33-4. Davison is disturbed by this 
‘invention’ noting that the shoes, which probably belonged to the artist himself, spoke rather of 
the coal-blackened cobbled streets of Paris. “It seems reasonable to speculate that had 
Heidegger known (this), he wouldn’t have been moved to reflect upon the story they tell. More 
disturbingly for his readers is the fact that he may have been tempted to claim that these shoes 
were mute technologised objects with no story to tell.” Davison, Technology and the Contested 
Meanings of Sustainability 126. 
55 Verbeek and Kockelkoren, “The Things that Matter” 30. We take this criticism of Eternally 
Yours further in Part 4. 
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design thinking, is that the environmental problematic takes place in a world of 
objects and relations that are already submerged in signs. 
It is not surprising then that the visual evocation of sustainability on its 
own has had little impact on the ‘sickness of affluence’ and product-based 
well-being that is sustained by the televisual.56 The televisual script works 
precisely because it keys into appropriate ways of being in a televisual 
environment continually reproduced by design.  
In this chapter we have reviewed practices that conduct political 
activity within the inducting framework of the image and have revealed that 
they are in the main unable to handle what McHoul calls ‘the space outside the 
sign’. A practice that is capable of reading the concealed ecological violence 
upon which design rests is, on the other hand, a practice that recognises that 
design is already political as it shapes and transforms beings and environments. 
Such a practice needs to fully engage with design’s complex support and 
technical completion of productivist ‘progress’ and work out a context for 
intervention that will generate changes in the existing culture, in which design 
largely removes both pain and memory.57  
The critical practice of de-sign is a vital initial strategy at this nascent 
point in the development of a culture of sustainment in the midst of concrete 
and ongoing unsustainability. De-sign is an act of discovery of ecological 
danger in a world in which functional transparency has liquidated any shadow 
of doubt. De-sign emerges between the empirical horizon sealed in and by the 
image and the interpretative/perceptual horizon that can contest it.  
 
SNAP SHOT: DE-SIGNING ‘THE DESERT OF THE REAL’ 
When is the sign? Now-here. A major arterial roadway in Sydney, a 
situated ‘anywhere.’ This is a barely noticeable transit zone, certainly 
not an obviously cultural place. Yet it presents a de-sign opportunity.  
                                                 
56 A recent, popular account of this ‘sickness’ is Clive Hamilton, Growth Fetish (Crows Nest, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003). 
57 On memory see Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 14. 
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I am standing at the lights waiting to cross the road. The environment 
does not invite lingering. There are the unnameable heavy smells, 
momentary thermal intensities and the piercing crescendo of the traffic 
to contend with. A bus chugs at the lights adorned with an 
advertisement for a ‘mega’-range cordless phone. In the image a tanned, 
bikini-clad girl lays poolside, talking into a phone. Behind her, in the 
typical hyperbole of digital images, an expanse of manicured, green 
lawn and a mansion-style house. Williamson could tell us in an instant 
about the semiotic construction of this image, what it affirms about 
women, patriarchal ideology, desire. However, if we unfold this image 
from the perspective of the future it projects and the environment it 
inhabits, a different causal story emerges. In a time of drought, the 
image attempts to evoke desire for a poolside lifestyle and for great 
expanses of verdant lawn, which will need to be constantly mown and 
watered to stay green. In a time of the emergence of ozone depletion 
and rising skin cancer, the carefree demeanour of the girl — who does 
not wear sunglasses and appears to be coated in a slick of suntan oil — 
flanked by the ridiculous tree-less lawn — is no longer a powerful 
symbol of desire, but a measure of extreme ignorance. In a time when 
‘climate change’ grows in resonance, such an image becomes a 
concrete example of dangerous denial.  
As I cross the street (the sign blinks red, threatening to reopen the road 
before I reach half way) I try to catch the eyes of the people in rows of 
cars and feel extremely vulnerable. Enveloped in their tinted 
microclimates, I recall Scarry’s description of the ‘artefact-human’, 
unconsciously extended and empowered by design. I look back at the 
bus; on its other side is an ad for a phone company. Below a big 
affirmative ‘yes’ is a promise: “we’ve built 1 new base station every 
day since 1999 and with more on the way we’ve got you covered”. 
Ahead of me a new, medium-density housing complex has just opened 
that looks out onto this road and the courtyard of a massive service 
station. The canopy of the service station is lined with a grid-feeding 
solar array. Around it is a cluster of fast-food restaurants, whose lights, 
(in spite of the solar sign of ‘renewability’ they surround), remain on all 
day and all night. In the centre of this array of buildings, and directly in 
front of the line of sight of a row of new aluminium and glass walled 
bedrooms, rises a mobile phone tower styled to look like Sydney’s 
Centrepoint, which carries the infrastructure of five competing 
telecommunications companies. The potential danger of unauthorized 
electromagnetic ‘conversations’ with the inhabitants sleeping in their 
bedrooms or working below is ignored.   
The service station, which displays clearly marked recycling bins, is 
surrounded by many more overflowing waste-bins full of empty chips 
packets, ice-cream wrappers and barely used plastic and paper bags. Yet 
the station continues to insist on the provision of an astonishingly 
 228
excessive array of packages — people in a hurry perhaps cannot muster 
the effort to resist. The new apartments that abut the main street are 
painted a pale cream, providing an unanticipated billboard for the heavy 
metals, carbon, synthetic rubber, unburnt fuel and dust particulate 
emitted from the passing cars. A corner electronics shop is full of new 
analogue televisions that will be obsolete within five years. This shop 
faces onto the adjacent street lined with ‘Chinese Tallow’ trees — a 
designated ‘environmental weed’ — unceremoniously hacked to makes 
space for the telecommunications infrastructure as their roots lift and 
crack the bitumen. De-sign reveals a world fashioned by self-certain 
designing. In this world the things gathered do not ‘understand’ each 
other, and there is little recognition of the shared space and future 
embodied in and shaped by them. 
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Figure 4 Apple Inc. product literature, 1999. 
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PART 4:THE DISCOURSE OF PRODUCTS 
 
 
 
All reification is a forgetting. (Theodor Adorno)58
 
It not just the loss of something, but the lack of 
memory of the loss that buries it a second time 
and for good. Memory, however, which keeps 
what was lost from disappearing into oblivion, 
means cultural search and reliving.  
(Ulrich Beck)59  
 
 
This final Part calls for a return of ‘environmental consciousness’ in the 
practice of design. It is particularly the everyday, technical product that we 
argue can be understood as a powerful, phenomenal expression of the 
designing that removes ecological danger in our world: ‘telegenic’ designing. 
We focus on the designed commensurability of idea and material form that puts 
the product literally and intimately in touch with human worlds in a way the 
image is inclined to deny — one cannot say of the product as John Tagg says 
of the photograph’s referential character, “the power it wields is never its 
own.” 60 We link telegenic designing to the professional practice of object-
oriented design and situate the application of our theory in this domain, 
elaborating a de-sign research strategy that builds upon the learning of this 
thesis. This strategy seeks to naturalise the practical investigation of what 
design designs in the conduct of material practices of design. The ontology of 
the designer, which takes shape in relation to the calculative methodologies of 
production and aesthetics and temporality of televisual ‘modernism’, is 
challenged.   
 
                                                 
58 Adorno in Über Walter Benjamin quoted in Levin, The Listening Self 15. 
59 Beck, Ecological Enlightenment 14. 
60 Tagg, The Burden of Representation  64. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The discourse of products travels in three related directions in what follows. 
The first is a discourse of cultural attention to products, exploring their 
operation, their meanings, their dangers as well as questions about what 
product design actually is. The second direction is the technical discourse of 
products that is supported by design practice and its various sites of action. The 
third is the discourse of products — what they tell us about themselves. This 
third discourse is often a clamorous rhetoric at the start of a product’s life, 
when sign value takes precedence, but then quickly withdraws into quiet use 
and symbolic disrepair. It is this third discourse that we — as practicing 
designers, design theorists and product users — need to subject to our cultural 
and technical attention.  
 
*** 
 
The sign is widely understood in design culture as “the very counterpart of 
materialism”.61 Some of the most interesting thought on design shows, 
however, that the sign does not exist in some Platonic non-space, but rather 
precisely inside the skin of the object. An applied theorisation of the product 
from this perspective will help us to dismantle the rigorous sign/world binarism 
that has taken root in our designed environments. To undertake this 
dismantling we will need to show how the technical object evidences the 
world-view of its designing and how it communicates this mind-set 
ecologically.  
One of the most telling indications of the epistemologies governing 
design is the prevailing legacy of the modernist aesthetic, which resists the 
ruinous consequences of temporality and the signatures of use. The object 
holds itself in place against ruin. However, an extreme environmental fragility 
                                                 
61 Verbeek and Kockelkoren “The Things that Matter” 30. 
 232
is concealed within this aesthetic ‘robustness’.62 The effects of the imposition 
of forms are unanticipated, and the future that the designed object as ideal 
simulacrum ‘thinks’ it is heading toward, diverges significantly from the future 
that it actually contributes to. It is well documented that variables such as 
environmental conditions and the habits, routines and diverse desires of people 
concerning how they wanted to live, compromised the modernist vision that 
began to direct simulation through the 20th century.63 Many modernist 
structures, born of and operating under the sign of ‘constant presence’, failed in 
a material sense, both in terms of mechanical stability (due to an abstract 
[mis]understanding of modern materials and how they interface with each 
other), and in terms of a disfiguring weathering.64 Le Corbusier for example 
understood the white building as an ‘objective architectural finish.’ 
“Accordingly”, comment Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, “the 
duration that is to follow the completion of the building — the life of the 
building — is conceived as a subtraction from the ideal condition of the project 
realised before inhabitation and weathering.”65 To recall Jullien, this is not a 
problem only at the level of material selection or contextual analysis, but an 
index of the broader problem of Western thinking, in which the ideal plan 
“drawn up in advance” is disarticulated from the conditions of its practical 
implementation, “which renders it subject to chance.”66
Deprived of multi-sensorial being and premised on the restorative 
powers of the economy of the same and its learnt empirical horizons, the 
televisual object idealises modernist autonomy. The designing of virtual spaces 
and objects reveals an expansionist mindset that fails to comprehend or 
                                                 
62 Baudrillard speaks of the ‘fragile object’ in the economic order of ceaseless production, 
“objects that are partly dysfunctional and destined for an early death; the system thus works to 
destroy such objects as well as to produce them.” Baudrillard, The System of Objects 131. 
63 Baudrillard’s “Design and Environment” offers one of the best descriptions of this vision. 
We might consider Le Corbusier’s idea of ‘autonous living unity’ as an example, which was 
made material in one of his most famous post-war buildings, Unité d’Habitation in Marseilles, 
itself only a partial but telling realisation of a more extensive urban plan. 
64 Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: the life of buildings in time 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993) 22-36. 
65 Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow, On Weathering 78-82. 
66 Jullien, The Propensity of Things 38.  
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respond to the lifeworld conditions of finitude. For Luhmann, society adapts 
itself to modern temporal structures via the aligning powers of the mass media, 
which “generate the time they presuppose”.67 Baudrillard also talks of a 
coercive temporality in relation to the system of objects. He says, “we live by 
object time: by this I mean we live at the pace of objects.”68 In a world 
populated with more designed things than people, “objects impose their 
disjointed rhythm — their unpredictable and sudden manner of being present, 
of breaking down or replacing one another without ever aging — upon human 
beings.”69  
The technical product manifests a confrontation between the interpreted 
time of design and what we might call after Heidegger the time of the earth, 
embodied in the materials design appropriates for its ideal ends.70 The tendency 
to continue to design products in televisual terms ignores the ‘painful’ joining 
of temporalities in the product and is indicative of the culturally embedded 
relational indifference that we have discussed in this thesis.  
Manzini has said, “(T)he quality of being photo and tele-genic has 
…become a decisive variable in the organisation of the universe of 
environments and objects with which we enter into contact.”71 In the first 
chapter of this Part we focus on telegenic designing, and reflect on the 
designing of products in which the relational indifference of the televisual is 
hard-programmed. We look at the work of Albert Borgmann, whose concept of 
the device paradigm is an important design-inspired reflection following 
Heidegger’s investigations of technology. We consider his reading of the 
problem of technological society and contrast his humanist reform agenda with 
a design-oriented approach that acknowledges the deeply contradictory 
conditions of our lifeworlds in which the artificial is naturalised and in which 
                                                 
67 Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media 21. 
68 Baudrillard, The Consumer Society 25. 
69 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 159. 
70 Heidegger identifies the presence of the ‘earth’ in things as a kind of commensurability with 
the world of their appearance. The ‘thing’ gathers relations rather than tears form into matter in 
the manner of the Riss (rift/design). Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 34; “The 
Thing” 167.  
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design’s duty of care is overlooked. We argue that the (in)visibility of design 
fractures the steadfast vision of moral reform. The designing of a culture of 
difference must take place in light of the defining conditions of the naturalised 
artificial.  
The second chapter of this Part sets the scene for our response to design 
— as a sphere dominated by strident technical and professional interpretations 
— which actively resists ‘impractical’ critical reflection. We contextualise the 
technical attempt to engender unthinking product design with environmental 
consciousness and briefly consider Donald Schön’s denaturalisation of the 
hermeneutic character of the design process in his theory of  ‘reflection-in-
action’, in terms of the practical relationality of de-sign. 
The aim of the last chapter of this thesis is to bring its theoretical 
‘conversants’— from hermeneutic phenomenology, cultural theory, sociology 
and both critical and technical design theory — into a practical dialogue. We 
present a design research strategy predicated on learning to understand the 
product as an assemblage of cultural and technical decisions, which have 
various complex ecological implications. Each design process begins in 
conditions of partial understanding and ecological ignorance. We acknowledge 
this by encouraging the development of situated memories of the artificial, in 
the condition of the erasure and lack of memory. Our strategy is to intervene in 
object-oriented designing as both a professional practice and a learnt 
ontological disposition; thus it is intended primarily (but not exclusively) for 
the designer-in-training, as a counter-inductive move. The strategy seeks to 
encourage a more consciously ‘reflective practitioner’, to use Schön’s terms, 
but also to register and communicate the shift in agency from the designer to 
the designed. 
                                                                                                                                 
71 Ezio Manzini, The Material of Invention 25. 
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CHAPTER 10. TELEGENIC DESIGNING 
 
SNAP SHOT: DESIRE ENVIRONMENT 
Christmas 2002. My daughter gazes in wonder at the gleaming, 
bedecked tree rising through three floors of a central city building. 
“Beautiful” she gasps. “Shiny and lovely”. She looks to me; eyes alight, 
to affirm her experience of utter joy and wonderment in the face of a 
particularly monolithic elaboration of the precession of sign value. I 
look at this huge hunk of virgin plastic, wreathed in more composite 
materials, alloys, painted glass, foam paint and covered in lights which 
mock, in their benign twinkling, the forceful wrenching of coal for such 
pointless ends. I do not know what to say, caught by my daughter’s 
authentic experience of wonder. Not wanting to confuse her I tell her 
it’s nice, but that I will show her a real tree one day, nicer than this. Of 
course, this is a painfully unsatisfactory response: where on earth is to 
be found this ‘real’, original tree experience, which will always now be 
preceded and defined by this one? I am with her in a designed 
environment that surrounds and affirms her, and which communicates 
in easy tones about the things she already knows are good. This ‘good’ 
is already embedded in her young psyche and in its affirming midst, is 
utterly impossible to diminish. Once more, I resolve to never get lazy 
about speaking to her of the underside of the existing designed world 
that supports and nurtures us, as I scrabble together from remote bits 
and pieces alternative visions of desire that speak in other, relational 
ways to her of what is good and sacred. Visions of sustainability will 
always have this double plus workload in our designed environments in 
which unsustainability is structural — the unworking and reworking of 
desire, the problem of relating them and communicating this relation.  
 
TELEGENIC PRODUCTS 
While our lives brim over with products, it cannot be said that we generally 
experience material overload. Our lifestyles are punctuated and sustained by a 
range of remotely designed and constructed things upon which we have come 
to depend. Yet these products are only rarely the subject of our overt 
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consideration. Being forced to take account of our belongings for example, 
tends to evoke the question “where did all this stuff come from?” What Scarry 
calls the human imagination’s “insistent thrust toward material self-expression” 
is concealed by design’s remarkable capacity to withdraw.1 It is this capacity, 
design’s structuring of forgetting, that we now want to investigate. 
In our always already relating to things, the character of these 
relationships tend to become withdrawn except for those situations of 
breakdown in which design’s failure is experienced as a lack, even betrayal on 
the part of the product. Our frustration or vengefulness at the sliding door that 
doesn’t make way for us or the chair that collapses under our weight, reveals 
the responsibility we attribute to and the trust we place in design. The door, the 
chair should have known better.2
The overt ‘dumb lump’ effect of non-functioning electronic products 
are a particular affront as they are both objectively present and distinctly 
unavailable. There is no mechanical function to resort to in many new devices, 
which indicates a lack of adaptability and flexibility: as Ivan Illich has noted, 
industrial design creates a world of things that resist insight into their nature.3 
The disappearing act multiplies. After an initial induction into using many 
products, we seem to become unaware of why they were designed the way they 
were and why we use them the way we do, let alone how they extend beyond 
our immediate relation to them, into complex ecological systems. This 
‘unconscious’ nature of design-in-use haunts any discourse regarding the 
question of cultural change. Product design works to more and more efficiently 
enhance this process of naturalisation and to meet shifting expectations of 
transparent ‘do-ability’. Digital products conceal their operations beneath 
interfaces that allow use without understanding, including self-repairing 
                                                 
1 Scarry, The Body in Pain 179. 
2 “(O)bject awareness is the acceptable, expectable, and uncelebrated condition of civilisation, 
while object-unawareness is the unusual, unacceptable condition.” Scarry, The Body in Pain 
296. 
3 Illich quoted in Walker, Eternally Yours 167. The broken machine becomes ‘no thing’ 
because it means nothing to us, or as one media commentator put it, “a dead PC… is a very 
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systems.4 This has become a more general mode of designing both in terms of 
products that we handle directly, and by electronic intervention. In the 
computer environment, tangibility is relinquished to the design interface. 
Interpretations of pathways of actions in technological objects are often, as 
Donald Norman shows in his study of unusable things, poor interpretations.5 
Products with seamless exteriors, ‘all-in-ones’ that conceal the materiality of 
componentry, lightweight products that revel in the ingenious valuelessness of 
plastics, appear to almost will a sense of inconsequentiality and disposability. It 
is impossible to clean, repair and reuse numerous things and where it is 
possible, it is often easier, more comfortable and efficient to dispose of them.6  
Fewer and fewer products are designed to bring the user back from this 
situation. Design continues to deliver products that design out the need to know 
how something works and the effects that it might have, and replaces such 
needs with instantaneous facilities that negotiate around ‘thingliness’. The 
users are insulated from the machine’s world of circuit boards, twists of wire, 
spinning disk drives and operational manuals. They are unable to distinguish 
between their computer’s designed ‘earcons’ and those ‘natural’ audio cues 
associated with mechanical faults and impending breakdown (such as a bearing 
about to give way).7 This mode of designing has been linked to a fundamental 
loss of hand-exercised skill.8 Its impact is that the human user is fashioned as a 
television watcher — fascinated with the promise of the object and literate 
within the practical space engineered by the sign, but radically incapable and 
                                                                                                                                 
expensive paper weight.” Darren Yates, ‘Trash or Treasure” The Sydney Morning Herald April 
28-29, 2001. 
4 User ‘repair’ in this case usually only extends to tweaking the PC’s cache to afford more 
speed, while it draws on the lexicon of mechanical repair: ‘tuning’, ‘servicing’ etc.  
5 Instead of pathways of action, his term is ‘conceptual models’. See Norman, The Design of 
Everyday Things.  
6 As Borgmann notes, “it is not just unnecessary but impossible to maintain and repair paper 
napkins, cans, Bic ball points or any other one-way or one-time devices.” Albert Borgmann, 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) 47. 
7 The ‘earcon’ is a term for auditory icons developed by  researchers at MARC’s, which 
provide a user with important information about a design environment. MARC’s is an auditory 
research laboratory at University of Western Sydney. 
8 “(…)the hand is an essential means of staying in touch with the world…what technology 
increasingly does is to make us, literally, out of touch.” Fry, Remakings 94. 
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ignorant in situations that demand spontaneous practical interpretation. In the 
ideal technological product-user relationship, we have a machine able to 
perform more and more nuanced and non-standardised tasks, and a user whose 
role it is to merely judge the performance. We are reminded of the particular 
‘environmental performance’ of the Holden/CSIRO's parallel hybrid car that 
circumvents know-how while declaring the environmental credentials of its 
driver. The brochure reads:  
The driver does not have to decide when to switch to electric power, or 
when to charge the batteries, or when to use the petrol engine. The 
EMC (Energy Management Computer) makes all those judgements, 
deciding in a split second what the car's performance requirements are 
and what form/s of power are needed to satisfy them. Want to overtake 
that slow-moving truck? Depress the accelerator and the car will 
respond as you expect it to. The extra burst of power happens to be 
electrically generated, but you won't notice the difference.9
 
Such products rebuff user knowledge, engagement and mechanical 
comprehension as domains of concern, resisting future invasion from the 
processes of repair and maintenance, while they grow ever more complex in 
terms of manufacture, materials, assembly, sign ecologies and environmental 
impacts. In this way design expedites the finitude of things under the sign of 
constant presence. Norman argues that the smooth transparency of well-placed 
affordances is a sign of ‘good’ design. In its unobtrusiveness, good design 
‘disappears’.10 This overlooks design’s ontological influence. It assumes that 
transparent design has been made to take responsibility for the ‘right’ thing: 
existing cultures of use. On the contrary, the emphatic user-friendliness of 
many technological products (such as the incessant ‘smart’ beeping of the 
                                                 
9 From the Holden Hybrid Technology brochure included in the PowerHouse Museum 
“EcoLogic” exhibition ‘showbag’. (Holden Public Affairs: Melbourne, 2000). 
10 Except when it is beautiful – Norman’s latest book explores the emotional responses we 
have to designed things and why things that have ‘aesthetic appeal’ work better. As noted in 
footnote 48, chapter 1above, I think the value in his argument concerns the care and attention 
of users rather than aesthetics – we tend to ‘see’ things that call upon the practice of focal 
attention as Borgmann, whose arguments we explore below, suggest. In my view, Norman’s 
argument problematically validates using design to satiate the whims of mood, which comes 
dangerously close to advocating retail therapy and also fraternises with marketing’s ploy to 
inspire brand love. Norman, Emotional Design. 
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microwave from which food has not been collected or a seat belt that has not 
been done up, or the self-cleaning shaver) that ‘jigsaw’ to stereotyped use, 
conceals the fact that the trust that design engenders is frequently misplaced.  
Designed things are, to follow Bateson, trusted ideas.11 These ideas 
remain intact, hidden inside technical housings unless design is retrospectively 
made to detail its secret actions. Bruno Latour remarks that accidents provide a 
scenario within which one is finally able to hear what machines silently do or 
say via a kind of reverse engineering: 
When the space shuttle exploded, thousands of pages of transcripts 
suddenly covered every detail of the silent machine, and hundreds of 
inspectors, members of congress, and engineers retrieved from NASA 
dozens of thousands of pages of drafts and orders. This description… 
retraces the steps made by the engineers to transform texts, drafts and 
projects into things.12  
Even so, the power of design in its relational transactions with users 
mostly eludes analysis because analysis is itself circumscribed by a technical 
worldview. Products are made and desired however on the basis not of 
technical but of cultural ‘truths’ and in response to utterly cultural expectations 
and idiosyncrasies of use.13 It is the cultural fit of the technical product that is 
prioritised in design, even while the predominant understanding is that the 
technical object is merely technical, composed with a neutral clarity of cause-
effect relations. This is enhanced by the sensible, object-oriented view of 
culture, which fails to value scientific and technical understandings as cultural 
interpretations. The kind of apparent benign servicing evidenced by the 
technical products of everyday life can be understood, suggests Borgmann, as 
                                                 
11 Bateson writes“(t)rusted ideas…become available for immediate use without thoughtful 
inspection.” Steps to an Ecology of Mind 509. 
12 Bruno Latour “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” 
233. 
13 This is indicated by the rising interest in ethnographic research in design. It is common for 
groups of designers to talk about the ways people relate to technology which have nothing to 
do with design intention — shaking and banging the mouse, saying the fax is ‘slow’, the 
temperamental desktop ‘likes’ to be left on all day etc. For a discussion on user experience in 
design see Margolin, “The Experience of Products” in The Politics of the Artificial. 
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enacting ‘liberal democracy’.14 The liberal democratic tradition, with its 
distinctive convergence of the notions of liberty as absence of constraint, 
equality and self-realisation, has become, he argues, an overdetermining 
political context.15 It is absolutely consonant with the instrumental conception 
of technology as liberator, a role that has been taken on too conscientiously and 
uniformly: we have, in Borgmann's view simultaneously been ‘liberated’ both 
from what burdens us and what is worth sustaining.16  
This characterisation of a cultural thematic locked into the instruments 
of technology is what Borgmann identifies as ‘the promise of technology’. We 
have consented to its specification of the ‘good life’, whilst allowing 
technological operations to remain sheltered from public scrutiny.17 This 
promise was issued when the transformative powers of science began to take 
worldly shape, and augured that liberation from human hardship via technical 
means was at hand. Borgmann quotes a prescient Descartes, who says that the 
unconstraining of human reason from the dire limitations of nature: 
(W)ould not only be desirable in bringing about the invention of an 
infinity of devices to enable us to enjoy the fruits of agriculture and all 
the wealth of the earth without labour, but even more so in conserving 
health, the principle good and the basis of all other goods in this life.18  
This promise resonates in the contemporary world in which citizens are 
‘haves’ or ‘have nots’. It drives the spread of proto-consumerism into the third 
world as the democratic sharing of a technically specified and symbolically 
charged standard of living.19 Technology is not a choice put on offer, but rather 
constitutes the very basis for choices, and access to its products is increasingly 
                                                 
14 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 92.  
15 He argues that liberal democratic theory “is a force even in places where modern technology 
has a conservative or socialist cast.” Borgmann, Technology and the Character of 
Contemporary Life 82. 
16 “This becomes clear when one asks not merely whether opportunities in a liberal democratic 
society are equal and just but what kind of opportunity they represent.” (86) For Aidan 
Davison, this is Borgmann’s crucial insight into technological society. Davison, Technology 
and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 111. 
17 Borgmann Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 100. 
18 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 36. 
19 Fry, A New Design Philosophy 240. 
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understood a basic human right.20 This situation is so culturally embedded that 
almost without exception, technology is called in to resolve problems that were 
at least in part technologically created. Environmental problems are for 
example exacerbated, made visible and managed by technology. Technology 
alone, it seems, has the ability to overcome itself. As Davison has noted, 
evidence of unsustainability is increasingly taken as proof of the nascent state 
of technology.21  
The technological ‘fix’ both prescribes our interaction with technical 
systems and is fed back into the very design of products themselves.22 Product 
development performs affirmative action for the promise of technology, 
confusing assigned potential with actual conduct. While it seems as though we 
are constantly getting more compact and integrated designs, the technological 
device is never fully integrated. It relies on a consistent power supply and is 
increasingly dependent on environmental data services. There is also an 
expectation that each technological increment carries the sign of its successor, 
which is also of course the seed of its own destruction. You will get more than 
meets the eye, hardware plus software, the object plus its coming abilities. 
Technological innovation is prescribed — you can often sense where 
innovation should go next as current technologies become incorporated and 
communicate new standards in acceleration and dematerialisation. Hardware 
merely punctuates the trajectory of innovation. It needs to feel natural and 
familiar to the user, yet also needs to meet expectations by feeling faster, more 
efficient and effortless. While these minimal transitory differences are 
eventually naturalised in use, they are an important part of the initial product 
rhetoric, which determine how judgement is cast on a new device and directs 
its cultural induction. The proliferation of ‘third generation’, wireless products 
now appearing, seem to be reaching for an era when the environment will be 
overtly techno-spheric, thick with data. Hardware will increasingly be designed 
                                                 
20 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 103. 
21 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 5. 
22 Borgmann notes that ‘technological fix’ was coined by Alvin M. Weinberg in 1966. 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 164. 
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to merely ‘window’ the efficiency of the system of fully-fledged high-
bandwidth wireless data services endlessly servicing the smooth operativity of 
daily life unobstructed by objects.  
In spite of this ideal destiny, actual use makes evident a disjuncture 
between the technological promise and the functions that are actually 
delivered, which is exacerbated by design’s rapid retreat into functionality. 
While many technical products can barely contain their promise in the 
proliferation of functions they could perform (virtual desktops are littered with 
unused programs and every internet search is swamped by endless offers of 
‘freeware’) we also seem to carry an expectation of the counter-intuitive nature 
of technical performance that leads us to tolerate a dysfunctionality and 
unreliability that we would be unlikely to accept from any un-powered, 
mechanical product.23 This implicates the complicity of the user in the 
technological promise as a major driver of technologies for the consumer 
market, where image functions as a sign of ideal operation.24
 The lack of a feeling for consequence, feedback or danger in relation to 
Descartes’ ‘infinity of devices’, does not sit somewhere outside the world of 
products in a world of ideas, but is brought into being by them. After 
Heidegger, Borgmann specifies a pattern of concealment that is designed into 
products.25 For him, the defining feature of each and every technological 
                                                 
23 Norman argues that says there is a lack of trust in relation to complex electronic devices in 
contrast to simple mechanical objects because we don’t know what to expect from them and 
frequently feel ‘out of control.’ This initial mistrust of course evaporates when the new 
software or operation is ‘mastered’. Norman, Emotional Design 138. 
24 Borgmann describes the consumer who is both wary of technology but also unable to act 
differently with it as complicit: “we have a vanishing or perhaps dawning sense of how tenuous 
and futile our allegiance to consumption is. This sense, joined with our reluctance to act on it, I 
have called complicity.” Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 173. 
25 While Borgmann is at pains to distinguish his project from Heidegger’s, particularly in 
relation to his specifically contemporary orientation, his device paradigm is highly 
circumscribed by Heidegger’s thought on Enframing as the technological mode of disclosure. 
We can hear this for example in the following, “(a)ll of reality is patterned after the paradigm, 
and in this sense we can say that the paradigm has acquired an ontological dimension. When 
applied to technology, this is not to explain the paradigm’s origin but to highlight the extent 
and intensity of its rule. When the pattern is so firmly established, it also tends to become 
invisible.” Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 104. Hubert 
Dreyfus says Borgmann does exactly what Heidegger hopes his readers will do, that is to find 
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device and operation is a decisive rift between the machine — its workings — 
and its ‘commodity’, which is here understood as its perceived material benefit: 
what it makes, enables or is for. His premise is that the technological machine 
is more present as the commodity it delivers: a central heating system is 
warmth for example. Further, the central heating device remakes warmth as 
“instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe and easy” the specific qualities that 
encapsulate for Borgmann the technological experience.26  
The sharp internal fault line separating technical machinery (or means) 
from the commodity (or ends it serves), enables products to conceal the 
machinery upon which they depend, so they are experienced as freely 
disposable and self-sufficient, making little claim on our faculties and releasing 
us from the burdens, and pleasures, of skilful comprehension.27 For Borgmann, 
the split between machine and the commodity procured by it is a profound 
move against the truly integrated nature of the ‘pre-technological’ world. It 
represents a splitting in two of the fabric of life, and has accordingly wrought 
powerful changes in how we orient ourselves in the world.  
This notion of the pre-technological or ‘traditional’ world refers to 
things, practices, concerns and experiences that Borgmann characterises as 
‘focal’. These are for him healing things; things that ground, focus concern and 
restore one “to the depth of the world and to the wholeness of our 
being.”28Before the central heating device there was the family hearth. This 
was a focus of family activities, involving the felling of trees, sawing and 
splitting, hauling and stacking of wood and building a fire. The hearth provided 
a sense of community, an understanding of the lineage of resources and of 
seasonal rhythms. It embodied the effort and exertion of making, the exercise 
of skill and an acute sense of a situated place and time. Focal things ask for our 
                                                                                                                                 
the specific phenomena about which he speaks. Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and 
Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on how to affirm technology”. 
26 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 41.  
27 Borgmann refers to Robert Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance as an 
example of the potentially rewarding nature of relating to technology through activities of 
repair and maintenance. Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 47.  
28 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 206. 
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engagement and involvement, even pain and risk, and in turn we reap greater 
rewards from them. The central heating device on the other hand simply makes 
‘heat’ available.29 Its productivist, efficiency-engineered and scientifically 
informed ‘mind-set’ has isolated the commodity, wrenched it free of its context 
and in so doing has released the object from the bind of dependent 
relationships.  
Borgmann does not restrict the expression of the device paradigm to 
technological machines. He anticipates the challenging complexity of 
biotechnological designing when he argues that technological availability also 
transforms ‘traditional’ things, which appear unchanged save for some radical 
improvements that await the user. Techno-scientific methodology analyses 
wine for the effects of chemical substances and physical processes on its taste 
and visual appearance. This enables wine’s internal ‘machinery’ to be laid bare 
and makes available “(a) pleasantly grapey, smooth, light, fruity, and soft” 
beverage that is “clean, clear, limpid, and free of sediments”.30 Technological 
wine provides these qualities with less risk that did traditional wine, it is also 
cheaper to buy and less fatiguing to drink. 
Technology’s project, according to Borgmann, is the systematic and 
pervasive transformation of ‘focal’ things like wine or the hearth and the 
practices that surround them, into products that diminish or even veil life, even 
while they bestow their commodities abundantly. Without the commodity 
being connected to its contextual aspects, the nature of the thing and our 
experience of it are fundamentally reduced.  
The device paradigm is a useful characterisation of the concealing-
revealing dynamic we have previously discussed in relation to Heidegger. 
However it cannot explain the problems of the technological society in general. 
When Borgmann turns to the broader social context of the device paradigm, his 
argument risks falling into a poetics of unmediated experience.  
                                                 
29 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 41.  
30 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 49. 
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In Borgmann’s view, the rupture in focal things and practices effected 
by technology continues to widen: the device paradigm is now so amplified 
that people can live their entire lives in the foreground of technology barely 
aware of the impoverished state of their existences in which they have 
sacrificed full-bodied things interwoven with culture, nature and community, 
for an endless supply of mere commodities lacking in resonance and 
consequence.31   
Focal practices and things on the other hand, speak in the voice of 
nature.32 They are a revelation in the foreground context — the difference in 
the quality of experience between eating in a fast food joint and enjoying a 
home-cooked meal with friends, or foregoing a guided bus tour and going for a 
solitary hike in the wilderness allows the “scales to fall from our eyes”, 
revealing a new depth and quality of radiant reality.33 Borgmann, like Levin, is 
highly ambitious for the natural, reorienting power of this moment of 
revelation, of comparative learning. In Borgmann this moment instigates the 
political shift from commodities to focal concerns. The focal practice relocates 
technology from its concealing rule to its proper place in the equipmental 
domain, where it is able to contribute to the anchoring practice. Borgmann uses 
the example of the hiker’s appreciation of the hi-tech gear that enables, 
augments and significantly ‘gives radiance’ to the focal practice of hiking. 
Such a practice resists the naturally “parasitic and voracious” character of 
                                                 
31 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 51.  
32 Borgmann, “The Nature of Reality and the Reality of Nature”, Reinventing Nature? 
Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction, eds. Michael E. Soulé and Gary Lease (Washington: 
Island Press, 1995) 42. 
33 “Through the diversion and busyness of consumption we may have unlearned to feel 
constrained by the shallowness of commodities. But having gotten along for a time and quite 
well, it seemed, on institutional or convenience food, scales fall from our eyes when we step up 
to a festively set family table. The food stands out more clearly, the fragrances are stronger, 
eating has once more become an occasion that engages and accepts us fully.” Borgmann, 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 205. 
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technology.34  In these instances of ‘pruned back’ but powerfully ‘liberating’ 
technology, the original technological covenant is restored.35  
While Borgmann imagines there is a growing unease with the 
technological foreground and a desire to recover things in their depth, we may 
wonder how is it possible to sense the diminishment and violation of our 
lifeworlds affected by the device, if what is being missed or lost is so 
effectively concealed?36 You can generate focal feelings by gathering the 
family around the hearth or dinner table, turning off the TV, recorded music 
and telephones, but you also consolidate the concealment of technology by 
these actions. The food is grown, transported and cooked; the table laid, the 
family gathered, all in technologically dependent and ecologically damaging 
ways. Equally, the desire for and production of authentic experiences — the 
labour and skill of cooking or hearth building, getting back in touch with nature 
— have increasingly been taken up at the centre of the technological project, as 
the growth of ‘ecotourism’ shows. And how do the myriad activities of 
symbolic repair, such as lawn mowing, car polishing, body building etc that 
render over the ‘scars’ of temporality but also centre many lives, fit into this 
schema? 
Borgmann holds that the inexorable spread of the artificial device, 
including the flexible postmodern environments of hyperreality and, 
increasingly, the phenomenon of ‘information’, threatens the closure of 
experiences that are continuous with ‘the real’.37 Always inseparable from their 
world and demanding a full bodily and social engagement, real experiences are 
of a different order to those given by the device, which are cut out of the flow 
of life. One emerges from the hyperreal environment and in that moment the 
                                                 
34 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 247. 
35 “…the context of technology …is restored to the dignity of its original promise through the 
focal concerns at its center.” Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 
247. 
36 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 56.  
37 Borgmann, “The Nature of Reality and the Reality of Nature”, Reinventing Nature? 38. In 
Holding onto Reality: the Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millennium (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) Borgmann’s argument turns to the digital age 
of information and the decline of reality as ‘meaning’.  
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heightened experience of simulation is denaturalised, revealed as a sham. This 
revelatory context refuses the pervasiveness of design and overlooks the 
significance of its withdrawn functionality, which reworks the experience of 
focal engagement as an experience of constructed alienation.  
For Borgmann, a thing is a thing only if “all or most of its physically 
discernable features are finally significant”38, like the resonant truth of pristine 
nature. What is strongly evident in Heidegger’s reading of things however is 
their own agency — things exemplify and communicate ways of being and 
modes of conduct via their thinging. In thinging, presence drops away. 
Heidegger says, for example in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” that while 
there is something correct in the idea of relating dwelling and building as ends 
and means, “...at the same time by the means-end schema we block our view of 
the essential relations...(f)or to build is in itself already to dwell.”39 Building 
(designing) is informed by the experience of dwelling (already relating to 
designed things). 
Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa remind us that while Heidegger 
did favour nostalgic, ‘old world’ and physically ingenuous examples — 
examples that Borgmann finds misleading and dispiriting in light of the 
technological society40 — he also alludes to things that thing even when we do 
not respond to them with full attention, such as the modern, highway bridge.41 
They underscore the crucial issue that each thing ‘things’ in its own way, with 
its own mode of revealing.42 As we have argued, televisual thinging is a 
complex concealing-revealing. It is no generous outpouring like that of 
Heidegger’s most famous thing — the wine jug — which is not just a useful 
earthen object that contains wine as fruit of the land and sun, but implies 
offering, giving, sharing around a table, and embodies and communicates these 
relations through use. The televisual does not openly gather and disclose its 
                                                 
38 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 191. 
39 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling,Thinking” 146. 
40 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 200. 
41 Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to 
Affirm Technology”.  
42 Dreyfus and Spinosa referring to Heidegger, “The Thing” in “Highway Bridges”. 
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surrounds, but it is certainly path-building. The technological device, in its 
service provision, is not a radiant, engaging, focal thing in the sense Borgmann 
wants to communicate. It is however, undeniably a kind of thing that things in 
its gathering of the world as a standing reserve of materials, manufacture, 
labour and sign value. It is a pro-duct thrown forward in the world, even 
though it is characterised by the concealing quality of technology. In their 
particular modes of thinging, products create worlds. They are made, desired, 
promoted, taken up and used, disposed of and forgotten and at none of these 
stages is their reality diminished. The implications of thinging are lost in 
thought for which the growing horizon of the artificial obstructs the self-
evident truth of nature.43  
Borgmann gives us important insights into the structure of forgetting: 
how commodities affect a dematerialisation of their apparatus by design, 
drawing attention to the fact that the separation between means and ends can be 
understood as both perceptual and material. However, he does not adequately 
account for the implications of this agency of design. There is something too 
passive about Borgmann’s device paradigm, which not only excludes a reading 
of what such products do in fact gather and the worlds they create beyond their 
expressions as a device, but also abandons the world of devices.44  As Manzini 
points out, “How is it possible to talk increasingly about ‘superficialization’ of 
experience, loss of the objects’ physical and cultural character, matter 
reduction in favour of information while, on the other hand, the world is more 
and more saturated with things…?”45 
                                                 
43 Bruce Foltz, for example, says that the styrofoam container is “by no means a thing”. Whilst 
itself lacking in presence, (possibly an example of ‘good’ design in Norman’s terms), such a 
container does carry substantial ecological consequences, which an understanding of thinging 
helps to disclose. The disposition upon the made that attributes no critical attention to such 
things might now contribute to the abandoning of things to their objectivity. Foltz, Inhabiting 
the Earth 20. 
44 The commodity in Borgmann’s analysis is also ‘no thing’. He says that to consume is to “use 
up an isolated entity without preparation, resonance and consequence.” Borgmann, Technology 
and the Character of Contemporary Life 51.  
45 Manzini, “Towards a new ecology of the artificial environment: Design within the limits of 
possibilities and the possibilities of limits.” Unpublished lecture, Domus Academy 1991 1. 
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In wanting to distinguish the radiance of true things, Borgmann clears 
the decks of the obfuscatory, morally compromised devices that attenuate 
experience, distract, disengage and fragment even while his analysis refuses to 
give them ontological status. This tendency gains in strength as the philosophy 
of technology turns purposefully toward the issue of sustainability.  
Aidan Davison, who writes on technology and sustainability, says “I 
see only deceit and conceit in attempts to design and engineer the good life.”46 
After Borgmann, Davison theorises the world we have built and live in as 
‘deformed’, somewhat out of balance.47 This notion of deformity gathers 
resonance when Davison refers to “the pain and love bound up in being related 
to my technological world as a parent… struggling in the jaws of 
technology.”48 For him, design fragments family life and the means of this 
fragmentation include: 
multitudinous factories producing even greater multitudes of 
inconspicuous artefacts, such as milk formula, plastic nipples, 
disposable nappies, cots, prams, stuffed animals (curiously enough, the 
majority of whose living counterparts were slaughtered long ago), 
television programs, videos and books, that display how the 
technological society cares for, shapes, and orders its young.”49
This litany of products composes an aesthetic of artificiality that Borgmann 
would no doubt also find alienating and contrary to the focal practice of 
parenting. However certain sustaining environments test the intimate aesthetic 
of Davison’s ‘world worth caring for’, from which all such devices are 
expelled. What would he have to say about the neonatal intensive care ward of 
any large hospital, which is overabundant in such ‘deformed’ products, or the 
grateful hands reaching for such artificial sustenance in community relief 
programs? 
                                                 
46 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 212-13.  
47 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 93 – 115. 
48 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 195. 
49 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 171. 
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While many of the pleasures of the world he describes may indeed be 
comparatively ‘rich’, the problem of the technological society lies not in its 
depletion of focal things and practices, but in the complex sustaining quality of 
the naturalised artificial and the experiential satisfactions our designed worlds 
provide. As long as the negative transformations effected by technology are 
understood as implicitly surmountable, the project of cultural change is unable 
to move beyond reconciliatory and ultimately aesthetic models of reform, 
recovery and restoration.50  
Indeed, in the twenty years since Borgmann first articulated the device 
paradigm, the ‘instrument-specific’ nature of desire has escalated 
exponentially, while the discourse of cultural change remains a dream running 
alongside culture, like an incessant, yet mostly disarticulated conscience.51 The 
problem goes beyond “a juxtaposition of alluring surfaces and troubling 
depths”; it is one of ontological designing, in which the need for an other way 
of life more sustaining of the future, is largely not felt.52
As the snap shot that opens this chapter attempts to show, it is a 
struggle is to keep sight of the fact that the authentic joys of our relationships 
emerge in and are supported by artificial worlds of design, with which we feel 
“at home”. 53 People are not led astray or away from the call of focal 
engagements by false things, rather designed things are incorporated; designed 
things entail rich, cultural worlds that legitimate human desire. Certainly, the 
world we live in is an irreducibly different shape to that of the past. Yet we 
cannot re-centre ourselves in a pre-technological world. We can imagine this 
                                                 
50  This is clear in the following passage: “Orientation in the inner cities does not have to be 
invented or produced, it needs discovery and nuture, the restoration of historic buildings and 
the preservation of open spaces around them. The recovery of green areas along river banks 
and lake shores and the connection of these focal points through pleasant walkways.” 
Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 244. 
51 “Abstract general ends — health, safety, comfort, nutrition, shelter, mobility, happiness and 
so forth — become highly instrument-specific. The desire to move about becomes the desire to 
possess an automobile; the need to communicate becomes the necessity of having telephone 
service...” Langdon Winner quoted in Borgmann Technology and the Character of 
Contemporary Life 62. 
52 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 188. 
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world with the help of historical stories and records, we can create experiences 
for ourselves that carry its trace, but it will never again become our ‘home’. 
The desire for the engaging, binding qualities of the moral life in 
Borgmann and Davison have ironically become driving concerns for the design 
of new devices that make these qualities more easily available and renew the 
authentic promise of technology. Following Borgmann’s argument, Verbeek 
and Kokelkoren say design needs to encourage more engaging relationships, to 
call attention to things as material objects instead of signs:  
If we want our attachment to be directed toward objects and not only 
toward their meaning and the lifestyle they represent, it would be wise 
to design products from the perspective of their engaging capacity. This 
could be done by healing the split between machinery and commodity, 
thus creating a revaluation of the machinery of products. Product 
machinery should be freed from its withdrawal and be visible, 
accessible, and understandable again. Where possible, dependent 
objects should be created instead of quasi-autonomous objects.54
 
This notion of healed things and whole things becomes very important 
in relation to the question of design ethics and design quality. It carries a strong 
ambition for design’s capacity to produce meaningful objects that can bestow 
quality of life on human beings. The ultimate destiny of the focal thing in 
Borgmann is the leverage of change. He says “we should measure the 
significance of developments about us by the degree to which focal concerns 
are beginning to flourish openly or continue to live in hiding.”55 The holy grail 
of this thinking transferred to the design context is the product that can become 
an ambassador of difference, and that is capable of leveraging difference.56 The 
object in much design thinking represents the fruition of design insight in a 
                                                                                                                                 
53 “We believe we are at home in the immediate circle of beings. That which is, is familiar, 
reliable, ordinary.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 54. 
54 Verbeek and Kockelkoren, “The Things that Matter” 41. 
55 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life 249.  
56 Van Hinte, Eternally Yours 22. 
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representational capacity. Ultimately, such as is the case for product semantics, 
the high-quality object ‘correctly’ reflects the true human context. Design, like 
art, is a practice subject to the expectation that ultimately its value should be 
finally discernable, embodied in objects. There is a strong sense that theoretical 
discourse is merely a deliberation, preparation and rehearsal for this ineluctable 
demand for realisation.  
It is typical of this approach that the question that people apparently ask 
most frequently of the Eternally Yours project is “can you give me some 
examples of products that comply with Eternally Yours standards?” van Hinte 
replies: “Unfortunately the answer is still: no we can’t. There are, however, 
many examples of products and services that can be considered satisfactory in 
some respects.”57 Eternally Yours suggests that this poverty of objects reflects 
the nascent state of products able to endure in material and cultural terms. 
However, there is a slightly sheepish element to this reply, which betrays that 
in design culture at least, this outcome is highly unsatisfactory. If we are not 
able to consolidate ideas in material forms, then the usefulness of such 
explorations for the designer would seem limited. Conversely, the few 
examples that are put forward (Verbeek and Kokelkoren for example laud a 
heating device that works via a focal practice of communal engagement at the 
close of their essay) tend to fall short of fully embodying the wealth of ideas 
invested in them, the promise of the problem.  
It is possible and as we shall see desirable to understand whether or not 
designed things embody interpretations that can be judged as forethoughtful. 
The poverty of design’s response to the call for more sustainable, engaging 
products can be attributed in part to the limited nature of the interpretations 
invested in them. However, the notion that the product form and the broader 
culture of production circumscribe the expression and capability of design, 
needs to be contested.  
There is no shortage of products that can claim to have made some 
form of a difference. The differences made by products and the embodiment of 
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difference in the product form, are however not the same thing. The deliberate 
project of generating cultural difference by design, is still another. Product 
innovation in a consumer-driven framework, which comprehends design solely 
in terms of sign value, confuses these claims. The distinction between design 
and visual styling fades away. In the commercial/industrial setting, innovation 
must be realised in the form of the product, even when the difference actually 
lies in how products ‘disappear’ in their shaping of thinking and practices. The 
product user is inducted via this object orientation into learning to intuit and 
desire quality as a visual characteristic, and over-looking existing facilities and 
new service-based solutions, even when these may in fact meet their perceived 
needs more effectively.  
As we have discussed, Winograd and Flores argue that this object focus 
is wrong: design(ing) actually occurs in language. Design is a hermeneutic 
practice and happens in interpretations and conversations before, around and 
after the production of new things. For Winograd and Flores, technology is a 
domain fraught with powerful cultural meanings. Rather than referring to the 
mysteriously self-enclosed artifacts functioning around us, technology is “a 
domain of anticipation”.58 Indeed, there is increasing interest amongst 
technological innovators in the economic vision of strategic foresight and talk 
about the ‘future-proofing’ of still relatively costly hardware.59 A ‘distinction’ 
or new perspective is first made in words and then shared by a design team. 
Innovations are speculations or opportunities within the frame of established 
practices, which then set the scene for the development of tools in support of 
speculations. In this light, the product form is a kind of decision, which shapes 
and directs the flow of energy, materials, interpretations, practices, desires and 
so on.  
                                                                                                                                 
57 van Hinte, Eternally Yours 22. 
58Fernando Flores, Introduction: Business Concerns for Technology (Emeryville: Logonet Inc, 
1987) 18. 
59 See for example Nick Marsh, Mike McAllum and Dominique Purcell, Strategic Foresight: 
The Power of Standing in the Future (Melbourne: Crown Content, 2002). 
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Let us consider an example of object-oriented innovation. The 
following short history reveals the limited horizon of object-oriented designing 
as it moves between conversations, signs, thing(ing) and practices.  
The iMac computer, Apple’s phenomenally successful ‘consumer 
computer’ was launched in 1998 at a time when Apple was radically losing 
market share. The iMac is an interesting case of the general shift to 
dematerialisation in computer design. Its strangely heavy visual presence 
became a kind of bridge to lead the consumer, still attached to the domain of 
things and tangible forms of communication, into the discourse of the digital 
future.  
The iMac was heralded as innovative because of two things: it found a 
new market for Apple and it made the computer strange again. The iMac’s sign 
value was its foregrounding of ‘user-friendliness’: it extended the comforting, 
non-tech appearance of the graphical user interface (first used in Apple’s ‘Lisa’ 
PC in 1983) to the surface of the machine. The look of the iMac managed to 
combine both the throwaway pop aesthetic and the “shallow functionalism”60of 
the streamlining era, making them endearing, quaint and tinged with nostalgia 
for the early years of product styling.61 It declared itself as an expression of 
different thinking (‘Think Different’ was the tag line for the advertising 
campaign) 62 and yet, in recognition of the cultural presence of technology as 
functionally secretive, it was very careful about promising to do the thinking 
for you. Apple understood that one does not just accumulate things, but 
meanings, actions, practices, ways of living and working that are attached to 
things. The iMac therefore needed to appear within pre-existing domains of 
concern, as a new opportunity within familiar practices of shopping, screen 
based entertainment and familial activity. What the iMac was able to achieve, 
by reaching those who had never owned a computer or been on-line, was to 
                                                 
60 Verbeek and Kockelkoren “The Things That Matter” 31. 
61 Harris, Cute, Quaint, Hungry and Romantic 50. 
62 The campaign used images of prominent pop cultural ‘thinkers’ such as Einstein and 
Picasso, and brands them with the Apple logo. 
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present as a mode of immediate social and cultural empowerment within these 
domains.  
When it was launched in 1998 it was, according to one website ‘the 
computer to bring Apple back from the brink’; it was voted ‘Machine of the 
Year’ by Time Digital and ‘best designed product of the year’ by USA Today. 
The iMac with its five colour ‘identities’ began making appearances as part of 
the domestic décor in home/lifestyle magazines, an antidote to the purely 
functional office aesthetic. It was claimed as the decorator’s friend, an 
inspiration for the design of rooms full of other translucent, colourful, plastic 
things. In Tanqueray’s Eco-Chic, the iMac is exemplary: “A brilliant 
combination of the hi-tech and the human, the colourful, personable, shapely 
iMac and iBook hopefully heralds the start of a new era of computer design, 
one in which the human element is no longer neglected”63 The ‘humanising’ 
and engaging iMac promised to overcome the uniformity of the product 
environment. From August to December 1998, Apple ran the biggest consumer 
computer campaign in history that premiered, appropriately enough, on the 
Wonderful World of Disney. For each of the 400,000 iMac’s Apple wanted to 
sell by the end of 1998, there was an advertising budget of $250.64More than 
15 million copies of a 12-page colour product catalogue were inserted in major 
magazines (more than double the amount of inserts Apple had distributed in the 
past). Billboards went up in 10 US cities, and eventually internationally, 
featuring a large photo of the iMac in configurations that completely did away 
with denotation (the iMac was unrecognisable as a PC), with one of the 
following headlines: “I think, therefore iMac,” “Chic. Not geek,” “Sorry, no 
beige,” “Mental floss” or “Yum.” Apple’s grammatically novel “Think 
Different” ads had already started to flood magazine back covers, city 
billboards, television and cinema screens internationally.  
This resource intensive rhetorical moment had a lifespan of less than 
one year. By then, the problems with the design-in-use of the iMac, (which 
                                                 
63 Tanqueray, Eco Chic: Organic Living. 
64 Tom Dunlap, CNET News.com August 14, 1998. 
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paradoxically was said to be all about the user) had emerged, and the 
‘speculative texts’ that had lauded it set about killing its sign value.65 The 
stacks of phonebooks that style conscious designers had to had to pack under 
the machine to bring it up to appropriate height, now became visible;66 the 
small screen was likened to squinting and peering through a key hole and the 
mouse was deemed too small, flimsy.67
 In addition to these obvious problems, the iMac was playing a game of 
Chinese whispers. The aesthetic virus it had spawned was spreading; 
generating a rash of technological clones that relinquished the utilitarian 
techno-aesthetic for organic-shaped injection moulded plastic housings, across 
many product ‘breeds’.68 The iMac look in overdrive quickly diminished its 
designer preciousness and necessary “breathing space”.69 It also prompted a 
tendency to offer previously single models of other things in rainbow multiples 
of five. A standout Borgmannian example here is the Sharp Lapiz television, 
which was advertised as a way to restore family harmony by servicing family 
members with their own private colour-coded television.  
Aside from its overt nod to streamlining (it was also called the new 
Volkswagen when it arrived — this company responded opportunistically by 
styling the ‘new Beetle’ in ‘eight delicious flavours’), the iMac’s ‘water clear’ 
housing gestured towards dematerialisation, the ideal of immateriality made 
                                                 
65 This is a term used by Fernando Flores to describe the research, trade and marketing journals 
(and one might add websites) that offer the observer of technology valuable insights into the 
conversations that surround technological innovation. Flores, Introduction: Business Concerns 
for Technology 12. 
66 Cozo, a Japanese company seized the opportunity to sell multi-coloured ‘usability 
enhancing’ iMac stands in response.  
67 By 2001, the IT media declared the iMac, with its ‘primitive’ 15-inch monitor (“imagine 
trying to view the Sydney Harbour through a keyhole and you’ve pretty much got the idea”) 
‘not quite the fashion statement it once was.’ Darren Yates review of AppleiMac SE in “Icon”, 
The Sydney Morning Herald May 19-29, 2001.  
68 Examples of Korean copies: eMachines' eOne computer was one of the first PC Mac clones 
that looked just like the ‘Bondi Blue’ iMac. Apple sued Emachines in 1999. Apple also sued 
Future Power for creating the E-Power, another computer modelled on the iMac and available 
in the same translucent colours but named after gemstones instead of fruit. Apparently there 
was at the time no precedent for the design of a computer being used as a trademark or 
copyrightable item. Aside from computers, there was a range of other Imac-like products, 
included a new smooth-edged instant cameras from Polaroid, mini analogue TVs, telephones, 
pet beds, candy bowls, and stuffed iMac toys sold through eBay. 
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material. A leading New York designer commented, “I started working with 
translucent plastics because I believe there is a poetic relationship between the 
material and the dematerialisation of the object. As soon as you can see 
through it, you reduce the visual volume of the product.”70 The iMac’s 
transparency aestheticised the ‘ready-to-hand’ absorption of things into their 
working environments. You are invited to gaze at the innards of the machine, 
but not to engage or tinker with them.  
While iMac’s styling was applauded as innovative, its speedy symbolic 
exit to make way for new models pushed techno-aesthetic obsolescence to new 
heights. Baudrillard calls the model a pattern of collective and mythological 
projection — it hides the series it implies. And while it is with the serial object 
that one lives, it is the model that achieves a referential status, becomes the 
archetype that the eye and mind are tuned in to.71The telegenic product enters 
the scene as though it is the first and only of its kind and leaves in the same 
way — it is literally made unaware of its ecological trace and the material 
detritus of the ‘copies’ in its wake. As Guy Debord writes, “(e)ach individual 
commodity fights for itself, cannot acknowledge the others and aspires to 
impose its presence everywhere as though it were alone.”72  
The all-in-one, stand-alone design (monitor and computer enclosed in 
the one unit), clean lines and hidden away cables and parts, symbolically 
disavowed the relational dependency of all electronic devices. But it also made 
the machine impossible to upgrade.73It had no expansion slots, and in an 
assertive move to bring technological futures into being, no floppy drive 
(though a net discourse emerged about how to create an illegal floppy drive for 
                                                                                                                                 
69 Baudrillard, The System of Objects 61. 
70 Helen Greenwood, “See-Though Society”, Sydney Morning Herald Spectrum, March 4, 
2000. 
71 Baudrillard remarks in a note: “When Brigitte Bardot hairdos were all the rage, every girl 
who followed the fashion remained unique in her own eyes, because her point of reference was 
never the thousands of other who looked exactly like her but, rather, Bardot herself sublime 
archetype and fountainhead of uniqueness.” Baudrillard, The System of Objects 184. 
72 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 43-4. 
73 The all-in-one design of the iMac meant that if something went wrong with the monitor, the 
whole machine was implicated. It also meant you had to work around an internal monitor to 
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your iMac). The secret the iMac was passing on was certainly not one 
promoting intergenerational compatibility. By 1999 already 4 new iMac 
models had come and gone, each outdoing the predecessor whose eventual 
possible upgrade was underpriced by complete replacement.74  
While the iMac was not futuristic in the way that streamline era 
products were, it was Futurist in that it demanded the obsolescence of the 
past.75 The iconic model conceals the conditions of its design and manufacture 
as well as its coming afterimage: hundreds and thousands of iMacs languishing 
in basements and cupboards, bits of iMacs, tons of unreusable multicoloured 
plastic casings and circuit boards. The iMac had no context of upgrade, of 
modular ‘self reflection’ and improvement; it was, in short, a situated instance 
of televisual worlding. It was also, however, a ‘successful’ design, an icon that 
embraced the role of overcoming contextual meanings.  
It is a testament to the materially transformative power of sign 
ecologies that you can actually sit in front of a 15 year old WANG computer 
that is in excellent repair, with its ergonomically positioned, easy to 
manoeuvre, concertina swivel neck (highly reminiscent of the new iMac with 
the LCD display); its well-made, PVC and fabric protective covers that actually 
came with it still intact, and think about it in the past tense: you ‘were’. Now 
that it has nothing in the world to connect up to, it is design out of time.76  
The thing shines in its iconic moment. But the rhetorical sign quickly 
abandons the thing, allowing it to slip into forgetfulness. De-signing the 
madeness of the icon is crucial for revealing what happens when things are, as 
                                                                                                                                 
add RAM, replace a hard drive, or install expansion cards and you couldn’t attach an external 
monitor.  
74 It would be uneconomical to install DVD and some of the other new features into an ‘old’ 
machine and by early 2000 you couldn’t buy memory for some of the early models. 
75 Flores says: “When we speak of technology we also have some simultaneous understanding 
of time associated with the technology. For example, to have tools and equipment is to 
participate in the conversations concerning obsolescence, the innovation of new tools, and 
speculation of new practices, which may eliminate the use of current tools. We assess the time 
when we say we must act in order to keep up with these innovations.” Introduction: Business 
Concerns for Technology 15.  
76 The afterlife of such a computer is limited to use as a film prop or as an exhibit for the 
nostalgic gaze in a hardware museum. 
 259
Dreyfus and Spinosa put it, “thinging but not shining”.77 The sign/world 
‘healing’, the revelation about quality, cannot be carried out at the level of the 
object, cannot be held in constant presence before us. The product is always 
already split, ‘unhealed’ by the mutually responsive relationships between the 
product, its setting and user.  
Design is not primarily about objects or even the conversations that 
precede them. Design is our second nature, allowing for changes in our ways of 
living to become natural.  It is a structuring of forgetting — forgetting both 
objects and the reasons and interpretations that produced them. The influence 
of design happens precisely in this forgetting, when design ‘disappears’. The 
appearance of the product, and how it interfaces with users, has to be assessed 
in this regard not from the position of being ‘correct’, but in terms of how it 
signals the becoming-natural of design — what it tells us about its pending 
disappearance into the half-light of habitual engagement.  
Elaine Scarry’s understanding of the designed thing as a force of human 
imagination helps us to further explicate this new context of assessment. For 
Scarry, the human being is not lost in a technological world, rather human 
interpretations are spread out into it, they inform rather than deform. There is 
no immunity in her analysis of the interaction between things and people. The 
designed thing is “a fulcrum or lever across which the force of creation moves 
back onto the human site and remakes the makers.”78 This interpretation 
recognises the environment as alive with design intentions, amplified and 
extended in things.  
  In her descriptions of world-making, design causes two 
transformations: “(F)irst from an invisible aspect of consciousness to a visible 
but disappearing action; second, from a disappearing action to an enduring 
material form.”79 The made thing is only the midpoint in the total action of 
design, existing between the projection of making and its magnified 
                                                 
77 Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and Feasts”. 
78 Scarry, The Body in Pain 307. 
79 Scarry, The Body in Pain 290. 
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reciprocation or ‘gift’.80 The making of a winter coat, for example, is an act of 
wishing human susceptibility to cold gone.81 This wish is embodied in the coat, 
the desire to impart well-being sewn into it. Further, the coat is capable of 
reciprocating a great deal more than was invested in it, in its potential longevity 
and transferability. Designed things are world-altering differences that project 
internal human characteristics of sentience into an indifferent world.  
Far from being indifferent themselves, designed things in Scarry’s analysis 
make an indifferent world turn toward us.  
This analysis also allows insights into the dangerous ‘empathy’ of the 
televisual and its ontological designing. For the positive gift of design can also 
reciprocate and amplify ignorance and destruction. The madeness of the 
constructed thing is often well concealed. Some made things — a god is 
Scarry’s example — depend upon their madeness being hidden away. In the 
case of the god “it will be important that the earlier arc of action be not only 
unrecognisable but even unrecoverable.”82 The hiding of madeness is also 
integral to the telegenic product. The iconic, promotional image is a 
performance of autonomy in which all traces of human signature are rendered 
over. It is unsurprising that many a mass produced thing — whether place, 
object or person — is received as a depreciation of the magical televisual 
appearance of the icon. 
The aeroplane, in a god-like fashion, depends upon the concealment of 
the arc of projection — the “seams and cutting marks that record and announce 
its human origin”.83 The exposure of design in the situation of flying could 
threaten to fill the imagination with horror, revealing the vulnerability of 
human participants and disabling the idealism which holds its design together.  
The world is made up of a ‘surfeit’ of things within which the 
interpretations of making are hidden. Made things have specified the nature of 
                                                 
80 See Clive Dilnot, “The Gift.”  
81The made thing is “the structure of the act of perception visibly enacted”. Scarry, The Body in 
Pain 290. 
82 Scarry, The Body in Pain 312. 
83 Scarry, The Body in Pain 312. 
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human imagination and are “now actually ‘felt’ to be located inside the 
boundaries of one’s own skin where one is in immediate contact with an 
elaborate constellation of interior cultural fragments that seem to have 
displaced the dense molecules of physical matter.”84 We are involved in a 
naturalised artificial environment in which existing objects sponsor new 
objects, and “human agents … are now caught up in the cascade of self-
revision they have themselves authored.”85 Through designed things, people 
also become implicated in each other’s sentience; relationships are conducted 
through things. Naturally, we take advantage of design’s promise to provide 
immunity and autonomy. 
This is somewhat of a reversal of the interpretations of the 
technological society we have thus far encountered, in which devices obscure 
rather than revise the self. Borgmann shows that the telegenic object effectively 
conceals its madeness, and yet what is more significant is that this concealment 
is integral to the fact of its becoming ontologically incorporated, revising and 
remaking its users.  
This remaking is not only secretly cultural — informing desires, 
expectations, judgements and even interpretations of others’ sentience — but in 
many cases is also secretly biophysical, as new dangers associated with the 
(in)visible power of previously insignificant materials and energies emerge in 
our increasingly complex designed environments. In the already televisually 
fraught case of electromagnetic radiation, for example, the environmental 
surfeit of technical objects, which are individually designed to be immune to 
their environmentality, are engaged in creating an (in)visible environment with 
a new, spatio-temporal architecture. Warning signs suggest that the ‘on’ mobile 
phone, which has already revised where we are in a cultural sense, will also 
potentially interfere with the pace maker or the ventilator, sparks a fire at a 
petrol bowser, or mess with the flight controls of airborne devices. While we 
are directed to ‘please turn off your mobile phone’ this request has no clear 
                                                 
84 Scarry, The Body in Pain 256. 
85 Scarry, The Body in Pain 321 - 23. 
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explanation, so the cultural response is equally hesitant. On the other hand, an 
opportunistic market for protective devices becomes established, which allows 
people to cover their bases with objects in the face of environmental 
ignorance.86 In this new, ‘hertzian’ environment of technical installations, the 
use of a ‘jammer’ constitutes a form of trespass.87   
 It was Scarry’s recognition of the complex implications of this new 
environment that caused her to transgress the ostensible disciplinary contexts 
of her Harvard professorship in 1998. She entered the arena of the televisual 
press with a controversial article in the New York Review of Books that raised 
very public questions about the TWA 800 plane crash off Long Island, New 
York in 1996. In this article she redrew the boundaries of the investigation 
beyond the twisted metal of the plane being painstakingly reconstructed in a 
Long Island hangar, to include the ‘goings on’ of ten military aircraft and ships 
in the vicinity of TWA when it crashed, demanding that the unauthorised 
‘argument’ that may have taken place between these devices be retraced and 
revealed.88 Her article draws attention to the unnameable range of 
consequences that emerge from minute and incremental human decisions, 
which are then amplified and extended by design. Our environments are alive 
                                                 
86 ‘Phone Shield’ is one device amongst many that promises to immunise users against the 
effects of electromagnetic radiation. In this case, to protect the head from emissions from a 
mobile phone. The advertisement urges the prospective buyer to ‘show you care’ by giving the 
product to mobile using friends and family.  
87 Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, Design Noir: The Secret Life of Electronic Objects (Berlin: 
Birkhauser, 2001) 27. I look at the issue of cumulative impacts in (in)visible electromagnetic 
environments in “Our Electromagnetic Environment: Keeping in Touch”, EcoDesign 
Foundation Information Ecology November, 1998.  
88 Scarry asks: “What equipment was switched on? What instruments were turned off? What 
was the sequence of those acts? We need to know the answers to these questions if we are to 
determine whether electromagnetic interference — a sudden pulsing or spiking in the 
electronic environment — may have caused TWA 800's electrical systems to go haywire, as is 
compatible with the fact that the transmissions from the transponder on its belly and the 
transmissions from the cockpit both ceased at the same moment, as did the black box (which 
often continues to record, even in the late stages of a plane's catastrophe).” Elaine Scarry, “The 
Fall of TWA: The possibility of electromagnetic interference,” The New York Review of Books, 
April 9, (1998): 59-76. 
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with these (in)visible projections, the cumulative effects of which remain both 
unthought and unthinkable  by science.89  
This situation brings to light the need for design to extend beyond its 
object orientation, to take responsibility for its forgetting and the relations of 
trust that this implies. This need becomes ever more pressing. The becoming-
natural of a critical mass of devices, moving steadily to a receptive culture that 
is always indiscriminatingly ‘on’, cannot be previewed by the scientific 
practices of impact assessment on the design planning end or on forensic 
investigation in the aftermath of an accident, particularly if neither of these 
make room for a learning capacity. 
Scientific investigation in the calculative tradition depends on 
predictive models, on research that can be iterated. It must focus on per unit 
instances (the radiation levels of one mobile phone tower; the efficiency and 
emissions of one car), which also then becomes the basis for assessments of 
product liability. It is not in the business of making ‘educated guesses’, 
advocating intuitive responses or precaution, or speculating on the exponential 
effect of its findings. Thus the ability to anticipate and respond to the relational 
and dynamic situation of multiple product systems speaking at cross-purposes 
is beyond the scope of the replicable study. As one scientist confronted with 
the environmental ‘moment’ of Scarry’s investigation replies, “the calculation 
problems are intractable”. We are increasingly abandoned to the unknown 
things that are themselves abandoned in and to their objectivity.  
In Scarry, the resolute humanist ‘spirit’, which guides Levin and 
Borgmann is reworked, cleaved open by designed things that rework the 
natural/artificial division. Her work gives us important insights into the gift of 
the artificial world, and how it sustains and remakes us. This affects an 
understanding of the product beyond the mere accoutrements of sign value. 
                                                 
89 At the final hearing on TWA 800 in 2000 the issues Scarry raised were dismissed, not 
however before two subsequent crashes occurred involving the same military zone that TWA 
800 had flown through. Scarry, “TWA 800 and Electromagnetic Interference: Work Already 
Completed and Work that Still needs to be done,” The New York Review of Books, Oct 5, 
(2000) 10 Dec. 2004. <www.nybooks.com/articles/13896>  
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The designed thing, as a materialisation of human interpretation, actually 
supports life, assisting, amplifying or altering the “felt-experience of 
sentience”.90 Yet this also means that human sentience is irretrievably altered 
by design, taken over by it.  
Design is the structuring of forgetting — it relieves us of our sentience. 
Whether this relief is ethical or responsible, depends on an understanding of 
design than exceeds the prevailing technical interpretation. The practice of de-
sign needs to follow the descriptive contexts we have explored to rematerialise 
the cultural transformations of design. 
Borgmann urges: “designers are charged with making the material 
culture conducive to engagement.”91 Rather than taking this as making anew, 
we take this to indicate a much-needed shift in perspective on the existing 
culture. This demands a different culture of designing, one that is open to the 
prevailing design agency of interpretations mediated by the accessible 
environment. The product of design is a form of knowing. It needs to be 
reclaimed as such. As Vilém Flusser suggests in his meditation on the ethics of 
industrial design, the production of things can no longer be considered ‘pre-
ethical’ and ‘value-free’ in the complex relationality of the televisual public 
sphere, in which institutional transparency, public trust and competence have 
departed.92  
The projected task of de-sign in this respect is of critical importance to 
the professional designer who, in manipulating icons, projecting markets, 
servicing clients and inventing signs, is caught up in the visible and 
quantifiable. The idea that designers design in conditions of (in)visibility  — in 
both a hermeneutic and technological sense — is counter-intuitive. The 
responsibility embodied in design must be met with a responsible, responsive 
designing. This depends on putting something in the way of the blinkered 
vision of telegenic designing and the autopoietic generation of new things — 
                                                 
90 Scarry, The Body in Pain 283. 
91 Albert Borgmann, “The Depth of Design” in Discovering Design 18. 
92 Vilém Flusser, The Shape of Things: A philosophy of design (London: Reaktion, 1999) 68. 
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learning, as the project of Eternally Yours suggests that we should, from design 
environments that are already seasoned with experience.  
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CHAPTER 11. TECHNICAL RELATIONALITY 
 
In this brief, ‘bridging’ chapter, we position the context of ‘technocratic 
sustainability’ that has no cause to take notice of our work.1 Mainstream design 
goes on regardless of theoretical deliberations, which are always a great deal 
more fragile and dynamic than scientific assertions. This culture doesn’t appear 
to need theory because it has its own modes of reflection and ‘continuous 
improvement’, including strategies of environmental management. Here we 
consider the theory and operation of the dominant practice of product-based 
environmental management, Life Cycle Assessment (LCA).2 In our critique of 
LCA as a method, we reveal the fragility at its core and also find in it a lesson 
about how a particular disposition is acquired through practice. We connect 
this to Donald Schön’s insights about the ‘reflective practitioner’ in order to 
position our strategic intervention into object-oriented designing.  
The environmental irresponsibility and unsustainability of consumer 
culture is news of increasing currency in the televisual domain of public 
knowledge. The epic story of climate change, for example, has been effectively 
linked to everyday actions and has brought glimpses of the destruction of the 
future into view.3 This visibility has demanded a wide scale industrial 
response. At most stages of the product’s life various actions have now been 
                                                 
1 This term is Davison’s. It refers to the transfer of technology’s ‘promise’ to the project of 
sustainable development in the last couple of decades. See Technology and the Contested 
Meanings of Sustainability. 
2 LCA is part of the International Standards Organisation’s suite of environmental management 
standards, ISO 14000, initially established in 1996. 
3See for example Myerson, Ecology and the end of Postmodernity.  
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undertaken or promoted that demonstrate a subscription to the framework of 
‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD) and its self-evident bases.4  
With comfort, governments can establish environmental policies, attend 
environmental summits, and be televised trudging through old growth forests 
with environmental lobbyists. Manufacturers can implement ‘cleaner 
production’ and ‘extended producer responsibility’ strategies in addition to the 
legal requirements of managing toxic wastes and practising the principles of 
basic social equity. Industrial designers, interior designers, architects and 
engineers can learn about the environmental impacts of the manufacture, use 
and disposal of their materials and sell this knowledge to clients in their 
practices of building and making. Retailers can take measures to reduce and 
reuse packaging materials, perhaps in a relation with manufacturers or 
distributors, and make opportunities to capitalise on these actions. Users of 
products are invited to feel good about their ‘consumption’ by practicing curb-
side recycling, bringing packaging back to shops for reuse, and buying energy 
rated, recyclable or in some other way environmentally labelled items, or by 
subscribing to renewable energy providers. There is a reasonable consensus 
that these cosmetic actions are at best making no difference and more likely are 
making things worse — the problematic consequences of the ways in which we 
currently live, which are a problem at the level of basic life requirements and 
not just for the current Western ‘standard of living’, continues to escalate.5 All 
such strategies are circumscribed by a fundamental optimism in relation to 
technological efficacy and the unquestioned ‘business-as-usual’ growth of 
productivism that sustains product-based well-being.  
Since the advent of ESD and the Brundtland Report in the 80s, a range 
of targeted environmental management methodologies have gained ground in 
the framework of the scientific world picture, becoming global standards of 
                                                 
4 Davison presents the recent history of the political incorporation of ‘ecomodernism’ in 
Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability. 
5 See for example Chris Ryan, Sustainable Consumption: A Global Status Report. This report 
sets an agenda for dealing with the essential worsening of the problem of ‘unsustainable 
consumption’ in the ten years since the 1992 Earth Summit and setting of Agenda 21. 
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measure. These methodologies manage the non-fit between particular systems 
and their environments predominantly by streamlining the efficiency of 
production. LCA, derived from the science of material and energy flow 
analysis and a history of the location specific assessment of chemicals and 
environmental risk, is a technique that maps the materials and energy flows 
generated in and by the lifespan of a product, from ‘cradle to grave.’6 It 
considers the stages of raw materials extraction and processing, manufacturing, 
assembly, packaging and distribution, use and post-use (disposal, reuse, 
recycling, remanufacturing). At each of these life stages, LCA calculates the 
environmental impacts of a particular product-system’s material and energy 
requirements in relation to existing data. The findings of LCA are used to 
compare one product system with another that performs a similar function (for 
example, a disposable shaver with a reusable shaver), or is brought to the front 
end of the design process to improve the efficiency of future product iterations. 
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘cradle-to-cradle’ approach.7  
The object of LCA is not simply the product itself, but the system of 
production, use and disposal needed to provide the product.8 Because of the 
potential complexity of the inventory of impacts in this system, the key 
decision to be made at the start of an LCA is where the boundaries of the 
product system will be set. Open-ended expenditures, such as those attached to 
individual styles of use (for example, the amount of water and electrical power 
used to shave) are often removed from the analysis, as they are subject to too 
many variations and cannot provide a sound basis for comparison. In short, 
decisions regarding what belongs to the system and what belongs to its 
environment need to support the possible conduct of the methodology.  
                                                 
6 See for example Bo Pedersen Weidema, Environmental Assessment of Products: A textbook 
on Life Cycle Assessment (Helsinki: The Finnish Association of Graduate Engineers, TEK 
1997). 
7 This approach is central to theories of industrial ecology that explicitly reject the concept of 
waste. See for example T.E. Graedel and B.R Allenby, Industrial Ecology (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2003) and William McDonough and Michael Braungart, Cradle to Cradle (New 
York: North Point Press, 2002). This text stresses eco-effectiveness over eco-efficiency — it is 
not fewer products but more appropriately produced products that will avert waste. 
8 Weidema, Environmental Assessment of Products 9. 
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LCA is incapable of making claims that are counter-productive. It can 
tell you that one ‘self-cleaning’ shaver is better than another, but it can’t 
undermine the implicit ‘good’ of the new device. It can’t suggest that neither 
shaver are as good as returning to using the razor your father gave you and its 
pleasures-in-use, nor recommend that you grow a beard. Rather than offering a 
critique or a redirection, LCA tends to ‘symbolically detoxify’ industrial 
activities. Indeed, from a very early stage in its history, LCA studies were used 
by individual companies to substantiate product claims (the winning self-
cleaning shaver can now market itself as an ‘eco’ shaver).9  
Technical methods such as LCA continue to construct and deal with 
problems in a way that renders them immune to the unsecuring of ecological 
relationality. As Beck points out, the tendency to counter the effects of data by 
means of contradictory data offers but a momentary consolation that is 
inconveniently ignored by ongoing environmental problems.10 There is an 
inevitable problem in that research, led as it commonly is by the availability of 
data, can only move ahead ‘mistakenly’ or ‘correctly’ according to the plan 
laid out in advance. There is no way forward but by reiteration, “…chasing 
after the future so as to work out a picture of it through calculation in order to 
extend what is present and half-thought into what, now veiled, is yet to 
come.”11  
As Heidegger’s reflections on the age of the world picture make clear, 
the environmental crises of our current situation cannot be ameliorated by the 
sophistication of calculative methodologies. The crisis experienced by research 
is dominated by the availability and relevance of data, not by what is done with 
the data, and certainly not by thought of what kind of designing is involved in 
                                                 
9 In 1966, Coca Cola backed a study on the impacts of beverage containers. Weidema indicates 
that a follow-up study on containers for the US EPA, is often considered to be the first LCA 
study.  Weidema Environmental Assessment of Products 11. 
10 Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk 5. This kind of activity is characterised by Beck 
in terms of the more general industrial project of symbolic detoxification, which aims at 
organising and sweetening the social perception of ecological ‘mishaps’.  
11 Heidegger, “The Turning” 48.  
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the construction of data.12 The ambition to take hold of things defiantly in a 
quest for security, which Beck characterises as ‘risk assessment’, is becoming 
more precarious and the task of concealing its costs more fraught with failure, 
more difficult and complex.13 The task before environmental management is to 
continue to suppress the opening of relations; managing our environments such 
that the relational conditioning to which they are always subject is controlled 
and screened-off.14  
A relatively recent ‘breakthrough’ problem exposes the impossibility of 
this management task. LCA’s approach to product function, materials, and 
processes, which focuses on correlating environmental impacts to numerical 
values, trains the practitioner to perceive a reductively defined and calculable 
product envelope. The practitioner makes adjustments within this envelope, 
taking on the assumption that every individual product can be ‘improved’.15 
This case-by-case focus fails to account for the escalating impact of the ‘net’ 
weight of resources used in and by products, and moreover, the sheer volume 
of products themselves. The ‘churn-rate’ of ever-shortening product life-cycles 
has deeply problematised the pursuit of per unit ‘ecoefficiency’, particularly as 
efficiency seems to accelerate rather than decelerate consumption. An energy-
efficient white-good or light bulb will prompt people to buy more, use more.16 
The ostensible growth in environmental awareness is indelibly attached to the 
growth in visible environmental ‘goods’, which is advocated by environmental 
                                                 
12 The key problem facing LCA is commonly held as data-relevance and availability. In 1999 I 
attended a forum of the Australian LCA Roundtable that was devoted to the issue of the 
problem of adapting European environmental impact categories, such as ‘global warming 
potential’, to Australian conditions. The significance of correctness in this discourse became 
clear as the question concerning what was to be done with the data was continually effaced by 
anxious discussion as to the adequate correspondence of data to scenarios. “The unambiguity 
of scientific statements has eluded insight into their dependence on decisions, methodology, 
context.” Beck, Ecological Politics 119. 
13 In “Building Dwelling Thinking” Heidegger shows us that security must come in another 
form. If after Heidegger we can think of sustainability as the freedom to endure, this requires a 
kind of security, protection, preservation that we do not yet have the tools or the capability for.  
14 This paradox reappears in the system as “opacities, illusions, disturbances and the need for 
screening off” Luhmann, Ecological Communication 108. 
15 Eva Heiskanen, “Institutionalization of Life-Cycle Thinking in the Everyday Discourse of 
Market Actors” Journal of Industrial Ecology 4.4 (2001): 35.  
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management methodologies that subtract the product from the relationality of 
its life situation. 17 Technocratic sustainability is, as Davison notes, essentially 
unreflective and uncontested.18  
In spite of this insurmountable problem, which means that a 
methodology like LCA could itself never be ‘improved’ to accommodate an 
ontological consideration of products, the practices of boundary setting and 
decision making at its heart afford a useful glimpse of the struggle entailed in 
imposing a workable scientific model.  
LCA’s deliberations about the technical and cultural boundaries of the 
product system are impossible to resolve and are renewed in each study. This 
has meant that the progress of LCA, particularly as a comparative tool, has 
been hampered by its openness to variables and assumptions. It is seen in 
scientific circles as undeniably value-laden and frequently inconclusive.19 LCA 
deals with interpretations of the interface of system and environment, an area 
in which “uncertainty is endemic”.20 A lack of consensus with regard to how it 
should be performed, when it should be performed (at product concept 
development or materials specification?) and a perception about LCA’s data 
limitations regarding the complexity of the impacts of one system upon 
another, as well as the uses to which LCA should best be put (product 
development and design decision making, marketing, service provision, 
policy?) have all threatened the scientific credibility of the method.21  
The effort to establish credibility entails identifying often quite tenuous 
and fragile relations between products and their effects, and arguing for the 
                                                                                                                                 
16 This is identified as the ‘rebound effect’. See Manzini, “Scenarios of Sustainable 
Wellbeing”. 
17 Research into physical phenomena must first recognise them as object — as individual, 
“spatio-temporal magnitude(s) of motion”. Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture 119. 
18 Davison, Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability 64. 
19Heiskanen, “Institutionalization of Life-Cycle Thinking in the Everyday Discourse of Market 
Actors” 32.  
20 Graedel and Allenby, Industrial Ecology 193. 
21 “Poor quality of input data, questionable assumptions, sloppy methodologies and debatable 
interpretation can all undermine or ‘contaminate’ LCA.” Helen Lewis and John Gertsakis, 
Design + Environment: a global guide to designing greener goods (Sheffield: Greenleaf 
Publishing, 2001). 
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significance of these relations.22 It also means anticipating life-cycle issues 
within the defined product system.23 In this, the experienced LCA practitioner 
learns to sense the outcome of an LCA before it is conducted, as well as how 
the boundaries and scope of the study needs to be set to avoid calculation 
problems.24  
This brings us to an unexpected spin-off of LCA that impresses itself on 
the practitioner and has begun to take on a life of its own: a style of ‘life cycle 
thinking’ that is “catching on at a discursive level”.25 Eva Heiskanen notes that 
the take up of lifecycle thinking by ‘market actors’ reveals a preference for 
transparent product-chains and a tendency to integrate environmental and other 
ethical issues, which in turn is creating a demand for the institutionalisation of 
these practices.26  
This observation is supported by the increasing ‘portability’ of LCA in 
a professional context. There is widespread use of ‘streamlined’ versions of the 
methodology, as well as the use of LCA as a tool for design decision-making 
rather than as a way to make definitive assessments about products. This trend, 
which can no doubt be partly attributed to a desire to avoid the intensive LCA 
process, reveals the ways in which a style of thinking is learnt and adopted in 
the process of practical activity.  
For Donald Schön, a practitioner’s knowing is in his or her action.27 
This ‘tacit’ knowledge allows the practitioner to develop a feel for what they 
are doing. One who has practical capability with a particular situation does not 
need to question the underlying assumptions of that situation in order for it to 
function, and such problems withdraw. The power of the practitioner’s 
                                                 
22 Heiskanen, “Institutionalization of Life-Cycle Thinking” 32. 
23 The suggestion has arisen in the literature that LCA provides a useful model for promoting 
strategic thinking in design by fostering a feel for the consequences of design decisions at the 
concept development phase, where many environmental problems are “locked in.” See Lewis 
and Gertsakis, Design + Environment 13. 
24 This point was ascertained by personal conversations with environmental managers at, Life 
Cycle Decision Making for Sustainability Conference 2002. 
25 Heiskanen, “Institutionalization of Life-Cycle Thinking” 42. 
26 Heiskanen, “Institutionalization of Life-Cycle Thinking” 43. 
27 Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (Aldershot, 
England: Arena, 1991) 49. 
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ontological orientation carries its own explanation. However, this can also lead 
to rigidity in thinking and “a parochial narrowness of vision”.28 Schön says 
“(m)any practitioners, locked into a view of themselves as technical experts, 
find nothing in the world of practice to occasion reflection”29  
The ability to make critical assessments in a practical situation is a 
capability that he calls ‘reflection-in-action’. In a ‘good’ design process, the 
practitioner shapes a situation and then, as unintended consequences arise, 
responds by reflecting and acting on his or her initial construction of the 
problem at hand. For Schön, designing is a “conversation with the materials of 
a situation” that lends itself to the practical research of reflection-in-action.30 
Schön’s comments on design are pertinent to our focus and are worth quoting 
at length. He says: 
A designer makes things. Sometimes he makes the final product; more 
often, he makes a representation — a plan, program, or image — of an 
artifact to be constructed by others. He works in particular situations, 
uses particular materials, and employs a distinctive medium and 
language. Typically his making process is complex. There are more 
variables — kinds of possible moves, norms and interrelationships of 
these — than can be represented in a finite model. Because of this 
complexity, the designer’s moves tend, happily or unhappily, to 
produce consequences other than those intended. When this happens, 
the designer may take account of the unintended changes he has made 
in the situation by forming new appreciations and understandings and 
by making new moves. He shapes the situation, in accordance with his 
initial appreciation of it, the situation “talks back,” and he responds to 
the situation’s back-talk. In a good process of design, this conversation 
is reflective. In answer to the situation’s back-talk, the designer reflects-
                                                 
28 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 60. 
29 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 69. 
30 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 78. 
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in-action on the construction of the problem, the strategies of action, or 
the model of the phenomena, which have been implicit in his moves.31
 
This accords with the significance of the interpretative horizon in ontological 
design. Each practical action, such as Bateson’s example of the cuts of the axe 
in the tree, speak back to the actor: “Each stroke of the axe is modified or 
corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree left by the previous 
stroke.”32 In addition, the design situation also changes, becomes modified 
with each change in the environment and each change in the disposition of the 
actor. Schön says that design practitioners tend to develop their own 
metalanguage, or language about designing, to deal with this back-talk.33 The 
back-talk of design concerns the situation the practitioner is in and the 
materials of that situation, which ‘speak’ about previous actions, their 
consequences and implications. The metalanguage of a design situation is the 
means of this ‘listening’ practice; it provides coherence and makes sense of the 
trace of the process, which guides further actions. It also conveys particular 
values of experience.34 While Barthes saw metalanguage as the fate of the 
mythologist, Schön suggests instead that metalanguage is both the sine qua non 
and modus operandi of practice.35  
Certainly the place for developing a metalanguage for sustainable 
designing cannot be assumed. It has to happen in relation to the existing 
languages of design practice, in which the ideal object, which sits conceptually 
outside the local design context, rules. It also needs to happen in relation to 
specific encounters, in which problems and questions are renewed. We seek to 
prompt the development of an intuition for sustainability by way of a practical 
strategy that works with the designer’s tacit knowledge of objects and 
                                                 
31 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 78 – 9. 
32 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 317-18. 
33 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 81. 
34 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 97. 
35 Barthes, Mythologies 158-59. 
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conceptual facility with them. Thereby the designer “becomes a researcher in 
the practice context.” 36  
                                                 
36 Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 68. 
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CHAPTER 12. RESEARCH THROUGH DESIGN 
 
By the time today’s five year olds are adults, only 
20% of the products and services they will be 
using exist now. In other words, 80% have not 
been thought of yet.  
(MIT Media Lab)1
 
To say that this is the world in which we must 
intervene does not mean accepting it as it is. It 
means understanding how it appears, how it is 
made up, and the problems that threaten it; 
regardless of what we want to achieve, this is the 
material with which we must work.  
(Ezio Manzini)2
 
The ‘technical r(el)ationality’ that currently owns the project of sustainable 
development and steers its correcting course, has not altered the fundamental 
problem of our relatedness to material culture. We need to find ways to raise 
the question of what worlds designed things open in the practical setting, in 
which design is nearly always reduced to and handled as a technical problem 
with a range of instrumental modes of resolution. 
 We have an uncontested design situation that is thoroughly 
implicated in the proliferation of telegenic forms — many of which fail on the 
market and fall out of sight by way of the designation ‘waste’. Schematic, 
ecologically cursory ideas are allowed to reach full elaboration in a material 
sense. This is encouraged by the computer-aided streamlining of the design 
process by way of which the chain to manufacture becomes ever more 
‘efficient’. The imposition of the worldview of the design discipline is 
increasingly instrumentalised.   
                                                 
1 MIT Media Lab Study cited in Marsh et. al. Strategic Foresight 135.  
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Victor Margolin has noted: “The world expects new things from 
designers. That is the nature of design.”3Industrial design conceives of its role 
as working through problems by providing object-based solutions. At a 
professional level this occurs as the timely and accurate response to a client’s 
design brief. The designer-in-training is inducted into the profession of design 
by learning to respond correctly to the demands of instructors, which carries 
through to servicing clients. Design students spend hours before their computer 
screens ‘dancing’, as Scarry would say, with the image, carefully elaborating 
individuated, telegenic responses, which upon completion are judged 
comparatively and largely abandoned. In the computer-aided design 
environment the designer-in-training learns to ‘forget’ the environment beyond 
the context of comp(l)eting objects.  
In this culture of designing, material forms occur in the exercise of 
correctness. The project of design for sustainability comfortably arrives as a 
new thematic for product design. Students use the ideas of Eternally Yours to 
make new product forms that are exhibited in vitrines in the foyers of 
institutions, representing the environmental credentials of the institution and 
the object-based approach of its form of education. Designers become so 
preoccupied with the theoretical resolution of problems in the telegenic 
scenario, that they literally lose sight of the mass of physical products in their 
environments of use, where interpretative contexts such as that proposed by 
Eternally Yours might have an instructive role.  
The projected escalation of the product environment indicated by the 
MIT Media Lab’s assertion above, feels true in spite of the other design truism 
that 80% of new products fail to be wanted, let alone needed. Whilst there are 
numerous ways to read the assertion — ‘new’ products can be understood as 
existing products that are reclaimed, modified or remobilised in service 
relations for example — it ostensibly holds a deeper promise for object-
oriented innovation. In fact, it is likely that most designers would want to read 
                                                                                                                                 
2 Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday” 221. 
3 Margolin, The Politics of the Artificial 88. 
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it as inviting the production of entirely new forms serving, ideally, new ‘needs’ 
(or, in the lexicon of the marketer, new ‘consumer functions’). But this natural 
reading, which apparently also shores-up the profession of design, carries an 
unacknowledged and untenable ecological and environmental burden. The 
optimistic promise reveals the easy erasure of the existing design environment 
and its future claims. 
This situation suggests that massive changes are needed in the conduct 
of design — not only in what design does, but in how design thinks. The 
interpretative context that allows strategic possibilities to emerge must be 
preserved and communicated as an integral part of design practice, particularly 
as culture becomes more pervasively televisual and self-consciously responsive 
to ecological disturbances and the demand for ‘sustainability’. However the 
understanding of the practical context also needs to change.  
A common lament in design circles is that designers caught up in 
generic computer generated design environments ‘no longer see’. What is 
meant, I think, is that designers often fail to reflect on what they see. But this is 
hardly surprising when the designer has been trained to see correctly and to 
understand design in terms of the realisation of individuated objects in 
uncolonised space. The landscape of the computer-aided design environment is 
understood as ‘free to work’. This environment circumscribes designers’ 
‘environmental awareness’ and they become skilled at the discipline of 
designing as spatial imposition. By way of remote designing, places are 
transformed into no place at all.4
While designers ‘think spatially’ the televisual destiny of this thinking 
in which all placings are interchangeable causes designers to ignore design 
environments in which things thing in particular and complex ways.5 The 
ontological designing of this situation correlates with the broader televisual 
inclination of culture that has informed our lifeworlds from our beginnings. 
                                                 
4 Foltz, Inhabiting The Earth 85. 
5 Christopher Nemeth referring to work by Howard Gardner says “…designers tend to rely on 
spatial intelligence.” Christopher Nemeth, “Get Real: The Need for Effective Design 
Research”, Visible Language 37.1 (2003): 98. 
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The memory of the designer is colonised by televisual forms that circumscribe 
and further embed the televisual context of designing. This disposition recants 
the development of a sense for design responsibility outside that governed by 
the accomplishment of correctness. In this situation, learning to ‘see’ 
differently is a task of considerable practical redirection.  
This problem ekes out a place in the heart of design practice for the 
return of theoretical reflection. We use the term ‘theoretical’ here in the 
original sense Heidegger gives it in “Science and Reflection”: theorein is…to 
look attentively on the outward appearance wherein what presences becomes 
visible and, through such sight – seeing – to linger with it.”6 We want to 
develop a capacity for what Heidegger calls ‘genuine’ reflection on the 
relational nature of being, a reflection that does not consume its object as 
object but rather struggles to see the thing as a ‘situated instance of worlding’.7 
In short, we want to push the hermeneutic aspect of designing in order to 
develop an ‘eye’ for the pro-duct, which acknowledges the agency and ethical 
responsibility of design.  
In what follows we outline an experimental, observational de-sign 
research strategy that aims to reorient the imagination, understanding and 
practice of designers. It seeks to motivate the development of skills in critical 
judgment by way of a careful attention to physical things in both their 
withdrawn environmental conditions and as decontextualised ‘props’. In this 
scenario, the object becomes a heuristic device for reinventing the sign value of 
encountered forms and directing the process of reflection-in-action. By 
observing things as gathered forms of knowing, we can discern from where and 
how things have been sent, and the lives they point to. At the location of the 
passage of their destiny, we can detect incremental possibilities and 
opportunities for their redirection and sustainment.  
                                                 
6 Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” The Question Concerning Technology 163. 
7 Heidegger calls this ‘genuine reflection’, reflection that “transports the man of the future into 
that ‘between’ in which he belongs to Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is.” 
Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 136. 
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Observing the tacit rationalism of the design of the computer, for 
example, enabled Winograd and Flores to develop design interventions that 
care appropriately, in their view, for the experience and the learning of 
computer users. This is in stark contrast to the development of design software 
that merely services consumer expectations and perpetually remobilises the 
computer’s misinterpretation of human cognition and language. The 
perspective we adopt makes any designing conditional upon what precedes it, 
surrounds it and modifies it. 
This de-sign research effort undeniably entails a measure of acquisitive 
curiosity, strain and calculation, which is suggestive of a disposition that many 
thinkers I have gathered together in this thesis — Heidegger and Levin among 
them — would find problematic. But the difference is that this effort attempts 
to forge relations in an extensively designed world that is artificially 
constrained by and flooded with objects of knowledge. It responds to the need 
to unpack the complexity of design-in-use within an appropriate research 
framework. Our research approach therefore draws on the empirical tradition, 
yet the object of the empirical view is destabilised by a cultural hermeneutics 
that entails in McHoul’s words, “a kind of experiencing opposed to traditional 
empiricism’s derivation from experience.”8  
 
RESEARCH THROUGH DESIGN – AN OBSERVATIONAL RESEARCH STRATEGY  
One of many ways to define ‘sustainability’ is that it is the ability of any 
system or environment to sustain or survive damage. This is a particularly 
useful definition to apply in the design educational milieu of computer-
generated environments, in which a sense for the wear and tear of the product-
in-use is strikingly absent. Design imaginations are largely trained on the retail 
glamour and corporate identity of new products, innocent of use. Conversely, 
the product that has endured some use-life is a rich resource for design 
                                                 
8 McHoul, “The Being of Culture, Beyond Representation” 11/20. 
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reflection. Its physical appearance bears the marks and traces of intended and 
non-intended use, news of design decisions including appropriate materials 
selection, and feedback about its cultural value in evidence of care, repair and 
maintenance.  
Currently, there is little research into the product during its use-life, as 
it is seen as beyond the designer’s jurisdiction. Industrial design looks closely 
at issues concerning the ‘fit’ of a product to a user, such as ergonomic and 
aesthetic preferences in consumer needs analysis. A designer creating a 
‘sustainable’ product on the other hand will put a lot of store on green materials 
selection and the optimisation of resources within the technical skin of the 
product envelope. The sustainability of the product is likely to be judged on the 
assumption that it will lead an exemplary life, without the intervention of 
troublesome variables, such as the user who will fail to care for the product, 
repair it, share it and ultimately feed it into the appropriate waste infrastructure 
at the end of its life.  
The designer-in-training — who is in the process of acquiring the 
instrumental skills and worldview of the profession — needs a portal to critical 
reflection in the existing stream of daily activities and projects. Our research 
strategy is therefore conceived as integral to the design process and responsive 
to its protocols and perceived pressures, including time and/or budgetary 
constraints in both a professional and educational context.9  
Research through design lends itself to the existing practical contexts of 
designing. Unlike traditional social science research, which focuses on human 
participants and involves extensive research design issues, or the numerical 
preoccupations of LCA, this is research for sustainability conducted in relation 
to the taken-for-granted, existing design environments that support and sustain 
the designer. It is conceived as an important and often omitted preliminary 
investigation that should precede and contextualise studio-based making. 
                                                 
9 In “Get Real: the need for effective design research” Christopher Nemeth argues that due to 
these constraints, effective and reflective design research needs to be incorporated into the 
design process.  
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Within the instructive framework, it is important that the designer-in-
training has a given directive to work with. In this case, an existing object-
oriented design brief provides a useful point of commencement that will be 
critically ‘undone’ and reconceived through the research process. Instead of 
fulfilling the requirements of solving a disarticulated design problem, the 
designer is directed to first consider the existing design environment in relation 
to the new design task, both ‘in the field’ and in a ‘crit’ session in which a 
decontextualised ‘prop’ is analysed in relation to its projected ‘living’ context.  
Research through design draws on the social science derived method of 
researching material culture, as well as on the design-related practices of 
reverse engineering (which involves taking apart physical objects and 
documenting their construction, with the aim of learning to do this 
conceptually) and ergonomic heuristics (which is a design method that takes 
the physical object as a guide to self-learning).10 None of these sources are 
unreservedly advocated, but they do enable us to develop a way of 
‘rematerialising’ the existing design environment and encouraging practical 
reflection. 
The key resource is researching material culture. This is a method 
particularly open to design appropriation in the context of our focus on things 
and our critique of the oversights of technical designing. Its mode of 
‘unobtrusive observation’ invests in objects and environments that have known 
use, which is in stark contrast to the dominating modernist aesthetic in design 
culture that we have so far observed.11 As an object of observational research, 
the ‘experienced’ product or environment provides indices that mark the spatial 
                                                 
10 While it works with a very mechanistic view of human performance, ergonomic heuristics 
explicitly validates the development of practical reflection. The designer sits down with a 
product and makes a series of methodical judgements about its useability, functionality, safety 
and other design features. With each event of product analysis, the researcher is developing 
their interpretative skills, drawing on their experience as designers and as product users. The 
outcome is a process-based argument about the ‘fit’ of the product. For an outline of this 
method see Neville A. Stanton and Mark S. Young, A Guide to Methodology in Ergonomics: 
Designing for Human Use (London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 1999) 94 – 97.  
11 For a detailed explanation of researching material culture in the social science context and 
other ‘unobtrusive’ research methods see Allan Kellehear, The Unobtrusive Researcher: a 
guide to methods (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993).  
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domain with signs of temporality, which the authors of the architectural study 
On Weathering call “sedimenting the past in the ‘present.’”12 Rather than being 
definitive, the visual cue provided by the physical object suggests the 
complexity of design in time. The researcher is encouraged to think beyond the 
product, through the product. This approach claims a space in the design 
process for speculation on the consequences of design decisions.  
Social scientists, anthropologists, historians and cultural studies 
scholars, to name but a few, have long valued material culture as a conduit for 
social information, and it is a cross-disciplinary preoccupation that is 
growing.13 The physical ‘traces’ of past human activities ostensibly reveal 
much about the shape of those activities, which is information of a very 
different kind to data obtained via the interview or ‘human factors’ data that is 
used to assess fitness for purpose in industrial design.  
We do not claim that material culture research offers any definitive 
solution to the problem of design’s sight  — its own history is well caught up 
in the reifying, anthropocentric traditions of science to which we have 
referred.14 Our interest is not in treating the product as a synecdoche of social 
conditions or as a sign of ‘man’; rather we are interested in the product’s own 
sphere of influence, which traverses material, social and cultural ecologies; 
histories and futures. We are not looking for the ‘essence’ of culture such as in 
the ethnographic tradition (of which design is increasingly enamoured), but for 
signs of design(ing) into which we can enfold our own design(ing). 
Material culture research was brought to wide attention in the social 
sciences in 1966 by the publication of Unobtrusive Measures.15 In this text 
Eugene Webb, Donald Campbell, Richard Schwartz and Lee Sechrest set out 
                                                 
12 Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow, On Weathering 82. 
13 Emily Eakin, “Screwdriver Scholars and Pencil Punditry,” New York Times February 24, 
(2001): 7. 
14 There are significant problems with the representational, anthropocentric approach of the 
cultural disciplines, as McHoul has shown. Heidegger also discusses the extreme 
anthropocentrism of the Weltanschauung of this family of disciplines in “The Age of the 
World Picture” (133).  
15 Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz and Lee Sechrest Unobtrusive 
Measures (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000).  
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by telling a story about Sherlock Holmes complimenting Dr Watson on his 
newly acquired office on one side of a duplex. The basis of the compliment 
was Holmes’ observation that the steps leading to Watson’s office were more 
worn than on his competitor’s side, from which Holmes deduced it was the 
office that attracted more business. This example falls into the first of two 
broad classes of measure the book considers; the erosion or wear on a material 
and accretion, which relates to a deposit of material, such as in the production 
of household garbage.  
This evokes a range of possibilities for the designer to engage with. A 
careful observation of experienced things can help us to discern the culture of 
their making, and to speculate on the cultures of use they support. A designer 
armed with a product brief, who is first directed to find ‘proxy’ situations 
related to the brief ‘in the field’, is confronted by a new context for designing. 
The situation, carefully elaborated, creates problems whose ‘solutions’ must 
now take account of a range of use-life speculations.  
The sign value of objects is changed by the altered situation of 
encounter. An aging carpet can be valued as a sign of how it is used; the 
location of major thoroughfares is indicated by discernable patterns of wear. It 
is a failing design, reaching a state of degradation on the basis of the regular 
use it should support. We can guess that it was an observation of this sort that 
led to the development of the carpet tile, which made the replacement of only 
the worn areas of carpet possible — a limited but much-lauded ‘sustainable 
design’ innovation. 16 More significantly, the designer is impressed by the 
environmental situation — the carpet covers the floor of an air-conditioned 
environment in a hot city that is getting hotter. This redraws the boundaries of 
the problem and opens the possibility of designing new ‘conversations with the 
materials of a situation’. 
                                                 
16 The ‘modular carpet’ is one of Interface Inc’s ‘sustainable products’ along with a variety of 
service-based ‘floor-covering solutions’. The company provides an interesting case study of 
how to sustain a product that is in many ways difficult to justify. See “Sustainments are never 
carpeted” Sustainments IE Newsletter April (2002) 
<http://www.edf.edu.au/Sustainments/Newsletter/> 
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The ‘personalised’ product or environment provides the design researcher with 
the physical documentation of the incorporation of a design into a person’s 
particular lifestyle. One might think of the underground doctoring of the first 
generation of iMac computers to include an internal floppy disk drive, the 
patterns of dust or dirt on a piece of broken-down industrial equipment, the 
layers of leaden paint flaking from a wall, the repair work on a much-loved 
garment or even the graffiti on a school bag as examples of ‘accretion’ that 
invite design judgment.  
Alan Kellehear’s more recent guide to methods, The Unobtrusive 
Researcher, expands on the physical trace to include the study of whole objects 
and organisational spaces, describing how material culture research can be 
conducted by methodically recognising different patterns in physical 
appearances.  
One particular example he relates is the study of a screwdriver, which is 
something of an icon in material culture research.17 We use this example to 
demonstrate how the product as a decontextualised prop can evoke situated 
conversations. The prop which students can hold, use, pull apart, examine for 
the marks of wear and tear and make guesses as to the materials, is illuminating 
for the form-focussed designer, providing a valuable heuristic opportunity for 
reflective practice. Consider the screwdriver that has served its current user for 
many years. We can hold this artefact up to the student and ask:  
Question: what is this?  
Answer: A screwdriver.  
Q: What is a screwdriver used for?  
A: It is used for driving screws.  
Q: How do we know this?  
A: We have learnt this in part by observing others and through our own 
experience as users.  
At this point we are still discussing an ideal type. A careful look at this 
particular object — the surprising difficulty of this exercise suggests how 
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resolutely the ‘model’ imposes itself on vision — will however reveal much 
more than simply a ‘tool for turning screws’. It is also used for prying lids, 
mixing paint, as a chisel, a digging implement. It could also be used as a 
weapon. We know this not only through our own experience or by observing 
others, but also by carefully observing the thing itself — it is a substantial, 
simple object from an earlier era of industrial design. Its surface is flecked with 
paint and dirt, its steel shaft is rusted, its head blunt, its resin handle 
impervious. We can discern that it is a product that has endured a degree of 
neglect but that it has always been ready to hand for the user. We can also 
speculate — given how its many uses have shaped it — that even though its 
screw-driving days may be numbered, it could live on in one of these other 
roles.  
Learning to read such signs transforms the denotative object, making it 
the destiny of relations the researcher attributes to it. Careful observation 
provides important clues about design decisions and processes, and a valuable 
angle on assessing the durability, performance and appropriateness to 
application of materials. Unlike an LCA study, this kind of observation allows 
a material to be assessed beyond the objective features of how it is produced, 
its inherent qualities and recyclability, in terms of how it actually interfaces 
with other materials. We can consider the durability and appropriateness of 
how joins have been made, (whether for example components are permanently 
glued together, welded or temporarily snap-locked), compare the wear and tear 
of one product with another of a similar function and consider the implications 
of particular product contexts, which continually modify the individual 
‘product system’. We can make assessments about whether these materials in 
this configuration have lent sustainment to the projected situation, or not. In 
this practice we start to relinquish the vision that overlooks the ‘situated 
instance’ of the serial object in favour of its model.  
The product-in-use is invested with special values. A close look can 
yield information about how it is handled and appreciated by its users and how 
                                                                                                                                 
17 Kellehear, The Unobtrusive Researcher 97. 
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it endures this handling by accommodating neglect or inviting care. We 
therefore have an opportunity to not only judge materials choices that sustain 
wear and but those that improve the cultural value of the product as it ages.18 
We can also judge how careful the product is in its own delegation of 
responsibilities.  
The ingenuous things of everyday life, such as the screwdriver, resonate 
with an honesty that Borgmann and even Barthes would certainly appreciate. 
Baudrillard would on the other hand no doubt draw attention to the unused 
toolkit hanging in the gleaming shed whose work consists primarily of 
endowing its owner with the aura of good labour. But what of the device, 
which is so good at concealing its operations? It is in relation to those things 
whose telegenic designing is revealed by way of their environmental fragility, 
that this mode of research is of particular value.  
The design environment is filled with an increasing number of low cost, 
all-in-one designs, in which the entire object turns out to hinge on a single 
fragile feature. This least resilient element is often also the least accessible 
element. Benign when new, this feature stands out when the product breaks 
down in a use context — the ink in a non-refillable biro runs out, a fragile 
globe embedded in a complex piece of medical equipment breaks, the monitor 
fails or the memory capacity in a technological device is reached. In this 
context we can see that a product like the iMac was closely shadowed by its 
impending functional obsolescence and use-life problems. This discovery 
allows for a re-evaluation of the styling of iconic products, which reveal an 
extreme environmental incongruity in a use-life setting. In the environment of 
competitions, exhibitions, promotional images, signature designs and celebrity 
designers, such an observation rarely has the opportunity to emerge. In the 
practice of research through design, it promotes the recognition of symbolic, 
practical and material commensurability in product styling. The 
commensurability we signal here is not ‘form follows function’ modernism, 
but form follows the comprehension of designs designing.  
                                                 
18 See van Hinte, Eternally Yours. 
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Because the overwhelming cultural tendency is to dispose of new 
products and materials to make way for more, finding exemplary ‘experienced’ 
products can be a feat in itself and provides another learning opportunity. 
When the selection criteria include qualities of endurance, appropriateness, 
resource frugality, structural care, it is much easier to find examples of the 
opposite — wasted new products or products that have aged prematurely due to 
poor material choices and inappropriate design.  
There are many practical advantages worth noting in terms of the 
learning opportunity provided by such research. The rise of a more resource 
conservative culture will mean that existing products may have to work harder, 
providing more services to more users. New industrial trends like product take-
back and disassembly for remanufacture will demand the design of products 
conceived for multiple lives and with “well–planned careers”.19 The acquisition 
of skills for assessing the performance of materials and product components 
over time will clearly become an asset in this context. Further, the designer 
who has developed a feeling for sustainability in material and cultural terms — 
like the LCA practitioner who knows by looking at the products to be 
compared how the study is likely to turn out — is in a much better position to 
introduce sustainable options to clients without recourse to moral 
environmental posturing. Being able to literally demonstrate specific problems 
of unsustainability substantiates arguments about more appropriate responses 
to the design brief. 
In spite of the intensive complexity of the design environment, we find 
but fragments to nurture a sense for sustainment. For example, in my search to 
find designs for children not predicated on the proto-consumer aesthetics of the 
televisual, I have gathered together a small selection of rare books, toys and 
games  — such as a well-crafted wind up toy with a variable resistance 
mechanism and a puzzle that grows in complexity — which ‘speak’ of 
                                                 
19 “A table or a vase or a television set is not complete without a well-planned career that starts 
as soon as it is thrown in the deep end.”Van Hinte, Eternally Yours 26. 
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resilience, endurance and appropriateness.20 Locating such examples can be a 
highly rewarding pursuit. The lessons learnt from them in use invite transfer to 
other design contexts.21  
A ‘metalanguage’ for sustainable designing begins to take shape in this 
cultural search. Designs for longevity and reuse, designs that are resource 
conservative and appropriate, designs that exhibit a certain commensurability 
between idea, form and use-life are validated and we can learn something in 
the process about the ecologically oblivious nature of most design predicated 
on technical and aesthetic resolution. The ‘sedimentation’ of the future in 
products designed for obsolescence begins to show up. 
The sign in this context no longer affects the privation of history, which 
Barthes (after Marx) accused it of. We are in the position of reattributing 
significance where the modernist aesthetic sensibility has relinquished it. We 
can learn to sense the increment of mined forest, contaminated soil, ground-
water, coal and land-fill space shadowing the telegenic product.22 Observing 
products-in-use we can also learn to discern the auxiliary relations and 
‘reference flows’ generated by them — the dependency of the computer on 
other media, on power supply and communications infrastructure for example 
— as well as bringing into view the parallel proliferation of products with 
                                                 
20 Another example worth mentioning is a book by Elizabeth Honey, The Cherry Dress (Crows 
Nest: Allen and Unwin, 1999). In a world saturated with images of transient fashion, this is a 
story about the life-cycle of a child’s dress that grows in value as it ages. The dress is made by 
a child’s grandmother and given to her as a birthday present. The child complains as the dress 
is beautiful but too big for her to wear — her mother then alters it, conserving the size for 
future use by strategically placed hems and seams. The dress is worn for two summers and then 
is passed on to siblings and to other children who have admired it from afar, gaining value as it 
is invested with the care and enjoyment of others while it slowly and appealingly fades. 
Finally, as it nears the end of its useful life, a photograph is taken and the now memorialised 
dress is returned to its maker years later in the form of a photograph, which gathers the history 
of its wearers. The fifteen inked pages of this $12 Australian book, printed in Hong Kong and 
derived from an unacknowledged forest, resonates nonetheless with sustaining potential. It 
shows effectively how a particular style of life can be communicated through design. 
21 Manzini’s ‘enabling solutions’ require a facility with this process of analogical transfer. An 
existing idea — such as that of car sharing — is ‘captured’, decontextualised and then 
amplified in a new setting. This strategy was explained at a Briefing Workshop held by 
Manzini on Friday March 12, 2004 at the University of Technology in Sydney. 
22 This relates to the concept of ‘the ecological rucksack’ developed by the Wuppertal Institute, 
a German research organization, which endows a product with the ‘invisible’ material burden 
of its making by a simple calculation of its materials intensivity.  
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identical functions. In this context, Beck’s call for the “redistribution of 
burdens of proof and of the manufacture of attributability” as an ‘antidote’ to 
modern industrial society, has a practical possibility and specific application.23  
In addition to enhancing the designer’s natural ability to intuit the 
consequences of design decisions and knowledge about how materials and 
technologies wear, this form of research instils recognition of the inventive 
nature of interpretation that is contrary to the demands of science for 
transparency and evidence.  
In the social science tradition, Kellehear remarks that the 
methodological strength in studying material culture in a social science setting 
lies in its value in stimulating creative questioning. He says, “physical objects 
and traces do not actively tell a story…Rather, they are more often simply the 
props to a story which begs the question, ‘What is the plot here?’”24 Rather 
than a search for definitive plots, the researcher can learn from reflection on the 
experienced product’s cultural impact and speculate on and how a prospective 
design might become socialised. The product prompts questions about the 
validity of the needs a design services and invites exploration of other cultural 
scenarios and their implications, such as how a product’s ‘commodity’ might 
be delivered in more appropriate ways. In this context, the ‘solution’ of 
dematerialisation is ineluctably connected to its material conditions, 
disavowing its flight into conceptual idealism.  
The cultural search for proxy situations brings designed things into 
view as the ‘memories’ of a projected future. The interpretations of the future 
locked into products is revealed ‘in the field.’ A useful directive in this case is 
to find apparent design ‘innovations’. A modest example concerns design 
strategies to reduce the amount of materials going to landfill. In analysing 
household garbage, the EPA discovered that people tend to fill a garbage bin 
whether it is the size of a coat pocket or an apartment block.25  We can 
                                                 
23 Beck, Ecological Politics 174. 
24 Kellehear, The Unobtrusive Researcher 112. 
25 Alan Kellehear, The Unobtrusive Researcher: a guide to methods (St. Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin, 1993) 103. 
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speculate that one design response to this was to provide a landfill bin much 
smaller than the recycling bin, a response reflecting the desired future rather 
than the actual current behaviour of households. This response ideally demands 
a more careful approach to waste sorting, and has the potential to feed back to 
other aspects of household management such as purchasing decisions.  
The practice of speculative invention is critical in an environment of 
structural unsustainability. ‘Myths’ about use or desired behaviours — such as 
the user who will keep, repair, share, reuse, disassemble or pass on a product 
— can guide the development of design simulations that anticipate and present 
an argument about how more sustainable cultures of use could be brought into 
being.  
Research through design amplifies the ‘back talk’ of design and helps 
the researcher to become practiced at interpreting the discourse of products. 
The researcher learns to reflect on the being of design and the relations that 
bring design into being. In learning to listen to this back-talk, we do not 
literally deconstruct the product such as in the practice of reverse engineering. 
We mobilise its indexical potential to shift perceptions of its significance and 
claim a memory of the artificial in the condition of its perpetual erasure. This is 
an ontological design practice of ‘making otherwise.’ For designers who learn 
to read signs in this way, products ‘speak’ the culture of their making and the 
sensibility of their makers, enabling a view on the enculturation of habitual 
ways of doing things and of what is sustaining the unsustainable.  
Research through design is by no means a solution to the problems of 
the tacit ongoingness of object-oriented designing, which is permitted to 
reproduce itself as design’s sole project. It is an approach that is fragile and 
dependent on each context of its mobilisation. A failsafe method cannot be 
designed because each situation will contest it. However, learning to observe 
and ‘read’ the product as a destiny of design decisions, as a conduit for the 
relationships, experiences and habits of its users, and as a script for future 
being, has the potential to foster the ability to create and project relations 
between ideas, actions and material conditions. It encourages a more 
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environmentally aware and forethoughtful practice of designing in the midst of 
our ‘ideal’ world.  
 
*** 
 
Design does not make for now, but rather thinks for the future. This thinking, 
which hides in objects, is realised in small choices, incremental decisions and 
uses. It is these aspects that bear the burden of cultural change. Change at this 
level involves — adapting a phrase of Manzini’s — the reorientation of the 
design imagination. It manifests in how the designer conceives of the task at 
hand and responds to it, and ultimately how the knowledge of the designer gets 
embodied in the practical situation.26  
As we said in the introduction to this thesis, sustainability is ‘a 
landscape to be invented.’ We do not picture this as an imaged landscape of 
new, sustainable products built on, or even out of the old. It is not a landscape 
that can be made visible in this familiar way. Images of a different future have 
little agency in relation to the future that is becoming through the made things, 
imaginations and practices of many. Rather, the landscape of ecological 
relationality is ever unpresentable — it opens up in the midst of the existing 
landscape of abandoned things and environments and in the shadow of 
ecological danger. It signifies a way of being with things not yet with us, but in 
dire need of direction. This need takes the work of design beyond the culture of 
televisual objects to alternative future ways of being. In relation to these 
futures, the designer’s work is reconceived as a process of learning to make 
with what is already made, but as yet unfinished. Design and de-sign work 
together in the development of new habits of interpretation and engagement 
with the product world.  
Whilst our research strategy is a far cry from ‘a new historical vision’ 
such as Levin proposes after Heidegger, it offers an adventure in reworking the 
                                                 
26His phrase is: “The ecological reorientation of the social imagination.” Manzini, “Prometheus 
of the Everyday” 238. 
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habitual ground of design practice in light of the (in)visible design conditions 
in which we are all implicated.27 It does not attempt to calculate these 
conditions, but rather to carry a trace of ecological process to the advancing 
project of design. The observed we observe testifies to the invisible, points to it 
but does not claim to know it.28 It acknowledges “the invisible shadow that is 
cast around all things everywhere” in light of the world picture.29  In this, a 
disposition is enacted — its propensity remains to be seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 In Heidegger’s work on Greek vision Levin says “The effort itself is sufficient, and serves its 
purpose, if it brings to light for us a visible difference between our vision and an other vision. 
For it would be through whatever that difference opens up that a new historical vision could 
finally emerge.” Levin, The Opening of Vision 103. 
28 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 154. 
29 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” 135. 
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